Afrasia Symposium Series
Studies on Multicultural Societies No.3

Proceedings of the Third Afrasian International Symposium

Rethinking Integration: Multicultural Societies of the Asia-Pacific

Edited by
Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos, Masako Otaki and Shincha Park

16-17 November 2013

Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase 2)
Mission of the Afrasian Research Centre

Today’s globalised world has witnessed astonishing political and economic growth in the regions of Asia and Africa. Such progress has been accompanied, however, with a high frequency of various types of conflicts and disputes. The Afrasian Research Centre aims to build on the achievements of its predecessor, the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies (ACPDS), by applying its great tradition of research towards Asia with the goal of building a new foundation for interdisciplinary research into multicultural societies in the fields of Immigration Studies, International Relations and Communication Theory. In addition, we seek to clarify the processes through which conflicts are resolved, reconciliation is achieved and multicultural societies are established. Building on the expertise and networks that have been accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past (listed below), we have organised research projects to tackle new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. We aim to disseminate the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in public discourse.

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2. Expertise in Participatory Research/ Inter-Civic Relation Studies
3. Expertise in Asian and Africa Studies
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Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University
Published by the Afrasian Research Centre
Printed by Tanaka Print Co. Ltd., Kyoto, Japan
Rethinking Integration:
Multicultural Societies of
the Asia-Pacific

多文化社会における「絆」の再検討
—アジア太平洋地域の中で—

Edited by
Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos,
Masako Otaki and Shincha Park

16-17 November 2013
Afrasian Research Centre
Ryukoku University (Phase 2)
Shiga
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OPENING REMARKS

Good morning. Welcome to the Third Afrasian International Symposium hosted by the Afrasian Research Centre of Ryukoku University. As a representative of Ryukoku University, I am very pleased to have the opportunity to deliver the welcome address at the opening ceremony of this Symposium entitled “Rethinking Integration: Multicultural Societies of the Asia-Pacific.”

The Afrasian Research Centre, which is the organizer of today’s Symposium, has been acting as one of the main research institutions at Ryukoku University. The Centre has devoted its energy to explore new aspects, such as research into the communication and language policy area which has not hitherto been linked substantially with migration studies and international relations theory. In doing so, the staff at the Centre endeavor to shed further light on the possibilities of resolving complex and multifarious conflicts and creating multicultural societies. In addition, the Centre seeks to clarify the process by which conflicts are resolved, reconciliation is achieved and multicultural societies are fostered. It aims to do this through research on both theoretical and practical aspects that are necessary to identify issues that can be addressed to make policy suggestions.

The First Afrasian International Symposium, entitled “Asia International Relations and Peace in Korea,” was held in November 2011 at the Seta Campus, Ryukoku University. The Centre held the Second Afrasian International Symposium, entitled “Multiculturalism in Asia,” in November 2012 at Ryukoku University’s Seminar House, located in central part of Kyoto City. This Third Symposium has been projected as an extension of research results built up through the hard work of the research members of the Centre.

According to my understanding, one of the keywords of this Symposium is “integration.” The concept of “integration” is gaining much more importance when we try to analyze all kinds of local, national, regional or global issues in multicultural societies.

I hope that the meeting and discussions held in this room of Campus Plaza Kyoto will achieve success and continue the endeavours of this project. Thank you so much again for coming to this International Symposium.

Norio Tanaka
Vice President, Ryukoku University

November 16, 2013
AIM OF THE SYMPOSIUM

The Third Afrasian International Symposium to be hosted by the Afrasian Research Centre at Ryukoku University, Japan on November 16-17, 2013 seeks to bring together innovative and cutting-edge theoretical, empirical and policy research around the topic of migrant integration in the Asia Pacific.

As the number of people moving and settling across borders increases, finding the right “mode” of conversation between them and the host society becomes more of a permanent necessity rather than an interim social issue. For a long time, multiculturalism, despite its taking up various meanings and thus implications, has been considered as a useful approach to migrant integration. Many countries have promoted multiculturalism as a national integration policy, but the outcomes have been varied and complicated. Some national leaders, influential policy practitioners and prominent academicians have even claimed that multiculturalism has “failed.” Some alternative, but equally controversial, ideas such as “interculturalism,” “civic integration,” and “social cohesion” have been offered. In some cases, the term “integration” itself is thought to be questionable. However, a consensus on which approach is most useful in achieving fair, stable and harmoniously diverse societies is yet to be achieved.

Such a predicament and its serious implications on the governance of international migration have inspired the organization of this Symposium. Here, we examine how these alternative approaches to migrant integration are conceptualized, contextually framed, and adopted in the formulation and implementation of migrant integration policies in three main domains of social life, namely, the family (household), school (learning institutions) and civil society, where “conversations” and inter-activities between the immigrants and the local community persist. By presenting perspectives based on different academic disciplines and experiences of various countries in the Asia-Pacific region, we hope to engage not only academics but also policymakers and the general public in discussions to “rethink” migrant integration. In the case of Japan which, compared to its neighbors in Asia-Pacific, has limited experience in dealing with migrants and migrant communities we hope our insights may provide some hints for further discussions on this pressing issue.
KEYNOTE SPEECHES
Introduction

In this age of globalization, human mobility across national borders has grown to unprecedented levels, introducing multiculturalism to the world’s societies more quickly than ever before (Tarumoto 2009b). Societies in Asia and the Pacific region are no exceptions—they are becoming multicultural at a tremendous rate, due to the influx of immigrants. These changes pose a critical question: how can a society integrate immigrants? Despite attempts by the state, international organizations, NGOs/NPOs, immigrant associations, and other social actors to integrate them, immigrant integration remains insufficient. This situation gives rise to several questions. What are the issues affecting the integration of immigrants? Why is integration such a difficult goal to realize? Is there any specific solution for Asia and the Pacific region? In exploring these questions, this article first tackles the Western world’s experiences concerning the integration of immigrants. Then, it will seek new solutions in the experiences of Asia and the Pacific regions. Finally, it will shift its focus to a theoretical exploration in order to make a fundamental reconsideration of the social integration of immigrants.

1. Western Turmoil

1.1 Western Experiences

Facing an influx of new immigrants in addition to current immigrant populations, the Western states and actors have had difficult experiences. At present, they struggle to deal with issues of migration as listed below:

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* This paper is based on a keynote speech at the Third Afrasian International Symposium of the Afrasian Research Center, Ryukoku University, entitled “Rethinking Integration: Multicultural Societies of the Asia-Pacific” given at the Campus Plaza Kyoto in Kyoto, Japan, November 16-17, 2013. Copyright 2013 Hideki Tarumoto. All rights reserved. Acknowledgements: I greatly appreciate the invitation to deliver the keynote speech from Professor Pauline Kent and professors and staff of Ryukoku University Afrasian Research Center. Part of the research for this article was aided by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) (from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, to Hideki Tarumoto); and the Global COE Program “Reshaping Japan’s Border Studies” (from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan [MEXT] to the Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University).
1. Islamophobia: The majority of a host society feels anxiety about an increasing population of Muslim immigrants, which results in their being discriminated against and excluded from society.

2. Issues concerning Islamic dress: Some Western states prohibit Muslim women from wearing Islamic veils (the niqab and burqa, in particular), and other societies are considering similar measures.

3. Extreme right-wing activities: Right-wing parties and movements have taken actions against the influx and presence of immigrants in society and have triggered incidents in France, Norway, Britain, the Netherlands, etc.

4. Terrorist attacks: Terrorists have committed attacks all over the world. Notable examples are the attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001, and in London on July 7, 2005.

5. Influx of irregular migrants: For example, recently, Lampedusa, an island off Italy has experienced an influx of immigrants from African and Arab countries wishing to enter European Union territory.

6. Underclass, poverty, and ghettos: Even today, immigrants tend to suffer from poverty, lack opportunities of social mobility to leave the underclass, and spend their lives in ghettos.

7. “Race riots”: Collective violent behavior on the part of the majority, as well as on the part of ethnic minorities, has resulted in material, physical, and symbolic damage in Britain, France, Sweden, etc.

8. Negative effects of multicultural diversity: There is an ongoing debate over whether or not the ethno-cultural diversity of immigrant populations weakens a society’s solidarity, which is necessary for welfare provision.

1.2 Theoretical Interpretation of the West
It has proved exceedingly difficult for Western countries and actors to resolve the issues of immigrant integration. Using a theoretical perspective, their experiences can be interpreted in a schematic way (Table 1).
Western countries have traditionally attempted to integrate immigrants through assimilation. This approach failed to bring about integration and was plagued with problems, so the West turned to integration through multiculturalism. Despite adopting a different approach, as mentioned earlier, the West continues to encounter integration problems. As a consequence, they have recently shown a tendency to return to an assimilative approach to integration, adopting policies such as those listed below:

- Tightening immigration controls, allowing only skilled migrants to enter and stay
- Changing ethnic minority policies to civic integration policies
- Adopting stricter naturalization procedures, through citizenship tests, in particular
- Advocating community cohesion, which endeavors to create “a community of communities”

These policies all demonstrate efforts on the part of Western states to try to introduce assimilative elements into multiculturalism. In other words, these states show signs of returning to assimilation as a mode of integration for immigrants.

How can we avoid the turmoil that Western countries have experienced in the course of immigrant integration? We should, at the very least, take the two following measures. The first is to learn from non-Western experiences. Specifically, this article will look at the experiences of Asia and the Pacific region. The second measure is to explore immigrant integration from a fundamental and theoretical perspective.

2. Variety in Asia and the Pacific Region

Asia and the Pacific region could serve as appropriate non-Western areas for research into immigrant integration as they are areas where trans-border mobility is high, large numbers of immigrants have settled, and unprecedented social change has occurred due to migration.

However, Asia and the Pacific region are too big and varied to fully investigate in just one article. Therefore, I shall look at East Asia to consider immigrant integration issues. Since East Asia still holds much cultural and social variety, I will focus specifically on Japan
and South Korea as non-Western examples in this article, then extend future research to other countries such as China, Taiwan, North Korea, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc.

The question here is: Do the experiences of Japan and South Korea reveal any insight into the specific modes that Asia and the Pacific region use to integrate immigrants?

3. Asian Immigration Development and Policies

3.1 Japan
First, I will look at the experiences of Japan, which was one of the first Asian countries to become highly industrialized. Japan accepted a high number of immigrants from the Korean Peninsula, the island of Taiwan, and mainland China in the pre-World War II era. These immigrants and their descendants—mainly Koreans and Chinese—are called “oldcomers.” After the war, Japan did not experience an influx of immigrants for another four decades, and it was not until the mid-1980s that Japan began to experience an increased level of immigration. Recent immigrants from this era are called “newcomers.” Compared to the oldcomers, newcomers are diverse in terms of their countries and areas of origin, gender, age, and skills. Largely, newcomers include highly skilled labor migrants, entertainers, care providers, and others.

### Table 2: Japan’s Foreign Population by Nationality (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China/Taiwan</td>
<td>519.6</td>
<td>606.9</td>
<td>680.5</td>
<td>674.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North/South Korea</td>
<td>598.7</td>
<td>593.5</td>
<td>578.5</td>
<td>545.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>302.1</td>
<td>317.0</td>
<td>267.5</td>
<td>210.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>187.3</td>
<td>202.6</td>
<td>211.7</td>
<td>209.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>138.8</td>
<td>136.7</td>
<td>140.9</td>
<td>139.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,011.6</td>
<td>2,161.4</td>
<td>2,184.7</td>
<td>2,078.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD (2003, 333); OECD (2013, 387)
providers, foreign trainees, Japanese descendants (*Nikkeijin*), and irregular migrants (Tarumoto 2012b, 2012c).

Consequently, Japan has had a substantial and relatively diverse immigrant population (Table 2). Japan established a policy regime after the end of the World War II to place some controls on immigration. Although the regime underwent changes in 1952, 1982, and 1990, it retains some strict controls over immigrants. In particular, it prohibits unskilled immigrants from entering and staying in the country, although the policy does have some loopholes (Tarumoto 2004, 2010, 2012a).

### 3.2 South Korea

South Korea has experienced remarkable economic progress in this last decade. Along with this economic development, South Korea began to accept immigrants. From the mid-1980s, it accepted three types of immigrants; irregular workers, foreign brides, and Korean returnees from abroad. Then, as the economy developed, the Korean government established a policy scheme to accept foreign trainees to fill its shortage of unskilled labor. In recent years, it has created and implemented a policy to officially accept unskilled labor migrants (Tarumoto 2009b).

#### Table 3: South Korea’s Foreign Population by Nationality (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>185.5</td>
<td>217.0</td>
<td>421.5</td>
<td>489.1</td>
<td>536.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>110.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>229.6</td>
<td>460.3</td>
<td>510.5</td>
<td>800.3</td>
<td>920.6</td>
<td>982.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD (2013, 387).
As a result, Korea, like Japan, has had a steady inflow of immigrant population (Table 3). However, Korea is somewhat different from Japan in terms of policy. In the early stages, Korea learned from and imitated Japanese policies to control immigration. One typical example is Korea’s introduction of a foreign trainee scheme to deal with a shortage of unskilled labor, while avoiding the formal introduction of unskilled workers. Since the late 2000s, however, Korea’s policies have become more inclusive. Now, it officially accepts unskilled migrants; this is in contrast to Japan, which still refuses to do so. This is the most unique aspect of South Korea in terms of its immigration policy.

3.3 Asian Turmoil

Now that I have established the history of immigration and immigration policy in Japan and South Korea, the question becomes: In Asia and the Pacific region, how do Japan and South Korea handle the integration of immigrants, and are their methods successful? Do they demonstrate any specifically “Asian” styles of integration?

A certain idea exists in Japan regarding the integration of immigrants and foreigners, and it is known as tabunka kyosei (multicultural coexistence) or just kyosei (coexistence; living together). The idea emerged from Kawasaki, a city with a high concentration of foreigners, around 1993, and then expanded to refer to the collaboration that occurred between the Japanese and foreigners in the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake in Kobe in 1996.

As an idea, however, kyosei is still ineffective and superficial. In 2006, a research group from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) published “A Report of Research Group on the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence,” asserting that Japanese society needs a system that promotes foreign residents’ participation as members of the local society (Bradley 2013). Despite this call for action, the central government has left the immigrant integration policy intact. With the lack of policy changes from the central government, NGO/NPOs, local governments, and international communications associations in local areas take action to help foreign residents (Tarumoto 2004).

In summary, Japan continuously and obstinately adheres to assimilation as its mode of integrating immigrants and foreigners. This attitude leads to various forms of marginalization, such as foreign workers being pushed into performing so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous, demeaning) work, discrimination against foreign residents, and movements that promote hate speeches. In comparison, the central government of South Korea has established ‘multiculture’ (not ‘multiculturalism’) as its catchword in the integration of immigrants and foreigners. In the beginning, the catchword targeted foreign brides and their mixed-race children, and was gradually extended to other types of immigrants. It should be noted, however, that this attempt does not seem to be specific to Asia; rather, it traces back to the Western mode of multiculturalism. In addition, South Korea still experiences some difficulties concerning integration, such as discrimination against immigrants and foreigners, 3D work, and hunger strikes.
Table 4: Modes of Integration in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Japanese ideal?</td>
<td>Korean ideal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration</td>
<td>Japanese reality?</td>
<td>Korean reality?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, Japan’s continued pursuit of integration through assimilation has caused it to encounter numerous difficulties. On the other hand, South Korea follows the multicultural ideal of the West, but it too presently suffers from integration issues (Table 4). Although the two countries take contrasting approaches to integration, they do have one thing in common: they are on the same track that Western countries have previously taken. While Japan remains in a stage that the West has previously been in, South Korea moves forward to the more recent stage of multiculturalism. Some scholars place their hope in Asian values such as Confucianism in order to achieve the integration of immigrants. But, as the cases of Japan and South Korea make clear, no Asian mode of immigrant integration thus far has been a complete success. It may be that the discovery of Asian way of integration is just a fantasy, or it may be that the Asian way has lost its effectiveness and fallen out of use.

4. Social Integration

4.1 Buzzword?
In order to consider whether any Asian method could bring about immigrant integration, we should first carry out a general theoretical exploration of social integration. However, we face an obstacle in the very first stage of our consideration, which is that previous research does not give us a clear definition of what social integration is.

“Social integration” has become a kind of buzzword, like globalization, social order, race riots, etc. It seems to hold diverse ideas without any specific meaning, and it always has a positive implication. We get the greatest common denominator of the concept from scholars—that is, social integration largely means a “unity of individuals (and sometimes of groups).” (See, works of scholars below who have submitted traditional solutions for social integration) Yet, this definition is too broad to truly capture immigrant integration in the real world. In migration studies, the meaning of social integration often goes beyond “a unity of individuals” and includes at least four dimensions: (1) no (or reduced) exclusion of immigrants, (2) no (or reduced) discrimination against immigrants, (3) no (or reduced) inequality of immigrants, and (4) no (or reduced) conflicts concerning immigrants.

Consideration should be given to each of these four dimensions in making a thorough exploration of immigrant integration.
4.2 Traditional Solutions

The next question that arises is: What factors could bring about the integration of immigrants? Traditionally, scholars—mainly sociologists and philosophers—have devoted a considerable amount of thought to social integration.

Political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (2012) famously referred to the issue of social order as “The war of all against all.” He pointed to the state as the solution of how to integrate people in the society. However, in this era of globalization, many are skeptical about whether the state can behave in a way that is neutral and does not cause harm to immigrants. Rather, history asserts that the state has a strong tendency toward executing minority-suppressing politics on behalf of the majority.

One of the founders of sociology, Emile Durkheim (1978), was also deeply interested in social integration. His solutions were moral that people internalize through education and also mediating groups that are situated between the state and the individual, emerging, like occupational groups, in the process of social differentiation. The latter solution is shared by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1973), who takes a slightly different perspective on the matter. Luhmann emphasizes that one function of society should be to reduce its internal complexities in order to maintain social integration. In other words, he asserts that social differentiation could induce social integration. Although Durkheim and Luhmann advocate social differentiation as a way to facilitate integration, both of them are referring to social differentiation in the sense of functional differentiation. However, moving across national borders, immigrants do not produce functional differentiation but rather multicultural differentiation.

The sociologist, Talcott Parsons (1951), devoted himself to the exploration of integration in terms of social systems. His solution was values. He states that if actors in a society share the same values, they can produce social order and integration. However, it is unclear how values and integration are related to each other. For example, there is one value that is discussed concerning the integration of immigrants in Western Europe, and that is the notion of “tolerance.” Although tolerance is more or less present in society, conflicts such as race riots still occur from time to time in Britain, France, Sweden, and other European countries. This reality shows that values might not be entirely effective in creating social integration. The Asian values mentioned earlier would share the same level of ineffectiveness.

Another major sociologist, Jürgen Habermas (1987), advocates “constitutional patriotism,” which asserts that people can achieve integration through their respect for a democratic constitution, regime, and rules. This begs the question, however, of how does the people’s respect for constitution and democracy lead to social integration? Particularly, who, among the majority, as well as the minorities, actively knows and/or cares about democratic constitutions and rules in their everyday lives?

John Rawls (1996), a well-known philosopher on the topic of justice, provides another idea for creating social integration. People within a society have different notions of justice. According to Rawls, if individuals could come to an overlapping consensus on justice, they
could produce social integration. His idea of “overlapping consensus,” however, is much more procedural than Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, and it lacks a concrete core culture of integration which could distinguish ‘this community’ from ‘that community’ and which it is to be integrated into.

In recent years, several political philosophers, such as David Miller (2000), have placed importance on liberal nationalism. This idea implies that a national identity has enough power to bundle individual actors together in a society. Certainly, it could be a tool for integrating people in a society. However, in many cases, it is exceedingly difficult for immigrants and foreigners to share the national identity of the host society. Rather, they often tend to retain their own identities based on their own cultures. In this sense, the solution of national identity might just become another version of assimilation. As a result, national identity could exclude multicultural actors on a practical level.

In summary, these traditional solutions do not provide much persuasive evidence for the promotion of immigrant integration. This leads to the question: Why do these solutions fail to demonstrate signs of social integration?

5. Citizenship Perspective

5.1 Three Elements of Citizenship
The main reason that the traditional solutions are ineffective is that they tend to be metaphysical and lacking in a substantial foundation. Without a firm practical basis, the traditional solutions cannot achieve unity among people or alleviate exclusion, inequality, discrimination, and conflict.

Do any other solutions exist? Many states and social agencies across the world place their hope in citizenship as a way to integrate immigrants.

**Figure 1: The Concept of Citizenship**
Citizenship has a substantial legal foundation of legal elements in that it constitutes a fulfillment of a social contract. Moreover, it includes the metaphysical component, or emotional aspect, that the traditional solutions offered. Specifically, the social contract aspect has two elements (i.e., legal status, and rights and duties) and the emotional aspect has one element (i.e., identity) (Marshall 1950). Legal status endows individuals with the power to stay in society, which could partially provide a basis for social integration. In this era of globalization, securing the status of immigrants has some ripple effects, such as issues of succession, naturalization, and double citizenship. In terms of the second element of the social contract (rights and duties), under globalization the issues of civil, political, social, and collective rights have become salient ones for immigrants and foreigners. Identity comprises the third element of citizenship. Considering, however, how the global increase in immigration has caused citizenship to branch out into the realms of national identity, transnational identity, and multiple identities, it has likely lost some of its power to integrate people in a society.

5.2 Citizenship as a Multi-layered Institution
Citizenship, with its three elements of status, rights and duties, and identity, creates an institution that could realize the social integration of immigrants. In this sense, citizenship becomes an institution that can be defined as a “self-enforcing belief system concerning routine, repetitive interactions of actors” (Aoki 2001).

Figure 2: The Hammar-Koido-Tarumoto Model

Source: Tarumoto (2005)
Using citizenship as an integration tool, the state and social agencies create a multilayered institution (Figure 2). This institution could include a strict selection process for accepting immigrants, provide education and welfare provisions, possibly grant political rights, establish rules for naturalization, and help create ethnic communities. These attempts are all involved in the theoretical concept of citizenship as an institution. In other words, all actors rely on citizenship in order to live their lives. Therefore, within the institution of citizenship, the state tries to establish and enforce a plurality of boundaries to keep the social order concerning immigrants. In the wake of globalization, discussions have emerged on deviations from national citizenship, such as denizenship, postnational membership, and transnational citizenship (Tarumoto 2008). But such deviations have their own positions within the institution of citizenship that the Hammar-Koido-Tarumoto (HKT) model designates.

The HKT model gives us a key suggestion: citizenship is not just a tool to promote the inclusiveness of immigrants; rather, it promotes a mixture of both inclusiveness and exclusiveness.

5.3 Various Issues of Citizenship Regarding Integration

The HKT model provides another suggestion for the integration of immigrants through citizenship. Each zone between the boundaries poses integration issues for immigrants (Table 5). Well-known female emigrants from the Philippines are positioned mainly between boundaries 2 and 3, and occasionally between boundaries 3 and 4, by seeking formal legal residency to stay in the host society by “making love” with men of the majority (Parreñas

Table 5: Examples of Integration Issues in the HKT Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1-2</td>
<td>Deportation</td>
<td>Exploitation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legalization</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trafficking</td>
<td>Medicare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2-3</td>
<td>Deportation</td>
<td>3D works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>Social participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Educational treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3-4</td>
<td>Deportation</td>
<td>Social participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Re-entry</td>
<td>Local suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harsh control</td>
<td>Hate speech</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position in civil society</td>
<td>Educational treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4-5</td>
<td>Naturalization</td>
<td>Collective rights</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Double citizenship</td>
<td>Citizenship test</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Divided loyalty</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Community arts</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Stereotyped image</td>
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2013), or in a stepwise way, by moving to different countries to pursue better jobs, such as nursing (Carlos 2013). Even in Australia, a multicultural country, along with the term “social cohesion,” the social integration of immigrants has become a significant issue, particularly regarding recognition and participation, as part of the elements of rights and identity, between boundaries 3 and 4, and boundaries 4 and 5 (Pe-Pua 2013).

For second-generation Brazilians mainly between boundaries 3 and 4, being educated in Portuguese can be a key to securing rights in their lives in Japan (Haino 2013). The weakest point of Japan’s policy regarding immigrants is its lack of multiculturalism concerning the elements of rights and identity at boundaries 2 to 4. Looking at education, for example, the slogan of *tabunka kyosei* and the scant concern about special treatment for foreign children creates a huge gap between theory and practice (Bradley 2013). In this sense, education is quite important in creating social integration. Again, even in Australia, an established multicultural country, education is crucial for the social integration of immigrants. Particularly, building a bridge between formal schooling and non-formal education might empower those children from ethnic minorities, between boundaries 2 and 4, who tend to drop out of the formal education system (Okano 2013). The ability to speak English is generally considered a necessary tool that the Japanese majority needs to survive the recent neoliberal economic trend under globalization. Moreover, increasing the nation’s English skills could be a way of making Japanese society more multicultural, concerning boundaries 1 to 5, which might change the ethnicity-centered national identity in Japan (Matsumura 2013).

To approach integration from the aspect of identity, cultural activities help immigrants between boundaries 1 and 5. For example, community arts can empower immigrants by regenerating the areas in which they live (Ho 2013). Also regarding identity, immigrants between boundaries 1 and 5 may suffer as a result of the stereotypes of immigrants that the mass media often produces. Some countries, including Japan, have no legal system in place to prohibit the mass media from producing distorted images of immigrants and foreigners (Yawata 2013). This issue is closely related to social integration of immigrants in the host society.

Responsibility for the social integration of immigrants cannot fall on the state alone. Ideally, actors in civil society must take action towards realizing a multicultural society. However, civil society is often underdeveloped in this regard. For example, since the Fukushima disaster, the reality has emerged that civil society is not unitary but divided into those with power and those without (Shimizu 2013). Immigrants and foreigners are generally put in the strata of the powerless, where they lack opportunities for social participation.

In addition, note that issues in the zones are interrelated in many cases, and some solutions would create conflicts regarding integration. For example, although Japan has weak educational policies for foreign children from the Philippines, some schools are pressured to help them and give them special treatment by instructing them in their mother tongue. During the same period, though, Japan started to strictly regulate Filipino entertainers, in some cases deporting them. Immigrants from the same country might experience different
treatment—generous and harsh—as a result of policy. Even within the topic of education, there is the debate: while multicultural education might empower the children of immigrants, it could, at the same time, prevent them from identifying with the host society, which seems to be necessary for social integration. Most scholars and researchers focus on one issue, or a few issues at most, in considering the integration of immigrants. However, it is necessary and worthwhile to explore the links between topics in terms of integration. Overall, research that spans the range of integration issues is needed to explore what type of citizenship institution can produce social integration and alleviate exclusion, discrimination, inequality, and conflicts concerning migrants.

6. Dilemmas of an Open Society for Immigrants

This article posed the following questions: What are the issues concerning the integration of immigrants? What makes integration so difficult to realize? Is there any specific solution in Asia and the Pacific region? We can make a summary of our exploration as follows.

With regard to the third question, although we had hoped to find a specifically Asian and Pacific method of integration but ultimately did not, Japan and South Korea, at least, have followed the historical and logical path of integration set forth by the West’s experiences. That is, both countries encountered the same difficulties as Western countries, facing the dilemmas of multiculturalism and assimilation (Tarumoto 2009a). This indicates that a theoretical consideration is first needed so as to create a method of integration that goes beyond the geographical restriction of the Western regions, Asia, and the Pacific regions.

As for the second question regarding the difficulty of integration, one of the basic reasons is the nebulousness of the concept of social integration. Although the term “social integration” is used without any specific definition by most scholars, it can, in a very general sense, be defined as a unity of individuals (and groups). However, it remains ambiguous as to what social integration means in terms of migration. Generally speaking, migration studies are concerned with exclusion, discrimination, inequality, and conflicts when speaking about the integration of immigrants. Even if the concept is made clear, though, it is still difficult to explore integration because, as the citizenship perspective demonstrates, inclusiveness and exclusiveness are often related in complicated ways. In short, social integration must be multilayered. According to the multilayered institution of citizenship, composed of five boundaries, integration could, at the least, proceed according to the five following dimensions: irregular migrants, temporary stayers, denizens, “second-class” citizens, and “first-class” citizens. In particular, the question of “who is included?” is followed by the question of “who is excluded?” The ambivalence these questions gives rise to still other questions: To what degree should people be included (or excluded)? In what domains should they be included (or excluded)? Under these theoretical and practical dilemmas, an appropriate and multifaceted approach should be pursued. In doing so, we are forced to make clear judgments regarding the social integration of immigrants.

