Mission of the Afrasian Research Centre

Today's globalised world has witnessed astonishing political and economic growth in the regions of Asia and Africa. Such progress has been accompanied, however, with a high frequency of various types of conflicts and disputes. The Afrasian Research Centre aims to build on the achievements of its predecessor, the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies (ACPDS), by applying its great tradition of research towards Asia with the goal of building a new foundation for interdisciplinary research into multicultural societies in the fields of Immigration Studies, International Relations and Communication Theory. In addition, we seek to clarify the processes through which conflicts are resolved, reconciliation is achieved and multicultural societies are established. Building on the expertise and networks that have been accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past (listed below), we will organise research projects to tackle new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. We aim to disseminate the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in public discourse.

1. A Tradition of Religious and Cultural Studies
2. Expertise in Participatory Research/ Inter-Civic Relation Studies
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ASEAN Regional Integration and Regional Migration Policies in Southeast Asia

Aysun Uyar Makibayashi

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ASEAN Regional Integration and Regional Migration Policies in Southeast Asia

Aysun Uyar Makibayashi *

Introduction

In today’s globalizing and interdependent world, regional frameworks have a particular stance in building economic, and even deeper, multilateral linkages. States recognize that certain issues cannot be solved by individual initiatives, and states can even further maximize their national economic, security, and political interests through more interactive regional formulations composed of multiple members. Indeed, these international/multilateral tendencies and policy calculations have made “regional cooperation” and “regionalism” even more attractive in recent years. Today, there are many examples of these multilateral/regional interactions, ranging from state, inter-state, and sub-state to non-state collaboration. Speaking from a rather classical point of view, the European Union (EU), MERCUSOR (Southern Cone Common Market), EFTA (European Free Trade Area), CARICOM (Caribbean Common Market), and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) were the forerunners of the mainstream regional economic cooperation/integration mechanisms.

As a natural result of the global socioeconomic and environmental changes of the twenty-first century, already existing regional mechanisms, which have usually been built upon establishment and betterment of regional economic or trade relations, have also extended the scope of regional cooperation, and even integration, to other spheres of joint collaboration. Challenges associated with global and regional environmental change, natural disasters, alternative energy needs of neighboring countries, and movements of people are some of the new challenges that are re-defining regional cooperation and integration.

As a unique case of a regional economic framework in Southeast Asia, ASEAN is one of the most active international/regional cooperation mechanisms in the world. It was established in Bangkok on August 8, 1967, by the five original member countries, that is, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Today, the association has a ten-member structure as a result of the expansion of the organization to include Brunei Darussalam.

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(January 7, 1984), Vietnam (July 28, 1995), Laos and Myanmar (July 23, 1997), and Cambodia (April 30, 1999). The ASEAN region now covers a land area of 4.43 million km², has a total population of about 616 million, a combined gross domestic product of US$ 2,311 billion, a GDP growth, in early 2013, of 5.7%, and a total trade of US$ 2,476 billion (ASEAN Secretariat 2013a). With its aspiration to become an integrated community, ASEAN has configured and implemented its recent roadmap to transform its regional collaboration into the “ASEAN Community” by 2015. In order to achieve this goal, three main pillars, ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, along with their strategic blueprints, were enacted as a roadmap for the ASEAN Community.

Migration, on the other hand, has also been an increasingly emerging issue on recent national, regional, and international agendas thanks to the dynamic transportation and communication modes of the first decade of the twenty-first century. There have always been different migration practices and relevant policies on migration, or to present it within more economic terms, the “movement of people,” depending on context (be it a sending or receiving country, be it a case of immigration or emigration, or forced versus voluntary migration). For this reason, not only national governments of sending and receiving countries, but also other regional and international platforms have developed ad hoc or more constructive migration regimes at bilateral and multilateral levels. Along with ongoing changes within the recent socioeconomic formation of societies since the end of the Cold War, the direction and composition of people’s movements have also changed. Hence, it is not the classical ad hoc and bilateral governmental mechanisms of migration, but the recent regional/international governance platforms (whether it is the EU or any other relevant organization of the United Nations System) that have felt forced to re-define and re-design international governance and management regimes of migration.

