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Proceedings of the Second Afrasian International Symposium

Multiculturalism in Asia

Edited by
Kosuke Shimizu, Pauline Kent, Shoichi Matsumura, William Bradley and Masako Otaki

17-18 November 2012

Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase 2)
Afrasia Symposium Series
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アジアの多文化社会
—移民・言語教育政策・国際関係からみた対話可能性の創出—

Edited by
Kosuke Shimizu, Pauline Kent, Shoichi Matsumura,
William Bradley and Masako Otaki

17-18 November 2012

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Here at Ryukoku University, the Afrasian Research Centre was established in 2011, funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan as a its Project for Strategic Research Base Formation Support at Private University for 3 years (2011-2013). Afrasian Research Centre is working on research with the theme “Research into the Possibilities of Establishing Multicultural Societies in the Asia-Pacific Region: Conflict, Negotiation, and Migration.” Our research projects aim to discover possibilities of resolving complex and multifaceted conflicts for establishing multicultural societies; and by an attention to the creation of possibilities for dialogue through communication, language (education) policies, and the international relations.

We are greatly pleased to hold the Second Afrasian International Symposium on the 17th and 18th of November 2013 at Seminar House Tomoikiso of Ryukoku University in Kyoto. The theme of this Symposium is “Multiculturalism in Asian.” The multiculturalism has been a buzzword recently in such areas as migration studies, language education, language policies, politics and international relations. It has been, however, quite rare that researchers of these different disciplines meet with each other and discuss issues related to multiculturalism directly.

This symposium is one attempt to transcend this state of affairs, and to find a new pathway to an interdisciplinary development. This attempt inevitably involves a wide range of intellectual endeavors from positivist and empirical researches of migration to theoretical and critical engagement in politics and public policies.

This symposium has been composed based on an assumption that what bridges the gap between the practical and the critical is communication studies including language education and communicative action in the public space. This surely challenges the extreme difficulty of the dialogue between different disciplinary languages. Yet, we believe that it creates a great opportunity for new intellectual enterprise in cross-cultural and political engagement.

Kosuke Shimizu
Program Chair of the Second Afrasian International Symposium

November, 2012
OPEING PANEL
The following section of the proceedings is a collection of papers written by the keynote speaker, Professor Lee Gunderson, and two featured speakers, Professors Dennis Murphy Odo and Reginald Arthur D'Silva, who were invited for the 2nd Afrasia International Symposium. Along the same lines as the main theme of the symposium “Multiculturalism in Asia,” all three papers explore the concept of “multiculturalism” in relation to language teaching and learning, as well as the region of “Asia” by looking at immigrants and students of Asian cultural backgrounds who are living and/or studying in Vancouver, Canada.

Lee’s paper “Theorizing Multiculturalism: Modeling the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in School-Based Multicultural Settings” is an attempt to examine factors that influence the level of inclusion and exclusion of individuals from one culture into the school environment of another culture. After reviewing the bulk of literature, including his recently published books, Lee proposes five factors to be of significance: 1) family (e.g., socioeconomic status, religious orientation), 2) first and second languages, 3) the overall number of culturally diverse students (e.g., immigrant and ESL students) in the class, school, or school district, 4) individual differences (e.g., psychological characteristics such as analytic, methodical, and reflective traits), and 5) first cultural teaching practices. Whether these factors can function as predictors of inclusion and exclusion in Asian contexts is a worthwhile theme to examine in future empirical research.

In his paper “Technology and English Language Formative Assessment in Asian Contexts,” Dennis approaches multiculturalism from the comparative perspective of language assessment methods employed in Asia and North America. He suggests that incorporating formative assessment methods step-by-step into the summative tradition by fully utilizing technology appears to be a realistic approach in real-life classroom situations. He also points out however, that one obstacle to widespread use of formative assessments in Asian contexts is the local assessment culture in which summative approaches are believed to be effective among teachers and parents alike due to the examination system, thus suggesting further investigation about how to keep the balance between summative and formative assessment in such Asian contexts where knowledge-based and test-driven teaching and learning are common.

Reginald’s paper “Social Inclusion and Exclusion in Multicultural Instructional Contexts: Highlights from Studies with Elementary, Secondary and Post-Secondary ESL
Learners in Canadian Schools” is a good example of empirical research that investigates the inclusion and exclusion phenomena in multicultural and multilingual school settings as shown in Lee’s paper. This study demonstrates that contributory factors to the inclusion and exclusion of ESL students of Asian culture backgrounds into local Canadian schools are different among elementary, secondary and post-secondary levels. This line of research can be applied to multicultural issues observed in Japanese schools where nonnative Japanese speakers are on the increase. Given the roughly two million foreigners residing in Japan, Reginald’s paper gives some clues toward investigating the inclusion or exclusion of nonnative Japanese students in local schools.