How can the state and social agencies overcome this contradictory situation? A
common view these days so that citizenship has become so light and insignificant as a concept that it is not enough to integrate immigrants (Joppke 2010). Has citizenship really lost its power to integrate people? Can the state and social agencies no longer depend on citizenship to create a stable society that includes immigrants? At the least, there are two approaches we can take in the future. First, the state and social agencies can aim to create an institution of citizenship wherein members of the society lose their benefits if they do not respect other cultures or multiculturalism. Second, they can consider the institution of citizenship not only in terms of the equilibrium in game theory, but also in the terms of satisficing that Herbert Simon found in his research on organizations. Then, the institution of citizenship should be linked to empirical phenomena such as exclusion, discrimination, inequality, and conflict.

Through this strategy, we can evaluate the power of citizenship and envision social integration within a multicultural society in the future. In the twenty-first century, the social sciences and humanities have a big responsibility in creating wisdom needed to realize the social integration of immigrants across the globe.

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Integration and Social Cohesion in Multicultural Societies:  
The Interface of Schooling and Non-formal Education

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Introduction

Social integration is a term used often in the media and even in daily conversations. Multiethnic populations have become so prevalent that almost all societies are multicultural to some degree. The typical government response has involved integration. We often view integration positively—we are told that successful social integration will bring social cohesion, and that social cohesion is beneficial to individuals and the society as a whole. However, is this true for all concerned parties and individuals? Do some people benefit more from the so-called “integration” than others? If so, how can we best understand “integration?”

Critics have questioned what they understand to be multiculturalism and integration, claiming that it is divisive, encourages ethnic segregation, and challenges social cohesion. Some governments have responded to them by emphasizing “shared values” (such as liberal democracy, and human rights) rather than focusing on ethnic differences. While debates on multiculturalism continue, individuals daily experience and make sense of their multicultural societies daily in diverse ways.

In this paper, I will critically explore the notion of integration as it regards education. I pose two questions: (1) What do we mean by social integration and cohesion in a multicultural society? When we talk about social integration, do we have a particular mode of integration in mind? (2) Where does education stand in this process? I refer to both formal schooling and non-formal educational practices, and in particular, the interface between the two.

I will begin by briefly examining the debates surrounding multiculturalism, with an emphasis on the different meanings that people attach to this all-inclusive term. I particularly note the divergence between the normative concept of multiculturalism and individuals’ experience of it. Next, I will discuss the notion of integration in terms of a continuum, with one-way, assimilative integration on one end and two-way, symmetrical assimilation on the other. Then I will discuss integration in terms of political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural processes. Finally, I will explore how education has attempted to assist the normative pursuit of “integration,” and how the people involved experienced that process. I wish to engage beyond formal schooling and investigate the interaction between formal schooling and
non-formal education. I will refer to the cases of Australia, Japan, and Indonesia.

I will argue that formal schools and educational authorities, in the face of their own inadequacy, increasingly acknowledge and depend on the non-formal sector’s pragmatic contributions to migrants’ education. I will further argue that this has led to a more collaborative relationship between formal schools and non-formal education providers. This extensive collaboration signals a significant change in the practice of post-war education in Japan, in that the supremacy of formal schools has diminished, and non-formal education has become less peripheral.

**Multiculturalism and Multicultural Society: Normative and Experiential (or Descriptive)**

The terms “multiculturalism” and “multicultural society,” are often used interchangeably between a normative sense, and a descriptive or experiential sense. Since this can confuse the discussion, let me explain our understanding of these terms first.

Political philosophers and policy makers discuss multicultural society in a normative way, advocating what should be. The shared normative understanding of multiculturalism is typically “an ideology that attaches positive value to cultural diversity, calls for the equal recognition of different cultural groups, and calls upon the state to support such groups in various ways” (Miller 2006, 326-327). There is a body of literature focusing on such normative debates (Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2006; Barry 2001; Okin 1999).

Multiculturalism policies often include: (1) active recognition of diversity; (2) active assistance for minority groups aimed at helping them maintain their cultural practices while simultaneously integrating them into the host society (Wright and Bloemraad 2012, 78); (3) provision of human-rights guarantees (extending rights concerning political, social, and cultural participation). The last policy involves ensuring common rights of citizenship, rather than minority-group-specific rights, but it is often included in discussions of multiculturalism in countries such as Japan and Australia (Kymlicka 1995, 31). Indeed Japan has long focused on human rights in multiculturalism debates, drawing on the prior civil movements for human rights organized by Buraku people and Zainichi Koreans (Okano 2011).

The descriptive use of the term multiculturalism is often used in demographic illustrations of diversity (e.g., the number of migrants, their residential geography, age, and ethnic groups, across regions and individual schools). We also see the term used in descriptions of personal experiences of demographic ethnic diversity, and in social science studies of how people (minorities and the dominant population) experience and make sense of diversity, discrimination, and identity development at a microscopic level. We can call this “experiential reality,” “lived multiculturalism,” or “everyday multiculturalism” (Wise and Velayutham eds. 2009; Harris 2003). I am interested in both, but specifically in government policies to address the educational needs of immigrants, as well as how children and their parents experience the educational process.
One-way Integration versus Symmetrical Integration

There are variations in approaches to incorporate the diversity and differences that migrants bring to a host society. At one end of the continuum is one-way incorporation (assimilative incorporation), and at the other end is genuine two-way incorporation (symmetrical incorporation) (Alexander 2013, 532). One-way incorporation sees a host society unilaterally force minorities to abandon their language and culture and adopt the dominant practices. Over generations, minority groups are expected to be assimilated into the host society, whilst the latter remains unchanged. Many indigenous peoples experienced this during colonization, including Aboriginal people in Australia and the Ainu in Japan. The White Australia Policy (1901-1973) not only restricted non-white migration but also forced migrants to assimilate into Anglo-Australian society. On the other hand, under an ideal process of symmetrical incorporation, the host society actively celebrates migrant culture, helping to maintain it via institutional systems and fostering a society that is inclusive of diversity. Please see the figure below.

Figure 1: The Continuum of Mode of Integration

![Figure 1: The Continuum of Mode of Integration](source: Compiled by the author)

In reality, we rarely find societies that operate at either of the above-mentioned extremes. Most societies fall somewhere between the two, in the grey area, although the extent of the greyness varies considerably across societies. Established migrant countries such as Canada and Australia are located towards the left.

We can also see shifts in position. It is useful to consider examples. For example, contemporary Australian practices are located more towards symmetrical incorporation than they were 50 years ago, in terms of both national policies and everyday experience. In the 1960s, one-way absorption was the more valued mode of integration, wherein English language learning and cultural adaptation were the focus. In the mid-1970s, the federal government replaced the assimilation model with a systematic multiculturalism policy, designed to celebrate differences and move the entire society away from an Anglo-centric focus. Schools were to embrace multiculturalism across their curricula (Gulson and Webb 2012).

Contemporary Japan is perhaps located more towards one-way incorporation than Australia. Japan still does not see itself as a migrant nation-state, but in recent decades, it has attempted to move towards symmetrical incorporation, at least at the level of affected schools,
for example, by teaching about migrants’ cultures in integrated-studies subjects (Okano 2012).

Indonesia, since its inception as a nation state, has advocated the symmetrical incorporation of a large number of ethnic groups at least at an official level, and adopted a non-ethnic-specific language, Bahasa Indonesia, as the national language and the language of instruction at school. As Bahasa Indonesia is not the language of a specific ethnic group, its adoption was not considered an advantage to any particular group. Critics however, continue to argue that the Javanese retain a privileged position over other indigenous ethnic groups (Miller 2011, 804), and that ethnic Chinese are marginalized (Hoon 2011). The vicious attacks on ethnic Chinese at the end of Suharto’s regime derived at least partially from the local indigenous perception that the Chinese benefitted disproportionately in an economic sense from that regime (Hoon 2006).

If multiculturalism has been perceived to have reached one or the other extreme end, some group has always raised protests. Human-rights activists object to assimilative incorporation. Conservatives often become uncomfortable at seeing their society changing to accommodate minorities. When members of a dominant group fear their culture to be threatened, they feel anxious and vulnerable. Australia saw this in the 1990s in the form of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party. In Japan, we see the Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai (Zaitokukai) (translated literally as The Citizens’ Association against Special Privileges for Foreign Residents in Japan), which demonstrates against what it sees as overly generous entitlements given to ethnic Koreans of former colonial descent.

Europe has seen some of the most overt popular protests against multicultural policies (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Politicians have expressed their concerns about multiculturalism policies at the same time as public opinion revealed a growing unease about migrants (Ryan 2010). For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that a multiculturalism approach has failed utterly in her country (Weaver 2010) and President Nicolas Sarkozy came to the same conclusion regarding France (TF1 2011). In the same year, 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron commented that state multiculturalism encouraged different cultures to live separate lives from one another and from the mainstream.

Integration: Political, Socio-economic, and Socio-cultural

Migrant integration occurs in three forms: political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural. The three often mutually reinforce each other.

Political integration includes minority-group representation in decision-making bodies (e.g., local government advisory boards, etc.) and their participation in political and media debates about issues that affect them. We can judge the extent of political integration by whether members of minorities trust government institutions and decisions (the local and national) and how much faith they put in them. This trust can be cultivated through more inclusive citizenship and individual rights, by promoting naturalization and providing
effective settlement measures (Koopmans 2013, 160).

Socio-economic integration relies on employment in the host society’s mainstream economy, as it enables migrants to achieve a standard of living comparable to the host society’s members. This is a long-term project and rests on migrants’ receiving education, as well as on the absence of institutional barriers (e.g., citizenship requirements) and of discrimination.

We see socio-cultural integration occurring when migrants acquire the host society’s language and participate in its communities. It depends upon the host society’s members learning the value of engaging with minorities. Language acquisition is crucial to socio-economic integration, since it is a prerequisite for seeking a place in the host society’s mainstream employment market.

**How Has Education Contributed to Particular Modes of Integration?**

Education is one of the most significant vehicles for facilitating migrant integration (Grant and Portera eds. 2011; Banks 2006) and social cohesion (Engel et al. 2013). When children are not equipped to reach a certain level of educational achievement, the typical result is unemployment later in life. Without appropriate knowledge of the host society’s workings and language, young people find it difficult to participate in society, and subsequently experience a sense of alienation. Education thus affects their sense of political, social, and cultural integration.

Schools therefore have some significant responsibilities: to understand the psychology of immigration and the importance of “academic language” (as distinct from “daily language”) acquisition, and to remain flexible and responsive in their pedagogy (Suarez-Orozco et al. 2011, 314). However, we may be expecting too much from formal schooling alone; collaboration with the community, families, and other sections of society outside the school must also be considered. Ethnographic studies of migrants at school reveal how children learn political, social, and cultural integration. These studies show how migrant children, in the process of schooling, encounter the dominant institutional culture, interact with children of the majority group, learn to cope with the daily school routine, and chart their educational trajectories (academic careers) (Meader 2005; Lopez 2003; Castro-Vazquez 2009; Tsuneyoshi et al. eds. 2011; Shimizu ed. 2008; Sekiguchi 2003).

Formal schooling is designed to produce citizens of a nation-state, rather than global citizens. Externally administered examinations (e.g., entrance examinations and matriculation results) and centrally determined frameworks for accountability and assessment do not often allow for alternative development of children with diverse backgrounds. Consider a migrant teenager who has a wealth of experience or cultural skills, as well as prior reading in his or her language, but who cannot express this knowledge fluently in a cultural and linguistic sense in the dominant language. The standard assessments are unable to evaluate these diverse capabilities and skills, since they cannot assess what they are not designed to assess. While some migrant children succeed against the odds in the host society’s educational
system, their experiences are still constrained by institutional schooling. Formal schooling systems are resistant to change, and even when change does occur, it comes as a directive from the center, which takes too long for the change to be optimally effective. This is where teaching and learning activities that occur outside the formal schooling system deserve attention.

**Non-formal Education and Integration in the Civil Society: Supplementary, Alternative, and Collaborative Relations**

By non-formal education, I refer collectively to teaching and learning activities that occur outside formal schooling. Some occur in the market sector (e.g., profit-making cram schools, cultural courses, company training, etc.), while others are initiated by community groups in civil society (e.g., programs for disadvantaged children and the elderly). In contrast, I see “formal” education as government-sanctioned mainstream schooling (ichijôko), which provides formal academic qualifications. Informal education is any non-institutional learning that individuals experience, for example, through self-study. (See Rogers 2005 and O’Connor 2012, for general discussion on non-formal education) (Figure 2).

Non-formal education has rapidly increased in both its extent and significance in the last two decades. This is at least partially because individual educational needs have rapidly changed and diversified, creating a demand that formal education alone is unable to satisfy. The private sector has seen the business potential in this situation and established, for example, institutions for the elderly and school dropouts. Others in the community-based sector have volunteered to provide classes for those whose educational needs were not met in formal schooling.

**Figure 2: Non-formal Education and Formal Schools**

Source: Compiled by the author
One of the most significant social changes to affect mainstream schooling in post-war Japan has been an influx of unskilled migrants. Without any prior substantial experience of overtly multi-ethnic and multicultural student populations, Japanese schools have attempted to respond to this challenge, initially with individual school-level initiatives, and later with assistance from local education boards and governments, and then from the national government. In the absence of a systematic national policy on multi-ethnic school populations, specific local governments were forced to respond to the demands from the affected schools.

While these attempts by mainstream schools were no doubt useful in helping children adapt to a new environment, a significant number of migrant children have struggled to keep up with school work, found school to be culturally alienating, and have been unable to advance beyond compulsory schooling (Sakuma 2006; Miyajima and Oota eds. 2005). Some of these students have opted to leave regular schools for independently operated ethnic schools. Some simply do not attend any form of school. When unoccupied, they are at greater risk of unemployment in the future. Not having a high school diploma is a severe impediment to complete integration (political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural, as mentioned above), since these young people will find it extremely difficult to obtain secure employment in the Japanese labor market and to achieve their potential.

Non-formal education has attempted to respond to such migrant children’s needs in the face of the failure of formal schools to do so. Drawing on the cases of the NGOs and ethnic schools that are attempting to fill this gap, I identified three distinctive roles they perform: (1) to assist migrant children struggling at local schools via homework clubs and study counseling, (2) to provide a place to stay during the day for migrant children who do not attend schools when they are not under adult supervision, and (3) to provide full-time ethnic education in ethnic schools. I shall examine these roles one by one.

First, homework assistance classes offer supplementary education for migrant children who regularly attend local schools but continue to struggle with academic work and the Japanese language. These students are often adjusted to the school’s culture and routines, but they lag behind in school work. Homework clubs are offered on a small scale at Takatori Community Center in Kobe and the Toyonaka Association of Multicultural Symbiosis. University students and retired school teachers volunteer-teach individual children who have been referred from the neighborhood schools in which they are enrolled. There are numerous programs of this kind run by neighborhood centers in areas populated with migrant children. The advantage of these small-scale programs is that the proximity between the students’ residential community and their schools enables regular contact between the three parties: the local schools, the neighborhood community, and the non-formal educational organization. What is more, attendance is free, which benefits not only the children and their families, but also the community members, since they enjoy greater community involvement as volunteers. These children are relatively less at risk, in that they at least attend local schools and are supervised by teachers during the day.

Second, providers of non-formal education offer a place of belonging for those migrant
children who are unable, or unwilling, to attend a local school. A substantial number of migrant children do not attend any form of schooling during the day, and many simply stay at home without adult supervision (since their parents work long hours). The ultimate goal is to enable migrant children to attend local schools by fostering basic literacy and numeracy skills and raising their self-confidence. The majority of migrant children find individual teachers very helpful and resourceful. In spite of this, migrant children typically fail to attend local schools as they have difficulty in understanding the class (despite receiving Japanese as a Second Language, JSL lessons) and feel alienated by the school culture.

The Rainbow Bridging Course at the Multicultural Symbiosis Centre Tokyo caters to children of compulsory-school age, who, due to language and adjustment problems, do not attend a local school either having dropped out or having never started. The long-term goal is for these children to eventually attend mainstream school. Another program, Multicultural Free School, on the other hand, is a full-time program for those over the compulsory-education age (16 years old) who therefore cannot be admitted to government middle school. Realizing the limited employment opportunities for those without a high school diploma, these students in their late teens aim to enter high school.

Thirdly, ethnic schools provide alternative full-time schooling in the relevant ethnic language medium (such as Korean, Spanish, and Portuguese). Ethnic schools, popularly and officially called “schools for foreigners,” offer education to children who are often at real risk of abandoning their education altogether. They also perform a welfare role by supervising children from early morning until late at night while their parents work, so that the children are not left alone at home (Okano 2013).

The disadvantages of ethnic schools are: (1) that attendance at ethnic schools limits employment prospects since they do not confer academic qualifications accepted in the Japanese labor market, and (2) that migrant children are excluded from meaningful interactions with other children, thereby hindering their integration into the host society (Kersten et al. 2006; Resnik et al. 2001). While ethnic schools may offer migrant children a protective environment (by shielding them from teasing, bullying, and discriminatory comments), they also deprive them of the chance to learn through such interactions and to understand and appreciate “others.” This has been the case with Koreans at North Korean schools (Ryang 1997; Okano and Tsuchiya 1999) and with Brazilians at Brazilian schools (Haino 2010). Some researchers counter these concerns that ethnic schools can hinder integration by distinguishing between short-term and long-term consequences. They emphasize the positive long-term effects of attending ethnic schools, namely that ethnic schools raise migrant children’s self-esteem and empower communities, and thus contribute to their academic success; this subsequently promotes their integration into the host society (Asanova 2005).

It is a significant development that formal mainstream schools now rely on educational provision from NGOs in guiding migrant children’s integration into the mainstream education system (Okano ed. forthcoming). In some cases, schools actively collaborate with social organizations, as seen in the homework clubs at Takatori Community Centre and the
Toyonaka Association of Multicultural Symbiosis. Indeed, the Multicultural Symbiosis Centre Tokyo currently receives project funding from the Ministry of Education. There is a growing awareness that the needs of migrant children are so diverse that NGOs can more effectively meet their needs than mainstream schools. Needs can vary according to ethnic background, the local situation (e.g., the existence of other NGOs and ethnic communities, and the level of commitment from local governments and local schools), and employment opportunities.

Ethnic schools have long been regarded as alternatives, rather than supplements, to formal schooling. They have not traditionally developed meaningful relationships with mainstream schools. For example, until a decade ago, even well-established North Korean schools had been officially excluded from various inter-school competitions (e.g., sports). At the ground level however, local schools have assisted migrant children in transitioning from ethnic schools to mainstream schools, and community-based organizations have provided assistance to these children, as mentioned above. While specific local governments have always provided funding to ethnic schools, it is only recently that the national government began to pay attention to ethnic schools. One example is the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ suggestion that schools for foreigners be granted “miscellaneous school” status, and therefore be subject to less strict requirements than mainstream schools (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan 2006). Another is the Ministry of Education’s proposal to provide JSL instruction in the non-formal education sector. The Ministry of Education has also proposed more flexible arrangements to ease the transition from ethnic schools to mainstream schools (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan 2008).

Conclusion

I started this paper by asking two questions: (1) What do we mean by social integration and cohesion in a multicultural society? How can we best understand “integration?” (2) How does education (both formal and non-formal) contribute to this process? At different points, I have referred to the cases of Australia and Indonesia, but the focus has been on contemporary Japan.

“Multiculturalism” and “social integration” are both nebulous terms in that people attach different meanings to them. I suggested that we need to distinguish between the normative concepts of multiculturalism and integration (often in the form of political philosophy and government policies), and individuals’ experienced reality of them. I looked at integration in terms of the grey area on the continuum between a one-way assimilation process and a symmetrical process. In the real world we rarely find societies that operate at either of the above two extremes. The extent of the greyness varies considerably between societies and across time. We can also understand integration in terms of political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural processes. The three processes reinforce each other over the long term.
Education is crucial for facilitating the political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural integration of migrants. It equips migrant children with formal qualifications that enable them to gain employment in the host society, as well as endows them with relevant knowledge of the society’s workings and the social skills needed to participate in political processes and the wider community. While the efforts of mainstream schools have helped migrant children’s adaptation to the host society, a significant number of children have struggled, some even abandoning formal schooling completely.

Mainstream schools and the government’s education authorities increasingly acknowledge, and depend on, the pragmatic contributions of non-formal education in furthering migrant children’s education. In examining four cases of NGOs and ethnic schools attempting to fill this gap, I identified three distinctive goals pursued by these civil society educational providers: (1) to provide supplementary education for migrant children struggling at local schools, (2) to provide a place of belonging for migrant children who do not attend school during the day, with the aim of enabling them to attend local schools eventually, and (3) to offer alternative schooling in ethnic languages. The ultimate goal of many of these organizations is to enable migrant children to participate fully in mainstream schooling, so as to gain the academic qualifications and socialization required to eventually enter the adult host society as fully functioning members. I contend that this has led mainstream schools to develop a more collaborative relationship with NGOs and ethnic schools. This signals a significant change in Japan’s education system, in which providers in the civil society have traditionally been peripheral.

Civil society players have thus taken on an increasingly significant role in migrant education over the last decade. To what extent this collaborative trend may extend to other areas of education is open to debate. Given increasingly diverse educational needs and demands, it is likely that collaboration between civil society providers and formal schools will be strengthened in an attempt to accommodate them.

References


Cambridge, UK: Polity.


Panel 1

Migration, Families
And Multiculturalism
Introduction

Maria P. Makabenta Ikeda
University of Hyogo

The first panel’s speakers focused on the role that the family plays in migration decisions and in promoting multiculturalism. The first two papers discussed the various aspects of migration as a strategic move for families rather than individuals. The third paper examines the family as it is projected in social cohesion research. They questioned the notion of citizenship as the most ideal tool for integration and emphasized the need for other policy tools that complement citizenship, support and enhance migrant integration and enable host and sending communities and societies to maximize the gains from the migration experience.

Rhacel Parreñas, of the University of Southern California, talked about the differences in the cultures of “love” and “marriage” in the context of Filipina entertainers in Japan. Filipina migrant hostesses pursue marriage with Japanese men for a combination of love and security with some marrying primarily for love, others for material security, and still others for both. Parreñas described the concept of sexual citizenship requiring sex for some individuals to become members in a nation; a tool for economic stability but not necessarily for social inclusion in Japan.

Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos, of Ryukoku University, discussed the motivations of stepwise migration as the efficient use of time while waiting for the chance to go to the most preferred destination and to accumulate transferrable resources. She distinguished between transit and final destinations, and pointed out that family integration is an important determinant in deciding the status of a destination. Carlos also discussed the value of citizenship for stepwise migrants. Migrants value access to rights and privileges vis-a-vis duties accorded to citizens of the destination as well as labor market access in the more preferred destination. The opportunity to bring in family and relatives, who can qualify for citizenship themselves, and advantages (but also disadvantages) of dual citizenship are some of the important factors that influence migrant choice of a potential final destination. Stepwise migration implies long separation between migrant and his family which can result in high social and psychological costs to the migrant and his family; even after the event of a family reunification in the host destination.

Rogelia Pe-Pua, of the University of New South Wales, identified and examined current and emerging drivers for social cohesion, social division and conflict in multicultural Australia. She also explained some strategies that increase social cohesion and how Australia fares in terms of a typology of dimensions that seek to identify the factors that enhance (or
Alternatively disrupt) social cohesion. Australia ranks high in several economic and social indicators such that Australians report high levels of life satisfaction and sense of belonging and pride in Australia and the Australian way of life. However, there are still socially excluded groups in present-day Australia: the elderly, people with low incomes, the unemployed, those with poor health, indigenous Australians, sole parent families, and people not proficient in English. The author points out that in thinking of social cohesion, we must think of the mutual intercultural relations among four groups: indigenous group, majority group, immigrant group and refugees.

The discussion and the open forum yielded important questions such as “What is the meaning or essence of citizenship for the migrant and the family in the three presentations?” Parreñas and Carlos emphasized that there are many layers and aspects of migrants’ “belongingness” in the host country, and the most visible one is political “belongingness” in the form of citizenship by naturalization. Being legally acknowledged as a citizen entitles the migrant to most of the rights and benefits accorded to locals (but also duties). Pe-Pua however, points out that citizenship is not enough to “belong” to the host society. There is a need to reexamine citizenship as a tool of integration and explore other ways to enhance integration in society.

A question was also raised about the costs to step-wise migration. Carlos pointed out that there is a need to evaluate both pecuniary and non-monetary costs such as social, psychological costs, etc. for the migrant and all members of the migrant’s family and in doing so have a more realistic view of the value or worth of international migration for the family.
Making Love for a Visa: The Sexual Citizenship of Migrants in Japan

Rhacel Salazar Parreñas
University of Southern California

Introduction

My paper examines the social meanings of marriage for migrant Filipina hostesses. It utilizes the data I used from my recently published study *Illicit Flirtations*. I will specifically draw from my interviews conducted with hostesses in Japan. I will start by establishing the prevailing ideologies of love that impose moral standards on their marriages. Then, I will move to show how hostesses negotiate these ideologies by examining how love is constructed in their marriages. So this talk is about love, and how love is made in the community of migrant Filipina hostesses.

There is a prevailing assumption of a right kind of love. First there is a dominant view that love and money inhabit not just separate but also morally opposing spheres. For instance, many dismiss pen-pal brides as morally suspect for wanting to get married for material security. Additionally, they see this motivation as void of love. According to anthropologist Nicole Constable, the instinct to view money and love as mutually exclusive is particularly salient in the West. As she describes, “This attempt to polarize love and pragmatics and to represent them as discontinuous represents a particularly western perspective and bias. Underlying such a dichotomy is the idea that ‘true love’ is somehow selfless and ‘pure,’ and not only incompatible with but also diametrically opposed to pragmatic or practical concerns” (Constable 2003, 128).

In her seminal book *The Purchase of Intimacy*, Viviana Zelizer has explained the source of our discomfort over the intersection of love and money in various social contexts including for instance prostitution and the outsourcing of childcare. According to Zelizer, we are plagued by what she calls the “hostile worlds” view in which we see a cultural and moral clash between what is rational, i.e., money, and what is sentimental, i.e., love. The merging of the two wreaks havoc in the social order. Reflecting the “hostile worlds” view haunts most scholarly assessments on international marriages. In her study of sex workers in the Dominican Republic, for example, Denise Brennan interrogates how love figures in marriages between sex workers and their foreign clients. Brennan found that sex workers are hardly ever driven by “emotion-driven love” but instead by what she calls “strategy-driven love.”

In Japan, the convention of marriage seems to be the opposite than in the United States;
individuals are said to marry for security more so than for romance. Yet, despite the different conceptions of marriage in Japan and the U.S., we likewise still see in Japan the distinction made of marrying for security and marrying for love, and the assumption that these are two distinct—and not disentangled—reasons for marriage. In Japan, the legal scholar Mark West claims that the absence of love in marriages is pervasive (West 2011). The leading feminist sociologist Chizuko Ueno observes, for instance, “Japanese couples get married for the institution and not out of romantic love… They choose the institution of marriage because of the material advantages it offers them” (West 2011, 98). While—according to a 1990 corporate-sponsored survey of Japanese and American consumers—87% of U.S. women and 84% of U.S. men believe that “being in love” is an important condition of marriage, only 68% of Japanese women and 67% of Japanese men think so (West 2011, 99).

Yet, for migrant Filipina hostesses, marriage to a Japanese contradicts the very essence of the “hostile worlds” view. In Japan, long-term residency for foreigners who are not of Japanese by blood is conditional to marriage or birth to a Japanese citizen. This means that long-term residency is conditional to the provision of sex. This would make long-term residents in the Filipino community of Japan what we could call sexual citizens, a term that does not only underscore sex as a primary condition of their belonging, but also acknowledges that their citizenship, by this I mean their terms of belonging in Japanese society, involves sexual relations with Japanese citizens. The subject position of sexual citizens—the requirement of sex for membership in the nation—makes it impossible to disaggregate love and money as motivations for marriage. Marriage resulting in the promise of permanent residency status and greater economic opportunities bars the separation of economic rationalism from feelings of love. Thus, for Filipina hostesses in Japan, marriage to Japanese men cannot be based solely on a profound love that is devoid of rational calculation.