Keeping in mind this changing direction of migration policies and regionalization experiences in the world, this paper looks at regional cooperation and the changing direction of ASEAN into a “community” while highlighting migration-related policies as well as issues pertaining to the ASEAN regional mechanism in recent years. The first part of the paper looks at the general and regional trends of international migration, with an attempt to combine the recent definitions and direction of migration movements. The second part examines the evolution of ASEAN from a mere regional economic consultation platform into an active integrative unit with a commitment to become “one community.” Finally, the last section makes an argument about the governance dynamics of migration at international/regional levels and the stance of ASEAN migration policies. While the paper approaches the ASEAN and its regionalization experience from a descriptive perspective, the concluding discussions on the recent migration-related agenda of ASEAN are more argumentative by concluding the discussion with a focus on new aspects of migration in the region.
1. Changing Patterns of Migration in the Twenty-First Century

1.1. Recent Migration Trends

Movement of people has been a clear phenomenon in societies since the beginning of the first human interaction, and migration became a significantly political concept after the establishment of the concept of “statehood” and nation-states. Migration is now defined as the “movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a state,” according to United Nations and International Organization for Migration (IOM 2013a, see Table 1). Although this definition is quite clear, the concept of “movement of people” has become complicated and somewhat blurred thanks to the latest phase of communication and transportation methods that has evolved in the last two decades. While thinking about migration, it is always difficult to present a well-explained classification of the act itself. To start with the basics, Table 1 presents the generally accepted definition of migration and its two basic concepts, that is, immigration and emigration.

In addition to these basic actions, there are other movements of people that can be referred to as migration. Depending on the incentive of the person who aims to cross the border, there might be voluntary movements, usually for economic or social reasons, or forced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Basics of Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IOM) The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration (IOM)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emigration (IOM)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The act of departing or exiting from one state with a view to settling in another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic or non-economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Starters</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary movements or forced migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Push/pull factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IOM) Push: drivers that cause people to leave their country of origin. Pull: drivers that affect people’s decision to choose their destination country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groups (from voluntary to forced movements)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IOM) Temporary migrants, economic migrants, documented/irregular migrants, skilled/unskilled migrants, brain drain/brain gain, circular migration, return migration, retirement migration, internally displaced people, refugees, asylum seekers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrant</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN) an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documented migrant, economic migrant, irregular migrant, skilled migrant, temporary migrant worker, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IOM) A term used to encompass numerous governmental functions within a national system for the orderly and humane management of cross-border migration, particularly managing the entry and presence of foreigners within the borders of the state and the protection of refugees and others in need of protection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM (2013a).
migration caused by natural or manmade disasters, internal or cross-border conflicts, diseases, or even economic reasons. Hence, economic and non-economic reasons are used to group movements of people in the first place. According to those economic reasons, there are various incentives, outcomes of these push and pull factors, and means of migration networks in today’s movement of people (Martin 2003). Economic migrants are usually those who seek better living conditions and job opportunities for a certain period of time. Those who follow their families also have economic incentives for which they plan to leave behind unemployed and other consequential and difficult living conditions. Nevertheless, economic migrants may end up experiencing unemployment, harsh working conditions, low wages, and/or discrimination in their host countries too. Hence, some of the incentives and outcomes would be the same as if they had not left. Non-economic migrants, however, have a strong incentive for family unification, which is in a way a voluntary incentive to migrate to another country. At the same time, there might be non-economic and forced movements to flee a war, a local/regional conflict, or a disease. In such a case, this side of the coin might also end up with expected or unexpected outcomes. Economic incentives are usually pursued via family connections (this is one of the most common types of regional/international migration in Southeast Asia) or business deals, while non-economic migration is achieved via various modes of communication, transportation networks, or even randomly, in times of crisis.

According to IOM statistics, 232 million people live outside of their country of birth; this number accounted for 3.2% of the world population in the first decade of this century. This percentage was about 2.1% in 1975, 2.3% in 1990, and 2.9% in 1995 (IOM 2013a). Women are almost 49% of all migrants; 27.5 million people are internally displaced by internal conflicts in more than 52 countries; and there are almost 15.4 million refugees, according to the 2010 data. This incremental increase in the number of people crossing borders shows that international migration is one of the main issues that has to be addressed at the international/regional and global levels. Table 2 provides a summary of migration trends in different parts of the world. There are various organizations working on compiling migration statistics, and this table, taken from the 2013 World Migration Report (IOM), provides a comparison of three authoritative organizations that work on and follow world migration trends. These organizations are Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), World Bank (WB), and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). According to these data sets, there are four major pathways of international migration in the world: (1) South to North, which is the most common or popular direction as citizens of the developing South move to the developed countries for better economic and social conditions. (2) North to North, mainly for economic reasons. (3) South to South, which, in most Asian and African cases is caused by forced migration. (4) North to
South, relatively speaking the weakest channel of international migration.\(^1\) As Table 2 shows, about 74 million people migrated from South to North, accounting for 35% of the total world migration movement, while another 34% of international migration happened in the South (UN DESA in Table 2).