As one reads through these three papers, it becomes clear that the language issues brought up in Canadian contexts are closely relevant not only to the cultural views students of Asian background bring with them into local schools, but also to the political and societal issues they are surrounded by in their home countries. As often stated in the literature, the issue of language cannot be examined fully without paying attention to the human beings who use it and the society in which it is used. The research shown in the three papers provides some insight into possibilities for a multicultural society where nonnative speakers are not labeled as “disadvantaged” and where they can function as competent members.
Keynote Speech

Theorizing Multiculturalism: Modeling the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in School-Based Multicultural Settings

Lee Gunderson
University of British Columbia

Introduction

I was asked by the organizers of the Afrasian Symposium to present a theoretical view focusing on multiculturalism in Asia. Such a focus is, of course, incredibly complex. I am aware, for instance, of the complexities and the arguments associated with multiculturalism (multiracialism in Singapore) in many different Asian countries. Considering the multiple Discourses involved in all of the countries in Asia and the vastness of the topic, I will focus on multiculturalism as it relates to teaching and learning in classrooms of which I am aware that are filled with students who vary in cultural backgrounds. This paper will include some views of individuals I have described in previous reports (Gunderson 2000; 2007). My purpose is to develop a multicultural model that can be argued, contested, discussed and possibly observed and tested in classrooms and schools in Asia.

It is clear that millions of human beings around the world are enrolled in classrooms where they learn a language different from the one they speak at home and are immersed in a culture different from their first culture (Gunderson, Odo, and D’Silva 2011). In British Columbia, Canada, for instance it is not unusual to visit classrooms that are filled with students from various cultural backgrounds. Matsumura (2012) describes one school in Shiga, Japan that has a majority of students from Brazil who speak Portuguese, but are ethnically Japanese. I have visited many classrooms in Asia in which the students are multicultural. In some cases, students are native-born, but differ in culture from the mainstream, and in other cases there are students who are immigrants or from families that are temporary or work-stay immigrants, sometimes called sojourners. I will first address the issue of defining the term “culture.”

1 Contact lee.gunderson@ubc.ca for a short reference list related to multiculturalism in 12 Asian countries.
1. Culture

About sixty years ago Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1954) recognized 160 different definitions of culture. Larsen and Smalley (1972) proposed that culture represented a map or a blueprint which:

guides the behavior of people in a community and is nurtured in family life. Culture organizes our behavior in groups, makes us sensitive to matters of status, and assists us to know what others expect of us and what will happen if we do not live up to expectations. Culture helps us to know how far we can go as individuals and what our responsibility is to different groups. “Different cultures are the underlying structures which make Round community round and Square community square” (Larson and Smalley, 39)

Condon (1973) proposed that culture “is a system of integrated patterns, most of which remain below the threshold of consciousness, yet all of which govern human behavior just as surely as the manipulated strings of a puppet control its motions” (4). Vontress (1976) concluded that each of us lives in five cultures that intermingle: the universal, the ecological, the national, the regional, and the racio-ethnic. Culture is more than a sum of its constituent parts and each of us is more culturally complex than we know or can describe. Culture allows human beings to survive by providing the mental constructs to categorize the world. Murdock (1961) describes seven characteristics of cultural patterns: (1) they originate in the human mind; (2) they facilitate human and environmental interactions; (3) they satisfy basic human needs; (4) they are cumulative and adjust to changes in external and internal conditions; (5) they tend to form a consistent structure; (6) they are learned and shared by all the members of a society; and, (7) they are transmitted to new generations. Culture can be viewed in a “macro-level,” as a broad generalization consisting of shared features across a group, and a “micro-level,” as particular features related to an individual or a very small group of individuals.

A discussion of culture often includes descriptions, discussions and arguments for and against such issues as race, ethnicity, socio-economic status, economy, gender, religion, and political philosophy. Culture is defined within the parameters of a particular academic culture. Sociolinguistic definitions differ from anthropological definitions which differ in turn from ethnolinguistic definitions and so on. Culture affects the way an individual perceives the world, both on a macro- and a micro-level. Culture has a direct relationship with one’s beliefs about, attitudes toward, expectations for, and views of teaching and learning and the importance of learning.

When individuals move from one culture to another there are both micro- and macro-level consequences. Micro-level features according to Schumann (1978a) may include such phenomena as culture shock, motivation, and ego-permeability. Schumann categorized acculturation relative those who wish to assimilate fully into a culture and those who do not
wish to assimilate. Schumann (1978a; 1978b; 1986) proposed that two factors affect the
degree to which an individual learner acculturates: social distance and psychological distance.
Variables related to social distance include: social dominance, integration pattern, enclosure,
cohesiveness, size, cultural congruence, attitude, and a learner’s intended length of residence.
Psychological distance is related to language shock, culture shock, motivation, and ego
permeability.

In Schumann’s view culture shock is often one of the most difficult experiences
immigrants encounter. An individual new to a culture begins to go through a process called
acculturation according to Schumann and others during which there are “stages” that
represent the degree to which one has become part of or adapted to the new culture.
Acculturation is a term that refers to the notion that an individual from one culture
must adapt to a new culture. The term assimilation refers to the case in which an individual’s
first culture is submerged in the new culture and there is often a loss of first cultural values,
beliefs, and behavior patterns. Acculturation is often associated with an individual’s success
in learning a new language. Indeed, many have suggested that failing to acculturate is often
associated with failure to learn a second language (Ellis 1985).

“Normal” acculturation occurs in four stages: euphoria, culture shock, recovery, and
acculturation. “Under normal circumstances, people who become acculturated pass through
all the stages at varying rates, though they do not progress smoothly from one stage to the
next and may regress to previous stages” (Richard-Amato 1988, 6). There is variation in
acculturation both between and within cultural groups.