In this talk, I would like to ask the questions—what is love, how is love constituted in the lives of migrant Filipina hostesses, and how is this love structurally determined. Scholars have long shown us that emotions do not exist in a vacuum, but instead their meanings emerge from particular social, cultural, and economic processes. Zelizer insists on not just the intermingling of love and money but how the meanings and ways they intersect are used to maintain social relationships. Zelizer refers to the variety of these relationships as “differentiated ties.” Eva Illouz, in her new book, Why Love Hurts shows how love “is shaped by social relations and institutions and that it circulates in a marketplace of unequal actors.” Meanings of love have been noted by family and marriage historians such as Nancy Cott, Stephanie Coontz, Estelle Freedman and John D’Emilio to be shaped by political economic conditions. Building on this idea, Anthony Giddens (1993) provides a telos of intimate relationships and calls attention to the recent transformation of marriages from the one-and-only nexus of “romantic love” to the active and contingent “confluent love” that as opposed to the perpetual commitment expected in romantic love is based on the search for a pure relationship, which could be ended if one is no longer without self-fulfilling
satisfaction. The idea of confluent love emerges from the notion that we constitute of liberal selves.

I want to engage these previous discussions of love by looking at the constitution of love among Filipina hostesses. Building from the well-established assertion that love emerges from particular social processes, I wish to speculate that the social constitution of love also takes shape from the particular social locations of subjects in relations of race, class, gender and nation. In other words, positionality matters, differentiating the configuration of the ways love and money intersect in the making of love in various marriages. In different gradations, Filipina migrant hostesses pursue marriage with Japanese men for a combination of love and material security with some marrying primarily for love, others for both love and money, and some purely for the material security of a visa. In this talk, I would like to systematically describe the process of this comingling.

To show the multiple ways that love/money intersect in the romances of Filipina hostesses and to show the different manifestations of “confluent love” among them, I propose that we place the motivations and outcomes of their marriage—whether it is for love or money—in a moral continuum in which emotional motivation is at one end and rational calculation at the other end. While the romantic sentiments of hostesses could fall at one end of this moral continuum with some guided more by instrumental calculations and others by an emotional interiority, the prominence of one does not disavow the other. Under this moral continuum, what Denise Brennan would distinguish as “emotion-driven love” and “strategic-driven love” would be deeply entangled. In this moral continuum, individuals who marry primarily for love with little conscious consideration for money would be at one end; individuals who have difficulty disentangling love and money would be in the middle; and individuals who marry for “zero love” would be at the other end. What I want to show is that regardless of where individuals stand in this moral continuum, money (and that is rational calculation) and love (that is emotional sentiment) comingle in the motivations and outcomes of marriages.

**Moral Continuum of Love and Money**

*Middle-Zone (Impossible to Disentangle): Rowena (and Elsa)*

In the middle of this moral continuum are relationships in which emotional desires and pragmatic gains are impossible to disentangle. Most relations pursued by hostesses fall in the middle of this moral spectrum; often pragmatism and emotions simultaneously shape their choices in romance. For hostesses, demonstrations of desire are most effectively displayed with pragmatic measures. This is because most—if not all—of their romantic prospects are with customers and the affective ties that develop between hostesses and customers blossom in the context of the commercial exchange of flirtation at the club, resulting in the

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1 “Confluent love” emerges from what Giddens refers to as “plastic sexuality,” the separation of sex from reproduction that comes not only from the rise of contraception but the sense of self that one could actively choose and cultivate (Giddens 1993; Giddens 1997).
The intertwining of love and money in the constitution of romance. Not surprisingly, hostesses describe the most “emotion-driven love” in monetary terms. Hostesses measure the enactments of love by lovers and husbands according to the weight of their financial provisions. How much a customer spends on you, how often someone visits you at the club, and the extent of monetary gifts he gives to you and your family in the Philippines would prove how much he loves you. Even tales of experiencing “love at first sight” are expressed via monetary calculations.

Let me give an example. When asked about her “love story,” the former hostess Rowena, for instance, immediately responded, “It was love at first sight.” After which, she proceeded to enumerate the expenses he incurred to demonstrate his love. First, she proudly shared with me the story of how her husband had released her from her labor contract by paying her middleman broker 150,000 pesos (US$3,000). Then, to further emphasize the weight of his love, she then let me know that he frequently visited her at the club and spent a lot of money to see her. As she described:

For one and a half month, he would go to the o-mise everyday. Then he went home to the Philippines with me. He earned a lot. He put it all in his credit card. In one day, he would spend 40,000 yen. He spent a lot there everyday. He even calculated it. (She laughs.) He spent 2,000,000 [yen] in one and half months from going there…he went everyday from the start to the end [of her contract].

For Rowena, the monetary expense of her husband establishes the depth of his love and devotion to her. Moreover, it serves as proof that he indeed experienced “love at first sight,” for why else would he have visited her at the club so frequently and have spent so much money on her from the moment he first met her to the moment she had to return to the Philippines if he did not love her.

Motivation/Money and Outcome/Love: Minda
Couplings that clearly involve the mingling of love and money are not always so morally palatable as Rowena’s, in which her references to money do not discount the supposed authenticity of her feelings of love. We have on one end hostesses who are unabashedly motivated by money. Indeed, many hostesses enter their marriages with Japanese men largely for pragmatic and material purposes. While they do so, we should realize that marrying for these reasons does not discount “emotionally driven love” as a factor into their decision to marry. Indeed, the utmost generosity of a not very attractive husband—even a smelly

Likewise, Sealing Cheng observed that “money is proof of love” for Filipina entertainers in Korea (2010, 145).
Rowena is now a housewife and mother of two children in Tokyo, having married the customer who had helped release her from her labor contract after only one term as a contract worker. Rowena was only 15 years old when she began working in Japan. Despite her youth, her father gave her permission to marry the customer, a man nine years senior, telling her “whatever happened to me would be my responsibility.”
At the time, 40,000 yen was approximately US$400.
one—could lead to emotionally charged sentiments of love. Minda, for instance, describes herself as “a practical woman,” who married her husband because of her “need to provide for her children” in the Philippines. She was not shy to admit to me that she felt comatose when having sex with her husband, physically repulsed by his old wrinkly body, during the first few years of their marriage. As she told me, “I am a practical person. I married my husband but I had no feelings for him. I remember just laying on the bed motionless while he had sex with me. I did not feel a response.” Yet, after seven years of spending every waking moment with him, she describes the development of her deep feelings of love for him, one engendered by her appreciation for his monthly remittance of US$1,000 to her children in the Philippines. The case of Minda tells us that feelings of love could fluctuate towards one end of the emotional spectrum of emotionally charged and rationally calculated sentiments, a fact that questions our urge to distinguish the two.

Motivation/Love and Outcome/Money: Eden
Let us move to the other end of the moral continuum. What if it is authentic irrational love that motivates one’s decision to marry? This surely had been the case with the 30-year-old Eden, who married for love without any financial motivation. I can say this because Eden and her husband are among the poorest of the poor in the Philippines. Yet, while money did not at all play a factor in the beginning of their relationship, it had become an issue in the maintenance of their family.

I had met Eden in Japan. She told me that she had come to Japan to find a Japanese who she could marry for a visa. This was not a decision that she came to on her own. Instead, she and her husband in the Philippines jointly decided that she would go to Japan as a tourist and once there she would find a Japanese man to marry as a means for them to obtain legal residency in Japan. To reach their goal as a family, Eden and her husband collectively decided to put their marriage on hold for five years, or however long it takes for Eden to receive permanent residency. Afterwards, Eden would divorce her second husband and then petition for her first husband to join her in Japan. According to Eden, this option is worth the sacrifice and a much better one than staying in the Philippines, where her family would only face a downward spiral to starvation. In the Philippines, Eden and her husband had been members of the working poor. With both having only completed an elementary education, they lived in the slums of Manila and struggled to feed their children. The opportunity to visit Japan as a tourist came through the invitation of her sister, who was once an entertainer and now a permanent resident. Not wanting to only stay in Japan temporarily as a tourist, Eden looked for a potential husband immediately after arriving in Japan and met one during her first month in the country.

The case of Eden gives us an example of what Denise Brennan describes as marriage as an “advancement strategy,” but in this instance it is not merely an individual but instead a family advancement strategy (Brennan 2003). Eden and her husband show us how the maintenance of the most deep-seated emotionally charged love is not void of the most calculated decisions. Both marriages of Eden occupy what historian Gail Hershatter describes
as a “chaotic zone outside the reach of the state’s legal and moral strictures” (Hershatter 1999, 381). Eden’s marriage for a visa makes her morally suspect. As we see with the treatment of mail-order brides, states usually view marriage for pragmatic motivations to be morally suspicious (Constable 2003). Likewise raising an eyebrow is the decision of Eden and her Filipino husband to have Eden marry a Japanese man as an advancement strategy for their family. Yet, the decision of Eden to seek a second husband does not necessarily fall outside of dominant moral strictures. After all, most marriages are held together by a combination of pragmatism and emotions and Eden’s actions, clearly dictated primarily by pragmatism, just fall on one end of this moral spectrum. The impulse to shun the decision of women such as Eden to engage in marriages without love or the urge to dismiss marriages that depend on the commercial sexual liaisons of women as occupying a “chaotic zone” foreign to the norms of society lose sight of the fact that all marriages involve the intermingling of emotions and pragmatism with certain relations falling on one or the other extreme of this moral spectrum. Eden and her Filipino husband remind us that pragmatism and emotions co-exist in relationships that are seemingly only held together by emotion-driven love.

But what do we make of the relationship of Eden to her Japanese husband? Does she not have some moral accountability to him? To enter marriages knowing of its finite period threatens the moral norms in both Japanese and Philippine society. Japanese courts do not recognize no-fault divorces while the Philippine state does not even recognize divorce. Thus, it is assumed in both societies that individuals enter marriage with the intention of staying in the relationship until death. One could argue then that Eden and her husband are deceiving her Japanese husband. However, and this is what is interesting, Eden is merely applying the moral norms of hostess work to her marriage. Hostesses look at customers as temporary boyfriends who they shower with love and affection within a temporally limited period. In a club, customers usually know to expect nothing more than the erotic thrills and titillations they experience during their temporally limited period with hostesses. Likewise, Eden sees her seven years of marriage to a Japanese man as a temporally limited period in which she would shower her husband with affection. And like a customer in a hostess club, he should expect nothing more than the thrills he would receive from Eden’s affection during the temporally bound period of their marriage.

**Conclusion**

Let me now conclude. My paper illustrates the comingling of love and money in the marriages pursued by Filipina hostesses in Japan. Building on the Zelizer’s notion of “differentiated ties” and Giddens’s “confluent love,” this talk establishes the existence of a moral continuum of love. This moral continuum questions the binary of “strategy driven love” and “emotion driven love” in most writings on international marriages, and the dismissal of

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5 Mirroring the morals of Eden and her husband, husbands in New York and Shanghai have been known to manage the commercial sexual activities of their wives with other men (Clement 2006; Hershatter 1999). Some may even find these liaisons lucrative.
“strategy driven love” as morally suspect. The latter is particularly the case in the United States but not alien in Japan, where marriage is considered an avenue for stability but is generally perceived as an institution requiring of not just love but an irrational and passionate love.

But I hope that this is not the only thing I am doing here—establish that love and money intersect. My discussion I hope disrupts notions of a dominant form of love, one for instance maintained by Anthony Giddens, when he presents a teleology of love. Platonic love, erotic love, romantic love, and intimate love are just some of the configurations of love accepted and recognized as valid by migrant Filipina hostesses.

Lastly, our acknowledgement of the continuum of love and money and the multiple constitutions of love leads us to the queering of marriages by the dismantling of a unitary definition of love. In state constructions of love, missing is the variations of love that we see among hostesses, but their world shows us that there is not just erotic love or romantic love but also platonic love and intimate love. Society however organizes itself via moral norms of love. Love is assumed to be an irrational, deep-seated emotion. In Japan, for example, court cases reviewed by Mark West shows that judges have assumed that love makes one irrational to the point that it justified and mitigated culpability in rape and sometimes murder. Interestingly, the harassment incurred by a victim in stalking is only illegal when it is based on “feelings of love or other feels of affection” (West 2011, 63). Court opinions repeatedly show that love in Japan is considered an uncontrollable and irrational force, allowing for the breaking of rules against what is considered ordinary behavior.

The recognition of these various forms of love—erotic, romantic, platonic, intimate—I would argue is our ultimate way of “queering” marriage. It truly expands our vision of legitimate partnerships. Limiting our understanding of “queer” marriages to the recognition of sexual preferences does not free us of homogenizing love. It assumes and leaves unquestioned that (1) sex is a prerequisite for marriage and (2) erotic love or romantic love (irrational love) is to be expected in genuine marital partnerships. Platonic love should be recognized as a valid and genuine basis for marriage, as such a love is not necessarily void of deep commitment and genuine partnership. This tells us that queering is not limited to sexual practices. Instead, the recognition of variances of love as a legitimate basis of marriage makes it an institution inclusive of a wider array of people.

References


The Family in the Context of Stepwise International Migration: 
The Case of Filipino Nurses

Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos
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Introduction

The emigration of Filipino nurses\(^1\) to the US from the Philippines, which was briefly postponed during World War II, began during the 1940s and intensified under the US Immigration Act of 1965.\(^2\) Filipino nurses began migrating to Europe in the 1960s, then to the Middle East (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Libya), Canada, and Singapore in the 1970s. In the 1990s, Australia, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) also became major destinations. Recently, other developed countries such as Japan, Germany, and Austria have also expressed their intention to hire Filipino nurses amidst acute nursing shortages and the greying of their populations.

This increasing number of destinations that solicit foreign workers has influenced the current nursing labour market in the Philippines, raising the hopes and aspirations of Filipino nurses working overseas, while encouraging more students to take up a nursing course in college. However, unpredictable and ambiguous migration policies in many work destinations make entry into their labour markets difficult, resulting in a large pool of nurses “stranded” in the Philippines, waiting to be deployed overseas. These conditions have paved the way for the popularization of the stepwise pattern of international labour migration (SILM) of nurses.

This paper emphasizes how the “stepwise” (also called multistage or multistep) migration of Filipino nurses, in which they work sequentially in several countries that serve as transit points to their preferred country (final destination), is a rational behaviour and strategy for the migrant and his family. This study found that nurses from the Philippines follow (and are likely to follow) SILM through a hierarchy of destinations. By going through several transit points, they are able to use their time efficiently, while waiting for opportunities in their most desired destination, to accumulate resources—human, financial,

\(^1\) In this paper, I focus on Filipino nurses who have taken up a Bachelor of Science in Nursing in the Philippines.
\(^2\) Philippine Nurses Association. For details about the history of Filipino nurse migration to the US, see Choy (2003).
social, and political—which are necessary to gain access and employment to the next country.

In this paper, I focus on SILM and the crucial role of the family in choosing transit and final destinations in SILM. The availability of family reunification policies, citizenship, and integration programs will be emphasized as an important deciding factor, as nurses move up the hierarchy of preferred destinations. Another essential implication of SILM (compared to other migration patterns) relates to the social and psychological costs to both the migrant and the family “left-behind.” It can be hypothesized that these costs are greater because the separation period is longer. However, further studies need to be done to validate this hypothesis.

This presentation is organized as follows: The next section is a discussion of the conceptual and analytical framework of SILM that draws on two previous papers by the author (Carlos 2010; 2011) and the research of Paul (2011). In section 2, study results are presented and then connected to the family dimension of international labour migration (Section 3). The last section summarizes the findings of this study. For a more detailed treatment of this presentation, please refer to Carlos (2013).

1. Analytical Framework—Stepwise Migration

Simply defined, SILM is a pattern, pathway, or strategy in which migrants move from one transit country (the stepping stone) to another until they reach their most preferred destination. This series of rational decision-making processes involves the constant assessment of labour and migration conditions and policies in host countries, as well as the migrants’ own capabilities and resources to move or relocate to better destinations, until they reach the countries they intend to settle in permanently (Carlos and Sato 2010; 2011). This is known as the “stepping stone” phenomenon in the UK (Kingma 2008; Buchan et al. 2005; Buchan, Jobanputra, Gough et al. 2005; Matsuno 2009) and as the “cascade” model among OECD countries (Dumont and Zum 2007). However, there is no detailed analysis on how and why this behavioural pattern happens.

SILM has three important features that distinguish it from one-time and circular patterns of migration. First, it consists of multiple stages of migration from one destination to another following some form of hierarchy. Second, stepwise migrants are not simply “transients” who spend a week or a month in one destination. Instead, they remain in one destination for years. Third, this pattern has a dynamic nature in which the migrants make a series of decisions—either at the beginning of their journey (departure from the source country) or along the way to their most preferred final destination. Their journey may be planned to some extent from the beginning, but it may also be unplanned (Paul 2011).

2. The Dynamics of Stepwise Migration among Filipino Nurses

This section discusses how and why stepwise migration has become a common practice
among Filipino nurses, as indicated by the results of fieldwork conducted in Singapore, Australia, the UAE, Japan, and the United States. The fieldwork comprises two parts: (1) the implementation of a common survey questionnaire through snowballing, with a few items redesigned to be compatible with the current migration situation and labour migration policies of specific destinations; and (2) semi-structured interviews and focused group discussions (FGD) with some of the respondents and stakeholders.³

2.1 Do Filipino Nurses Engage in a Stepwise Migration Strategy?
In order to determine whether Filipino nurses engage in stepwise migration, we first inquired about their work experience before moving to their current location. The survey results show that some respondents worked in countries outside the Philippines at least once. In addition, all respondents in Singapore had some work experience in their home country, whereas some nurses in Australia and the UAE had none. This is because in Australia⁴ and the UAE, alternative migration pathways, other than working visas, for which a Philippine license is often required, are available to Filipino nurses.

2.2 How Do Filipino Nurses Engage in Stepwise Migration?
To further understand how exactly stepwise migration took place among the nurses in this study, we examined their pathways and periods of stay in each destination. The results revealed several trends in SILM.

First, migrant nurses stay in one destination for a considerable period, usually years. This length of stay is necessary to accumulate the human and political resources (i.e., experience, skills, and citizenship) required to move to the next destination. Another interesting trend is that the majority of those with experience working outside of the Philippines were previously based in the UK, Ireland, the KSA, and other Middle Eastern countries. The KSA emerged as the most popular, with the exception of the UK for Australia-based nurses. Apparently, the KSA has been actively recruiting nurses from the Philippines since the 1970s. Easy access to nursing jobs through POEA-accredited recruitment agencies, fast processing, and immediate deployment at an affordable cost largely contribute to its popularity as an initial transit destination. For Filipino nurses currently working in Australia, the UK (18.5%) and Ireland (9.2%) emerged as previous popular places to work.

Third, compared to those based in Singapore and the UAE, many who now work in Australia had passed through several transit destinations, the most popular being the UK and Ireland (as mentioned above). One interviewee who left the Philippines in 2000 said that

³ For details of the methodology and results, please refer to Carlos (2013).
⁴ The visas available are as follows: (a) Nurses sponsored by an employer (Temporary Work (Skilled) Visa (Subclass 457), Employer Nomination Scheme and Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme); (b) Skilled Migration (Independent migrant, sponsorship by an eligible Australian relative or nominated by a state or territory government); (c) Working holiday; (d) Temporary visa option to do a bridging program to improve skills; (e) Training and Research (Occupational Trainee Stream) Visa; (f) Visitor (Business Stream) Visa (Subclass 600); (g) Student visa (Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship of Australia 2013).
compared to those originating directly from the Philippines, “it was much easier and less expensive to come to Australia with the UK passport, UK experience, and a UK nursing license.” Given these advantages, we can infer that Filipino nurses who possess British or Irish passports are more likely to engage in stepwise migration to Australia.

To further verify the current country’s status as a final or a transit destination, the respondents were asked about their future plans. The survey results show that while only 8% of respondents in Australia had plans of leaving that country to work in another destination, more than half of the nurses in Singapore (54.7%) and the UAE (79.6%) had plans to do so. Moreover, a considerable percentage of the respondents in these two transit countries were still undecided on whether to stay or move to the next destination. Such trends were further confirmed by asking the respondents how long they planned to stay in the current destination to work. About 80% of those in Australia wanted to remain in the country for an additional ten years or more, while 70-80% of those in Singapore and the UAE had shorter-term plans of no more than five additional years. The migrant’s decision depends on the differences in each host country’s policies regarding (1) economic factors (differences in salary, benefits, and other labour conditions); (2) factors concerning resource accumulation and transferability; and (3) factors related to family reunification and integration.

It can be inferred from these trends that a hierarchy in the preferred destinations of stepwise labour migrants exists, with transit destinations being further ranked as initial, “in-between,” or intermediate, followed by the final destination. Initially, nurses go wherever there are opportunities to work, which suggests that such rankings are most probably not determined before their first departure from the Philippines. As they move along their stepwise pathways and accumulate resources overseas, the succeeding decision-making process that determines whether and when to stay or move becomes more systematic.

2.3 Why Do Filipino Nurses Engage in a Stepwise Migration Strategy?
Evidently, the tendency for nurses to take a roundabout pathway and pass through several transit destinations instead of heading directly to their most preferred final destination is a rational strategy in light of the variations in each destinations’ nurse migration policies. Filipino nurses initially go to countries that implement easy-entry, easy-exit policies and wait for the chance to go to the preferred destinations that have relatively unpredictable migration policies.

The unpredictable labour migration policies of many preferred countries encourage potential migrant nurses to initially work in less desirable destinations. Whether, when, and how to recruit and accept foreign nurses is singlehandedly decided by stakeholders in these destinations. Respondents pointed out that staying in a transit country is an efficient and effective way to spend time while waiting for the opportunity to work in their most preferred destination, which depends largely on immigration policy reforms that may take years to be approved.

Instead of staying in the Philippines, many will first work in less favoured destinations with more restrictive labour conditions and lower pay, but also have shorter processing times.
and requirements that are easier to meet because of active recruitment. Indeed, when the respondents were asked about their top three reasons for working in their current destinations, 71.7% of those in Singapore and 59.6% of those in the UAE chose “having the opportunity because this country actively recruits nurses from the Philippines.” In contrast, only 11.3% of the respondents from Australia chose this response. This finding confirms that countries actively recruiting from the Philippines easily become immediate or initial transit destinations for these nurses, but not necessarily their final destinations.

Filipino nurses engage in SILM to accumulate resources that are useful in the next destination. Results show that transferrable resources in the forms of human resources (skills and license), economic (financial) resources, social networks, and political resources (citizenship) can be accumulated in initial and transit destinations, motivating nurses to work there first and engage in this stepwise strategy. Regarding human resources, Filipino nurses target skills acquisition in the transit country to make them more marketable in the next destination. Moreover, having a license appears to be a valuable asset, enabling some nurses to work immediately upon arrival in the more or most preferred destination. The licensure or board examinations are objective ways of assessing nursing skills and the knowledge accumulated elsewhere, as well as evaluating their transferability across countries. In some countries, licenses are honoured under a mutual recognition scheme, so that nurses can begin working with minimal orientation from the new employers.

Nurses also accumulate the economic resources to cover moving expenses to the next destination, such as recruitment fees, examination and review fees, and transportation and settlement costs. Because of low salaries in the Philippines, these nurses prefer to work outside the country for a much higher pay that can then be saved to cover such expenses. Social networks (social resources) that include Filipino friends, families, and community, international recruitment agencies, and co-workers from other countries are easily accessed within a transit destination and provide nurses with increasingly accurate information about other countries. Recently, the Internet has become vital for recruitment and as a source of information on life and work in potential destinations. Access to a preferred destination’s labour market is sometimes easier from transit destinations, since some international recruitment agencies establish temporary and permanent offices there rather than in the Philippines to avoid strict Filipino recruitment regulations and because employers prefer nurses with experience working overseas.

Most of all, many of the respondents value the citizenship (political resource) obtained in temporary destinations through naturalization as a way to easily access more favourable employment conditions in another country. It also gives them equal rights and privileges under the country’s law and allows them to settle permanently without migration restrictions. Many destination countries also use citizenship to attract and retain foreign nurses. Moreover, citizenship provides the entire family with the opportunity to join the migrant and become citizens. Indeed, in contrast to the common notion that a migrant will stay if he/she becomes a naturalized citizen in a host country, the nurses in the study instead consider such access to citizenship as a vital means to move to another destination.
3. The Family in the Choice of Transit and Final Destinations

For Filipino nurses, policies concerning migrant family reunification and integration gain greater significance as they move through their hierarchy of preferred destinations. While the final destinations in this study, Australia and the US, openly promote and support policies and practices related to migrant families, transit destinations (the UK, the UAE, and Singapore) have imposed less accommodating policies. These differences affect the migrants’ long-term plans on where to migrate in the hierarchy of destinations, rather than the initial decision on whether to migrate or not. Below, I describe the policies of three destination countries based on their position in the hierarchy—Singapore as initial transit destination, UK as in-between transit destination, and Australia as final destination.

3.1 “Easy Entry-Easy Exit” Transit Destinations: The Case of Singapore

Singapore represents a group of destinations that allow easy entry because of its well-established foreign worker employment policy and its organized recruitment system. The private sector, including hospitals, care-home administrations, and private recruitment agencies are actively involved in bringing in foreign nurses (Personal communication with a recruiter in Singapore, 19 March 2008). Many Filipino nurses from the Philippines take up jobs in Singapore, if only to facilitate their easy exit to a preferable destination.

It is evident from the interviews that finding work in Singapore compared to the US, Australia, and other receiving countries is relatively easier, faster and cheaper. Because of the acute nursing shortage, the urgent need to fill vacant positions, and its efficient, transparent processing system (in terms of what documents are needed and the adoption of online applications and verification software), the entire recruitment process from application to employment usually takes one to two months, compared to second years in the US. Applications can be lodged through relatives in Singapore, partner recruitment agencies in the Philippines, or via the Internet. The recruitment fee is comparably less expensive and paid using an easier repayment scheme. As of 2008, the recruitment fee ranged from $1,500 to $3,000, which was paid by the Filipino nurses in instalments after their arrival in Singapore.

Compared to their counterparts in many destination countries, Singaporean employers and the Singapore Nursing Board play crucial roles in recruitment. A nurse administrator interviewed in 2010 mentioned that they went to the Philippines with licensure examination administrators to conduct examinations and interviews. Singaporean employers can easily hire foreign nurses because they do not pay any fees to recruiters and are assured that a nurse who performs poorly during the six-month probationary period can be “returned and replaced with another nurse from the Philippines” (Personal communication with a recruiter in Singapore, 19 March 2008).

While Singapore and some Middle Eastern countries openly and actively recruit foreign workers, their conditions after arrival are rather difficult. Residence status is tied to the type of working visa received, which in turn is based on salary, job category, possession
of a professional license, and nationality.\(^5\) By setting rules based on these criteria, the government can selectively accept “desirable” foreign workers and their families.

Foreign workers in Singapore are categorized according to their skills, with domestic helpers and construction workers at the bottom (categorized as unskilled) and skilled professionals on top. Filipino registered nurses are considered “mid-level skilled” workers. With the “S pass” visas\(^6\) they receive, they enjoy a greater number of better privileges than do foreign workers in construction and many services sectors. However, their privileges are fewer and less superior than those accorded to professionals engaged in IT, education, research, pharmaceuticals, and other high-value added sectors.

According to the latest (2013) information provided in the Ministry of Manpower’s website, “S-pass” holders are only allowed to bring in their immediate family members (spouse and unmarried biological and/or legally adopted children below age 21) as dependents, if their monthly fixed salary is at least $2,800.\(^7\) They are barred from applying for dependent visas for their parents and parents-in-law. While many of the respondents could meet such salary requirements, they chose not to petition for dependent visas because of Singapore’s high cost of living. Costs for housing and children’s education are not subsidized by the government or by the employer. Some respondents bring their families in only for a vacation since the Philippines is only a three-hour flight from Singapore.

Moreover, in Singapore, citizenship through naturalization is generally not granted to foreign workers unless they marry a local or if there are extraordinary circumstances.\(^8\) Dual citizenship is disallowed. Nurses with S-pass visas can apply for permanent residency, which allows them to work in Singapore and bring in their immediate family members relatively easily. This does not, however, assure them and their family the right to permanently stay in the country, since this status is tied to employer sponsorship. Permanent residency and re-entry permits, to enter and exit Singapore, are both issued with specific validity dates, and can only be renewed by showing proof of employment (Immigration and Checkpoints Authority Singapore, n.d). For the migrant, the difficulty in maintaining permanent residency and more so, obtaining citizenship in Singapore have important implications on family settlement, which becomes one of the motivations to move to another destination.

### 3.2 The Preferred “In-between” Transit Destinations: The UK

Based on the stepwise pathways revealed by respondents, the UK\(^9\) and Ireland are considered the preferred “in-between” transit destinations of Filipino nurses for many reasons.

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\(^5\) For example, in Singapore, the approved source countries for the manufacturing sector are China, Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong only. Philippine nationals are also not allowed to work in the construction sector.

\(^6\) For details about the S-pass, see the Ministry of Manpower Singapore (2012).