Once again, according to the UN DESA data, almost 69% of the international migrants were born in the South, while 31% were originally from the North. Immigrants and emigrants in the North and South also show the impact of the push/pull factors on the move from the North to the South. According to the UN DESA data, 11.3% of the 1.24 billion people who live in the North are immigrants, while emigrants originated from the North account for 5.2% of this population. The same data set reveals that the South had a population of 5,671 million in 2010, and 1.52% of this number were immigrants (far lower than the percentage of immigrants in the North) and 2.5% were emigrants (IOM 2013b, 59). This is not surprising, as the world’s population is comparatively larger in the developing South and movement of people naturally runs from the less economically appealing regions of the South to the North, which has more economic and social opportunities. This classical flow of international migration has continued during the last two decades as well. Nevertheless, there were different intervals and changing directions of international and regional migration caused by changing socioeconomic and environmental conditions in regional societies.

### 1.2. Migration in Asia and Southeast Asia

Migration can be driven by economic factors, political or social difficulties, ethnic, religious, or other political conflicts, or natural disasters that create harsh environmental conditions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, an old trend is that migration usually occurs from the South to the North, but in the last two decades, there have also been derivations within this overall pattern.

\(^1\) “North” and “South” are contested terms and are defined differently by various organs. The three main authorities, UN DESA, WB, and UNDP, define these geo-political regions in the following manner: UN DESA considers the “South” to be the five developing regions of Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean, Asia (excluding Japan) and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand), and defines the “North” as the developed countries. WB defines the “South” as the low- and middle-income countries and the “North” as the high-income countries. UNDP considers the “South” to be the countries with low, medium, and high ranks on the Human Development Index, while the countries of the “North” have the very highest rank on the same index (IOM 2013b, 44).
channel of movement of people. Figure 1 shows the regional tendencies of international migration over the years since the 1990s. Although Europe and North America were the main destinations of international migrants between 1990 and 2000, migration was most common in Asia in the following decade, between 2000 and 2010. Asia saw an average of 1.7 million international migrants per year during this decade, and one million migrants were added between the period of 2010 and 2013 (UN DESA 2013).

Among the top five destination and home countries for international migration, Asian countries are featured prominently. For example, India and China are ranked second after Mexico in producing South-to-North migration (8% of the overall total for that category). The Philippines—a significant country in terms of international migration in Southeast Asia—contributed to 5% of the international migration in this track in 2010 (according to the World Bank classification of the North and the South) (IOM 2013b). Migrants from Afghanistan (6%), Bangladesh (5%), and India (5%) also play important roles within South-to-South migration. The top destination countries for those migrants moving within the South are the Russian Federation (16% of all South-to-South migration), India (7%), Pakistan (6%), and Kazakhstan (4%), and they are all in Asia.

As mentioned in the previous section, there are a variety of migration channels framed by particular push and pull factors. Because of the economic growth and further development potential, as well as the urbanization and relative industrialization paths of the Asian and Southeast Asian countries, one might think that most of these international and intra-regional movements occur because of economic reasons and on a voluntary basis. Indeed, labor
migration is the largest portion of people’s movements, but refugees and internally displaced people account for considerable portions of those regional migration trends. Although it does not only occur in Asia, the South-to-South movement of refugees in 2010 numbered 7.4 million, accounting for 10.5% of all migrants in this track and 81.2% of all refugees in the world (IOM 2013b). The same statistics also show that the South-to-North track has 1.8 million refugees migrating to the North from the South, and this share counts as 18% of the world refugee population and 1.8% of the total migrants in the destination area.

Changing socioeconomic dynamics and the increasing number of communication and transportation facilities has added another group to the migrating masses, that is, international students. As the concern of this section is Asia and Southeast Asia, the same source used before presents the 2009/2010 data sets for international students as one type of migration. A total of 535,695 students changed their residences for educational purposes in the South-to-North direction, and they account for 51% of the global student stock. While North-to-North movement of students accounts for 29% of all global students, 18% of all international students chose the South-to-South direction for their future dreams. Southeast Asia also plays an active role in terms of migration movements. According to the UN DESA database, while the number of Asian migrants rose by 0.9%, the number of migration movements in Southeast Asia rose by 3.9%, the highest rate in Asia (UN 2013b).