A number of factors affects the degree to which individuals become acculturated:
nation of origin, reasons for immigrating, age on entry, amount of prior schooling, economic
status, difficulties related to travel, extent of disruption and trauma related to war, and a
family’s immigration status (Gunderson 2007). Schumann’s (1978a) model “seeks to explain
differences in learners’ rate of development and also in their ultimate level of achievement in
terms of the extent to which they adapt to the target-language culture” (Ellis 1994, 230).
Acculturation according to Schumann means, “... the social and psychological integration of
the learner with the target language (TL) group” (Schumann 1986, 379). However, a number
of researchers view the notion of acculturation as a negative one.

Second-language researchers have suggested that this view is a negative one (see, for
instance, Duff and Uchida 1997) because it characterizes the second language learner as one
who must give up a first culture. Socialization theorists have a more positive view. Duff
(2010) notes, “... students in classrooms are often socialized into and through discourse of
(showing) respect (and self-control, decorum) to teachers, to one another, and to the subject
matter itself” (173). Children and other novices learn to function communicatively with
members of a community by organizing and reorganizing sociocultural information that is
conveyed through the form and content of the actions of others (Schieffelin and Ochs 1986a,
1986b). Schieffelin and Ochs (1986b) conclude that as children learn to become competent
members of their society they also learn to become competent speakers of their language.
Talmy (2012) states that second language socialization research “... is typically longitudinal,
ethnographic in design, and favors analytic frameworks that allow for the examination of microgenesis and ontogenesis in (L1 and L2) linguistic and other social practices, as well as how such practices relate to matters of extra-situational, or macro, cultural and social logical significance” (571). Duff and Talmy (2011) note, “Language socialization also differs from cognitivist SLA in its focus on the local social, political, and cultural contexts in which languages are learned and used, on historical aspects of language and culture learning, on contestation in chains across timescales, and on the cultural content of linguistic structures and practices” (96). It is suggested here that the potential for socialization into classroom discourses is associated with a number of cultural features and variables.

2. Propaedeutic to a Multicultural Model

2.1. Teaching and Learning

Teaching and learning, that is, schooling, are not culture-free. I (2000) conclude that, “North American educators continue to view education within a “mainstream” viewpoint, one that focuses on European values and beliefs, even though their school populations grow increasingly multicultural.” It is clear immigrant students bring with them complex cultural beliefs about teaching and learning that are, in many respects, different from the views of mainstream teachers and students (Gunderson 2007).

2.2. Significant Cultural Variables

I believe that culture constitutes the ideas, customs, language, arts, and skills that characterize or reflect a given group of individuals in a given period of time, particularly as they relate to its members’ learning in schools. However, culture is not a singular unitary phenomenon. Indeed, human beings live within the contexts of multiple cultures. Gunderson (2000), reporting on a study of secondary students, notes “Members of the diasporas in this study were lost in the spaces between various identities: the teenager, the immigrant, the first language speaker, the individual from the first culture, the individual socializing into a second language and culture, the individual in neither a dominant first or second culture but one not of either culture” (702). Human beings exist in multiple inter-cultures. So, a student who enrolls in a school in a new country brings with her a complex set of beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors related to privacy, co-operation/competition, personal space, eye contact, body movements, and physical contact. In addition, she possesses individual differences that are developed within a culture that are often referred to as cognitive style. Features include such characteristics as analytic, methodical, reflective, global, relational, and intuitive (Reid 1987; Scarcella 1990). Helmer and Eddy (2012) also identify features such as assertiveness/compliance, dominance/submission, and direct/indirect communication styles. Individuals also possess backgrounds that include information about family structure, including roles of family members, child-rearing practices, gender roles, adult-child interactions, educational expectations, expression of emotions, conversational rules, child-rearing practices, individual responsibility, and spirituality. The difficulty, of course, is that families exist within cultures and their views and beliefs are formed through interactions
with their broader culture, their family’s first culture, and their local community’s culture, to name a few of the cultures that interact.

Cultural influences are highly evident in classrooms. But this should not be a surprise since schools everywhere are designed by human beings who represent their cultures. There are variables that represent cultural features, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, that can help to predict cultural inclusion and exclusion (Gunderson 2009). Groups of variables can constitute factors.

Cultural differences can affect the degree to which an individual from one culture is included or excluded in the environment of another culture. There would appear to be hundreds of variables that could be identified that are either directly or indirectly related to culture. It would also appear doubtful that a useful model could account for them all. As a consequence I will attempt to hypothesize factors that impact on group dynamics in multicultural classrooms. It is important to note in advance that the proposed factors are neither mutually exclusive nor uniquely different in content.

2.2.a. Country of Origin
A first factor to consider is a student’s country of origin. Where do students come from? This often informs one about the kinds of schools a student has or has not attended. What are reasons for families to leave their home countries? Most immigrant families that come to British Columbia report that their purpose is to get a better education for their children (Gunderson 2007). Unfortunately, country of origin often predicts an immigrant’s likelihood of success in schools in BC because in many cases the country of origin is a marker of other underlying features that are associated with school success or difficulty. Country of origin is likely a factor that impacts school success around the world.