\(^7\) This minimum required amount was raised to $4,000 in September 2012, making it more difficult for nurses to petition for their immediate family members.

\(^8\) Young foreign men may become Singaporean citizens if they complete the National Service military obligation.

\(^9\) For more details about the results of the survey and discussions on the situation and policies in the United Kingdom circa 2000, please refer to Carlos and Sato (2010).
First, compared the initial destinations of Singapore and the UAE, it is more difficult to enter the UK and Ireland because their requirements regarding work experience and licensing are more prohibitive. Second, access to recruiters for these destinations is quite limited in the Philippines. Many are often based in other transit destinations, like Singapore and the UAE, where interviews are also conducted. Third, these destinations offer higher salaries and better benefits than the initial transit destinations.

The last and perhaps most important difference from initial transit destinations is that these destinations provide migrant workers, who have lived in the country for a specified period, with opportunities to become citizens. In the UK, usually after five years, a migrant who holds an “indefinite leave to stay” visa is allowed to apply for British citizenship. Obtaining citizenship has dual implications for the migrant. First, it increases the probability of being hired in a more desired destination because of favourable policies and mutual agreement schemes (such as those among the Commonwealth countries) concerning employment and the status of citizens’ stays. One interviewee from Australia said, “When I was in the UK, everyone was eyeing UK citizenship because (we) wanted to go to Australia. It was easy for me to come to this country (Australia) because of my UK passport.” One interviewee in the UK also said, “now that I have a UK passport, I am planning to return to the UAE because (as a UK national) I will earn more compared to Filipino nationals there.”

Second, British citizenship is attractive for the Filipino migrant because it allows him to bring his family to the UK and apply for their citizenship. The entire family can then enjoy most of the privileges and rights accorded to UK-born citizens, such as free or subsidized education and social services. Holding a UK passport also allows the naturalized migrant and his family to live and work in other EU countries. Filipinos are also not required to give up their citizenship, since both the UK and the Philippines allow dual citizenship. Despite these privileges, however, Filipino nurses opt to leave this country for the US or Australia for reasons to be explained below.

3.3 Final Destinations: Australia and the US

Not surprisingly, the United States is the top destination because of its historical and cultural affinity with the Philippines. Buchan et al. (2005) and Buchan, Jobanputra, and Gough (2005) observe that a majority of nurses from other source countries are also inclined to target the US as a destination. It is the traditional destination for Filipinos who wish to pursue the American dream, as it has what Paul (2011) calls “place reputation.” In addition, the Philippine nursing curriculum is patterned after that of the United States, so that less adjustment is required in the workplace. A very large Filipino-American community is also available to support newly arrived nurses.

Career growth also appears to be important among the nurse migrants. Varied career options and clear career pathways in the US for foreign nurses contribute to its popularity as a final destination. In a telephone conversation (June 2012) with a Filipino nurse based in

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10 For details about the history of Filipino nurse migration to the US, see Choy (2003).
Washington D.C., he noted, “while in other countries, there are very few options for nurses, especially Filipino nurses, in the United States there is career development or job promotion… Here in the US, if you really work hard, you get recognized, you get promoted, you get compensated, kahit sino ka pa [whoever you are].” Filipino nurses in the US not only find opportunities to work in hospitals but also in other fields such as home nursing care, medical insurance, and nursing-related businesses. They have assumed important positions such as vice-president of a health care company, owner of an elderly care home or head nurse in a hospital.

This study reveals why Australia is also an emerging final destination for Filipino nurses. Among all the destinations, this country offers one of the highest salaries and best benefit schemes, such as a six-week annual leave. Opportunities for career growth, citizenship, and family reunification are available. Australia’s milder weather and a shorter visiting distance from the Philippines, compared to the UK or Ireland, are appealing. Respondents also mentioned Australia has having “lots of space” and a positive environment for raising children and building a family.

Since family reunification has been a vital part of Australian immigration policy, nurses can include their immediate family members in their application for a skilled worker visa, a relative-sponsored visa, or even a student visa. Converting a working visa to permanent residency also takes less time compared to many other destinations. One respondent was able to get permanent residence visas for herself and her husband through employer nomination barely a year after migrating to Australia on a working visa (Interview with a Filipino nurse in Darwin, 2012). This visa ensures that she and her family can stay and work in Australia on a permanent basis, receive subsidized healthcare, and access certain social security benefits and payments. They will be eligible to apply for Australian citizenship after one or two years. It also gives her family the opportunity to sponsor relatives such as siblings, parents, and cousins from the Philippines.

Similar to the US, Australia, being an immigrant country, allows for dual citizenship. For naturalized Philippine-born nurses, this is an advantage if they want to enjoy the rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen, such as owning land and other real estate in the Philippines and long-term stays without the necessity of applying for a visa, while keeping a residence in Australia. Moreover, the multicultural character of Australian communities in terms of hosting migrants from many countries and having ethnic restaurants and groceries appeals strongly to the respondents. More importantly, national and local governments, as well as the workplace provide opportunities to people of different origins and backgrounds to actively interact through its multicultural policies and programs. For example, multicultural festivals (country days) and seminars are held to promote understanding of varied cultures, and free interpretation services in many languages are provided.

From the discussions above, it is clear that opportunities for family reunification, citizenship for all family members, and its integration into the host society contribute to the stepwise migrant’s decision whether to stay in one destination or to move through the hierarchy of preferred destinations.
Summary

In this paper, I highlighted the perspective of the family in our understanding of migration patterns, particularly SILM. First, I introduced SILM, which I described as a pattern in which a migrant worker makes a series of rational sequential decisions to move from one destination to another (the transit countries) until he reaches his final destination. In the second part of this presentation, I showed that in SILM, the consideration of the family is a crucial factor in the nurse migrant’s choice of where to move in his hierarchy of transit and final destinations.

Empirical studies conducted in the US, Singapore, the UK, Australia, and the UAE indicate that SILM is common among Filipino nurses. Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the UK emerged as transit destinations, while the US and Australia are considered as their preferred final destinations. These transit destinations allow them to efficiently use their “waiting” time to accumulate the transferrable human (skills), social (networks), financial, and political (citizenship) resources required to attain preferred destinations.

As the migrant moves through the hierarchy of destinations, the availability of social and economic integration policies, as well as reunification and citizenship opportunities for the entire family become important as factors in choosing where and when to move next, and then finally settle. Of the resources accumulated in transit destinations, citizenship is of utmost importance because it allows for family reunification and settlement. It also entitles the migrant and his family members to the privileges accorded to those born in that country, particularly the opportunity to live, work, and settle in other preferred destinations. In this sense, citizenship through naturalization becomes a powerful resource for SILM migrants to access better destinations, rather than accepting a status that encourages them to settle in the transit destination. Moreover, the availability of integration programs for migrant families, such as language and skills training, assistance and subsidies in the areas of education, health, and housing become crucial deciding factors in where Filipino nurses finally settle.

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The Face of ‘Family’ in Social Cohesion Research: 
An Australian Case Study

Rogelia Pe-Pua

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This presentation draws from a study of drivers of social cohesion in multicultural Australia (Dandy and Pe-Pua 2013). Using Jenson’s social cohesion framework and its dimensions of belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition and legitimacy, we conducted 15 focus group discussions with 138 community residents; and interviewed 54 key informants (government and non-government service providers and community representatives). Among the themes that emerged from this study are those related to changes to the immigrant and refugee families and households as they form a new life in a new country. A main theme in relation to belonging is the attachment the families have towards their ethnic groups, as well as to the local and national community which is influenced by a number of factors. Inclusion is a dimension of social cohesion where families had to make the greatest adjustment and face the most discrimination and conflict. Community and political participation are low. Their experiences in the dimension of recognition—mutual tolerance and respect—are colored with some tensions in intergroup relations, some racism and discrimination, and a lack of awareness of Aboriginal Australian cultures and heritage. Issues of legitimacy usually relate to some distrust of government departments and the police. These issues of social cohesion will be discussed together with key factors that influence social cohesion. Last but not least, some relevant programs that aim at enhancing social cohesion are outlined.

PANEL 2

MIGRANTS, EDUCATION POLICIES AND MULTICULTURALISM
Introduction

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Our modern society is undergoing substantial paradigm shifts. Particularly, the spread of globalization is accelerating international mobility and migration, and in the near future our society will surely become much more diverse, more multicultural and multilingual than it is now. However, this diversity is not always a blessing to a given society. Rather it requires many efforts and dialogues: to promote peaceful coexistence between multiple races, ethnicities, and cultures; and to celebrate and sustain language diversity, religious diversity, and social equity. This panel explores ways to resolve such diverse aspects of conflicts related to multiculturalism in our changing society primarily from linguistic and educational perspectives.

The first topic is related to migrant issues in Japan. Due to the revision of the Japanese Immigration Law in 1990, there has been a great influx of Latin Americans of Japanese descent, mostly Brazilians, working in Japan. Focusing on their “language resources,” Sumiko Haino analyses the case of second-generation Brazilian adolescents and examines the larger question of whether a multicultural society in Japan is sustainable.

The second topic is “Conflicting Ideologies in Japan’s English Education: Past, Present, and Future.” In recent years, due to the worldwide expansion of English as a lingua franca, special attention has been paid to improving English language education in Japan. Nonetheless, there still are heated debates in terms of what is the purpose of learning English for the Japanese and the implementation of meaningful language policies. Interestingly enough, this has been a recurring issue. Shoichi Matsumura sheds light on what ideologies lie behind the English language policy in Japan, based on his research with a survey covering elementary school teachers’ perceptions of Japan’s English education policies.

Finally, William Bradley reexamines multiculturalism from a theoretical point of view. He poses a fundamental question about the concept of multiculturalism, claiming that theory cannot allow for actual, diverse practices in our multicultural societies, and explores a new dimension of what may exist in post-multiculturalism.
Sustainable Multicultural Society and Second Generation Brazilians in Japan

Sumiko Haino
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Introduction

Aim of This Study
This paper aims to examine whether a multicultural society in Japan is sustainable by analyzing the cases of second-generation Brazilian adolescents residing in Japan, who contribute to the Brazilian community via their bilingual language proficiency.

Specifically, I will examine the cases of Brazilian adolescents who learned Portuguese in a supplementary Portuguese language course offered by a Brazilian school, or Portuguese classes offered by a university in Tokyo. Then, I will analyze the purpose of their learning and reasons for their chosen professions which allowed them to exercise their Portuguese language proficiency.

Among the informants are a few people who were born in Japan; almost all of them came to Japan by the age of ten. To be precise, they may be a 1.75 or a 1.5 generations rather than second generation. The common point among the informants is their Portuguese and Japanese bilingual proficiency gained through a Japanese university education.

Background
(1) Multiculturalization in Japan and Immigrant Language
By the end of 2012, the foreign population in Japan comprised 1.6% of the total population, which is much lower than other countries such as the United States or Australia. Yet, their social integration into local society in Japan has been discussed for more than 20 years, with a focus on their Japanese language proficiency in realizing that integration. From this point of view, Brazilians in Japan have been criticized for their low Japanese proficiency. As interpreters, Brazilian children whose parents do not speak Japanese fluently, often have to support their family in Japan.

The immigrant language has been treated as one of the tools or personal resources that contribute to the acquisition of the primary language of the host society, the stabilization of their identity, and the maintenance of their domestic communication. Nowadays, the immigrant language as a social resource also, is considered to have the potential to bring some merit to the host society directly. Accordingly, in the United States or Canada, those who are able to speak their mother tongue as well as English are treated as human resources
who have gained bilingual and bicultural literacy. Unfortunately, in Japan, this type of recognition has not yet occurred.

Nevertheless, in Japan, people who have multilingual proficiency are in high demand, and the idea of “immigrant language as a social resource” is starting to be recognized and is gradually being pursued (Shoji 2010). In this study, then, I investigate the significance of the Portuguese language proficiency of second generation Brazilians in Japanese society where multiculturalization is in progress.

(2) Second Generation Brazilians in Japan and their Portuguese Language Acquisition
The second generation Brazilians residing in Japan have more opportunity to maintain or relearn Portuguese than Brazilians in other countries, and more opportunity when compared with members of other ethnic groups in Japan. While there are more than 60 Brazilian schools in Japan where Portuguese can be learnt, the majority of Brazilian families have selected Japanese schools for their children. Hence, their Portuguese education is entrusted to their parents. In some towns with a high Brazilian population, there are some Portuguese classes sponsored by local governments or non-profit educational support organizations. Although the number is limited, some public schools have mother-tongue classes for immigrant children.

Second-generation Brazilian adults can learn Portuguese in private lessons or at language schools with Japanese students. Recently, we have found some Brazilian students in departments in some Japanese universities which teach Portuguese. Even though these Brazilian adolescents pretend to learn the language from scratch, almost all of them have an advantage in listening. They have succeeded in attaining Portuguese listening proficiency unconsciously in their home.

Portuguese proficiency is necessary to survive in Brazil for the returning second generation Brazilians. Following the so-called Lehman Shock (the global financial crisis of 2008) and Great East Japan Earthquake (2011), about 30% of Brazilians in Japan returned to Brazil. The recent economic growth in Brazil also influenced their return. As a result, those children who transferred to Brazilian schools in Brazil encountered language and cultural difficulties. Some of them take private lessons, with their parents as impromptu teachers of Portuguese. In relation to the argument concerning the indispensability of Portuguese acquisition upon returning to Brazil, this preliminary study refers to the relationship between career formation of Japanese-Portuguese bilingual Brazilian adolescents in Japan and the sustainability of a multicultural Japanese society.

Research Method
I conducted 90 minute interviews with two second-generation Brazilians adolescents who live in a town with a concentrated Brazilian population. I also interviewed five Brazilian students who studied Portuguese at universities in Japan in 2011 and 2012. In addition, a questionnaire was given to first-year students of the Department of Portuguese, at a university in Chiba, in April 2013. The reasons for selecting that particular department was among the
questions asked. All of the names in this article are fictitious.

1. Places to Learn Portuguese

1.1 Formal Education
At the end of 2012, there were about 190,000 Brazilians in Japan and about 23,000 of them were school-age children (i.e., from 5 to 14 years old) (Ministry of Justice). About 4,000 of them were studying in Brazilian schools. More than 60 schools exist in Brazilian-concentrated towns, and 44 of them are recognized by the Ministry of Education of Brazil (Brazilian Embassy in Japan). Seven are in the process of applying for authorization. The students can study in Portuguese, and the credits gained in these schools may be accepted after returning to Brazil. In Brazilian schools, they can also study Japanese, and entrance into Japanese universities has been realized by a number of students (Haino 2011).

In Japanese schools in August 2012, there were about 9,000 pupils whose mother-tongue is Portuguese and who need special instruction in the Japanese language because of a lack of proficiency. For these pupils, the most urgent issue is Japanese language education; immigrant language education is considered a domestic matter in the Japanese public education system, even though there are some public elementary and junior high schools—in Hyogo, for example—that offer immigrant language classes to immigrant descendants. There are some high schools, such as in Kanagawa and Osaka, that have several foreign languages classes including Portuguese.

1.2 Non-formal Education
In Brazilian-concentrated towns, there are some Portuguese classes sponsored by local governments or non-profit educational support organizations. In several Catholic churches in Japan, such as the St. Ignatius Church in Yotsuya and Hamamatsu, after masses in Portuguese, Brazilian parents or priests have offered Portuguese language classes or Bible readings in Portuguese for Brazilian children. Moreover, on weekday afternoons or on Saturdays, Brazilian schools offer supplementary Portuguese language courses for Brazilian children who study in Japanese schools.

1.3 Second Generation Brazilian Adults
In Japan, there are six universities that have a department teaching the Portuguese language. In other universities, Brazilian students can learn Portuguese as one of the modern foreign languages. Language extension courses are also available. In cities like Tokyo, there are many foreign language courses or classes including Portuguese. Private lessons are also an option. Kenichi, who came to Japan when he was ten years old, studied Portuguese with a private Brazilian teacher before entering the Department of Portuguese at a university in the Kansai region because his family had changed the language used at home from Portuguese to Japanese just after entering Japan.
2. Reasons for Learning Portuguese

Below I present some case studies to ascertain the reasons and motivations to learn Portuguese.

2.1 Case of Sérgio
Sérgio (24) came to Japan in 1998 when he was ten years old. He entered a public elementary school and, three years later, he began studying Portuguese in a supplementary Portuguese language course offered by a Brazilian school near his house. His younger brother who was forgetting Portuguese gradually had already started to learn the language, and he decided to follow in his brother’s steps and continued his study for three years. All of his family members have a permanent Japanese visa. He is the eldest son and always talks in Portuguese with his parents, preferring Japanese to communicate with his brothers. Mota notes the same phenomenon regarding the eldest son and daughter of an immigrant family (Mota 2012, 36). Recently, there have been a few opportunities to brush up his Portuguese proficiency, through reading Brazilian magazines or watching TV programs in Portuguese. He says that his family is united. As the eldest son, he saves part of his salary so that his two younger brothers will be able to complete their studies at the university where Sérgio himself graduated.

When he was a high school student, he had imagined he would be a factory worker like his parents. Back then, he had an opportunity to teach Japanese as an assistant teacher using Portuguese to Brazilian children who had just come to Japan. He had already earned level 1 on the “Japanese Language Proficiency Test” (Nihongo Noryoku Shiken). Teaching Brazilian children following in his footsteps, and overcoming various difficulties on his own became the biggest motivation to work hard at his studies in high school with the hope of being admitted to a Japanese university. His expectation of becoming a factory worker changed to the dream of becoming a teacher of the Japanese language.

As a high school student, he began to work at a legal office, located in the town where he lived, to help with the translation from Portuguese to Japanese of documents to renew passports and visas of foreign citizens living in Japan. At the university, he took a course to become a Japanese language teacher. Because of the low salary and mainly part-time positions, it would be difficult, he realized, for him to be as a Japanese language teacher and support his family as the eldest son. Thus, Sérgio changed from his endeavors to become a Japanese language teacher to take up a career related to the law, which would require that he attain national qualifications. Now, his immediate aim is to make use of both his Portuguese and Japanese language abilities and attain qualifications that will allow him to support non-Japanese people in the area where he resides. In so doing, he will become the first Brazilian citizen in his region to obtain such qualifications.

2.2 Case of Tiago
Tiago (22) came to Japan at the age of ten and entered a public elementary school. After several months, he began to study Portuguese, in the same course that Sérgio had studied and...
kept up his studies until he was 15 years old. In the beginning, his parents had planned to return to Brazil in three years time. However, they have since bought a house in Japan and all the family members now hold a permanent visa.

In the supplementary Portuguese course, which was managed by the full-time Brazilian school, the textbooks they used were the same as the textbook used at the Brazilian school. The textbook not only included remedial Portuguese but also other subjects such as science, geography, and mathematics in the Portuguese language. There were two or three classes per week, of one or two hours in duration, that were held after school on a weekday. After Tiago completed Portuguese elementary education up to the 7th grade he left the supplementary school. He has made an effort to keep up his Portuguese proficiency by watching Brazilian DVDs or reading books in Portuguese that he borrow from the local public library.

In his first year of high school, he had the opportunity to Japanese, with Sérgio, to Brazilian children who had only recently arrived in Japan or had poor Japanese. From this experience he also dreamed of becoming a Japanese teacher. He felt that his interest in languages was influence by the role he played a translator for his parents from a very early stage. As an only child, his parents relied on him to translate local notices and news into Portuguese language. At times he would accompany his parents who were not able to understand Japanese, to the hospital and the local government offices. Even though ten years have passed since his arrival in Japan, he is still responsible for fulfilling the role as translator to tie the household with the local community.

Tiago also studied English. He achieved a level 2 on Eiken, one of the popular English proficiency tests in Japan, before going to university, and with this qualification he was exempt from paying university fee for the first year. He made further use of scholarships offered by the university, and by keeping excellent grades he was exempt from paying fee for all four years of university. He took the international sociology course at university and when he graduated his TOEIC score was 925. Why did he put so much effort into learning English? He explained his motivation as follows. In the Brazilian community, there are many Portuguese-Japanese bilingual Brazilians. To differentiate himself from these Brazilians, he began to study English. His present aim is to begin a Japanese language class for not only Brazilian children but also children from other foreign countries. In the area where he lives there is a concentration of Brazilians, but there are also people of different nationalities living in the area. Tiago turned his attention to the local area. If he wanted to do something for the foreign residents a high level of Portuguese proficiency would be indispensable. In addition, he thought that a level of English proficiency would open up a number of business chances. Moreover, his bilingual ability and proficiency in English were also the key to obtaining a short-term job in very competitive position at Brazilian embassy in Tokyo. As of December, 2013, he was working at a town office as an interpreter. But this position is also temporary and non-formal.

Even though he had been successful in his jobs, Tiago was not particularly interested living in Japan permanently. Sometimes he thinks of finding a job in Brazil, but he does not want to live alone. He constantly worries about his parent’s life in Japan without him. Even
so, he does not tire of his role as their interpreter. Tiago’s role is typical of second generation immigrants (Mota 2012, 32). His Brazilian friends, who are in the same situation, help and encourage him.

Tiago told me of Sérgio’s strong influence and the fact that if he did not have the Japanese-Brazilian friends with whom he had studied the Portuguese language, he would not be able to continue his study. Each of these children have assumed the responsibility of interpreter in each family.

He does not intend to become a naturalized citizen in Japan. He is proud of being Brazilian, he says. These words express clearly his ethnic identity.

2.3 Cases of Students Relearning the Portuguese Language

Students’ reasons for relearning Portuguese vary. Takeshi (18), for example, selected a Portuguese language department at a university near Tokyo in order to keep in contact with his grandparents and relatives residing in Brazil. In an extension course at a university in Tokyo, Larissa (22) began to relearn the heritage language of her mother, who was eager for her daughter to learn it. Her dream is to work for one year in Brazil to brush up on her Portuguese in order to be able to discuss any topic with her mother. Both Takeshi and Larissa want to master the language to communicate with their parents and relatives.

On the other hand, there is another motivation to relearn Portuguese. Telma (21) is studying Portuguese from scratch, although she can speak it fluently because she thinks studying grammar is useful to teach the Japanese language to Brazilian children whom she has taught as a volunteer. Kenichi, whom I have already mentioned, opened up an office after graduation from university to promote cultural exchange between local Japanese and Brazilians through the publication of a town magazine that introduces Brazilian shops in the area in Japanese, as well as teaching the bossa nova and the Portuguese language to Japanese people.

In another case, Carlos, who works at a Japanese company, is studying Portuguese because of his boss’s advice to learn his heritage language. This company plans to branch out in Brazil.

3. Analyses

Based on the above cases, we can extract some factors that motivate Brazilian youth to acquire and maintain their Portuguese proficiency as follows:

3.1 External Factors (Social Context)

(1) Brazilian Community in Japan
Even though the Brazilian community is becoming smaller due to economic crises or the Great East Japan Earthquake, translators are still needed.
(2) Supplementary Courses in the Portuguese Language
To maintain the Portuguese proficiency of Brazilian children or adolescents, there are some local governments, non-profit organizations and foreign schools that administer these courses in the cities with a high concentration of Brazilians.

(3) Brazil in the Global Scene
Today, business opportunities in Brazil abound, and so do the Japanese companies that inquire about them. Some such companies employ Brazilians who have graduated from Japanese universities, further encouraging their study of the Portuguese language.

3.2 Internal Factors (Private Context)
(1) Parents Who Do Not Speak Japanese
Why Brazilian parents do not speak Japanese;
- Because the number of ethnic businesses in the community renders it unnecessary.
- Because of the types of jobs they such as factory workers (who have limited contact with Japanese peers).
- Because of their hope to return to Brazil in the near future.

Why Brazilian children maintain their mother language proficiency;
- Because their parents always talk to them in Portuguese.
- Because of their strong bond with immediate relatives in Brazil. In addition, their legal visa status facilitates travel between Brazil and Japan. Brazilians always repeat this transbordering with their children, which makes the children feel close to their relatives in Brazil. As a result, they are dedicated to the study of Portuguese, as Somerville (2008) mentions.

(2) Ethnic Identity
Tiago’s words reveal his solid ethnic identity. This consciousness helps his study of the Portuguese language and symbolizes his being Brazilian.

(3) Wish to Contribute to the Brazilian Community Using Their Ability Acquired in Japan
The desire to contribute comes from self-confidence as a second-generation Brazilian pioneer who has survived in Japanese society.

(4) Educational and Professional Career
Through their experience as teachers of the Japanese language using Portuguese, Sérgio and Tiago discovered the significance of acquiring their mother language. At the same time, they recognized that high-level Japanese and English acquired in school would also be useful to contribute to the Brazilian community.
(5) Age When Entering Japan
Sérgio, Tiago, and Kenichi came to Japan at ten years old. At this age, it is easier to maintain one's mother tongue.

(6) Friends in a Similar Situation
Having friends in a similar situation who act as translator for the family, or who take responsibility for their family to survive in Japan, forms a strong friendship, and they encourage each other when someone encounters difficulty. Belonging to an ethnic group helps the study of the idiom of the group that Chinen and Tucker (2005) mention.

(7) As a Pioneer or With a Model
In the aforementioned cases, an adolescent has acted as a role model for others, helping them to find their way and encouraging them to persevere. Sérgio has lived without a model, and this helped him to become a model himself. Having Sérgio as a model, Tiago also became another model for the Brazilian children around him.

In this way, we can find several factors to enable and motivate their study of Portuguese. Based on these points, I would like to consider the relationship between their language resource and the sustainability of a multicultural society.

4. Immigrant Language and Multicultural Society

In this section, I discuss the influence of the second-generation Brazilian language resource on the multicultural Japanese society using the case studies mentioned above and the results of the questionnaire survey administered to students of the Department of Portuguese at a university in Chiba.

4.1 Personal Resources
Regarding youth like Sérgio and Tiago, who have studied Portuguese from school age, they chose jobs that required Portuguese as a tool or personal resource. They tended to select jobs which contributed to their ethnic community and professions which utilized their Portuguese proficiency. The Portuguese language was also important in establishing Tiago’s ethnic identity. On the other hand, those relearning the language have valid reasons for acquiring Portuguese proficiency. In both examples, they were not overly conscious of the rising value of the Portuguese language in the global scene due to economic growth in Brazil. Rather, they regard its value as their cultural capital (as a Brazilian, as a pioneer in the locality, etc.). In any case, these immigrant children have the advantage over monolingual people in a global era that calls for multilingual people. Nakajima (2010, 4) argues, “In the twenty-first century, the language resource also must be protected and developed positively like a natural resource.”
4.2 Social Resources

(1) For the Brazilian Community
I would like to suggest the possibility of immigrant language as a social resource. Sérgio’s and Tiago’s bilingual resource has always supported their family, as well as the lives of Brazilian citizens in the ethnic community. Recall that they also taught Japanese to Brazilian children as volunteers. In this way, they are bridging two communities in various dimensions. Why does this role exist? To answer this question, we refer to some special and contemporary characteristics of the Brazilian community in Japan. The first is their limited contact with Japanese people in the workplace and local region. The second is the widespread presence of Brazilian ethnic business. These two points have contributed to the low level of Brazilians’ Japanese language proficiency in Japan. The third is the passage of time. The Brazilian immigrant history spanning more than 20 years has produced bilingual second-generation adults. These days, the role of a “bridge” or a “pipeline” between local and ethnic communities, constructed by bilingual first-generation Brazilians is gradually being maintained, succeeded, and renewed by the second generation. There are the circumstances of the local community, too. In more than 20 years of Brazilian immigrant history in Japan, the Brazilian-concentrated cities have become famous as “Little Brazils,” and local governments have utilized this designation to promote their sightseeing policies. To realize these businesses’ a bilingual resource is indispensable. For this ethnic community to thrive and avoid isolation in Japanese society, the role of “bridge” played by second generation Brazilians is very important.

(2) For Bilateral Relations between Brazil and Japan
The Brazilians who relearn Portuguese in language courses around Tokyo want to maintain their ties with relatives in Brazil and are interested in visiting or working there. This motivation seems to be a private one. In Brazil for 16 years, from 1994 to 2010, about 20 million people had regular employment (Kawai 2012). The economic growth of Brazil is remarkable, and the number of Japanese companies that go into Brazil is increasing. The bilingual Brazilian youths may find better employment there from now on. In this way, the immigrant language has great potential and will become more useful for economic and cultural bilateral relations.