There are various tendencies that have caused the world to shift from a mere South-to-North movement to more extended movements from South to South (within in Southeast Asia) or from North to South. Change in destinations is one clear observation that can be made about the last two decades of international migration. Changing migration agendas can further be analyzed by taking into account the emergence of wide-ranging migrant groups (by including the recent emphasis on semi-skilled and unskilled workers), as well as the growth of irregular migration. Women have always played an important role in migration and this has become even more visible in the recent years. The increasing mobility of data, the presence of informal/formal transportation facilities, and low transportation costs, all bring both progressive and detrimental effects to the movement of people.

2. Regional Integration and ASEAN

Regionalism is the process of cooperation and/or integration between contracting parties around commonly agreed upon targets. Though the act consists of simple cooperation, there might be different motivations and processes that initiate and implement regionalization among the selected members. The establishment of ASEAN can also be explained according to various approaches of regionalism. Pluralism is one of the main perspectives that can be used to discuss the establishment of ASEAN.
The concept of pluralism was developed against the state-centric approach of realism during the Cold War. In the 1960s, developing transnational relations between states, especially on financial and trade matters, resulted in the emergence of multinational corporations (MNCs) and joint investments. Diminishing Cold War rivalries and the development of regional cooperative tendencies, like the establishment of the EEC (European Economic Community), on economic and social matters further led to the emergence of new actors in international relations. Under these circumstances, it came to be understood that only looking at state-to-state relations, or an analysis of these relations, could not be enough to grasp the complex emerging relations and increasing interdependency in the world.²

Pluralism has been improved around four basic concepts (Brown 1997, 42–45). Initially, the scope of international relations expanded beyond that of the nation state. A structure that can go far beyond the border and authority of the state is also peculiar in this approach. National security concerns are not solely related with military and expressly political issues. Rising trade and transnational linkages are crucial enough that socioeconomic matters have also become determinants of relationships. Increasing social, economic, political, and cultural transactions created an atmosphere in which the state is not a unitary actor. It is accepted that states are not whole units but instead are composed of individuals, interest groups, bureaucratic units, civil society entities, and non-governmental organizations. As the state is a composition of different interest groups, its decisions reflect interactions, discussions, and, ultimately, joint declarations from all these parties. Therefore, there may be interest seekers and this may lead to subjectivity concerning both domestic and transnational issues. Non-state actors are coming from all different levels of analysis, including individuals, societal groups, firms, markets, bureaucracies, interstate organizations, non-governmental groups, and MNCs, but, most importantly, transnational organizations and interactions are all significant units of international relations alongside the state itself. Thus, pluralism, as can be understood from the term itself, comprises all these actors and their interactions by claiming that the emerging international environment necessitates such complexity.

In fact, this complexity and these pluralist discussions led to the emergence of regionalism as another sub-field in international relations; regionalism looks at the environment behind and rationale of the emerging regional organizations and platforms. Toward the end of the 1970s, regionalism gained increasing popularity in practice and among scholars. Growing issues of the environment, financial deregulation, energy needs, migration, the emergence of Japan and European cooperation against the American hegemony, and the declining US stance in the financial system with the end of the classical Bretton Woods system, had all resulted in the intensification and differentiation of regionalist claims coming from different parts of the world. This phenomenon of interdependency is the common ground on which all regionalist

² See Keohane and Nye (1977) for further discussions about the emergence of pluralism.
tendencies were built. In fact, regionalism and interdependency are complementary concepts, since complex issues and necessities lead those entities to a joint platform, or at least to a consultation mechanism.

Hence, regionalism is “...an attempt by a group of states to order their relations amongst each other in such a way as to advance commonly agreed aims, to avoid local conflicts and to manage it, if it does break out, as much as possible, on regional basis” (Roy 1997, 20). Related to this common definition, there are versions of regionalism, that is, open regionalism, economic regionalism, and sub-regionalism, through which the fundamentals of ASEAN can be examined. Open regionalism is a term developed by Richard Higgot and Hadi Soesestra in order to define a trade regime characteristic of ASEAN (Segal and Wanandi 1998, 136).

According to Higgot, this is a Pacific model of economic co-operation. Open regionalism mainly aims to avoid the institutionalization of military and security issues, any discriminatory trading bloc, and any kind of strict institutionalization for non-member actors (be it a state or non-state actor). Economic regionalism also leans in a similar direction as open regionalism, in which economic interactions take priority, but it is a wider concept that includes open regionalism and sub-regionalism as well.