2.2.b. Family
The notion of what constitutes a family varies from country to country, and, it would seem, often within a country (Gunderson 2007). This is one of the most powerful, and probably the most complex, multicultural factors. Parents and their children have views of teaching and learning that are related to both first cultural views and socio-economic status.

_We waste too much time in school. Too much time not working. Teachers are too lazy they don’t tell you what to do_ (15 years, Male, Cantonese).

_The labs are better equipped in Canada, but the teachers don’t show us what to do with them_ (Female, Cantonese, 16 years).

Many individuals from higher socioeconomic families generally view learning the way they view business (Gunderson 2007). In this view, the teacher is responsible for teaching the pieces of knowledge, somewhat like products, needed to pass a test. The student’s responsibility, in this view, is to memorize (acquire) all of the knowledge the teachers deliver.
A measure of success and is the number of items the student gets correct on an examination. They have what Freire (1970) called the banking view of teaching. In some cases the comments clearly differentiate those who were affluent:

*There aren’t enough parking spaces at school* (Male, Mandarin, 18 years).

*Canada is really stupid because it builds big beautiful super highways but only lets you go 50 K an hour. That’s a waste of money. They waste money on immigrants. They give tax money for immigrants to stay in Canada and all they are doing is taking advantage of Canada. It’s not good use of tax. Canada people have to get smart, not waste money on people who don’t work* (Female, Cantonese, 16 years).

from those who were less affluent, such as:

*ESL students work so hard. Even if you do really well you just get an ordinary job. They have no future, that’s why so many drop out. Kids have to work to make enough money for comfortable life, no, not even comfortable life. In school there’s gangs, there’s drugs, oh, it’s horrible thing and school’s so small, it’s unhealthy. I have a few cousins, they all drop out. There’s no future so what’s the point? You pay extra to go to better class. Money is so important. Most parents can’t afford it* (Female, Vietnam, 17 years).

Variables related to the family factor are complex. What are the family dynamics? What is the family decision-making structure? Who should be contacted if needed at home? What is the naming system? How are individuals addressed? This is an important issue because in some cultures the way an individual is addressed or named may be considered impolite, insulting, or inappropriate in another culture. Are there communication patterns associated with different roles such as parent, child, teachers, or relatives?

What are general attitudes toward school and schooling? Are there strong overall cultural values that might make a difference? Are there views of teaching and learning that might impact students’ and parents’ views of the instruction occurring in a school? Are there epistemological differences in parental views about what should or should not be the focus of instruction? That is, do the teachers’ views of what is valuable for students to learn the same as or different from the parents’ views? In some cases teachers’ views focus on process rather than product (Gunderson 2000). Differences in views clash and the result is an unfortunate conflict between schools and homes (Li 2006).

Often, religious orientation makes a significant difference in how a family views what is being taught in a school. What might this mean for teaching-learning relationships? What might this mean for teacher-student, student-student, adult-student, male-female relationships in school? There are numerous reports of clashes between teachers’ or school views or practices and the religious views of parents. A court case, for instance, in a trial in a Federal
Court in Tennessee (1986, Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools), was brought by parents who believed their beliefs were being assaulted by the materials being used in their children’s classrooms. DelFattore (1992) wrote about the trial:

The protesters, who described themselves as born-again fundamentalist Christians, based their entire understanding of reality on their particular interpretation of the Bible. In their way of looking at life, all decisions should be based solely on the Word of God; using reason or imagination to solve problems is an act of rebellion. Everyone should live in traditional nuclear families structured on stereotyped gender roles. Wives should obey husbands and children their parents, without argument or question (36).

The books teachers used to teach reading were filled with imaginary creatures, fantasy, and fairy tales. Parents were upset about the material, but they were as upset about the notion of asking learners to become critical readers. DelFattore (1992) notes:

Imagination, like independent thinking and tolerance for diversity, has no place in the Hawkins County protesters’ world view. They alleged that the process of imagination, regardless of the content, distracts people from the Word of God. Once the mind is open to imagination, all kinds of alien thoughts may enter, and the soul may be lost. Moreover, using imagination to solve problems substitutes a human faculty for the absolute reliance on God that is necessary for salvation (44).

In some cases students are not expected to ask questions of the teachers or of texts, while in other cases this behavior is expected. These differences in views are potentially extremely contentious.

2.2.c. First and Second Language

Language differences can impact student interactions in school. What are some specific language features that might make a difference? Vietnamese speakers, for instance, find it difficult to learn English for various reasons (Honey 1987). Honey notes “Because their mother tongue has no inflections, differentiates words by tone, and makes great use of syntax and particles for grammatical purposes, Vietnamese find a language like English, which is so dissimilar to their own, very difficult to learn” (238). There is a relationship between the degree to which one can communicate in the language of instruction and one’s inclusion into the culture of the classroom. There is also an overall relationship between L1 and L2 that suggests some individuals who speak an L1 that is similar to the L2, may find it easier to learn and, as a result, to be included into the culture of the classroom, but again, compared to other factors, this relationship is not a major one. Language does make a difference, however.

*The white kids are big and loud like gorillas. You have to get out of the way because they so big. They think they own school because they are born here. They are so, so*
loud you can’t be a friends with them cuz they don’t talk, they scream. They are so rude (male, Vietnamese, 15 years).