(3) For a Multilingual Japan
Brazilian economic growth has spawned a greater number of Portuguese learners around the world (BBC Brasil 2012), and Japan is no exception. The publication of Portuguese language textbooks is now increasing. While only 15 textbooks were published in the 1980s, about 80 textbooks were published in each decade during the 1990s and the 2000s, and this trend continues. The increase in the number of publications began in 1990, the same time the Brazilian population began to swell in Japan. In 2000, Brazil was named as a member of BRICs, four economic emerging nations. This point is crucial. The surge in Portuguese learning in Japan was caused by frequent contact with Brazilians in local communities, which
is clear judging by the titles of some of the textbooks published at that time, such as *Useful Portuguese at Schools* or *Portuguese in Working Spaces*. Therefore, we can confirm that the existence of Brazilians in Japan has contributed to Japan, increasing its language resource at the personal level.

Recently, a Brazilian school announced the opening of a new Portuguese course not only for Brazilian infants but also for Japanese residing near the school, to raise them as Japanese and Portuguese bilingual.

The presence of Brazilians has also influenced Japanese youth as indicated by the questionnaires conducted in April 2013. Sixty three students in the “Instructive Study about Brazil” class were asked why they chose the Portuguese department or the class. Thirteen students (20%) answered that the influence of Brazilian classmates at their elementary, middle high, or high school, and Brazilian neighbors was significant. Among them was a student who studied Portuguese in a school located near her house during spring vacation. In the extension course of Portuguese language that I teach, there are some Japanese who have married Brazilians in Japan and who have been in the Brazilian-concentrated towns such as Hamamatsu and Ota. The influence of the spatial- and temporal-intensive existence of foreigners who speak another language is great and offers an opportunity for Japanese children to interact daily with different cultures and languages. Japanese students who have lived among foreigners may have unconsciously acquired intercultural literacy.

**Conclusion**

The analyses suggest that the language of second generation Brazilians is a social resource, and its existence is key to sustaining Japan’s multicultural society. The multiculturalization of Japan cannot be undone, and thus in order to foster a mature, multicultural society, we must ensure that the rights and culture of all citizens will be protected whatever his or her nationality or cultural background. The sustainable education of immigrant adolescents to preserve their language resource as they bridge the gap is just one requirement to realize social maturity in Japan. It should also be pointed out that those who work in government administration offices or schools, in positions that try to bridge the ethnic community and the host society, are often not in permanent positions and therefore tend to be of unstable employment. The sustainability of multicultural society will become more reliable only when we begin to discuss various problems, including the stability of immigrants’ life in Japan, and work to resolve problems one by one.

**References**


**Websites**


Implementation of Japan’s Elementary School English Education: Challenges and Potential Pitfalls

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Introduction

There have been a significant number of English-related issues appearing in Japan’s mass media in recent years: To name but a few, English education was officially introduced into Japan’s elementary school curriculum in 2011; advancing the starting point to Grade 3 is now under consideration; teaching English in English has been made obligatory in principle in high schools; fostering English ability among Japanese people has been set as a national educational goal; a score of 730 on the TOEIC test or 550 on the TOEFL test has been set as a minimum requirement for an English teacher credential; those who have a score of 100 on the TOEFL iBT test or 7.5 on the IELTS test are hired as “super English teachers” in Osaka; the Tokyo Board of Education decided to send current teachers to teacher preparation programs in the U.S. to improve their practical English skills; and perhaps one of the most frequently appearing issues is Japanese universities’ aim of fostering “Global JINZAI,” that is, those who can function as competent members of a rapidly globalizing world.

All these issues reflect a greater emphasis on English education, especially teaching the functional aspects of English, and their perceived importance in a global economy. As pointed out by Butler and Iino (2005), however, all these issues develop in conjunction with a number of conflicting ideological issues: (1) whether Japan should pursue a policy of multilingualism or a policy favoring the advancement of English, (2) whether Japan should emphasize international understanding or simply English education, and (3) promoting an egalitarian view of education versus an individualized needs-based education.

This paper describes a research project that examined potential problems resulting from an undue emphasis on English at the expense of other foreign languages in Japanese society. Based on an evaluation of the policies, a reading of the research literature, and an analysis of the results of a survey administered to public school English teachers, this paper discusses a potential threat to educational equality for minority language students, namely, school

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1 An earlier version of this paper entitled, “Conflicting Ideologies in Japan’s English Education: Past, Present, and Future” was presented at the “Migrant, Education Policies and Multiculturalism” panel in the Third Afrasian International Symposium “Rethinking Integration: Multicultural Societies of the Asia-Pacific.” I would like to thank Professor Steve Wolfe for his insightful suggestions for revisions.
children whose first language is neither Japanese nor English. Finally, this paper focuses on several challenges that both researchers and teachers must confront to ensure that Japan’s English education functions as an arena that nurtures healthy multilingual and multicultural interaction.

**Trends in Japan’s English Education Policy**

A historical review of ideological conflicts concerning Japan’s English education recalls the Hiraizumi and Watanabe debate which took place in 1974-1975. Hiraizumi was a member of the House of Representatives, and Watanabe was a professor at a private university in Tokyo. Hiraizumi criticized Japan’s English education and made several proposals for drastic changes. Shown below is a brief summary of his proposals (Hiraizumi and Watanabe 1975):

1. Remove English from compulsory education as it was costly but not effective.
2. Set the goal of English education such that about five percent of Japanese nationals develop English abilities.
3. Foreign language education at school should concentrate on English only.
4. Instruction should be targeted at the acquisition of practical English skills.
5. Intensive English courses should be created for students who volunteer to study English at the high school level.
6. English should be removed from college entrance examinations.

Hiraizumi’s idea of training only a select group of people as English elites can be seen as an example of individualized needs-based education. Watanabe’s counterargument was that English education should be targeted at deepening students’ intellectual curiosity and increasing intellectual potential, suggesting a more egalitarian view of education.

Looking at public opinion about Japan’s current English education, one can see that similar debates are still going on. The most notable one is about elementary school English education. The main point of discussion is whether or not English should be taught as a compulsory subject in all public elementary schools. A key related issue here is the fact that the social environment surrounding English education has changed in the last 30 years toward the trends of “globalization,” “multilingualism,” and “multiculturalism.” In fact, the 2010 report published by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development recognizes the importance of foreign language education as follows:

As world economies become increasingly interconnected, the international skills needed to operate on a global scale have become increasingly important. Globally oriented firms seek internationally-competent workers who speak foreign languages and have the intercultural skills needed to successfully interact with international partners (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2010, 310).
The policymakers, with the help of the mass media, have used those trends as rationales for pushing forward an English-centered approach in Japanese elementary schools. However, I believe it is a problem that policymakers see multilingualism as largely synonymous with Japanese-English bilingualism and that they think of such bilingualism as the solution for communication problems in an increasingly multicultural Japanese society. Thus, the fundamental questions raised here concern whether teachers in the actual classrooms consider that English should be the only foreign language offered in school and whether they see globalization as a reason for so strongly emphasizing the study of English, in the same way as these policymakers do.

Another important question in relation to elementary school English education is whether there are any perceptual differences in the choice of a foreign language between teachers who have minority language students in their classes and those who do not. For minority language students whose first language is neither Japanese nor English, such as Brazilian children whose first language is Portuguese and who are living in Japan temporarily (cf. Haino 2013), the study of English in school means the simultaneous study of two foreign languages. Several activists who oppose elementary school English education including Otsu (2005) argue that it is not recommended for even native Japanese speaking students to study a foreign language at such an early stage of language acquisition when Japanese language skills are yet to be mastered fully. So, it would be interesting to examine how elementary school teachers perceive the teaching of both Japanese and English simultaneously to minority language students.

Since this discussion is primarily theoretical, it is important to examine empirically the on-the-ground voices of elementary school teachers since the realities of the classroom and its context are the reasons for the discrepancy between the policymakers’ intentions and teachers’ execution of that policy (Silver and Skuja-Steele 2005). In order to examine how policy and practice interact, it is important to examine teachers’ views of pedagogical rationales underpinning government policies.

Hypotheses

Given the discussion so far, the hypotheses to be tested can be stated as follows:

Teachers’ views about whether English should be compulsory at the elementary level can be accounted for by how they feel about the need for English in the globalizing world, the simultaneous teaching of both Japanese and English at an early age, and the prioritization of teaching English as opposed to other foreign languages. In addition, there may be a difference among teachers depending on whether their schools have minority language students or not.
Methodology

Setting and Participants
The setting for this investigation was public elementary schools located in western Japan: 22 schools in one rural school district and 14 schools in two urban school districts. Participant teachers in the study were currently or formerly entrusted with teaching English to 5th and/or 6th grade students because all elementary schools they worked for had experimented with having homeroom teachers teach English in an “International Understanding” class for two years, prior to the official start of elementary school English education in 2011.

Data Collection
Quantitative data were collected using a 24-item questionnaire that was designed to examine teachers’ backgrounds (e.g., whether or not they had experience of teaching minority language students) and perceptions about English language teaching (e.g., the necessity of teaching English in the globalizing world, the simultaneous teaching of both Japanese and English, and the prioritization of teaching English at the expense of other foreign languages). All but the very last open-ended question, “What changes need to be made to make elementary school English education function effectively?” were presented in the form of multiple-choice or 4-point Likert scale. I asked 36 school principals to distribute the questionnaires to all teachers involved in teaching English in their respective schools. Since it was administered under permission from the local boards of education, the response rate was as high as 85% so that data were collected from 341 teachers in total.

The author also examined the impact of regional differences on English education as it might influence the testing of the hypotheses stated above. Specifically, the author observed several English classes over a period of one academic year at two elementary schools located in the rural school district and one elementary school located in one of the two urban school districts in the year preceding this research project. The findings of the observations suggest that English classes provided in rural schools did not differ significantly from those offered in urban schools. There were about 30 students in each class, and a class team-taught with a native English speaking assistant language teacher was offered twice a month. There were both regular English classes taught by a Japanese teacher alone as well as those team-taught with a native English speaker and/or a local Japanese volunteer with competent English proficiency. None of the Japanese teachers working for those schools had ever received training in English language teaching. All classes observed were conducted following the national syllabus guideline, although several extra materials were distributed in the respective classes. Based on these classroom observations, it seemed reasonable to conclude that regional differences need not be considered a factor affecting teachers’ views on policy and its implementation.
Data Analysis

A multiple regression analysis was performed using one outcome and four predictor variables with the data collected from two groups of teachers. Specifically, the degree to which teachers feel English should be compulsory was designated as an outcome variable (Y), whereas four predictor variables were specified as the degree to which teachers feel English is needed in the globalizing world (X₁), the degree to which teachers feel the learning of both Japanese and English simultaneously is effective (X₂), the degree to which teachers feel the prioritization of teaching English at the expense of other foreign languages (X₃), and the teacher types, namely, whether teachers work for a school which has language minority students or a school which does not (X₄). The teacher-type variable was categorical and thus contrast-coded, but all other predictor and outcome variables were continuous variables ranging from 1-4. Some items whose values had been reversed in the original phrasing to enhance validity of the questionnaire were rekeyed, so that the score of 4 always indicated a maximally positive response. The missing data were deleted, resulting in the complete data being available from 328 teachers. Among them, 180 had experience of teaching minority language students in class and 148 did not.

Results

Table 1 summarizes the results of descriptive statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) for the data on both one outcome and three predictor variables for two teacher types. Teacher Type 1 and 2 represent those who had minority language students in class and those who did not, respectively.

A multiple regression analysis was performed with four predictor variables entered simultaneously in the regression equation. A set of assumptions required of linear regression analysis was checked before proceeding to examination of the results. Specifically, inspection of the results of the descriptive statistics, the scatter plots, and the histograms revealed that the outcome variable was normally distributed (e.g., skewness = -.133, and kurtosis = -.789). Moreover, examination of the scatter plots and the histograms of residuals suggested that the

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<th>Teacher Type 1 (n = 180)</th>
<th>Teacher Type 2 (n = 148)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Compulsory (Y)</td>
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<td>Prioritization of English (X₃)</td>
<td>1.79</td>
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residuals were normally, independently distributed, that homoscedasticity was satisfied among them, and that the independent variables and the residuals were not correlated. Furthermore, no serial correlation was found among the residuals (Durbin-Watson = 1.892). Given these findings, it was safe to conclude that the assumptions required of linear regression analysis were not seriously violated.

Table 2 summarizes the results of the multiple regression analysis for the outcome variable with four predictor variables. It should be noted that the standardized beta coefficient is generally of little use in an analysis using contrast coding because it varies with changes in relative sizes of n (see Cohen and Cohen 1983 for a detailed discussion). Thus, it is omitted from Table 2. From the $R^2$ and its $F$ values shown in Table 2, the null hypothesis that the four predictor variables as a whole accounted for no variance in the outcome variable was rejected at the .001 level. Inspection of the $R^2$ and adjusted $R^2$ values revealed that 41.9% and 41.2% of the outcome variable in the sample and the population, respectively, was associated with the four predictor variables, although sources of variance other than those predictor variables were present. Moreover, examination of $B$ and $t$ values and their signs indicated that the globalization variable accounted for the variance of the outcome variables better than the other three predictor variables.

<table>
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<th>$B$</th>
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<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-.119</td>
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<td>Globalization (X₁)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher Types (X₄)</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>2.202*</td>
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Note. $R^2 = .419$, adjusted $R^2 = .412$, $F (4, 323) = 58.220**$, **$p < .001$, *$p < .05$.}

The separate regression equations for the data collected from a group of teachers who had minority language students in class ($Y_1$) and from a group of teachers who did not ($Y_2$) are shown below:

$$Y_1 = -.085 + .344X_1 + .348X_2 + .333X_3$$

$$Y_2 = -.196 + .596X_1 + .205X_2 + .241X_3$$
Interpretation of the results of descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis shows that both groups of teachers are aware of policy initiatives related to foreign language education and to the potential longer-term needs of students for English. Globalization seems to be considered a key factor in making English a compulsory subject in elementary schools, particularly for the group of teachers who did not have minority language students in class. Interestingly, both groups of teachers seem to think that learning both Japanese and English simultaneously in elementary school was effective in the language acquisition process. This is not congruent with Otsu’s assertion. Moreover, deep-seated ideologies favoring English were not as prominent among teachers as among policymakers. Teachers who have minority language students in class, in particular, show negative views of the prioritization of teaching English as opposed to other foreign languages and positive views of teaching other foreign languages in elementary school. In other words, they see multilingual skills as a resource.

Discussion

In response to growing criticism that Japanese do not have sufficient communicative skills in English, the Japanese government proposed the Action Plan to foster English abilities among Japanese people in order for them to function actively and effectively in the globalizing world (Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology 2003). However, the recently enacted foreign language education policy has shifted away from a view of multilingualism as a resource and/or asset and toward the imposition of the more “English-centered” foreign language education curriculum in Japanese elementary schools. This can be interpreted as pushing the idea of English as a resource and multi-languages as a problem, the opposite to what was expressed by a segment of teachers in the present research. Ironically, this policy change occurred in a global context in which multilingualism and multilingual language policies are as much in evidence as they ever were (see Hornberger 2002 for a detailed discussion). What is worse, such undue stress on English has resulted in a new type of cultural nationalism among several researchers that would stress the idea of fostering Japanese language abilities as the basis of all intellectual activities. The findings of the present research suggest, however, that teachers who have minority language students in class are concerned about the prioritization of teaching English at the expense of other foreign languages. Implicit in this suggestion is that these teachers believe it represents a threat to educational equality for minority language students.

As is often the case with Asian countries where English is taught as a foreign language, the Japanese Ministry of Education sets a national syllabus which is expected to serve as a guide for all teachers working in public schools. When changes are made to the syllabus, they are intended to be nationwide, and teachers are expected to implement them at the classroom level (Silver and Skuja-Steele 2005). However, such lack of flexibility makes it difficult to accommodate local needs (Matsumura, Kim, and Yeh 2012). As far as Japan’s elementary school foreign language education policy is concerned, it is difficult to allow particular schools to implement the teaching of other foreign languages than English in order to take
into consideration the needs of minority language students (Matsumura and Wakita 2011). What is needed is to open up as many ideological channels as possible to foster multiple languages and literacies in the classroom, community, and society. A concern detected in the findings of the present research is the situation that “first” might soon mean “main” and that “main” will soon afterwards mean “only.” That is, English was introduced as the first foreign language for study in elementary school, and it is now recognized as the main foreign language. It does not appear that it will take too much time for English to become the only foreign language in the national curriculum.

The policymakers, particularly those dealing with Japan’s foreign language education policy, need to pay more attention to research on the efficacy of bilingual education. As things presently stand, the recently implemented policy shows a failure to incorporate research-based understanding of the necessary and optimal conditions for English language learning and literacy development. Review of the literature shows, for example, that a learner’s native language should be acknowledged as playing an important role in facilitating English language development and allowing students to keep pace academically (Evans and Hornberger 2005). In fact, the findings of the present study support this claim. Moreover, it has been reported in various research results that English language learners studying in bilingual classrooms gain English language proficiency equivalent to those attained by children studying under English-only instruction (Cummins 1981; Ramirez, Yuen, and Ramey 1991), and in other cases attain higher levels of English language proficiency than those studying in English-only programs (Mortensen 1984). Given these findings, the question of how the native languages of minority language students should be incorporated into English education in Japan’s elementary schools seems a critical and challenging problem to be solved.

Conclusion

It is apparent that the recent changes in Japan’s foreign language education policy were made without a careful examination of empirical research results, and much worse, without the public being fully informed of the reasons for the changes. What needs to be stressed is that caution is necessary when sticking to modest, perfunctory teaching goals in foreign language education as exist in the current national syllabus. Specifically, the current English education policy has the potential of exposing the public educational system to another risk, namely, that wealthy families have the means to send their children for private lessons, driving a wedge between rich and poor, and creating linguistic haves and have-nots, eventually leading to an even more unequal society. Therefore, it is time for policymakers to think in what aspects and to what degree the national syllabus should be flexible and respond to local needs. As reported elsewhere (e.g., Hornberger 2002, cf. May 2001), transforming a standardized education at the nation-state level into a diversified one at the local level may involve ideological difficulties that are a challenge to implement. However, the local needs-based decentralization of education seems a necessary first step in the process of accommodating
vulnerable groups of various minority language students and making public schools a truly global community.

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Theory and Practice After Multiculturalism:
Gaps in Grounding Principles for Co-existence

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Introduction

Since there is a widespread acceptance of an idea that there has been a passing of the golden age of multiculturalism, or in other words a demise of multiculturalism, and scholars can turn to retrospective analysis of what multiculturalism “was” (Mishra 2012), a space has been opened for further discussion of what exactly has “failed” (or at the least not been successful in many/most contexts, although some would wish to exclude Canada) about multiculturalism and in multicultural policies. This in turn raises questions about what comes after multiculturalism, a theme that I have discussed elsewhere (Bradley 2013). Some would refer to the contemporary juncture as a post-multicultural era (Kymlicka 2010, 2012; Vertovec 2010), while at the same time proposing that the conditions and flows of migration and necessity for integration policies of immigrants and other minorities in many societies have not lessened (if anything they have accelerated) since the supposed transition beyond the multicultural era. Such approaches focus attention on the condition in many parts of the world of what Vertovec (2010) refers to as “superdiversity,” that is, not only is immigration increasing, but the types of immigration are changing and there is more frequent and short term movement, instead of permanent migration. In addition, families with multiple ethnicities, and individuals with multiple and hyphenated identities, are also increasing. To summarize, many academics who study multiculturalism in the second decade of the 21st century seek ways to describe its many facets in new ways while analyzing its lack of acceptance as a codified policy (or set of policies), and moreover its growing abandonment by large numbers of intellectuals, media, and ordinary people, particularly in various countries in West Europe and other formerly leading immigrant-accepting countries.

Mishra’s claim that multiculturalism was (and is) always a problem in need of redefinition is similar to the other critiques from those nominally sympathetic to multiculturalism. “‘Multiculturalism’ as theory comes as a challenge to an earlier definition of it as an empirical fact,” in short “cultures were part of the nation, without the nation itself sensing the need to theorise itself in terms of multiplicity of cultures” (Mishra 2012, 23). In other words, multiculturalism is, ironically by its own definition, an unstable concept, one that can only be a starting point for exploring changes occurring simultaneously in many
countries (including Japan) in immigration, citizenship, economic integration, psychological well-being and belonging, national identity, cosmopolitan understanding, and consciousness of the optimal weighting and significance of these various categories in combination and vis-à-vis each other. If one category of change is given too much emphasis, then another diminishes correspondingly due to complexity of trying to account for multiple variables in theory, policy, or practice at the same time. How many diverse pressures on the social fabric, however conceived, related to diversity can a definable human community accommodate? Vertovec (2010) gives one of the best (both for its comprehensive scope and its conciseness) definitions of what he terms the past thirty years of “institutional initiatives” in multiculturalism. Multicultural policies are made concrete by “broad, common objectives. These included providing opportunities for group representation to local and national government authorities; restructuring institutions towards pluralistic public service provision; putting in place measures to promote equality, respect, or tolerance, particularly among the dominant population towards minorities; and providing resources to support continuity of traditions and identities among immigrant groups (as opposed to assimilation)” (Vertovec 2010, 84). A problem repeatedly identified by numerous scholars is that these priorities more often than not conflict with each other. Promoting equality does not sit well with the majority in most cases if it means providing additional resources to the minority to give but one pithy exemplary dilemma. Critical multiculturalists have long criticized liberal multiculturalists for prioritizing recognition and tolerance over redistributive justice and economic policy. In the course of attempts at satisfying everyone, multicultural policy-making can satisfy almost no one, it would appear, and therefore becomes a target for replacement, relexification, or abandonment.

This paper explores two corresponding dimensions to multiculturalism. One is at the meta level, drawing on the experiences that can be termed international or universal with regards to multiculturalism as a set of principles, and policies that follow from the principles. The other is at the level of concrete examples from the policy perspective which are then related to real-life living conditions in Japan, where tabunka kyōsei, or multicultural existence has been a term to describe multiculturalism for the past decade and especially since the 2006 Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) report, “Research Group concerning the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence.” Space considerations preclude a full discussion of the variations between multiculturalism viewed from a universal perspective and its Japanese variant tabunka kyōsei. A more comprehensive version of such an argument about varieties of multiculturalism has been suggested by others in contrasting versions of, for example, Canada’s supposed continued more successful policies with Europe’s recent withdrawal from further advancement of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2012). However, a truly global version of the diverse theories of multicultural policy (including Asia) is still lacking to the extent that such commonalities across national settings have not been categorized with enough clarity to make such discussion illuminative (compared to varieties of capitalism or neoliberalism for example, where arguably much greater discussion has been generated).
The point that I wish to make clear here, however, is that the discussion of multiculturalism in many contexts often precedes with little consideration of the various gaps that exist in the problems of what is defined, for whom, and for what purpose. In other words what is meant by multiculturalism, for whom is it meant to be a description and policy (or set of policies) to be implemented, and for what purpose is it used? While many articles or chapters on multiculturalism begin with a phrase like, multiculturalism is an “awkward term” (Ivison 2010, 1), or an overused or difficult term, “maddeningly spongy and imprecise” (Hall 2001, cited in Vertovec 2010, 85), many others simply assume that common knowledge of the term allows for it be discussed in the specific form or focus in a given region or locality, or field or set of issues, whether in regard to education, immigration, political participation, tolerance and respect for difference in the weaker forms or celebration of diversity or in the stronger forms of codification into anti-racist legislation (and often bonding a field and a form, e.g. multicultural education in Japan, which combines the field of education with a curricular form of teaching respect for difference of resident Koreans or other minorities).

In this paper, I use the term gaps to call attention to these problems not only in understanding and implementation between the more theoretical and the more practical but also the leaps that are required to transcend assumptions in the questions of what, for whom, and for what purpose, referred to above. In other words, if we take Mishra’s claim above seriously, then what is necessary is not only a rearticulation of multiculturalism but a fuller discussion of what it is in relation to terms such as cosmopolitanism and a humanistic politics, what I would term an “anthropolitics.” I will try to give a hint of directions for this in the conclusion.

Returning to the problem of gaps, one simple way to articulate them is to look at those that have occurred between theories (of multiculturalism) and practices (of multicultural policies) and suggest that the theories have been inadequately translated into practice or that particular sites of practice have not conformed or been amenable to ideal notions expounded by theory. This type of argument which I refer to as the pragmatic stance (or the middle level in my diagram), may well carry a lot of proof of the “failings” of multiculturalism as a set of policies or implied policy implementations, but I argue here that gaps exist at multiple levels of the equation, namely in theory and contexts of theory and in policies of practice and actual practice (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Levels of Gaps in Multicultural Understanding

- Theory → Contexts of Theory
- Theory → Idealized Practice/Policy in the Abstract
- Policies of Practice → Contexts of Actual Practice
In other words there are at least three levels of gaps in multicultural understanding and policies as illustrated in the diagram. In ordinary (or pragmatic) understanding, the middle level is the one level that is most often considered problematic, in other words how to translate theory to practice. But by focusing on these other two levels, at the higher level of theory and the range of phenomena referred to as multicultural or multicultural coexistence, and the lower level of policy implementation with actual practice, we can start to see how the problems of multiculturalism are quite diverse and in many respects not solvable as such, without much further discussion and trade-offs between various conflicting values, norms and desirable outcomes. Let’s look at each of these levels in turn, providing several examples.

Gaps in Theory to Contexts of Theory

While by no means underappreciated, the problems of theory and the contexts of theory are quite important to an understanding of why and how multiculturalism is often confusing and confused. To begin with, as Murphy (2012, 4) has suggested there is a vital need to distinguish between philosophical principles and policies. While this may be also an argument that is central to problems at the middle level of the diagram, leading to a pragmatic stance, it affects multicultural understanding right from the outset. For example, does one include in a discussion of multiculturalism, immigrants only (in addition to the newcomer vs. “oldcomer” distinction in Japan; Chapman 2006), or does one include indigenous groups (of which the Ainu are the only officially recognized group, but which should also likely include discussion of Okinawans and Burakumin). Multiculturalism, as a theory of inclusion, most often answers this question with the latter choice, although some have suggested that this addition dilutes the central problems of citizenship and equality of rights, which for most indigenous minorities can be assumed to be already in force (sometimes, in Japan as elsewhere, after historically long struggles). What about other kinds of minorities; people with disabilities, certain kinds of stigmatized illnesses such as HIV/AIDS or survivors of environmental or radiation poisoning (Hiroshima/Nagasaki hibakusha, Fukushima evacuees, Minamata victims and so on)? Would every self-determining minority count as representative in discussions of multicultural theory? Certainly one’s definition of multiculturalism on a theoretical level will be affected by such choices and there seem to be unreliable standards for making such choices. What if women, as a group suffering exclusion and discrimination, are also included in multicultural theorizing? What about privileged (as least on a global scale) white professional immigrants in Asia?

The second question which revolves around the first is whether policies emphasize tolerance of difference and recognition of various rights to display difference in public (clothing, religion, celebrations, etc.) versus policy attempts to bring about equality, particularly in socio-economic spheres. One of the strongest backlashes against liberal multiculturalism from the progressive/critical perspective is that multiculturalism often stops short and insures that recognition becomes a replacement for deeper demands for social change (Mishra 2012). As such, multiculturalism can be seen as a postcolonial solution to
unresolved colonial and historical problems of injustice, at least in respect to many immigrant and indigenous populations (this would potentially be true in Japan with regard to Koreans, Ainu and Okinawans) and one that leaves neither the ex-colonizer or the ex-colonized particularly satisfied with “simple” recognition.

A third question is related to critiques of what drives multicultural theory in the first place. It might be taken for granted for many to have a commonsense view that the state is making more or less informed and rational decisions about such matters as immigration policy and citizenship, but in many ways the numbers and nationalities of immigrants are not predetermined (certainly influenced, but not ultimately controlled) in an organized way by policy making. In other words, a normative model of a state (Japan, in this case) making politically expedient and linearly implemented decisions about immigration policy and seeking to increase certain kinds of immigrants is challenged by the reality of de facto decision making and its results, based more often on less than transparent tradeoffs between political factions seeking their own goals. In any case, the obvious example of favoring immigration (by relaxed visa controls since the 1990s) of 2nd and 3rd generation South American Nikkeijin, who were then encouraged to return to South America (by receiving ¥ 300,000 with a proviso not to return to Japan for three years) after the economic downturn in 2008, shows that such policies often have less linkage to contexts of their implementation than could be rationally assumed. Who counts as a Nikkeijin, how well they integrate, and who is able to return to Japan via marriage or other routes are questions that policy makers cannot hope to account for.