2.1. Road to ASEAN

The establishment of ASEAN has been one of the biggest accomplishments in Southeast Asia. The Bangkok Declaration, the founding document of ASEAN, was written on August 8, 1967, and was signed by the five founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Although the document was designed to promote regional cooperation and stability, ASEAN, from its foundational moment, was primarily aimed at economic cooperation. In fact, this historical beginning represented the end of the colonial era in Southeast Asia. Following their victory in the Second World War, the colonial powers tried to maintain the status quo in the region, either through political and economic aid programs or through the establishment of social and cultural linkages. Japan and China were also identifying their ideological and political positions in this new environment marked by an ideological split in the international system. During the 1950s and 1960s, most of the region remained under the influence of colonial powers while de-colonization movements and struggles also took place in various forms. As these newly established countries had no experience of development, and needed to recover from their war-torn economic conditions,
the need for a regional mechanism became clear. Initially, the five countries came together to discuss the possibility of creating a regional common platform for development.

In 1961, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand convened to implement the ASA (Association of Southeast Asia) group. However, regional conflicts hindered this cooperation during the 1960s, and a border dispute between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia caused the cancellation of this first initiative. After this failure, a more wide-ranging proposal (which included Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, Taiwan, New Zealand, South Vietnam, and Thailand) was created in 1966 under the name of the Asia-Pacific Council (ASPAC). Once again, regional disputes between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan created an obstacle to cooperation. It was then, in 1967, that the three original members of ASA (Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) decided to invite Indonesia and Singapore in order to establish another discussion platform for regional political and economic problems. The Bangkok Declaration became the basic document of the organization by stating that:

The Association represents the collective will of the nations to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom, and prosperity (The ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967).4

As stated in the preamble, the organization’s primary priority is the maintenance of the economic and social wellbeing of the region. One distinctive element of ASEAN regional cooperation is that, from the beginning, full co-operation was said to be provided on non-military matters. This in fact has led to a different path for the region by keeping the region more collaborative than integrative, especially when compared to other cooperation/integration mechanisms like the EU. On the other hand, a very promising and hopeful statement issued by the ASEAN founders suggested that the EU would be a model for ASEAN. As Thanat Khoman stated in one of his speeches for ASEAN:

...our model has been and still is, the European Community, not because I was trained there, but because it is the most suitable form for us living in this part of the world in spite of our parallel economies which are quite different from the European ones.5

4 The aims and purposes of the Association are: (i) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations, and (ii) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. See, ASEAN Secretariat (2013b).

5 By Thanat Khoman, former Foreign Minister of Thailand. See, ASEAN Secretariat (2013c).
After this bright start, ASEAN has expanded through the inclusion of the other Southeast Asian Nations. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia became the last member in 1999. As for the membership, a peculiar feature of ASEAN is that it is the most heterogeneous regional organization. Demographic, social, and economic indicators for the organization show that these are not an average indicator for ASEAN potential. Most of the members are developing countries, but other members such as Brunei and Singapore have some of the highest per capita income levels in Asia (Table 3). There are also many nationalities and languages with various ethnic origins within the membership. Most of the ethnic problems originated from this complexity of roots among the member countries. Economic development models and recent achievement of the members are quite different from one country to another. Political heterogeneity is another feature since there are monarchies, republics, parliamentary systems, and authoritarian systems as well. Thus, it is very difficult to draw a general picture about the economic, social, and political framework of the region, as Table 3 indicates. Then again, the recent regional cooperation path of the ASEAN proves that the organization in the past few years has learned how to utilize these differences for regional economic development and ongoing prosperity with the commitment toward one community.

2.2. Towards ASEAN Community

ASEAN was established according to functional development needs in the larger East Asian and Asia-Pacific context, as mentioned in the previous section. The organization’s initial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (thousand)</th>
<th>Population density (per km²)</th>
<th>GDP (US$ million, current prices)</th>
<th>GDP per capita (current prices)</th>
<th>Total trade (US$ million)</th>
<th>GDP growth rate (constant prices, %)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Ratio of total trade to GDP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>399.8</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16,967</td>
<td>42,446</td>
<td>16,856</td>
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<td>99.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>14,411</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>18,664</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>244,776</td>
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<td>878,223</td>
<td>3,588</td>
<td>381,721</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2013a).
establishment date is interesting. ASEAN was established in 1967 (even though the first initiatives were in the early 1960s), but the first meetings where the members convened was not until 1976. Although some argue that this late action of the members indicates pessimism about the organization’s future, Cold War dynamics and rising tensions in the region had in fact forced the founding members to wait and see. The second ASEAN meeting (1977) featured a much more progressive character and the free trade area of ASEAN was framed in this meeting. When ASEAN was established, trade among the member countries was insignificant. Estimates between 1967 and the early 1970s showed that the share of intra-ASEAN trade as a proportion of the total trade of the member countries was between 12% and 15%. Hence, the Preferential Trading Arrangement of 1977, which defined tariff preferences for trade among ASEAN economies, was a crucial start for regional economic collaboration. ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) was also established as a regional forum at the Second Meeting of ASEAN. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation stated that ASEAN political and security dialogue and cooperation should aim to promote regional peace and stability by enhancing regional security. Though it was changed in the 1980s and 1990s, the treaty still functions as one of the foundational documents of the organization when there is a need to take action in times of political difficulties for the region.