Perceptions are influenced by L1 backgrounds in complex ways. Language can be a barrier to inclusion:

I spend two years with no friends, no one. I spend two years not talking, anyone. I go school, I go home, I talk only my mother, my brother. Best friend United States. Cry, all time, cry. being sick, all time, sick, stomach hurt, head hurt, heart hurt, all time, bad dream, all time, all time (female, Kurdish, 16 years).

2.2.d. L1 Teaching and Learning Practices
The methods, procedures, and practices of teaching and learning in an individual’s first culture or home country constitute a powerful factor in inclusion/exclusion. I conducted a number of Factor Analyses to explore English reading as a dependent variable and found that the standard models of L2 reading were not substantiated (Gunderson 2007). It appears that instructional practice is a variable that masks potential underlying differences. Students’ were taught in systems that used bottom-up teaching styles and results revealed bottom-up processing. Immigrants possess a deep-seated view of what constitutes teaching and learning. Many expect to be involved in activities that focus on rote memorization, attention to facts and details, teacher-centered instruction, and a focus on grades. Li (2006), for instance, found that the Chinese parents she studied rejected the teaching and learning going on in their children’s school and opted, instead, to rely on outside school activities to give their children the skills they believed to be valuable.

2.2.e. Overall Numbers and Inclusion/Exclusion
Schools and school districts in British Columbia vary greatly in the number of immigrant or ESL students enrolled in them. They vary from essentially zero immigrants to 100% (Gunderson 2007). We designed a study to investigate whether overall ESL numbers make a difference in reading achievement. Two ESL consultants working in two large school districts were convinced that ESL numbers in a classroom probably affected the English reading achievement of students. They opined that there is probably a critical mass of ESL that would have a negative effect on learning (Eddy, Carrigan and Gunderson 2008). We hypothesized that the smaller the ESL number was the higher their learning would be because more models of the target language would be available to them. Findings were interesting and may have something to say about inclusion/exclusion.

The study took place in two large urban school districts and included six schools that enrolled students from kindergarten to grade seven. In total there were 1,013 students in 33 classrooms involved. There were no statistically significant differences in mean income in the six schools. We measured the ratio of English to ESL speakers and for the six schools it was: A 87-13%; B 35-65%; C 64-36%, D 39-61%; E 23-77%, and; F 68-32%. Ratios varied
dramatically from classroom to classroom (5% ESL to 90% ESL). Reading achievement varied relative to the percentage of ESL students in the classroom. However, the relationship was not linear. Classrooms that had low and high percentages of ESL students scored lower than those that varied from about 40 to 60%. The relationship is similar to a bell curve. Results of interviews suggest that inclusion was also associated with numbers of ESL students.

Conversations with the teachers led the members of the research team to conclude that ESL students in low ESL classrooms were, in essence, integrated into the classrooms based on the notion that they would learn English and how to read English simply because their classmates were English speakers and readers, not by making accommodations for their special needs and abilities. This feature is not one of inclusion, but of submersion. In essence, these students were excluded unconsciously by ignoring them. This finding was corroborated by 3 independent researchers who observed and recorded notes over the 9 months of the study.

Teachers in high ESL classrooms appeared to feel overwhelmed by the challenges they perceived in the diversity of abilities their students represented. Students were excluded by having teachers ignore their special needs and abilities. Secondary-level students reported that they felt like they were excluded and that it was like being in a ghetto (Gunderson 2007). Students felt ESL classes were for second-class students, those who had little chance to go on to university. ESL classes made students feel inferior, “like those who are crippled or blind.” One 16 year-old male Polish student noted, “People make fun of me because I was in ESL.” I found that, “Those who were in ESL classes the longest scored lowest on all of the examinable courses and also had the highest disappearance rate” and “parents complained bitterly that ESL classes were roadblocks to students’ success and they interfered with the learning of examinable courses.”

*It was hard to make new friends. All my good friends are in Somalia. I don’t know anyone in ____ school who is from my country* (male, Somali, 16 years).

*Too much Chinese. ESL class are fill with Chinese. Teachers no good, not stop Chinese talk. No help Spanish. I not passing nothing* (male, Spanish, 14 years).

*I’m Kurd, Iraq. No one know (?), no one. Here, many India people, think we being India. Here Chinee people, think India. No one know I not India* (male, Kurdish, 14 years).

*Too much Chinee talk. Too much Chinee people. No English. Bad class, teacher no good, not stop Chinese talk* (male, Kurdish, 14 years).

So as a factor, I hypothesize that overall numbers and inclusion/exclusion is complex.
2.2.f. Individual Differences

Human beings are incredibly unique in their ability to cope with elements of their environments. Different authorities and researchers in the past have identified characteristics such as analytic, methodical, reflective, global, relational, and intuitive to describe individual differences in the way ESL learners make sense of and cope in the world, especially the classroom (for reviews, see, Reid, 1987; Scarcella 1990). It is unclear what individual differences can account for the finding that some students are able to achieve way beyond their apparent capacities in schools where they language of instruction is different from their home languages. These are the resilient students and some believe resilience can be taught (Roesingh 2004). Individual differences may account for students’ inclusion or exclusion, but it is not clear how strong this factor is or whether teachers can, in fact, reliably and validly measure features associated with variables that make up this factor.