This leads to a final discussion of methodological nationalism inherent in many multicultural theories. Not only are cultures generally reified in terms of single entities, especially in the manner of counting immigrant numbers and groups, but a deeper problem of acceptance of multiculturalism leading to a reinforced identity of Japanese versus foreigners has been suggested by many researchers. Kashiwazaki (2013, 42) has written, “‘multicultural co-living (tabunka kyōsei)’ in Japan continues to lack the component of national integration. This omission contrasts with the premium on the local; the challenge is how Japanese and foreigners can forge relationships of ‘co-living’ at the community level.” Admitting that some view this as evidence of a progressive relinquishing of the heavy hand of nation-state administrative control over enforcement of one-size-fits-all national norms of integration policy does not, from her perspective, offset the disadvantage that accrues in ordinary Japanese’ understanding of a strict division of multiculturalism for foreigners to be accommodated as foreigners, rather than to being allowed or even encouraged to be part of a new and expanding Japanese identity.

Gaps in Theory to Idealized Practice

This is perhaps the most obvious level for gaps to exist, in implementation from policy to practice. I use the term idealized practice (and alternatively, policy in the abstract) because this level calls attention to the back and forth that occurs in the process of trying to match
policy at the theoretical level to multiple sites and localities. Policies that may seem good in principle and are more or less subject to agreement across a range of political and administrative actors and often come to be viewed as less than adequate when applied to different settings. In this respect the notion of devolving policy to local areas (chiho bunken), that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) recommended in its 2006 report, “Research Group concerning the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence,” writing a letter to prefectural and city governments asking them to investigate their own multicultural policy making, could be said to be a step in the right direction. This type of initiative did not of course happen in a vacuum as some local governments, such as Kawasaki City in Kanagawa had already taken the lead in setting up (in 1996) foreign resident representative assemblies (Aiden 2011; Green 2013). Green argues that this has provided a model of adaptive informal policy innovation, and that many other local governments (Tokyo 1997, Kyoto 1998, and others) have followed the example set by Kawasaki.

Nonetheless in the absence of sustained communication back and forth from the central government to the local levels, there are many misunderstandings about the policies of tabunka kyösei, particularly by those who have been working with newcomer immigrants (Japanese language educators, NGOs, and local policy administrators) for many years. Nakamatsu (2013) details many comments from her research, from questioning the relevance of an obscure term like kyösei (with biological roots and sometimes translated as symbiosis or co-existence), to complaints about lack of funding, and recognition of the real labor involved in policy implementation. “Even local government officials who were supposed to promote the policy, felt it unrealistic in principle and assimilationist in practice: social cohesion achieved by assimilation, in the hope that this would prevent segregation” (Nakamatsu 2013, 15).

In this respect, moreover, one would have to be somewhat pessimistic about the possibilities for the current national government administration, while pushing for policies of increasing military strength and greater adherence to curricula and textbooks that promote respect for Japan, to be of much help in facilitating give and take on a national level over immigration policy developed at the local level.

**Gaps in Policies of Practice to Actual Practice**

Even if policies at the previous two levels could be specified in a somewhat straightforward manner, gaps at the practice level illustrate more complex problems. First of all there are always competing policies. If one looks at education for example, the need in Japanese compulsory education contexts to ensure equality of opportunity means that in some schools with immigrant children, there is an opportunity for justification of pull-out instruction in native languages. In many cases, however, such education is inadequate, as there are not well-trained teachers available to provide immigrant children Japanese as Second Language training to the degree that they need it. Moorehead’s (2013) examination of the “Amigos Room” at an elementary school in central Japan shows that teachers are sometimes
unenthusiastic (they are not specialized but chosen to staff the room in rotation), and the space is not well supplied and serves not as a place for supplementary Japanese language instruction so much as a space for students to overcome their feelings of isolation by being with immigrants like themselves. The observation that there is a diversity among different language groups with different needs in Japanese learning among immigrant school children in various localities in Japan is rather undramatic but underscores the problem that policies of practice face in the context of such diversity, as has been noted in many countries prior to recognition of the challenge in Japan.

**Escaping the Critique of Methodological Nationalism**

Whether or not the problems of multicultural theorizing or multicultural policy making are to be located primarily in the confusion of “multifamily resemblances” (Modood 2013), namely that each group (whether immigrant or not) is considered to bear resemblances to each other for the purpose of integration into the national framework, despite differences in groups, attributes of the groups (religion, language, ethnicity for example), difference in actions and priorities and so on, or whether there is a more fundamental problem with the nature of “integration” into a national identity in the first place is a question that needs to be addressed at multiple levels, just as the problem of gaps analyzed above does. The critique of methodological nationalism in social sciences has been carried forward by a number of critics, including some focusing on migration. As Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003, 584) have pointed out, “integration is always thought of as being established, less problematic, less fragile among those belonging to the national group.”

According to Chernilo (2011), before the rise of strong nationalism in the late 19th century, in some parts of Europe at least there had been a mixture of class, national and cosmopolitan ideals that were not mutually exclusive. How these came to be considered nearly mutually exclusive is a historical review that cannot be elaborated on here but it is worth noting that the contingency of such categories gave rise to seeing them as some, perhaps most, of the time mutually exclusive. How and if they could be linked to form tighter categorizations of identity are a challenge that faces mature democratic societies in the contemporary era. External factors to the normative composition of society (and here it is that the strongest linkage to methodological nationalism becomes clear) have been treated by many as problems and issues to be resolved, whether or not (and to what degree) the external factors (one of which is, minority groups) are accommodated and used to facilitate change in community and society.

Viewing multicultural policy implementation outside of the box of a given society helps to remind us that there are other ways to think about issues of identity, immigration and co-existence. For example, recent work on the commonalities of East Asian multiculturalism (in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; see Kim and Oh 2011; Nagy 2013) suggests the possibility that one could look beyond the notion that there is something exceptional about *tabunka kyōsei*, and that multicultural theorizing in and about Japan should necessarily be
focused on Japan alone in exclusion of the wider geographical sphere surrounding it. The connections between lived contexts and problems faced by particular groups of immigrants in Japan, for example Filipino nurses, or South American factory workers, may have less in common with each other than they do with Filipino nurses in other countries in Asia and elsewhere and immigrant factory workers in other countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. As such then, multicultural theorizing needs to explore the gaps that are thrown up in the contemporary age not as evidence of inadequacy of policies per se, but as questions that are likely to persist and probably intensify in a world of continuing inequality and injustice based on ethnic divisions, as well as partial understandings built on discrete identifications formed by categories that are methodologically nation bound. There is no single model of utopian theory that can scaffold authentic attempts at intersectional identity formations and be able to bear the brunt of attacks based on the cynical formulae that many of the current political leaders resort to, that diversity has gone too far and that integration and majoritarian values and norms are the only way to go forward. Neither will recognition alone continue to serve as a way to diffuse frustration, even desperation, in a world of stressed resources, jobs, and living conditions.

The growing recognition that a key problem for any multicultural policy framework of the future revolves around questions of solidarities (Kivisto 2012) in imagined communities, whether they are local, national or even transnational is inescapable. Whether it is a problem of the future of the European Union or of Japan finding its role between good leadership and responsible remediator in East Asia, the problem remains one that cannot simply be solved by resorting to internal national consensus (which it needs to be admitted may also be politically necessary) in a multinational world. As such a politics that is both cosmopolitan but engages at the local level, what I would term anthropolitics, and a multiculturalism that acknowledges the gaps in multiple levels while promoting principled but expedient policy making are both necessary. The details of such a twin project are not easily explicated and cannot likely be accomplished in any individual setting or context, by any multicultural policy within borders, or through any multicultural theory in and of itself without reference to a broader politics beyond borders, but at least the scope of the project needs to be visualized for solutions to be possible. If focusing on the gaps in multicultural understanding as a way of visualizing better possibilities for futures can be encouraged in opposition to blithely describing what has “failed” to date about multiculturalism, then this paper hopes to contribute to that project in a small way.

References


PANEL 3

MIGRATION, CIVIL SOCIETY
AND MULTICULTURALISM
Panel Three entitled “Migration, Civil Society and Multiculturalism” was the last panel in the Third Afrasian International Symposium. The main purpose of Panel Three was to reconsider the concept and practice of “multiculturalism” in Australia and Japan. The three presentations in this panel attempted to open a new vista of “multicultural society.”

The first paper was given by Christina Ho of University of Technology, Sydney, entitled “Building Multiculturalism through Community Arts: An Australian Case Study.” Multiculturalism is considered to be a social threat to Western Sydney. As a result, Arabs and Muslim-Australians are marginalised in Western Sydney communities. This is not “Global Sydney” based on the concept of cosmopolitanism. In order to build the “real” multicultural Australia, Dr. Ho paid much attention to the role of culture, specifically the role of community arts.

The second paper was Koichi Yawata of Ryukoku University. The title of his paper was “Hello, Can You Hear Us?: Ethnic Minorities in Japan’s Broadcasting System.” The Broadcast Act of Japan does not consider multiculturalism in any of its provisions and does not take into account ethnic minorities in Japan. In other words, the Act does not pay attention to cultural diversity within Japanese society. Dr. Yawata concluded that the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 in Australia could be a model to promote ‘multicultural co-existence’ in Japan.

In the last paper, Kosuke Shimizu of Ryukoku University re-examined the concept of civil society as the public under the title of “Reflection, the Public, and the Modern Machine: An Investigation of the Fukushima Disaster in Relation to the Concepts of Truth and Morality.” He cited the work of Hannah Arendt, and mentioned that the public in our contemporary civil society was essentially multicultural. The Fukushima Disaster in 2011 would be a good example to reconsider the elements of the public realm as well as civil society in Japan. He also raised the question of the relationship between multiculturalism and democracy from the viewpoint of political thought.

All three papers did not deny the importance of “multiculturalism,” but stressed present and foreseeable future risks facing a “multicultural society.” The panel successfully provided some materials and implications for further discussions on multicultural societies of the Asia-Pacific.
Building Multiculturalism through Community Arts: An Australian Case Study

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Introduction

Australia was one of the first countries in the world to adopt a multiculturalism policy officially. Since the 1970s, there has been broad support for multiculturalism from mainstream political parties as well as the population at large. Multiculturalism, which acknowledges and celebrates cultural diversity, is typically seen as an essential part of contemporary, cosmopolitan Australia. In 2011, announcing a new multicultural policy, then immigration minister Chris Bowen lauded what he called the “genius of Australian multiculturalism,” arguing that the Australian model was unique, built on “respect for Australian values,” citizenship, and bipartisan support (ABC 2011).

However, the official acceptance of multiculturalism in Australia has always coexisted with uneasiness about certain minority groups. In the 1990s, Asians were targeted as a threat to social cohesion as witnessed in the rise of the right-wing One Nation Party and its leader, Pauline Hanson. In her 1996 maiden speech to parliament, Hanson warned that Asians were swamping Australia. According to Hanson, Asians “have their own culture and religion, form ghettos, and do not assimilate” (Australia Network 2011).

However, since the first decade of the 2000s, anxiety about Asians has been eclipsed by a much more virulent opposition to Arabs and Muslims.¹ In fact, in the wake of 9/11 and the “war on terror,” public debates on multiculturalism have been mainly reduced to the “Muslim question.” A recent news story broadcast on Nine Network’s 60 Minutes program is emblematic of this reduction. “[R]ight now nothing divides opinion like multiculturalism,” the show’s introduction explains. “But let us be frank here,” it continues, “This debate is not so much about race as religion, and a fear of one in particular—Islam” (Usher 2011). Muslim communities in Australia, who have a long history in the country, have become suspect, accused of failing to integrate into mainstream society, mistreating women, and harboring “home-grown terrorists.”

¹ “Arab” and “Muslim” are regularly conflated in Australian public debates, reflecting the numerical dominance of Lebanese and other Middle Eastern-origin immigrants within the Australian Muslim population. However, the conflation is often misleading, ignoring the large numbers of Muslims from elsewhere, including Turkey, Indonesia, and the Indian subcontinent.
1. Mapping Multiculturalism in Sydney

1.1 The Cosmopolitan Inner City
In Sydney, the tension between official praise for multiculturalism and the ongoing anxiety about minorities is played out in the city’s geography. The “global city” image of Sydney that governments are so keen to propagate is primarily restricted to inner urban areas. As Turner (2008) argues, the wealthy inner-city areas pride themselves on their cosmopolitan characteristics, seen, for example, in the diversity of cuisines available on fashionable high streets. This consumption-based multiculturalism, or cosmo-multiculturalism as Hage (1998) calls it, is a mainly middle-class phenomenon, enabled by economic globalization as much as immigration.

As Turner describes, from the 1970s Sydney’s inner city transformed from an urban slum to a sophisticated bourgeois village. Residential housing was renovated, café strips with alfresco dining appeared, and “European-styled village centres emerged” (Turner 2008, 572). The signs of multiculturalism “became the achievement of cosmopolitanism,” offering “the opportunity to exercise a self-conscious bourgeois lifestyle connoisseurship” (Turner 2008, 572). The refurbishment of the inner city coincided with the globalization of the Australian economy, accompanied by greater access to consumer commodities, cheaper international travel, and global communication, which facilitated “globalized,” cosmopolitan middle-class lifestyles.

Ironically, the gentrification of these inner-city areas led to the exodus of older generations of working-class immigrants, who had been concentrated in these previously industrial areas. As the inner city became fashionable, older immigrants, particularly those from southern Europe and the Mediterranean, were priced out of the market and were thus no longer able to afford escalating rents. The factories and warehouses that previously employed them had also succumbed to the same fate. As Turner (2008, 573) writes, “Those who poured the cappuccinos in the inner city cafes were forced out to the next ring of suburbs, to live outside the inner city.” The middle classes who replaced them have been mostly Anglo-Australian, joined by some second-generation immigrants. The cosmopolitan image of the inner city, therefore, sits uneasily with the actual decline in cultural diversity among the local population.

1.2 The Racialized Western Suburbs
Multiculturalism is viewed very differently in the areas of Sydney that are, in fact, the most culturally diverse, namely the western suburbs. Western Sydney, home to two million residents, is Sydney’s working-class heartland. It has long been considered the “other” Sydney (Collins and Poynting 2000), geographically and symbolically distant from Sydney’s usual icons—the glittering harbor, Opera House, beautiful beaches, and vibrant metropolis. Generations of immigrants have settled in Western Sydney, attracted to its cheaper housing, blue-collar jobs, and established immigrant communities. According to the 2011 census, a third of Western Sydney residents were born overseas, and 39% spoke a language other than
English, with the most common languages being (in order) Arabic, Vietnamese, Cantonese, Mandarin, Tagalog, and Hindi (Western Sydney Regional Organization of Councils (WSROC) 2013). Meanwhile, the fastest-growing religions in Western Sydney were Islam and Hinduism (WSROC 2013).

However, in much public debate Western Sydney’s cultural diversity is not viewed as an asset but a threat. In these working-class suburbs, the strong presence of immigrants is often associated with sensationalist fears of “ethnic gangs” and crime, immigrant ghettos, and youth delinquency. While globalization has been associated with new service industries for the city center, in Western Sydney it has meant the disappearance of manufacturing jobs because factories have relocated offshore. The decline in manufacturing has been most acutely felt in the suburbs hosting the highest numbers of immigrants, particularly in southwest Sydney, which continues to suffer from higher poverty rates, unemployment, and relative socioeconomic disadvantage. Turner (2008, 574) highlights the structural economic disadvantages experienced particularly by Arabic-speaking youths in southwest Sydney, where the unemployment rate is as high as 41%. Class and ethnicity therefore intersect to produce a powerful perception of an undesirable and even menacing region.

In the last decade or so, Arab and Muslim Australians, who are geographically concentrated in Western Sydney, have been at the center of these concerns. Bin Laden in the Suburbs by Poynting et al. (2004) provides a useful account of how these areas and their communities have become simultaneously racialized and criminalized. In particular, a series of gang rapes in the first decade of the 2000s committed by Muslim Australian men, allegedly targeting “Aussie” women, provided one of the catalysts for a sustained moral panic about “ethnic crime,” alleged mistreatment of women by Muslims, and cultural clashes. These gang rapes followed an earlier high-profile youth murder and the drive-by shooting of the Lakemba police station in 1998.

These crimes were seen as evidence of a cultural pathology among Arabs and Muslims, with social problems reduced to a single cause—ethnic culture. “Ethnic villains” were inscribed as “morally culpable on the basis of their ethnicity” (Poynting et al. 2004, 576). Arab and Muslim men were viewed as inherently violent, antisocial, and prone to gang involvement. Entire suburbs were represented as ganglands or places ruled by organized ethnic gangs who had “secret signs” such as “sucking on colored straws or wearing red necklaces—signatures of the new criminal fraternity, which was increasingly occupying territories across Sydney” (Poynting et al. 2004, 16).

Anxiety about Arabs and Muslims culminated in the Cronulla beach riots of 2005, which saw thousands of young white men violently attacking anyone of Middle Eastern appearance in an attempt to “reclaim” the beach and, symbolically, the nation. The riots

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2 While Muslims made up 2.2 percent of Australia’s population in 2011 (ABS 2012), in Western Sydney the figure was 7.5% (WSROC 2013). In addition, in some Western Sydney suburbs, the proportion was much higher—Lakemba, for example, where 52% of the population was Muslim (ABS 2013). Considering native languages, 8% of Western Sydney residents spoke Arabic, which is double the overall Sydney average (WSROC 2013).
started as a protest against the so-called un-Australian behavior of Lebanese men, following the bashing of a lifeguard earlier in the week. This was just the latest in a series of alleged offenses, including harassing women on the beach and arriving in large groups and behaving in antisocial ways—for example, playing soccer on the beach instead of swimming (for an extensive analysis of the Cronulla riots, see Noble 2009).

In the post-9/11 era, many have seen Muslims as testing the limits of Australian multiculturalism or evidence that multiculturalism has “gone too far.” Accordingly, the suburbs hosting the highest numbers of Muslims in Sydney, such as Lakemba, have become viewed as almost a contagion on the body politic of the nation, an alien landscape of mosques and veiled women, unrecognizable to mainstream Australia. Moreover, these areas have been accused of hosting terrorist cells. The title of the book by Poynting et al. (2004) was taken from a newspaper headline from the Sydney Telegraph: “TERROR AUSTRALIS: Bin Laden groups in our suburbs.”

2. Responding to Negative Perceptions

How, then, have Western Sydney communities responded to these moral panics? Perhaps the most innovative response has been to embrace rather than deny cultural difference and attempt to rebrand Western Sydney from a criminal ghetto to the cosmopolitan heartland of multicultural Australia. Referring back to images of Sydney’s western suburbs as hotbeds of crime and deviance, advocates of the area have depicted it instead as possessing an authentic and rich diversity, an area where minority groups from all over the world coexist peacefully and productively. In addition, it is argued that this cultural mix produces a new identity for multicultural Australia, one in which hybridity and cross-cultural exchange generate an exciting and genuinely cosmopolitan outlook.

Local governments in Western Sydney proudly market cultural diversity as their region’s biggest asset. For example, the council of Fairfield, in southwestern Sydney, has adopted the motto, “Celebrating Diversity.” On official publicity, virtually all councils in Western Sydney describe their communities by referring to the number of different countries residents come from. Many councils in the region fund lavish festivals, cultural and food tours, and other initiatives to showcase the cultures that call the area home. For example, the annual four-day Parramasala contemporary arts festival, held in the Western Sydney suburb of Parramatta, celebrates South Asian arts and culture with a program of music, theatre, dance, film screenings, workshops, and talks. As its website asserts, “Parramasala is at the forefront of the promotion of Parramatta as a great city in which to live, work and play and of Western Sydney as a region with its own distinct cultural stamp” (Parramasala 2013). Meanwhile, the Cabramatta Moon Festival, held annually for the past 15 years, has become one of Sydney’s largest Asian cultural events. Each year, more than 90,000 people take part in a celebration of Vietnamese tradition (Fairfield City 2013) in a suburb that 20 years ago was viewed as a crime- and drug-infested “no-go” zone.
Community organizations in Western Sydney often focus on minority groups for community development programs, aiming to provide an alternative view to the sensationalist headlines. Community arts have been a significant part of this effort and are ideally placed to do this, given their purpose is to create spaces for people to produce their own stories and images. Lally and Lee-Shoy (2005, 11) describe community arts, or community cultural development (CCD), as a “keystone practice” in Western Sydney. A strong network of arts workers has created a vibrant and locally grounded cultural sector in the region. As Lally and Lee-Shoy (2005, 1) remark, “Western Sydney communities embody cultural forms that span the globe, driving our organizations to connect better with them and constantly seek new ways to understand, promote and ‘do art.’” They explain that the Western Sydney cultural sector is characterized by the combination and hybridization of different kinds of arts practices, including community cultural development, fine art, contemporary practices, cross-art-form practices, multidisciplinary programs, heritage, research and development, and issue-based social history work (Lally and Lee-Shoy 2005, 10).

2.1 Case Study: Information and Cultural Exchange
This paper provides a case study of one community organization, Information and Cultural Exchange (ICE). ICE is Western Sydney’s largest community arts organization, describing itself as a “creative conduit between Western Sydney and the world” (ICE 2013). The organization specializes in filmmaking, music making, performance, graphic art, and blogs (ICE 2013), and is well known for its work with young people from minority communities. For more than 25 years, ICE has worked in Western Sydney and has long argued that the region, rather than being a cultural wasteland, is in fact brimming with creativity and dynamism.

Multiculturalism is a key part of this narrative. As the first paragraph of the 2009 ICE Annual Report states:

With over 100 nationalities calling it home, Greater Western Sydney is one of the most culturally diverse communities in the world. This complex region is currently exploding with stories, global influences, fresh interpretations, and new collaborations. It is here that Australia’s changing multicultural identity is being imagined and realised, and ICE is at the centre of this process (ICE 2009, 4).

ICE argues that it is precisely Western Sydney’s cultural diversity that enables it to represent the “real” multicultural Australia. This contrasts with the mainstream Australian cultural production emanating from elite areas, which typically fails to capture the diversity of the Australian population. The mainstream images of Australia seen, for example, on

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3 This work is based on a four-year research collaboration between the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), and ICE, funded by the Australian Research Council. The research involved participation observation of ICE projects, in-depth interviews with ICE staff and other community arts workers, and surveys of ICE participants and other Western Sydney organizations.
commercial television or in films are often highly monocultural, and generations of commentators on multiculturalism have lamented the absence of nonwhite faces on Australian screens.

ICE programs, however, often deliberately target culturally diverse participants. This is necessary to cater to the organization’s Western Sydney constituency and a part of its strategy to work with disadvantaged communities who are often non-Anglo Australian. ICE’s filmmaking, digital storytelling, and hip-hop programs have been particularly successful in engaging young people from migrant, refugee, and indigenous backgrounds as seen in programs such as *Yallah! What’s your story?*, *Pacific Specific*, *Koori Kinnection*, and *Vietnamese Story Exchange*. Other programs, while not targeting minority communities, are still typically dominated by nonwhite participants. Themes of cultural identity, racism, and belonging are commonly explored in these programs with long-running projects, such as the Urban Music Program and Youth Digital Cultures, providing a valuable space for self-expression and skills training.

Western Sydney is another important theme in several ICE cultural productions. Films, songs, digital stories, and other productions often express pride in the region and respond to negative stereotypes. Some ICE projects have focused on Western Sydney suburbs, showcasing their unacknowledged cultural life and history. Examples include the *Pearls of Granville* architectural tour, *Scout: A Filmmaker’s Guide to Parramatta*, *Remembering Minto: Life and Memories of a Community*, *One Day in Cabramatta Mobile Story Exchange*, and *Stories from Mount Druitt* (for samples of works produced, see http://www.ice.org.au).

Among programs engaging Arab Australians, a standout ICE initiative is the Arab Film Festival Australia. Established in 2001, the festival screens films from the Middle East as well as the global Arab Diaspora. From its small beginnings, this annual festival now tours across Australia and receives substantial public and private sponsorship, as well as broad recognition among the Arab community in Australia and beyond. Its website states that the festival aims to address contemporary misrepresentations of Arab peoples and cultures by reflecting the complexity and diversity of Arab experiences, and providing a critical space presenting alternative representations of Arab subjects, cultures and narratives on screen (Arab Film Festival Australia 2013).

Individually, these projects are often small in scale, but carried out continually over years and decades, many small-scale projects have a cumulative impact. This is particularly the case when we remember that ICE does not work alone but, rather, is part of a vibrant network of community arts organizations in Western Sydney, all helping to create alternative images of the region and its communities. Other organizations, such as the Auburn Community Development Network, Bankstown Youth Development Service, Powerhouse Youth Theatre, and others, work in fields similar to ICE, although some have specialized in other artistic genres, such as literature and theatre.

Regardless of the medium, ethnic diversity is a trademark aspect of cultural production in Western Sydney. Theatre worker Lina Kastoumis expressed in graphic terms the distinct approach taken in Western Sydney cultural productions:
We look like real Australians, you know what I mean? It goes so counter to the Anglo-dominated representation you see on TV…every time I watch Australian TV, especially commercial stations; I believe I am living in a parallel universe. That is not the Australia I know. … So, when I go to an ICE event, or a Campbelltown event, or a Blacktown event. I am at home in my diversity, and I am a part of that diversity, and I feel very proud that there is a reality to us that we are rejoicing, celebrating, hanging shit on, but it is there as opposed to the fallacy of the Anglo-centric world that we see on television (Kastoumis interview 2010).

The cultural productions Kastoumis refers to treat diversity as the norm, and Kastoumis herself speaks from the standpoint of a proud and assertive migrant as well as a professional arts worker. This type of assertiveness, found throughout Western Sydney, has become increasingly common since the 1980s, when ethnic culture evolved from being something different and quaint to something that could be edgy and political. Immigrants could also be represented as “excluded, suffering, and angry” (Hawkins 1993, 140).

2.2 Gauging the Impact of Community Arts

The cumulative impact of community arts work in Western Sydney is evident in the gradual change in perceptions of the area. Western Sydney is increasingly acknowledged as a creative and culturally dynamic region. While local residents previously had to travel to the city to visit cultural institutions or participate in cultural events, recent years have seen the opening of numerous galleries, museums, and other cultural institutions in the region. In the first decade of the 2000s, nearly ten major arts centers were established or refurbished in Western Sydney, mostly thanks to the New South Wales (NSW) government’s Western Sydney Arts Strategy (for a more detailed discussion, see Ho 2012). Major festivals, such as the Sydney Festival and the Sydney Writers Festival are increasingly scheduling events in the west, along with other major events that had previously never left the city. We are seeing more partnerships between Western Sydney and Sydney-based organizations, resulting in productions such as ICE’s *East London West Sydney* hip-hop dance theatre show, which was presented at the 2011 Sydney Festival.

The New South Wales government recognizes that the “center-periphery” perception is no longer so dominant (New South Wales Ministry for the Arts 2006, 7) and that there has been “increased recognition of the [Western Sydney] region and its unique cultural values and expression” (New South Wales Ministry for the Arts 2006, 5). Western Sydney has become an “incubator for innovative strategies,” it states, adding that “Cutting edge, hybrid and innovative artistic and cultural practice has featured across a range of art forms, and ‘community cultural development’ has been reinvented in 21st century terms” (New South Wales Ministry for the Arts 2006, 6). A recent NSW government report notes that numerous artists and professional arts workers “are now choosing to remain in Western Sydney to live and work” (New South Wales Government 2013, 2). Crucially, it adds that Western Sydney’s
art and cultural sector “can challenge traditional perceptions of disadvantage in the region through the promotion of local arts achievements, prominent artists, and the exporting of Western Sydney branded arts product” (New South Wales Government 2013, 3).

News stories about the cultural renaissance of Sydney’s west now appear regularly in the media with headlines such as The Sydney Morning Herald’s “The zest in the west: Sydney’s sizzling centre” (Pitt 2010). The item noted that the Western Sydney suburb of Parramatta had transformed itself into a “dining and arts hub.” Local newspapers in Western Sydney have also increased their coverage of arts and culture in the region, often from a very low baseline (Ho 2012, 40).

Clearly, several factors have coalesced to shift perceptions of Sydney’s undesirable western suburbs. One crucial factor, however, is undoubtedly the years of work done by community organizations like ICE, who have tirelessly propagated the initially unpopular narrative of the dynamism of multicultural Western Sydney. Organizations like ICE have worked routinely with governments and local councils, lobbying for more policy attention to multiculturalism and the arts, and practical programs for community members. At a more direct level, ICE programs have trained and mentored hundreds of local project participants, some of whom have subsequently become critically-acclaimed artists, filmmakers, and performers.