The principles of ASEAN, to improve regional cooperation and strengthen war-torn economies in the region, were detailed during the Fourth and Fifth meetings of 1992 and 1995. Indeed, the period between 1992 and 1995 is important as most of the organization’s political and economic improvement procedures were drafted during that period. Economic cooperation in the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) was established to increase production through a “single production unit” strategy, and the major political step of establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was achieved in 1994.

In 1992, the ASEAN heads of state and government declared that ASEAN should intensify its external dialogue in political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region. Two years later, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established. The ARF aims to promote confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution methods in the region. The present participants in the ARF include: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, PRC, DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, the United States, and Vietnam. Under this premise and through political dialogue and confidence building, tensions have not escalated into an armed confrontation among ASEAN members since its establishment.
In addition to these main summit meetings, there were also informal ministerial and other summit meetings of the 1990s that paved the road for the ASEAN community. The Second Informal ASEAN Summit in Malaysia was very significant for the future of ASEAN, since future terms for the conduct of regional integration were initially discussed in that meeting. Then, in 1997, ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 platform, which called for an ASEAN Partnership in Dynamic Development aimed at forging closer economic and political cooperation within the region. The vision aimed to create a stable, prosperous, and highly competitive ASEAN economic region, in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investments, capital, and equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socioeconomic disparities. After this bold initiative was declared, the Hanoi Plan of Action was adopted in 1998 (at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in Vietnam), to serve as the first in a series of planning actions leading up to the realization of the ASEAN vision and community. The Third Informal ASEAN Summit (1997) was also important because it saw the initial “inter-regional” cooperation attempt of ASEAN drafted under the name of ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus Japan, South Korea, and PRC). The ASEAN+3 forum was initially formulated with policy proposals from Japan, PRC, and South Korea. In fact, this forum shows how well ASEAN is regarded and accorded respect by the East Asian regional powers. Since ASEAN had started to be a very demanding and promising market, regional powers wanted to have direct access to the region. In the meantime, Japan, PRC, and South Korea have established their own bilateral linkages through ASEAN+1 frameworks, in order to keep close contact with the ASEAN institutions.

The 2003 Summit of ASEAN, the ninth such summit, began a new chapter of regional integration in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Community was introduced as the new road map for ASEAN regional integration and the 2007 ASEAN Summit saw an agreement to realize the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015 (Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015). The Community is composed of three main pillars: ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Based on the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Work Plan 2 (2009-2015), ASEAN’s regional cooperation has been re-structured along these three main paths of cooperation toward regional integration, and it is referred to as the road map for the ASEAN Community (ASEAN Secretariat 2013c). Indeed, ASEAN member countries and ASEAN institutions have accelerated their activities and initiated wide-ranging projects for further integration, from regional security-related issues to cultural communication. Migration has also recently become an important item within these political-security, economic, and socio-cultural integration pillars. The ASEAN Community structure and activity areas looking forward to 2015 are summarized in Figure 2.
With the development of Vision 2020 (1997), the Hanoi Plan of Action (1998), and, most importantly, the 2003 Plan of ASEAN Community, ASEAN co-operation has resulted in greater regional economic integration. Today, ASEAN economic cooperation covers the following areas: trade, investment, industry, services, finance, agriculture, forestry, energy, transportation and communication, intellectual properties, small and medium enterprises, and tourism. Intra-ASEAN trade has recently expanded to account for 24.5% of all total ASEAN trade, according to 2009 data (Table 4), and not only East Asian countries, but also other regional players such as the EU and US, are strong trade partners of ASEAN (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Top Ten Trade Partners of ASEAN (percentage share in total trade, 2008)**

Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2013a).
Although migration has been a significant phenomenon that is not necessarily or initially related with trade, these trade movements within ASEAN and with other regional economic powers provided the foundation for one increasingly more common path for mobility of people between ASEAN members and other non-regional partners, namely labor migration.