2.2.g. The Multicultural Model

The purpose of this model is to hypothesize variables that are associated with inclusion in multicultural classrooms where the cultural background of the student differs from the culture of the classroom. While there are hundreds or thousands of variables that likely influence the inclusion of a human being from one culture into another culture, five factors are proposed here: Family; First and Second Language; Overall Numbers; Individual Differences; and First Cultural Teaching Practices. To explore these factors I have used an approach that features focus groups. Several, usually no more than about 10, members of a culture are recruited to explore these factors. Practice has shown that the following focus questions are helpful in exploring the five factors (Gunderson 2009). These questions can also form the basis of an inquiry into the culture of a particular school in order to describe first cultural features.

2.3. Focus Group Questions

a) Where do students come from?

b) What is the main religious orientation? (What might this mean for teaching-learning relationships? What might this mean for teacher-student, student-student, adult-student, male-female relationships in school?)

c) What are reasons for families to leave their home countries?

d) What is the naming system? (How should people be addressed?)

e) What are the family dynamics? (What is the family decision-making structure? Who should be contacted if needed at home?)

f) Are there strong overall cultural values that might make a difference in “our” schools?

g) What are general attitudes toward school and schooling?

h) What are some specific language features that might make a difference?

i) Are there communication patterns associated with different roles such as parent, child, teachers, authorities, others?

J) Are there ways in which the teacher can be sensitive to cultural differences?
3. Focus Group: An Example

Culture is difficult to define as shown above. It is also difficult to get human beings to agree on features that are common in their own cultures. Gunderson (2009) notes:

The following observations were made at the University of British Columbia and were developed from a focus group. The reader is cautioned to consider the following as being an extremely limited view developed by five informants who themselves also made it clear that these views were very limited and non-representative. They also concluded and argued strongly that there is no single view that could adequately represent the broad category “Arab.” It was noted by one member of the group that there was a great deal of contention and often bitter vituperation related to the inclusion of Egyptians as Arabs. It was noted that many Egyptians have deep respect for their rich cultural and historical roots and view Arabs as being nomadic wanderers without established cultural and historical roots. They often resent being included in the category. The reader is cautioned to remember that the results are dependent on the experience and backgrounds of a local group and they are related to where the individuals came from (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).
Table 1: Arabic Focus Group Observations

| Geographic Origin | Originally individuals from the Arabian Peninsula, but presently this includes individuals from Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Oman, although many contest that Egyptians are Arabs others maintain that they are. Arab immigrants have also come from Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Columbia, and Central America. The biggest group of Arabs living outside of the Middle East is in Brazil. |
| Religious Background | Primarily Muslim, however, there are Arabic speakers who indicate they are Christians or Jews. |
| Reasons for Immigrating | Reasons for immigrating vary considerably from group to group. Individuals from regions outside of the Middle East usually immigrate for better educational and economic opportunities. Recently many have arrived in North America as refugees. |
| Naming System | The system seems complex, but it isn’t. A man is given a name and it is followed by “bin Ali” (son of Ali) followed by “bin Saleh” (son of his father Aleh), which is followed by the family name. The pattern is the same for women except “bint” means daughter of. This is followed by the name of the father’s father and the family name. This is the basic approach used in places such as Saudi Arabia. The system differs in other areas. |
| Family Dynamics | Generally families are led and dominated by the father or oldest male. Often there is an obvious separation of men and women even in the home. There are differences between individuals who have grown up in rural versus urban settings. |
| Cultural Values | Generally, interactions between males and females are highly regulated by deeply held religious beliefs. |
| Common Attitudes Towards Education and Society | Generally, there is a strong belief in the value of education and a deep respect for those individuals who have successfully completed degrees. In some countries the possibility of completing degrees in prestigious English-speaking universities such as Oxford and Harvard is a highly coveted opportunity. Parental interactions with teachers are often difficult because of gender related issues. Students in many countries are separated by gender and boys and men are almost never taught by women and girls and women are almost never taught by men. |
| Significant Social Patterns | Members of the group concluded that good friendships were very deeply appreciated and were considered to be life-long. Good friends are expected to be loyal and to be generous with their friends. One difficulty noted was that men appeared to be brutally blunt in their conversations, but that this was a communications style. |
| Culturally Sensitive Approaches | Interactions between parents and teachers can be difficult as a result of gender differences in communications. Initial communications are probably best arranged by men initially. Adult students are the most difficult since they have deeply ingrained male-female beliefs. |

*Source: Gunderson 2009*
The task is to compare the knowledge learned about the first culture, as shown above, with the cultural features of the school to see the matches and mismatches and to predict inclusion/exclusion and to identify areas in which the teacher might accommodate students from different cultures. A model is shown in Figure 1.

An individual student (I) possesses a complex cultural background that is a composite learned within the overall First Culture (C1). It includes cultural features associated with family, community, and individual differences. The graphic contains only two intersecting local cultures, although in reality there are many. The Second Culture (C2) is as also complex. In this case the school (S) and community cultures overlap within the larger national culture, although the graphic is also considerably less complex than it likely really is. The degree to which a student is included in the C2 is initially related to the match (or mismatch) of C1 and C2 features. The teacher’s individual views are also reflected in the C2. The feature that may be problematic is some schools in the case of Arabic speakers relates to gender roles. It may be difficult for a young Arabic-speaking immigrant boy to enter a classroom where the teacher is female. This would certainly have a negative effect on his inclusion into the culture of the classroom.