As part of this research, we conducted a survey in 2009-2010 to gauge the recognition of ICE programs among 50 Western Sydney institutions such as councils, educational institutions, and local media. We asked respondents what impact they thought ICE projects had. Several credited ICE with playing a key role in the Western Sydney arts transformation, saying the organization

- “helps create identity in Western Sydney”
- “contributed significantly to a change of identity and perception of the area”
- “brought a lot of interest in Western Sydney from the outside”
- “built an arts precinct in Parramatta”

In our in-depth interviews with community arts workers, this comment from community theatre worker Claudia Chidiac was typical:

I think there’s a handful of organizations in Western Sydney…that have made people want to be here, have made people want to work in the region, and ICE have really led the way in turning Western Sydney into [something] really sexy…. People were seeing all the work that was coming out of this region, and it was always leading back to ICE (C. Chidiac interview 2010).

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4 Community-based organizations (either in the arts or “ethnic” sectors) were excluded because we wanted to gauge the level and type of recognition of ICE projects among “mainstream” institutions.
In its 2013 report on the arts in Western Sydney, the NSW government highlights the region’s assets, which include, in addition to galleries, museums, and the like, “highly regarded community based arts organizations” and “a diversity of traditional multicultural arts” (New South Wales Government 2013, 2). It notes the importance of community-responsive programming in developing audiences in Western Sydney, “drawing on local stories to create quality, accessible, and sometimes challenging arts and cultural experiences” (ibid.). The crucial role played by community organizations is a factor that distinguishes cultural activity in Western Sydney, allowing it to be more responsive to diverse local needs, and to produce works that are more experimental and less mainstream (ibid.).

Conclusion

In a traditionally disadvantaged region, it is perhaps unsurprising that community arts, rather than prestigious or commercial arts, for example, have played such a big role in the local cultural sector. However, the dominance of community arts in Western Sydney has facilitated an outpouring of nontraditional cultural expression, whose innovation and dynamism are slowly changing the perception of the area. To the extent that community arts have helped transform Western Sydney’s image from that of a ghetto to a vibrant multicultural hub, it is fair to say that Australian multiculturalism is being built in a practical way through community arts. Far from the bourgeois consumption-based multiculturalism of the inner city, Western Sydney’s lived multiculturalism is gaining a new recognition, thanks to local efforts to rebrand the region, and simultaneously demonstrating to the rest of the country and beyond what genuine multiculturalism looks like.

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Hello, Can You Hear Us?:
Ethnic Minorities in Japan’s Broadcasting System

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Introduction

Since the idea of multiculturalism is very complex and can sometimes be controversial, it is important to clarify what it means. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, multiculturalism is “the practice of giving importance to all cultures in a society.” In this definition, “a society” usually refers to a nation-state, and “culture” refers to ethnic, racial, religious, and/or linguistic differences. Based on these ideas, this paper defines multiculturalism as a social practice enacted by and for a nation-state, in which different cultures are considered equal. Thus, multiculturalism is closely related to legislation and social consensus among state stakeholders, making multiculturalism a basis for statewide social policy.

It is widely known that Japan is highly homogeneous, particularly in terms of race and ethnicity. Because of territorial and historical factors, Japan has traditionally kept its doors firmly closed to “aliens.” However, in light of globalization and the rapid aging of its population, Japan has gradually become more receptive to non-Japanese nationals. Although the figures remain extremely low compared to other nations with multicultural societies, the number of registered foreign nationals in Japan has steadily increased over the last few decades. At the end of 2011, there were approximately 2.01 million foreigners with various resident statuses living in Japan—a 48% increase since 1996. This figure accounts for 1.63% of the total population of the country.

Despite this influx of non-Japanese nationals, many of Japan’s social systems remain domestically oriented in that they are primarily designed for those who speak Japanese and have Japanese cultural backgrounds. Since almost 98% of the population is ethnically Japanese, policy makers are, in effect, not required to consider ethnic groups when they plan and manage social systems. A clear example of this tendency is Japan’s current broadcasting system. This system excludes ethnic minorities from the broadcasting industry, broadcasting content, and hence the corresponding public sphere.

This paper examines Japan’s broadcasting system in the light of social policy, particularly with regard to ethnic majority–minority relations. The Japanese broadcasting system context consists of public and private broadcasters, the Broadcast Act, and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC). There are 127 private broadcasters and one public broadcaster in Japan, all of which must follow the Broadcast Act and MIAC regulations.

Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK), officially established in 1950, is the only public broadcaster in Japan; its annual revenue is almost 600 billion USD. As Japan’s only public broadcaster, NHK’s nature and status can illuminate how and to what extent Japan’s broadcasting system pays attention to ethnic minorities residing in the country. It is important, therefore, to closely examine the Broadcast Act since it forms the basis for the existence of public broadcasting in Japan and influences programming. As this paper will demonstrate, there is obvious exclusion in the Broadcast Act.

As mentioned above, Japan’s social structure is gradually changing; namely, Japanese society is moving from homogeneity toward diversity. Since embracing multiculturalism is important for Japan’s future, the country should tailor its social practices toward a multicultural environment. In particular, Japan’s broadcasting system has to consider the demands and needs of the nation’s marginalized and vulnerable ethnic minority groups.

1. Outline of the Japanese Broadcasting System

Since launching its services, Japan’s broadcasting system has maintained a binary structure. There are currently 127 commercial broadcasters and one public broadcaster in Japan. The one public broadcaster, NHK, is larger than any other Japanese broadcaster; accordingly, NHK has been influential in program making, technology development, and the formulation of public opinion. The organization runs two terrestrial TV services, two satellite TV services, and three radio channels, and derives 96% of its revenue from viewer subscription fees. In terms of finances and organization, NHK overwhelms its commercial competitors in Japan. Headquartered in Tokyo, NHK operates 53 regional broadcasting stations throughout Japan’s 47 prefectures. The organization has approximately 10,400 employees—almost seven times the workforce of Fuji Television Network, Japan’s largest commercial broadcaster. Accordingly, NHK plays a leading role in providing information, forming culture, and creating the public sphere in Japan. Given the importance and necessity of multiculturalism, the nation’s only public broadcaster should be responsible for enhancing and strengthening Japan’s multicultural environment.

Commercial broadcasters in Japan, on the other hand, have smaller coverage areas and, thus, less influence. The commercial broadcasters form five nationwide news networks. The five major broadcasters (called “key stations”) in Tokyo play a leading role within the networks, providing most of the aired programs. The commercial broadcasters typically attach high value to viewer ratings. This inevitably leads to two programming problems concerning ethnic minority groups: (1) there are almost no programs intended for ethnic minorities since such programs would not likely be popular among mainstream audiences, and (2) programming often marginalizes foreigners or ethnic minority groups. For example, some popular programs emphasize the bizarre behaviors of “foreigners” who visit or reside in
Japan. Such programs can achieve high ratings but can also affect viewers’ perspectives and encourage stereotypes, exoticism, and xenophobia. Marginalization through media representation might also conceal the existence of ethnic minority groups in Japan and the problems they face.

In addition to NHK and the commercial broadcasters, the MIAC is a key player in Japan’s broadcasting system and is responsible for Japan’s national broadcasting policy and administration. The MIAC holds jurisdiction over all broadcast-related legislation, including the Broadcast Act (Hōsō-hō) and the Radio Act (Denpa-hō). Since it is important for democratic nations to maintain a balance between freedom of expression and the social influence of broadcast media, national broadcasting systems generally have an independent regulatory body. Examples of such bodies include the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States, the Korean Communications Commission (KCC), the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), and the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). Japan, however, does not have such a mechanism. Instead, the MIAC regulates the broadcasting industry. This creates societal concerns regarding the independence of broadcasters and the sound development of journalism. This unique but problematic structure prompts a close examination of the Broadcast Act of Japan as it plays a significant role in the MIAC’s regulatory and policy-making initiatives.

2. Examining the Broadcasting Acts of Japan, Canada, and Australia

It is important to consider the role of public broadcasting, especially in market-based societies where commercial broadcasters tend to be dominant. In general, broadcast media serve both majority and minority groups by promoting dialogue, mitigating conflicts, and forming a collective identity among various groups. Public broadcasters are expected to take such initiatives without commercial motives or interference by sponsors. To better understand these expectations, we can examine national legislation related to the role of public broadcasting since such legislation usually defines the objectives and mandates of public broadcasters. Accordingly, this section examines the core articles and clauses of the broadcasting-related acts of Japan, Canada, and Australia.

(1) Japan

The Broadcast Act of Japan, which has 11 chapters and 193 articles, does not include any statements regarding ethnic minority groups. The Act was established in 1950 and has been amended several times. In December 2010, for instance, structural amendments were made to accommodate problems and challenges associated with the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications. Although the Act has not kept pace with the velocity of technological development, it remains the most important factor in formulating Japan’s broadcasting policy and administration.

Article 4 in the second chapter of the Act, “General Rules Concerning the Editing and
Other Matters of Broadcast Programs,” is of particular importance here. The first clause of Article 4 stipulates four “general rules” for all broadcasters and their programming standards:

The broadcaster shall comply with the matters provided for in the following items when editing the broadcast programs of domestic broadcasting or domestic and international broadcasting: (i) it shall not harm public safety or good morals; (ii) it shall be politically fair; (iii) its reporting shall not distort the facts; (iv) it shall clarify the points at issue from as many angles as possible where there are conflicting opinions concerning an issue.

These four items are key to understanding the insufficient consideration of ethnic minorities in the Japanese broadcasting system. For example, the first rule does not define who the “public” is and what the term “safety” means. In other words, it is unclear whether the concept of the “public” includes ethnic minority groups and Japanese citizens with different cultural backgrounds and/or first languages. Likewise, as ethnic minority groups are generally marginalized and thus vulnerable, the concept of “safety” is important and should be carefully considered; however, it remains ambiguous in the article. Since the “general rules” require broadcasters to design so-called program standards according to the article, it is critically important to examine the terms and concepts used in the article because they may improve the existing results.

The second clause of Article 4, however, says that programs should consider those who have physical disabilities, stating that;

the broadcaster shall establish as many broadcast programs as possible which enable visually impaired persons to listen to voices and other sounds which explain the instantaneous images of stationary or moving things and broadcast programs which enable persons with aural disabilities to see characters or figures which explain voices and other sounds when editing the broadcast programs of domestic broadcasting, etc. through television broadcasting.

This clause indicates that the Act does not entirely neglect the socially vulnerable. However, the Act should also include other types of socially vulnerable or marginalized groups—namely, ethnic minorities.

(2) Canada
Canada is well known as a nation that officially adopts multicultural policy, which may explain why the Broadcasting Act of Canada stands in sharp contrast to Japan’s Broadcast Act. The Canadian Act displays clear consideration for minority cultures. For instance, Article 3 (clause 1-d-iii) of the Broadcasting Act of Canada stipulates that;

the Canadian broadcasting system should, through its programming and the
employment opportunities arising out of its operations, serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations of Canadian men, women and children, including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of the Canadian society and the special place of the aboriginal peoples within the society.

This simple but important sentence emphasizes that Canada is multiracial and multicultural and recognizes the importance of maintaining this social environment. The article also mentions the role of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)—the nation’s public broadcaster. Article 3 (clause 1-m-viii) stipulates that “the programming provided by the Corporation should reflect the multicultural and multiracial nature of Canada.” These clauses reflect renowned Canadian legislation such as the Constitution Act of 1982 and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, both of which proudly endorse the nation’s multiculturalism policy.

(3) Australia
Australia’s Broadcasting Services Act of 1992 also warrants consideration. Article 3 of the Act stipulates that “the object of this Act is to promote the role of broadcasting services in developing and reflecting a sense of Australian identity, character, and cultural diversity.” This sentence clearly confirms the importance of ensuring and maintaining cultural diversity in Australia—a nation similarly renowned for its relatively generous multiculturalism policy.

The Australian broadcasting system has another remarkable piece of legislation: the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) Act of 1991. SBS is a broadcaster that airs multilingual programs over its radio and television channels and ensures ethnic minority groups have media access to ethnic-oriented content. There are many noteworthy clauses in the SBS Act. For example, Article 6 (subsection one) of the Act stipulates that “the principal function of the SBS is to provide multilingual and multicultural media services that inform, educate and entertain all Australians, and, in doing so, reflect Australia’s multicultural society.” Similarly, subsection two of Article 6 stipulates that;

the SBS, in performing its principal function, must: (a) contribute to meeting the communication to Australia’s multicultural society, including ethnic, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities; (b) increase awareness of the contribution of a diversity of cultures to the continuing development of Australian society; (c) promote understanding and acceptance of the cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity of the Australian people; (d) contribute to the retention and continuing development of language and other cultural skills; (e) as far as practicable, inform, educate and entertain Australians in their preferred languages; and (f) make use of Australia’s diverse creative resources.

These are just a few examples of articles or clauses that illustrate how the SBS Act
(and therefore the broadcasting system) is tailored toward a multicultural environment.

Close examination of the broadcasting-related acts of these three nations highlights clear differences between them with regard to the consideration or tolerance of ethnic minority groups. While there are explicit manifestations of multiculturalism in the Canadian and Australian legislation, there are no such statements in the Broadcast Act of Japan. Although more than two million of Japan’s citizens and residents come from different ethnic backgrounds, the country has yet to officially adopt a multicultural policy.

Conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction, the multicultural environment in today’s Japan is steadily growing. To address the changes in Japan’s demography, the government of Japan is promoting a comprehensive social policy called *Tabunka Kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence). Initially developed by the municipalities, *Tabunka Kyōsei* has become a national agenda. According to the Local Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the policy intends to “provide administrative and life information for non-Japanese inhabitants [and promote] the granting of assistance for their daily lives and the coexistence of different cultures in the community.” This policy will primarily be implemented in municipalities where foreigners and minority groups spend their daily lives and interact with Japanese citizens. In the strictest sense, *Tabunka Kyōsei* is different from multiculturalism policies in places such as Europe, Canada, and Australia. However, the concepts share some essential ideas. Overall, Japan’s government must take measures to promote the coexistence of different cultures, including amending the Broadcast Act so it serves ethnic minority groups living in Japan. As established in this paper, legislation is key to promoting multiculturalism in the Japanese broadcasting system.

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Reflection, the Public, and the Modern Machine: 
An Investigation of the Fukushima Disaster in Relation to the Concepts of Truth and Morality

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Introduction

In March 2011, Japan suffered a massive earthquake. The resultant tsunami hit the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. It was later revealed that the plant went into a state of meltdown as it had completely lost the electricity required for cooling the reactors. The accident has not yet been resolved as some of the reactors are still in a critical condition. In fact, the full extent of the damage cannot yet be assessed at this stage as it is ongoing. However, it is anticipated that the damage will be far greater than expected, according to the reports published after large-scale investigations into the nuclear accident were conducted. ¹ While it is still unclear how many people will be affected, both mentally and physically, by the radioactive fallout, the extent to which people’s lives are subject to the extreme risks of scientific technology has become patently clear.

Three of the four reports emanating from the investigations state that the disastrous consequences are largely attributable to human error. They are unanimous in their claims that the nuclear accident and the subsequent dispersion of radioactive substances, causing widespread suffering to those living in the area, were man-made and at least partially resulted from a lack of proper foresight.

Historically, numerous philosophers and political thinkers have drawn attention to the risks of modern technology, and many of them have attributed the risks to the lack of critical thinking and the overwhelming ascendancy of instrumental reason (Arendt 1971; Heidegger

¹ There are four reports on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident published at the time of writing (September 2013). They include those published by the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (ICAF: a committee appointed by the Cabinet); the National Diet of Japan, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC: appointed by the National Diet); the Rebuild Japan Institute Foundation (RJIF: an NGO established by business CEOs, journalists, and independent researchers); and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (ICAF) (2012), Investigation Report; The National Diet of Japan, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) (2012), The Official Report, available from the Secretariat of the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission; Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF) (2012), The Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident.
If the lack of critical thinking is the main cause of the perceived risks related to the Fukushima tragedy, we are obliged to ask what we really mean by “thinking.” We need to ask, “What does ‘thinking’ actually consist of?” and “How could it prevent man-made disasters from occurring?”

This paper strives to clarify what the risks of scientific technology are in relation to instrumental reasoning and critical thinking, and, subsequently, in relation to the significance of the concept of the public in contemporary world affairs, with a specific focus on the Fukushima accident. In so doing, I shall introduce arguments relating to scientific technology by such Western philosophers as Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, and Max Horkheimer, as well as the Kyoto School philosophers, including Kitaro Nishida and Jun Tosaka. This paper also focuses on the issue of morality in order to address the notion of the lack of critical thinking and the disappearance of the public realm. To clarify these points, the paper starts with a brief explanation of science and thinking. By using Arendt’s concept of thinking, I shall argue that the unquestioned adaptation of reason as a mere instrument for technological development actually inhibits the function of critical reflection. Second, I shall concentrate on the issue of the disappearance of the public realm in the modern world as a result of a lack of critical reflection. I shall argue that the evaporation of this realm is intimately intertwined with the emergence of the contemporary machine of technological development and human progress, which in fact destroys human lives, as in the case of the Fukushima disaster. Third, I shall conduct a detailed examination of the investigation reports on the Fukushima accident. A careful reading of the reports reveals that the accident occurred because of the reckless adoption of the technological machine of the nuclear complex, which is characterized by a lack of critical thinking and moral reflection. Next, I shall pay specific attention to some counterarguments to the ascendancy of instrumentality. Here I shall introduce Tosaka’s theory of literature and morality, and attempt to elucidate the importance of a possible collaboration between social science and the humanities to avoid the disastrous consequences of instrumentality. This will be followed by some concluding remarks.

Science, Reason, and Thinking

Arendt, a prominent political thinker of the twentieth century, severely criticized the lack of thinking that resulted from relying exclusively on instrumental reason, and contended that it was the main cause of the emergence of totalitarianism (Arendt 1958). Nishida, a well-known Japanese philosopher, wrote after the Kanto Earthquake in 1923 that the practice of critical thinking had disappeared in contemporary society and that this had resulted in the disastrous consequences of the earthquake (Nishida 1952, 129). In this sense, they both agreed that the disasters were man-made.

Any investigation of the relationship between scientific technology and the contemporary world should probably commence with a close scrutiny or analysis of the term “reason” as a human trait. The “reason” usually used in scientific investigation is purely instrumental; thus, it comes very close to the Kantian notion of intellect. According to
Heidegger, the prominent philosopher and proponent of existentialism, science investigates the relations of cause and effect. It strives to reveal the causal relationships, mechanisms, and logic lying behind the manifestation of its research objects. The ancient Greek philosophers, Aristotle in particular, distinguished between four types of causality: material (causa materialis: what something is made of); formal (causa formalis: what it is to become); purpose (causa finalis: the end for which something is done); and efficient (causa efficiens: that which brings about the final effect). For Heidegger, contemporary science only focuses on the efficient cause and rarely concentrates on the others. What is important here is that scientists disregard the importance of the purpose and meaning of the change, or the other causes, and “causa efficiens, only one of the four causes, sets the standard for all causality” (Heidegger 1977, 7).

Concentrating on the causa efficiens, in fact, means that we, those who are living in the contemporary age of the domination of science, have got used to employing only instrumental reason. Consequently, we have lost our capacity to “deeply” consider the purpose and meaning of the consequence. This, of course, denotes that we are unable to call in question the purpose of the change, asking whether the means actually contributes to achieving the pre-set goals, whether the means is justifiable in relation to the purpose, and whether the purpose itself is morally acceptable or not. Horkheimer, a harsh critic of modern technological society, contends that scientific investigations based on instrumental reason put aside the moral question because they disregard the purpose. The scientific task, set without considering the moral question in this way, can appear to be set “arbitrarily” and thus becomes “ideological” (Horkheimer 1989, 52-57, 56). In this sense, it comes close to what, in International Relations, Robert Cox calls “problem-solving theory” (Cox 1981, 126-155).

Arendt (1971) also takes up the issue of reason in her posthumous work, The Life of the Mind, and addresses the question of thinking and evil-doing. Examining Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem in 1961, she comes up with the notion that evil is not something monstrous or demonic, but simply “banal” (Arendt 1977). In fact, what she saw in Eichmann was simply the total lack of thinking. As a result, Arendt felt obliged to address the question of thinking and evil-doing: “Might the problem of good and evil, our faculty for telling right from wrong, be connected with our faculty of thought?” (Arendt 1971, 185, 5). Thus, she had to address the following question:

Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens to come to pass or to attract attention, regardless of results and specific content, could this activity be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually “condition” them against it? (The very word “conscience,” at any rate, points in this direction insofar as it means, “to know with and by myself,” a kind of knowledge that is actualised in every thinking process) (ibid., 5).

“To know with and by myself” is, to Arendt, the core process of critical reflection. But what is this critical reflection? Martin Heidegger’s definition of reflection is indicative: he
states that reflection means, “the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that deserve to be called in question” (Heidegger 1977, 116).

This can be done within oneself when we acknowledge the plurality of the self. Arendt argues:

Nothing perhaps indicates more strongly that man exists essentially in the plural than that his solitude actualizes his merely being conscious of himself, which we probably share with the higher animals, into a duality during the thinking activity. It is this duality of myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks and the one who answers (Arendt 1971, 185).

In this sense, plurality within an individual is an essential condition for critical reflection. It is not just to ask oneself whether the goal was achieved in the way it was planned and whether the means hired to achieve the goal were consistent with the purpose of the action, but also to ask, in the reflective thinking process, whether the purpose of one’s action itself is justifiable. Thus, it inevitably involves a moral judgment as well as technical issues.

The ICAF report on the Fukushima accident in fact touches upon the problem of “purpose,” plainly stating that the nuclear engineers or administrators never ensured that they agreed on the purpose of the nuclear energy policies among themselves, let alone morally assessed them. The chairperson of the ICAF deprecatingly states in the epilogue of the report that “nuclear scientists or engineers did not have, or even attempted to have, any consensus whatsoever on the primary purpose of the organizations they belonged to or what they had been granted by society in relation to the nuclear energy policies” (ICAF 2012, 446). This clearly indicates that he sees one of the most important elements of the nuclear accident as the fact that the scientists and engineers were concerned more with instrumentality and the technical issues, the causa efficiens, of nuclear energy promotion than the purpose, the causa finalis, thereof. In other words, their efforts were exclusively devoted to maintaining the formality of the nuclear complex, but never aimed at contributing to the wellbeing of people living in that area or those using the electricity in the broader society.

What is the purpose of Japan’s nuclear policies then? The Atomic Energy Basic Act states:

The purpose of this Act is to secure energy resources in the future and achieve the progress of science and technology and the promotion of industries by encouraging research, development and utilization of nuclear energy and thereby contributing to the improvement of the welfare of human society and of the national living standard (Article 1).

Here, the ultimate goal of the nuclear power policies is to contribute “to the
improvement of the welfare of human society” and the “national living standard.” However, it is obvious that this purpose is not really the true purpose and that it is regarded as a mere abstract principle, which has no concrete meaning to engineers or administrators. What they were more concerned with as the purpose of their endless efforts is stated before the principle, and that is “the progress of science and technology” and the “promotion of industries.”

The progress of science and technology and the promotion of industries are obviously the means to achieve the ideals, such as the improvement of the welfare of human society and of the national living standard. It is evident here that the means have been converted into the ends. This is because instrumental reason is always for a certain end and the end is effortlessly transformed into the means to achieve something else. This forms an endless “chain whose every end can serve again as a means in some other context” (Arendt 1958, 153-154). If we trace the chain backwards, it is possible to say that instrumental reason is incapable of setting the end and means itself becomes the end. In other words, there is no end as such, but only means in the eyes of instrumental reason.

In this context, Arendt distinguishes “meaning” from “ends.” The “meaning” denotes “the ideal of usefulness” or principle with meaningfulness that “can no longer be conceived as something needed in order to have something else.” It therefore “defies questions about its own use.” However, those with instrumentality cannot distinguish the meanings from the ends, simply because they are “incapable of understanding meaning” (ibid., 154-155). They need a further end to the present end, which turns into the means to achieve the former. This paradoxically leads to an argument that they would not recognize a purpose as an end if there were no further purpose. It is possible to say therefore that “the improvement of the welfare of human society and of the national living standard” did not register with the engineers or administrators of the nuclear complex and that these ideals failed to be recognized by them simply because they are too abstract and incapable of clearly defining concrete beneficiaries.

The ICAF report repeatedly states that the total lack of attention to the principle of nuclear power policies contributing to the improvement of the welfare of human society was one of the most impelling reasons for the accident (ICAF 2012, 19, 44, 333, 564, 577, 583-584). It severely criticizes the nuclear administration and the attitude of TEPCO for devoting themselves only to the promotion of nuclear energy industries and not paying sufficient attention to the safety and health of individuals. It is evident here that this was directly related to the administrators and engineers’ instrumentality and their lack of reflective thinking. However, this is not the end of the story.

The Universal Truth and the Public Realm

The lack of critical reflection and the excessive inclination towards instrumentality is clearly part of the cause of the accident. However, there is another factor that is closely related to critical reflection: the disappearance of the public realm. The public realm is, according to Arendt, also based upon the idea of plurality. In this sense, the existence of political dialogue and the practice of critical reflection are two sides of the same coin, both of which are
established on the basis of plurality. The essential element of critical reflection is thus the existence of plurality, whether it exists within an individual or among individuals.

However, critical reflection is different from the notion of the public realm in terms of human activities or, in Arendt’s words, *vita activa*. While the former can be conducted within an individual, the latter needs others with whom to communicate. For Arendt, the function of the latter is vital in relation to the human condition. This is because it involves “action and speech.” She does not think that a life without action and speech deserves to be called a life, as “it is no longer lived among men” (Arendt 1958, 175-176). This encapsulates the essence of Arendt’s argument on the basic human condition, that is, to live “among men,” which is similar to the Japanese word for human beings, *ningen*, literally meaning inter-human.

Because she was deeply concerned with the plurality of human beings in the public realm, Arendt was a harsh critic of science and technology. In her *Human Condition*, she argues that science’s relentless pursuit of a transcending and universal truth is a dangerous business. Contrary conventional wisdom, Arendt contends that it is misleading to assume that science and technology have nothing to do with politics; on the contrary, they dwell at the very core of politics.

The situation created by science is of great political significance. Whenever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, for speech is what makes man political (*ibid.*, 3).

Arendt regards the speech and dialogue naturally generated by the plurality of individuals as the most essential condition of human existence. This plurality is the origin of the public realm, according to Arendt, and the public realm cannot materialize in any sense without human plurality. In this context, she maintains that the problem of science is mainly caused by its robust assumption that there is a universal truth that transcends human existence. The truth in this context cannot be doubted nor is it debatable in any sense, simply because it is the truth. Discussions or dialogue in the public realm regarding the “truth” are simply superfluous once scientists have discovered the universal truth. Thus, the truth, by definition, is assumed to exist exogenously to society.

However, this assumption appears to be inaccurate and far from convincing when we look at existentialist philosophy. Kitaro Nishida for example, contends that there is “pure experience” before it is divided by language into subject and object (Nishida 1947, Vol. 1). It is literally incommunicable experience because it is impossible for anyone, by definition, to present this pure form of experience to others as it presumably exists before the subject-object division and thus before language. Nishida assumes that pure experience is the only way to grasp reality. Once it is narrated, it is easily captured and distorted by the power of language. In this sense, “scientific truth cannot be called the perfect truth” when it is spoken (*ibid.*, 37). Hitoshi Imamura transforms “pure experience” into the existence of reality in general and argues that we should distinguish “pure” existence (the genuine truth) from “language” existence (the narrated fact); the “pure” reality, in other words the truth, only exists before it is spoken (Imamura 2008, 73). However, many scientists robustly maintain the prevailing belief, with their persistent faith in instrumental rationality, that transcending
universal truth can be discerned on the basis of scientific investigation. They also hang on to the assumption of the transparency of language and believe that it conveys the truth without distorting it.

Scientists’ unwillingness to interact socially with others and their unmitigated reliance on instrumental reason often results in the dispersion or disappearance of the public realm. Taking the example of scientists who developed the atomic bombs and nuclear weapons, Arendt insists that the reason she considers scientists’ judgment to be misleading does not lie in their naivety in believing that their scientific development would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and never be abused, but in that their scientific practice to discover universal truth actually deprives society of the opportunities for dialogue. Arendt maintains:

The reason why it may be wise to distrust the political judgment of scientists qua scientists is not primarily their lack of “character”—that they did not refuse to develop atomic weapons—or their naïveté—that they did not understand that once these weapons were developed they would be the last to be consulted about their use—but precisely the fact that they move in a world where speech has lost its power (Imamura 2008, 73).

This is a typical example of Arendt’s perception of science. For her, life without action and speech is “literally dead to the world” (ibid., 176). In this way, she sees scientists as no longer existing among human beings and having disappeared from the public realm.