3. International/Regional Migration Governance in Southeast Asia

The actors usually involved with migration are governments and government agencies, regional and international organizations, and migration networks (companies, Non-governmental Organizations(NGOs), unions, and communities). The levels of migration governance that take into account various policies and management strategies about migration are country-level unilateral actions taken by either sending or receiving countries by themselves; bilateral agreements between the sending and receiving countries; regional processes (that usually take place among more than three countries involved with intra-regional and similar experiences of migration); and international regimes such as treaties, conventions, and multilateral non-governmental forums that aim to regularize migration patterns and outcomes when there is no clear government presence or when there is a weak governmental institutional mechanism for the management of migration patterns. The movement of people within and out of the region can be positioned between formal government initiators/institutions and/or private and non-governmental (informal) stakeholders. The government to government track is composed of multilateral-formal mechanisms, such as regional labor regulations. Regional economic partnership agreements (like the ASEAN free trade agreement) are implemented under this track. The government to government bilateral track can consist of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and other labor agreements put

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Intra-ASEAN share in total exports¹</th>
<th>Extra-ASEAN share in total exports¹</th>
<th>Total exports²</th>
<th>Intra-ASEAN share in total imports¹</th>
<th>Extra-ASEAN share in total imports¹</th>
<th>Total imports²</th>
<th>Intra-ASEAN share in total trade¹</th>
<th>Extra-ASEAN share in total trade¹</th>
<th>Total trade²</th>
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<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>9.57</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21.1</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>116.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>96.83</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>74.3</td>
<td>156.7</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>123.18</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>74.3</td>
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<td>6.35</td>
<td>53.7</td>
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<td>3.85</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
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<td>38.33</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>81.43</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>269.19</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>245.23</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>72.7</td>
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<td>76.0</td>
<td>134.12</td>
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<td>718.57</td>
<td>24.5²</td>
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<td>1,521.3</td>
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</table>

¹%, ²US$ billion, ³approximate

Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2013a).
into force by governments with liabilities. The *trans-governmental track* promotes coordination of state and private initiatives to promote and especially secure movement of semi-skilled and unskilled laborers in order to protect their rights and secure their working conditions in, for example, bilateral trade and sector agreements. This track can also be implemented at bilateral and multilateral levels depending upon the specific migration context. Nevertheless, private companies and communities usually prefer informal initiatives within the *private intra-/inter-regional track* (Uyar 2010).

As migration is by its nature an international and regional issue, there have been various attempts taken by the above-mentioned agencies to deal with the ongoing problems of migration. The International Conference on Population and Development (ICDP), in Cairo (1994), was the first crucial attempt to gather a large number of agencies to discuss issues of migration. The ICDP Programme of Action is still a bold document giving guidance to states on how to deal with the issues of human rights, human trafficking, and irregular migration (UNFPA and IOM 2013, 22). Other foundational meetings related to migration and its outcomes in the last two decades are the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), the UN Millennium Declaration (2000), the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban, 2001) and the World Summit Outcome (2005). One crucial but relatively weak agreement that deals with migration and migrant workers (those who are basically re-placed or dis-placed by voluntary or involuntary economic necessities), the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, was adopted in 1990 and finally came into effect in 2003. There are now only 46 member states, mainly from the developing countries, participating in this convention (UNFPA and IOM 2013, 23).

Other international/regional bodies focus on international migration regulations as well. For example, the IOM developed its International Dialogue on Migration framework in 2001, while a cross-organizational body, the Geneva Migration Group (GMG), was established in 2003 with the cooperation of the ILO (International Labour Organization), IOM, OHCHR (Office of the High-Commissioner for Human Rights), UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency), and UNODC (United National Office on Drugs and Crime). These steps led to the initiation of the first UN General Assembly High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006. GFMD (Global Forum on Migration and Development) was established as an inter-governmental agency to consult on migration-related issues. Today, GMG and GFMD are the two most important platforms that direct the world’s attention on migration and influence bilateral
and/or regional/international migration governance mechanisms in different parts of the world.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, there are still issues to be discussed at regional and global levels of migration governance. A lack of complementary and regulatory mechanisms between the existing international migration regimes causes a clash of interests and further complicates the global migration governance agenda. As explained in the first part of the paper, migration has various levels, including formal/informal, push/pull, economic/non-economic or voluntary/involuntary levels. There has so far not been a framework that encompasses all these various aspects and examples of migration. In addition, governments usually take unilateral or bilateral (government-to-government) tracks to deal with these problems on an ad hoc basis.