Figure 1: First (C1) and Second (C2) Culture and Inclusion/Exclusion
Conclusion

My purpose was to develop a model of inclusion/exclusion where students’ first cultural features differ from or match those of the classroom. Inclusion and exclusion are complex variables. One feature not mentioned has to do with national identities (Pickett and Brewer 2005). Individuals may not be included because of the way they are perceived relative to a national identity. Esses, Dovidio, Semenya, and Jackson (2005) conclude “…when national attachment takes the form of nationalism-belief in the superiority of one’s nation over others-increased attachment is associated with unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants” (332).

It was proposed that L2 focus groups should be organized within the local school community. Results should be considered to be local snapshots, rather than grand generalizations. A focus group of local L1 individuals should also undertake the same exercise to develop a picture of the same school-related features.

Five factors were hypothesized to be important differentially in the degree to which they are associated with the inclusion of an individual of one culture into a school environment of another culture. As Duff and Talmy (2011) suggest, this approach is one that “addresses the manifold complexities of children or adults with already developed repertoires of linguistic, discursive, and cultural practices as they encounter new ones” (97). As such it can be described as an L2 socialization view.

Every country in Asia appears to have school-age immigrants enrolled in their schools. It appears that immigrant enrollment varies widely from country to country, area to area, and school to school. The potential for inclusion, theoretically, can be estimated by comparing the cultural features that immigrants bring to a school with the cultural features of the enrolling school (and teachers). Overall, absolute percentages of immigrant students in a classroom is hypothesized to predict roughly inclusion/exclusion, with other factors, so that a small number of immigrants in a classroom will likely not be easily included, nor would students in a class that has a very high number of immigrant students.

At some point, it would be interesting to study the features of this model in classrooms that vary in numbers of immigrant students. At this point, the model is presented her to generate discussion, disagreement, and argument. As a test, one could compare the Arabic cultural features noted above with those in schools in Asia. The question to ask is how do these cultural features compare to the cultural features in my school in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, etc.? What are the potential difficulties students might have and what accommodations might a teacher make to include them?
References


Introduction

The shortcomings of traditional standardized approaches to assessment (i.e., summative) in North American contexts have been well documented (Matheson and Ross 2004; Menken 2008; Pandya 2011). Some of the most serious consequences of schools relying exclusively on formal assessment data from standardized tests include reservations about the trustworthiness of tests for ELLs (Solano-Flores and Trumball 2003), L2 learners failing high-stakes standardized tests at disproportionate rates (Menken 2008; Murphy Odo 2012), frequent testing hindering effective instruction (Pandya 2011) and ESL learners being pushed out of school to avoid school accountability for their poor test performance (Menken 2008). These difficulties demand careful consideration of test suitability for particular groups and close scrutiny of how results are used but not necessarily that the tests be eliminated altogether. A more prudent approach would ensure that the most appropriate test is used for its proper purpose.

The challenges with large-scale standardized assessments are not unique to North America. Use of these types of tests with L2 learners has a long history in Asia as well. Klenowksi (2009) notes a recent developing interest in Assessment for Learning in the Asia-Pacific Region. As evidence of emerging interest, the government of Singapore has “called for the end to exams for Primary 1 and 2 and the introduction of holistic assessment to support learning” (265). There have been moves to encourage wider use of formative assessment in Hong Kong and Thailand as well (Kennedy and Lee 2008). Several Asian countries are also investigating the effective integration of technology with formative assessment. “Some examples of successful pedagogical, policy and technological approaches to e-learning employed by Asian schools include… review of the modes of assessment with a shift towards formative assessment, learning process, and peer- and self-assessment…” (Hedberg and Ping 2004, 201) Unsurprisingly, the integration of technology and assessment practice is more prevalent in countries with the required infrastructure than those yet to obtain access to basics like computers or electricity (Hedberg and Ping 2004). While these developments certainly inspire cautious optimism, there is still much work required to help
English language teachers reach the level of assessment literacy they need to implement effective formative literacy practices in their classes.

Educators and assessment specialists now draw an occasionally fuzzy distinction between standardized summative tests (often referred to as “assessment OF learning”) and more informal classroom-based formative assessments (often known as “assessment FOR learning”) (Assessment Reform Group 1999). Many formative assessment advocates assert that traditional approaches to assessment have tended to inordinately focus on summative evaluation of learners at the expense of identifying their learning needs (Crooks 1988). They call for a balance between measuring achievement and identifying students’ needs which implies a more sparing use of summative assessments than is presently the case (Stiggins 2002).

One obstacle to widespread use of formative assessments in Asian contexts is local assessment culture. There is a long history of standardized public exams in Asia. In fact, Cheng (2008) notes that “The testing and examination history in China can be traced back to the imperial period nearly two thousand years ago … These examinations determined the positions in the civil service based on merit and education, which promoted upward mobility among the population for centuries” (15-16). Thus, it was in Asia that standardized assessment was born. Kennedy (2007) contends that traditional summative approaches to assessment are still well-entrenched as the preferred mode of assessment and formative approaches are “not characteristic of much of Asia” (15). He explains that “[e]xaminations remain a key assessment strategy across countries. The importance of examinations is reinforced not for any genuine educational rationale but for social reasons concerned with the allocation of limited places for much sought after secondary schools and universities.” (15) Within this type of assessment culture, it can be challenging to introduce new ways of doing assessment.