If the main problem of science is the evaporation of the public realm, does technology have the same problem? In the case of technology, the story seems to be even more complicated. This is because the term scientific technology implies the application of scientific knowledge in society. As technicians exist in the world of social and material forces, so too does their technology. In this sense, technology is ceaselessly social and political from the outset.

Jun Tosaka argues that technology becomes possible only when it is applied in society to produce goods (Tosaka 1966a). Without being applied to material production processes, “the knowledge of physics or chemistry remains as mere scientific knowledge” (ibid., 241). Tosaka insists that technology is ideological and the widespread misunderstanding that technology exists outside of social structures is itself ideological. This is because scientific technology often results in a confirmation of the prevailing political and economic order and therefore, whether intentionally or unintentionally, delivers the benefits to the dominant class in society. Tosaka maintains that this happens because the technicians usually belong to the dominant bourgeois class and their perceptions often take for granted the prevailing socio-economic and historical order in which they find themselves (ibid., 269).

Technology, together with scientific truth, the production process, the apparatus of wealth generation, and, of course, administrators and engineers, constitute a “nature-like” machine (Arendt 1958, Chapter 3). This machine exclusively aims at achieving “startling increases in efficiency,” but has no clear end. It has its own mode of reproduction and lasts
forever, as there is no end. Arendt compares it to nature because neither of them has any discernible beginnings or ends, but only the continuity of its functioning. Arendt contends that the machine has already replaced nature in the modern age and our lives are controlled and dominated by it. Arendt states:

The continuous process pursuant to the channelling of nature’s never-ending processes into the human world, though it may very well destroy the world qua world as human artifice, will as reliably and limitlessly provide man-kind with the necessities of life as nature herself did before men erected their artificial homes on earth and set up a barrier between nature and themselves (ibid., 152).

Once human beings are involved with this reckless machine of wealth production, no one seems able to escape, as they are deprived of the opportunity of thinking or interacting with others in the public domain. This is a peculiar problem of modernity and, in a very real sense, the Fukushima disaster was caused by this uncontrollable machine.

**The Nuclear Village and the Modern Machine**

There is no clearer example of the deprivation of human life by the reckless machine of wealth production through scientific technology than in the case of the Fukushima accident. It is often said that Japan’s nuclear power energy policies have been mainly promoted by what has been referred to as the “nuclear village” (genshiryoku mura), consisting of the scientists, technical experts, government politicians and administrators, which constitute a complex cartel strikingly similar to Arendt’s depiction of the modern machine. In the Fukushima case, the main organizations forming the machine include the government Cabinet; the Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency, which was later reorganized into the Nuclear Regulation Agency of the Ministry of the Environment, in 2012; the Japan Atomic Energy Commission; and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Among those bodies, the majority of scientists and engineers are in TEPCO (RJIF 2012, 251), but the company itself is by no means controlled by them. Instead, administrators have long been controlling TEPCO and, in fact, no scientist or engineer has ever been appointed as the president of the company.

This nuclear machine often works as a fortress of nuclear energy production to protect established organizations and companies. For example, the RJIF report states that laws and regulations set by the agencies often functioned monopolistically to prevent other electric power companies from entering the nuclear power generation market, so that TEPCO did not have to invest resources to compete with them (ibid., 7).

The monopolistic character of the nuclear village has presumably resulted in the disappearance of the public realm in which democratic dialogue is supposed to takes place. Strikingly, some government officials and TEPCO nuclear engineers, individually interviewed by the investigating committees, testified after the accident that they were “aware that there was a lack of safety measures in the nuclear policies of Japan, but that one person’s
demand for countermeasures would not have made much difference” (ibid.). It is indeed shocking that they were aware of the deficiency of the system long before the accident. Thus, by and large, there was critical reflection, but it could never be expressed in public because there was no such thing as a public domain in the village.

One may well ask, what is the mechanism behind the silence of the engineers and administrators? One of the possible answers resides in the peculiarity of Japanese cultural politics. For example, Masao Maruyama, a prominent political scientist in post-war Japan, argues that there has been a subtle but long lasting, balance between Western “institutions” and indigenous “spirit,” on the basis of which Japanese modernity has been established and maintained since its inception. The “pattern” of Japanese perceptions of organizations and individuals, namely, the “fetishizing” of modern institutions by bureaucrats and the adherence of the ordinary people to nature has been interestingly internalized and embedded in the individual, without him/her becoming aware of the inherent contradiction between the two. This is because, according to Maruyama, these two extreme perceptions of society appear to be very different and seem to be completely dissimilar and unrelated (Maruyama 1961, 52-53).

Similarly, a Japanese theorist, Tetsuro Najita of Chicago University, states that Japan has a long history of the importation of knowledge and technology by arranging for them to fit in with Japanese culture, which is a combination often referred to as Japanese soul and western knowledge (wakon yosai) (Najita 1989). He argues that there has been a particular perception of knowledge and technology in Japan from the beginning of its modernization process:

What we are capable of knowing from whatever source outside ourselves may indeed be true and valid, but the real margin of plenitude is in our indigenous culture. The quest for Western science and technology in the mid-nineteenth century was grounded in this sense of cultural certitude (ibid., 9).

If Najita is right, then there has been almost no tradition of “thinking,” in the Arendtian sense, and Japanese “culture” is supposedly founded on the basis of the “senses” and “feelings” of people, as Maruyama argues. The “senses” and “feelings” were supposed to be inherent in Japanese culture and the assumed monoculture cannot and does not accommodate the difference, which results in the disappearance of the plurality among individuals, namely, the public realm. In fact, the evaporation of the public realm became the foundation of the anzen shinwa (safety myth) of the nuclear power management. The disappearance of the public realm functioned in such a bizarre manner that administrators and engineers started simply believing that nuclear power plants contained no risk (RJIF 2012, 247). The RJIF report asserts vigorously that:

All the concerned individuals adopted a particular attitude that they would not make any remarks which may trouble the organisations on the question of the “Safety
Myth” (Anzen Shinwa). There are some who interpret it as the peculiar characteristic of Japanese society. However, if “reading the atmosphere” (kuki wo yomu) is inevitable in Japanese society, such a society is not capable of safely managing nuclear energy, which requires high risk and complex technology (ibid., 7).

What was at stake in the case of the Fukushima disaster was the existence of the nuclear machine as a result of a lack of critical reflection and the absence of the public realm. It became clear that the evaporation of a public space for dialogue and critical discussion in Japan’s nuclear village actually produced tremendous risks in the process of bringing into existence the most advanced technical knowledge and scientific technology.

How then could we ensure that we have critical reflection and the public realm in contemporary life, which seems to be virtually dominated by instrumental reason? One of the key concepts is human beings, which is absent in the discourse of the nuclear village.

**Tosaka Jun’s Theory of Technology and Morality**

If the causes of the Fukushima disaster reside in the modern machine, based on a lack of reflective thinking and the disappearance of the public realm, the problem is by no means limited to this nuclear power plant. The issue is about technology and politics in the age of modernity in general. In order to draw lessons from the Fukushima accident, Tosaka Jun’s theory of science is probably the most insightful and indicative theory on which to concentrate. This is because Tosaka investigated Japanese culture and politics before WWII, and examined the separation of technology from philosophical engagement. It is also because he was very much aware of the importance of human beings, not only for the principle of human dignity, but also for practical engagement in politics.

Tosaka was very much concerned with the practice of reflection and technology from the very beginning of his philosophical enterprise, and his analysis of scientific technology is historical. He acknowledges history in dialectic form and argues that science, whether natural or social, is a historical product. This not only means that science is always exposed to social and material forces, but also that it itself is a social force.

For Tosaka, the analysis of technology consists of three different dimensions: the dimension of technology per se, the ideological subjective dimension, and the dimension of the technician (Tosaka 1966a, 234). The first objective or dimension of analysis, which corresponds to the physical technology, does not appear to Tosaka to be as important as the last two. He explains the reason why he pays more attention to the second and the third dimensions than the first dimension. According to Tosaka, technology per se becomes an imperative only when it is connected to material society. Take for example a big business. Machines do not produce anything by themselves. Thus, machinery is not in any way technology in itself. Machines need operators, business organizations, and transportation methods to function as machines. Thus, technology is an organic combination of machinery and concomitant elements of the production process (ibid., 239).
As technology is always organizational and in need of socio-economic interactions with other organizational bodies, Tosaka contends that technology should be analyzed in a wider context, that is, history (ibid., 241-243). For instance, whether a certain set of scientific knowledge deserves to be called technology totally depends on the state of social development. If economic or social forces do not find the scientific knowledge useful in relation to social development and progress, the knowledge remains mere knowledge and will never be developed into technology. In this way, technology is profoundly influenced by history.

Just as scientists and engineers are historical products, Tosaka himself was, of course, also a product of history. In the 1930s, when he successively published his works, Japan was exclusively characterized by an economic downturn and the emergence of a militarist government, following the overwhelming prevalence of capitalism and consumerism. For Tosaka, science and technology were critically important elements constituting this historical epoch. The crucial issue in science and technology for him was not only the fact that scientists and engineers confirm the perceptions of the dominant bourgeois society, but also that their narratives are ostensibly based on the alleged “truth,” and this has tremendous power of persuasion over ordinary citizens because it looks less ideological than social science (ibid., 271).

Tosaka contends that the ideological function of scientists and engineers is embedded in the production of the objective “truth.” This truth is solely formulated and produced by science on the basis of instrumental reason. As instrumental reason, as noted above, focuses exclusively on the *causa efficiens*, it does not contain any impetus for critical self-reflection. This clearly stems from the fact that scientists do not pay sufficient attention to the *causa finalis*, the purpose of the change, and, consequently, using instrumental reason, they never raise the self-critical question of the purpose of their investigation. The justification of the investigation is inevitably left to the question of “morality.”

Similar to the concept of “truth,” which presumably resides outside of human activity, morality is traditionally supposed to be exogenous to human reason. Conventional wisdom usually assumes that human reason does not have the capacity to develop morals or morality on its own and thus morality needs to be given to it externally, usually by religion, or, as David Hume argues, by passion (Audi 2007, 238). In the case of Japan, morality has presumably also been provided by religion, cultural heritage and local convention, and obviously then the foundation of morality is assumed to be outside of or beyond human reason. However, Tosaka argues that the benefit of the term morality resides in the ruler’s intention to maintain the prevailing social norms. In other words, morality is a product of social and historical forces for maintaining the prevailing political and economic order. As the powerful and dominant always intend to institutionalize morality in society as far as it benefits them, morality is frequently deified and universalized (Tosaka 1966b, 252). In this sense, the deified and universalized morality is a result of power structures based on instrumental reason. Then what is moral in Tosaka’s understanding of the term? He states it is a “living consciousness,” which is far from exogenous to human activities (ibid., 217).
argues that morality is not a separate area from other areas of life such as politics, law, and the economy. It is not an external coercion. It is not, and should not be, something fixed either. It is rather “an attitude for searching, or the purpose of searching” (ibid., 223). Tosaka was suspicious of any forms of morality that were formulated collectively. As socially formulated morality is often imposed on individuals, it is inevitably biased by social and historical forces and only represents the power relations in the society (ibid., 259).

For Tosaka, the purist form of morality exists only in individuals. Yet the concept of “individual” (kojin) itself is the product of social forces. Instead, he uses “self” (jibun) in order to refer to his unique concept of individuals. He states that the concept of “individual” is an abstract and universalized form of the particular. However, this particularity is a generalized particularity (ibid., 260). Thus, it only exists on an abstract level in contrast to the universality. As a result, the individual does not hold the peculiarity based on experiences inherent in a person and that becomes exchangeable with other individuals, like a laborer, for instance. On the other hand, the “self” is assumed to be a concept that cannot be replaced with other selves.

In the case of the Fukushima accident, some technicians and bureaucrats in the nuclear village were more “individuals” than “selves” in Tosaka’s sense. They failed to reflect on the potential problems of the nuclear village for themselves. Even if they became aware of the issues, they were unsuccessful in realizing that presenting their reflection was a moral act. This can be found even in the reports on the accident. An independent association of journalists (the Japanese Association of Science and Technology Journalists (JASTJ)) published a critical examination of the four reports in 2012, which contends that none of the four reports explicitly tackled the issue of morality (JASTJ 2012, Chapter 13). Obviously, the lack of morality was one of the main causes of the accident in the first place, but it is surprising to see that the issue of morality is not touched upon by any of the official investigation teams. This means that the issue of morality is still regarded as exogenous to the Fukushima accident and was never taken seriously, despite the number of books that have been published on the plight of those who suffered. The lack of morality and thus the absence of reflective thinking also explains the recent LDP government’s hasty move to re-commission nuclear power plants.

According to Tosaka, the most salient form of the expression of self does not reside in social science, but in literature. He states that the “individual is a social scientific concept while the self is literary representation” (Tosaka 1966b, 265). This is the only foundation for sound morality. A social issue affects individuals uniformly. However, the reception is different, thus the social issue become a “personal” issue on the self. In other words, a social issue will be “humanized” through the self (ibid., 266). The particularity becomes truly particular only through reflection of the self. Thus, Tosaka contends that morality is formulated on the basis of “personal truth” (ibid., 268), and this personalized truth only takes place through reflecting the social forces and political structure upon itself. Thus, the “self” is a mirror (ibid.).

According to Tosaka, the representation of this personalized truth, which is often
apparent in literature, is one of the most important moral acts. Literature is able to perform this function because literary expressions are able to distinguish the “self” from the “individual” with its “non-existential functions such as representation, fantasy, and exaggeration” (ibid., 265). Of course, Tosaka does not see such “non-existential functions” negatively. They are rather the purist representations of one’s “sense and sensations” (ibid., 266).

Interestingly, Arendt also developed a similar argument for literature. She regards art as the direct representation of “thinking.” This is because works of art do not embrace any “exchange value,” which represents a standard of value judgment in modern society. They are “unique,” and “defy equalization through a common denominator such as money” (Arendt 1958, 167). In artistic endeavor, the “most human and least worldly” is poetry. This is because Arendt believes that a poem’s “end product remains closest to the thought that inspired it” (ibid., 169). Although Arendt differs from Tosaka in the sense that she regards poetry as a direct representation of “thinking” instead of the “senses,” as Tosaka argues, her intention to broaden the scope of our inquiry to embrace contemporary society for moral reflection by focusing on art remains the same.

In fact, numerous books and journals have been published after the Fukushima accident on the lives of the locals. The words and voices of the people who are suffering from the accident have been collected and they provide a very strong social force against the LDP government, which, like an unstoppable, reckless machine, is hastily propelling the resumption of nuclear power generation. It is our task now to expand the public realm regarding the resumption of nuclear power generation so that it includes the local voices of Fukushima. Probably the first step is to transcend the boundaries of social science and the humanities so that the voices of the “self” are clearly heard and expand the scope of our investigation to include the representation of art.

**Concluding Remarks**

As we have seen, scientific technology has a peculiar tendency to concentrate exclusively on instrumentality and thus lacks the capacity for critical reflection and including the public realm. This seems sufficient to explain the cause of the Fukushima disaster. It also explains the reason why some engineers and administrators remained silent before the accident, despite their clear awareness of the problems inherent in the nuclear power policies. Tosaka’s argument of morality indicates the possible collaboration of science and the humanities for the sake of moral reflection. Taking seriously the stories of those who suffered is a tremendously important gesture in understanding contemporary world affairs. The fact is that innumerable notes and memoirs have been published by those who suffered as a result of this man-made disaster, which give us the opportunity to reflect on the meanings of our contemporary lives.

The question remains how we shall maintain the public realm in which different perceptions and perspectives are represented and understood by a variety of participants. Our
view of contemporary world affairs seems to be limited by the presumption of the truth principle of science. This “truth” is strictly limited to being objective and verifiable. This often ends in neglecting personal stories and narratives in understanding the world. The public realm or domain is not something exogenous to our investigation. Rather, our investigation constitutes the public. Therefore, it seems to be our duty to widen the scope of our research as much as possible for the sake of a more accurate comprehension of the ongoing tragedy as well as of the human dignity of those suffering.

On 7 September 2013, the International Olympic Committee voted for Tokyo to host the 2020 Olympic Games. The New York Times reported that at the presentation before the voting session, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gave an “emphatic assurance of safety regarding the country’s 2011 nuclear disaster and continuing concerns about radioactivity” (Longman and Fackler 2013). The same night in Japan, a well-known poet living in Fukushima wrote a poem reflecting the feelings of those who are suffering:

Looking at the slowly approaching autumn sky I thought I heard someone say
“Fukushima is 250 km away; the radiated water cannot affect Tokyo”
The clouds try to block it out by moving hastily
Mishearing in September is cruel.²

References:


² Author’s translation, from Wago’s Twitter @wago 2828 on September 6, 2013, by his permission.


Wago, Ryoichi. 2013. Twitter @wago 2828 on 6 September 2013.
PROGRAM

DAY 1  November 16, Saturday

Program Emcee: Junya Takiguchi (Ryukoku University)

9:30
REGISTRATION

10:00-10:10
OPENING REMARKS

Norio Tanaka (Vice President, Ryukoku University)
Kosuke Shimizu (Director, Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University)

10:10-11:30
KEYNOTE SPEECH

Hideki Tarumoto (Hokkaido University)
“Migration and Integration from a Citizenship Perspective”
Discussants: Hiroyuki Tosa (Kobe University)
Rieko Karatani (Kansai University)

11:30-13:00
LUNCH

13:00-14:45
PANEL 1: MIGRATION, FAMILIES AND MULTICULTURALISM

Chair: Maria P. Makabenta Ikeda (University of Hyogo)
Rhacel Salazar Parreñas (University of Southern California)
“Making Love for a Visa: The Sexual Citizenship of Filipino Migrants in Japan”
Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos (Ryukoku University)
“The Family in the Context of Stepwise International Migration: The Case of Filipino Nurses”
Rogelia Pe-Pua (University of New South Wales)
   “The Face of ‘Family’ in Social Cohesion Research: An Australian Case Study”
Discussants: Nobue Suzuki (Chiba University)
  Akihiro Asakawa (Nagoya University)

14:45-15:10
COFFEE BREAK

15:10-16:55
PANEL 2: MIGRANTS, EDUCATION POLICIES AND MULTICULTURALISM

Chair: Hirofumi Wakita (Ryukoku University)
Sumiko Haino (Kanda University of International Studies)
   “Sustainable Multicultural Society and Brazilian Second Generation in Japan”
Shoichi Matsumura (Ryukoku University)
   “Conflicting Ideologies in Japan’s English Education: Past, Present, and Future”
William Bradley (Ryukoku University)
   “Theory and Practice After Multiculturalism: What Do the Gaps in Grounding
   Principles for Co-existence Tell Us?”
Discussant: Toshinobu Nagamine (Kumamoto University)

18:00-20:00
RECEPTION

DAY 2  November 17, Sunday

Program Emcee: Aysun Uyar (Doshisha University)

9:30
REGISTRATION

10:10-11:30
KEYNOTE SPEECH
Kaori H. Okano (La Trobe University)
   “Social Cohesion in Multicultural Societies: The Interface of Schooling and
   Non-Formal Education”
Discussant: Julian Chapple (Ryukoku University)
11:30-13:00  
LUNCH

13:00-14:45  
PANEL 3: MIGRATION, CIVIL SOCIETY AND MULTICULTURALISM  

Chair: Shiro Sato (Osaka International University)  
Christina Ho (University of Technology, Sydney)  
“Building Multiculturalism through Community Arts: An Australian Case Study”  
Koichi Yawata (Ryukoku University)  
“Hello, Can You Hear Us?: Ethnic Minorities in Japan’s Broadcasting System”  
Kosuke Shimizu (Ryukoku University)  
“Reflection, the Public Realm, and the Modern Machine: An Investigation of the Fukushima Disaster in Relation to the Civil Society”  
Discussants: Katsumi Ishizuka (Kyoei University)  
Satoko Nakane (Ryukoku University)

14:45-15:10  
COFFEE BREAK

15:10-16:55  
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION: RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC  

Chairs: Pauline Kent (Ryukoku University)  
Aysun Uyar (Doshisha University)

16:55-17:10  
CLOSING REMARKS  

Kosuke Shimizu (Director, Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University)
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

Third Afrasian International Symposium
  Afrasian Research Centre
  Ryukoku University

William Bradley
Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos
Takumi Honda
Tomomi Izawa
Pauline Kent
Tomoko Matsui
Shoichi Matsumura
Masako Otaki
Shincha Park
Kosuke Shimizu
Koichi Yawata

Note: The names are listed in alphabetical order of the surname.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Akihiro Asakawa, Nagoya University
William Bradley, Ryukoku University
Julian Chapple, Ryukoku University
Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos, Ryukoku University
Sumiko Haino, Kanda University of International Studies
Christina Ho, University of Technology, Sydney
Maria P. Makabenta Ikeda, University of Hyogo
Katsumi Ishizuka, Kyoei University
Rieko Karatani, Kansai University
Pauline Kent, Ryukoku University
Shoichi Matsumura, Ryukoku University
Toshinobu Nagamine, Kumamoto University
Satoko Nakane, Ryukoku University
Kaori H. Okano, La Trobe University
Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, University of Southern California
Rogelia Pe-Pua, University of New South Wales
Shiro Sato, Osaka International University
Kosuke Shimizu, Ryukoku University
Nobue Suzuki, Chiba University
Junya Takiguchi, Ryukoku University
Hideki Tarumoto, Hokkaido University
Hiroyuki Tosa, Kobe University
Aysun Uyar, Doshisha University
Hiroyuki Wakita, Ryukoku University
Koichi Yawata, Ryukoku University

Note: The names are listed in alphabetical order of the surname.
PRESENTERS’ PROFILES

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Hideki Tarumoto is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology, Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, Japan. He obtained his Doctor of Sociology at the University of Tokyo, Japan (1999). He was Research Associate at Hokkaido University (1995–1997), Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Warwick, UK (2001) and Visiting Professor at Sciences Po, Paris, France (2013). His research interests are citizenship and migration, ethnic diversity and welfare state regimes, and ethnic stratification in Europe and Asia. His major publications include Kokusai imin to shiminken gabanansu (International Migration and Citizenship Governance) (Mineruva-shobo, 2012); Yokuwakaru kokusai shakaigaku (Understandable Transnational Sociology) (Mineruva-shobo, 2009); Theorizing International Norms and Immigrant Rights: Japanese Cases in The New Asias: the Global Futures of World Regions (eds. H.-C. Lim, W. Schafer and S.-M. Hwang., Seoul National University Press, 2010). Citizenship Models in the Age of International Migration in Globalization, Minorities and Civil Society: Perspectives from Asian and Western Cities (K. Hasegawa and N. Yoshihara. eds. Trans Pacific Press, 2008). Website: http://www.hucc.hokudai.ac.jp/~h31509. E-mail: tarumoto@bk.iij4u.or.jp.

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Kaori H. Okano, PhD, is Professor in the Asian Studies Program at La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. She conducts research on education and social inequality and multiculturalism. Her major publications include Minorities and Education in Multicultural Japan: An Interactive Perspective (ed. with R. Tsuneyoshi and S. Boocock, Routledge, 2011), Handbook of Asian Education (ed. with Y. Zhao et al., Routledge, 2011), Young Women in Japan: Transitions to Adulthood (Routledge, 2009), Language and Schools in Asia: Globalisation and Local Forces (ed. A Special Issue of Language and Education, Taylor & Francis, 2006), Education in Contemporary Japan (with M. Tsuchiya, Cambridge University Press, 1999), published in Malay as Pendidikan moden Jepun Ketaksamaan dan kepelbagaian (ITNMB, 2004), and School to Work Transition in Japan (Multilingual Matters, 1993). She was a secondary school teacher in Australia and New Zealand for several years prior to embarking on her academic career.
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Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos is Professor of the Faculty of Intercultural Communication and Vice-Director of Afrasian Research Centre at Ryukoku University. She received her bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degrees from Kobe University. Before moving to Ryukoku, she was Associate Professor at Kobe University Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies (2001-2003). She was also a Visiting Research Fellow at the Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines in 2012. Her major field of interest is international migration and/or/in economic development. Currently, she conducts research studies on the stepwise international migration of Filipino nurses, the impact of the 2008 global economic crisis on foreign workers in Japan, and the role of international migrant remittances in Philippine economic development. E-mail: rdcarlos@world.ryukoku.ac.jp.
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Rogelia Pe-Pua is Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (Australia) where she has been an academic for the last 18 years. She received her PhD in Philippine Studies at the University of the Philippines (1988) where she also taught for 15 years. Her research interests include indigenous psychology, racism in Australia, multicultural attitudes in plural societies, migration policy, cross-cultural psychology, social and community issues, and youth issues. She has undertaken research on migration and return migration in Hawaii and the Philippines, labor migration in Spain and Italy, the character of Australian ethnic press, international students’ experiences, street-frequenting ethnic youth, refugee family settlement, Hong Kong immigrants in Australia, legal needs of immigrants, an evaluation of a Juvenile Crime Prevention Strategy, a project on the needs of Australian Muslim families, and research on social cohesion, social division and conflict in multicultural Australia. She has also worked collaboratively with international researchers comparing ethnocultural youth identity and acculturation; and culture and trait links. Among her most recent major publications are three book chapters: (a) “Social cohesion and social capital: the experience of Australian Muslim families in two communities” (with S. Gendera and I. Katz) in Muslims in the West and the Challenges of Belonging (F. Mansouri and V. Marotta. eds. Melbourne University Press, 2012); (b) “The Philippines” (with P. Perfecto-Ramos) in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives (D. B. Baker. ed. Oxford University Press, 2012); (c) “From Decolonizing Psychology to the Development of a Cross-indigenous Perspective in Methodology: The Philippine Experience,” Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context (eds. U. Kim, K.-S. Yang, and K.-K. Hwang, Springer, 2006). E-mail: r.pe-pua@unsw.edu.au.

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William BRADLEY

William Bradley earned a PhD from University of Arizona in Language, Reading and Culture (2001) and is Professor in the Faculty of Intercultural Communication, where he has been for the past 17 years. His fields of specialization are education and anthropology and in addition to both of those fields, he teaches cultural studies, media and risk, and social science theory and methodology. He has written articles in the last five years on a variety of topics such as images of culture, “Beyond Orientalism: Historicizing the Geisha as Fetish and Spectacle,” (Journal of Socio-cultural Research Institute, Ryukoku University, Vol. 9, 2007), risk society, “Risk Consciousness Among Japanese Youth,” (Journal of Socio-cultural Research Institute, Ryukoku University, Vol. 7, 2005), and globalization of Japanese higher education, “The Dialectic of Internationalization and Globalization in Japanese Universities” (Ryukoku International Center Research Bulletin, Vol. 13, 2004). He is co-editor of Education and the Risk Society (eds. with S. Bialostok and R. L. Whitman, Sense Publisher, 2012) and recently authored a Working Paper Series: Studies on Multicultural Societies, “Is There a Post-Multiculturalism?”(Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University, Vol. 19, 2013)

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Christina Ho is Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Technology, Sydney, where she does research on migration and multiculturalism in Australia. She received her PhD in Political Economy from the University of Sydney (2004). Her publications include ‘For those who’ve come across the seas...’: Australian Multicultural Theory, Policy and Practice (eds. with A. Jakubowicz, Anthem Press, 2013), Beyond the Hijab Debates: New Conversations on Gender, Race and Religion (eds. with T. Dreher, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), and Migration and Gender Identity: Chinese Women’s Experiences of Work, Family and Identity in Contemporary Australia (VDM Verlag, 2008). E-mail: christina.ho@uts.edu.au.

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Koichi Yawata is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Intercultural Communication at Ryukoku University in Kyoto, Japan. He received his PhD in International Media and Communication from Hokkaido University in 2007, and his MA in Public Administration from Carleton University in 2002. He was Associate Professor at Nagoya University from 2007-2011, and his major field of interest is media and culture. One of his major publications is “Hactivism and the Public Interest of the Information-Culturological Sphere: From the Perspective of Michel de Certeau’s ‘Tactics,’” which can be found in the Journal of Information-Culturology 21(2), 2013. E-mail: yawata@world.ryukoku.ac.jp.
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Kosuke Shimizu is Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Ryukoku University. His recent publications include “Nishida Kitaro and Japan’s Interwar Foreign Policy: War Involvement and Culturalist Political Discourse,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11(1), 2011, and “Materialising the ‘Non-Western’: Two Stories of Japanese Philosophers in the Interwar Period,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, forthcoming.
Afrasia Symposium Series
Studies on Multicultural Societies No.3

Proceedings of the Third Afrasian International Symposium

Rethinking Integration: Multicultural Societies of the Asia-Pacific

Edited by
Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos,
Masako Otaki and Shincha Park

16-17 November 2013

Afrasian Research Centre
Ryukoku University (Phase 2), Shiga