When one looks at the management of regional cooperation and integration models, not only in migration but in other aspects as well, one regional governance pattern in the ASEAN style is peculiar: ad hoc and technical committees have always played an important role in building trust among member countries and finally managing to reach agreement on further integration. The highest decision-making organ of ASEAN is the meeting of the ASEAN Heads of State and Government. The ASEAN Summit is convened every year. The ASEAN Coordinating Council is the meeting of foreign ministers and is held twice a year. ASEAN Community Council is the new branch within the organizational structure and combines the three pillar councils and works on progressing toward the Community. Sectoral Ministerial Bodies are the main executive branches that work on a theme and project basis by focusing on timely issues and the day-to-day administering of regional activities. For the time being, there is no separate ministerial body working just on migration, but since migration is linked to various issues on the agenda of the Community (Figure 2), migration is addressed by various bodies and committees.

Migration in Southeast Asia usually occurs because of economic pull and push factors and labor migration; as well, conflict or environmental change can be the main causes of movement of people. Labor migration is a critical issue since there have always been disparities among member states, and these disparities create intra-regional mobility from less economically progressive regions (primarily the newer members of the organization) to relatively better-off economic regions. Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are the most common host countries, while Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos are the main sending countries within the region. ASEAN had not developed a joint policy on the issue of movement of people during its first decades, though there had been

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\(^6\) Other member organizations of GMG are UN DESA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research), UN Women, the UN regional commissions, WHO (World Health Organization), and the World Bank (UNFPA and IOM 2013).
established informal tracks between neighboring countries through family and community linkages. Drug trafficking and black market activities were growing problems in the “Golden Triangle” of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. The push for policy initiatives on migration came from the outside world when the principal trade and political partners of ASEAN insisted on adding items, such as human trafficking and transnational crime, as well as the rights of women and children, to their joint declarations. Indeed, most of the migration-related documents within the ASEAN organizational archive are part of the foreign conventions and declarations. One critical action taken regarding migration was the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrants Workers. It was signed in 2007 in Cebu, the Philippines. It was the first agreement at this level that migration issues and rights of migrant workers should be acknowledged and governments should take collective and bilateral actions as part of the ASEAN Community. Based on this start, the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers (ACMW) was initiated in 2008. In their first meeting, the committee focused on four main issues: protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers; promoting good governance mechanisms; human trafficking; and the development of a new ASEAN scheme for the rights of migrant workers.

Conclusion

The major trends within ASEAN migration movements can be summarized by the following list: feminization of migration, dependency on temporary foreign worker programs, undocumented migration, cross-border flows, informal employment, and human trafficking (UN Women 2013). Some of the other issues to be tackled within the ASEAN region and ASEAN Community are the lack of a regional labor market, limited information sharing among governments and related agents, bilateral or sometimes unilateral legislation, and actions that solidify smooth documentation between the sending and receiving countries. In addition to these issues, two more increasingly common trends of migration are receiving attention: labor mobility and forced migration due to internal or cross-border conflicts or environmental disasters.

National governments and the recent ASEAN institutions related to migration have been taking important steps in response to these issues and the changing character of migration trends in recent years. Nevertheless, individual and regional mechanisms are also being criticized for not being able to respond to the needs of people on the move, especially those who are from the sending countries. Some immediate measures that are generally proposed for the betterment of national and regional/international governance of migration include the following: enhancing consultation and coordination for management-related problems among the countries; transparency and data sharing not only between governments but also among the agents of migration, formal and non-formal, within each state; collaborative legal frameworks;
and, social protection for migrants in their host countries as well as welcoming social and economic infrastructure for the returnees through sustainable return and reintegration schemes.

This paper initially provided a descriptive analysis of migration and recent migration trends in the world. The argument next focused on the second leg of the discussions, namely regional integration and how ASEAN has become a committed mechanism towards “one community” instead of a mere economic cooperation platform by including various other aspects of regional cooperation as well as integration. While introducing the recent trends of migration governance, Southeast Asian examples were also elaborated upon in the last section, and emerging migration trends with new institutions within the ASEAN Community were briefly discussed. In conclusion, it became obvious through the discussions that both regional cooperation/integration and international migration are changing because of regional and global trends in international society. No matter which path of movement people take to migrate from one country to another or within the same country, this causes concerns about human security at individual and community levels. While making decisions on how to manage migration governance within and outside circles of the region, decision makers at the ASEAN level as well as national governments should take this reality into consideration.
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