Summative approaches assessment have historically played a dominant role in education systems around the world (Stiggins 2005). The central goal of those educational systems was to place students along a continuum ranging from top performers who were ultimately destined for further education and bottom performers who faced progressively limited access to education and professional positions. Stiggins (2005) notes that “if some students gave up and stopped trying (even dropped out of school), that was regarded as the student’s problem, not the teacher’s or the school’s” (325). Summative approaches that simply recorded students’ achievement level were effective tools for determining who should be allowed to progress within the system. These tools efficiently accomplished the task of sorting students by ability. However, recently, educators have become aware that this approach to education and assessment is no longer workable in our technologically sophisticated world where the typical job requires the literacy skills of a college graduate (Graham and Perin 2007). Students who have traditionally struggled and been left to fend for themselves lack the requisite literacy skills to effectively function in our modern technologically-based and ethnically diverse society. “So today, in asking schools to leave no child behind, society is asking that educators raise up the bottom of the rank-order
distribution to a specified level of competence.” (Stiggins 2005, 325-326) That is, teachers are now expected to educate all learners to meet a minimum standard of literacy ability. This raising of the bottom scores ensures that schools are producing members of society who can function in the knowledge economy.

Creating highly-skilled lifelong learners for our modern societies requires educators to take an approach toward assessment that fosters learner engagement and progress rather than simply sorting into ability categories (Stiggins 2002). This places new demands on teachers in that they can no longer leave assessment decisions in the hands of specialists. They must proactively engage in continuing professional development to build their assessment literacy. Increased teacher assessment literacy is essential for making certain that teachers have the knowledge and skills they need to effectively implement formative assessment in their classrooms (Stiggins 1991). An increasingly indispensable component of assessment literacy in multilingual classrooms is understanding of the powerful affordances of technology for formative assessment as well as how to take advantage of a variety of technological tools. Second language teachers in Asian EFL learning contexts must learn how to more fully exploit the improved formative assessment capabilities afforded by the use of technology to advance English literacy development in the multilingual classroom.

1. Formative Assessment Features that Enhance L2 Literacy Instruction

Innovative approaches to formative assessment in the L2 literacy classroom stand to offer L2 literacy educators in Asia numerous benefits for their learners. Black and Wiliam (1998) characterize formative assessment as being all classroom activities that “provide information to be used as feedback to modify the teaching and learning activities in which they are engaged. Such assessment becomes formative assessment when the evidence is actually used to adapt the teaching to meet student needs” (8). A key component of this type of assessment is that continuous feedback is used to adapt instruction to the needs of the individual learner. A rapidly expanding research literature indicates that formative assessment produces the kinds of learning gains (Black and William 1998) as well as increased learner self-efficacy, awareness of learning needs and efficient study methods (Crooks 1988) that are indispensable as we move forward into the 21st century. Several unique features of formative assessment particularly facilitate the gathering of assessment information that constructively informs multilingual literacy instruction.

Open classroom dialog is one such feature that is fundamental to the formative assessment process. Nichol and Dick (2006) observe that effective formative assessment “encourages teacher and peer dialogue around learning…” (205). Leung and Mohan (2004) contend that “much of the formative work is interactionally realized through teacher-student talk” (336). This dialog allows for cooperative analysis and co-interpretation of the learning event which has an undeniable influence upon formative assessment. The putative purpose of this ongoing dialogue is for the learner to eventually come to share the teacher’s understanding of the criteria for quality work and to be able to use this understanding for
effective self-evaluation during task performance (Sadler 1989). Dialogue also allows student and teacher to collaboratively set future learning targets (Stiggins 2005). Most teacher talk in traditional classrooms appears to “…close down opportunities for exploring student understanding rather than opening them up” (Torrance and Pryor 2001, 621). That is, current methods of communication in many classrooms may actually be impeding rather than encouraging the generation and productive use of feedback.

A consequence of open dialog around learning promoted by formative assessment is the access to growth-inducing feedback on task performance. Sadler (1989) notes that “Few physical, intellectual or social skills can be acquired satisfactorily simply through being told about them. Most require practice in a supportive environment which incorporates feedback loops” (120). This observation underscores the criticality of feedback within the teaching-learning cycle. Several sources point out that good feedback practice begins with the end in mind. That is, learners must be provided with “a clear student-friendly vision of the achievement target to be mastered including models of strong and weak work. These examples reveal to learners where we want them to end up” (Stiggins 2005, 328). Learners then use this information to develop an “appreciation of what high quality work is…[and] the evaluative skill necessary for them to compare with some objectivity the quality of what they are producing in relation to the higher standard…” (Sadler 1989, 119). Through this process, learners improve their own practice as they expand their knowledge base and refine their skills. As learners develop their abilities they are assisted with ongoing explicit feedback that clarifies the learning objectives rather than simply reporting grades or scores (Stiggins 2005). This explicit feedback illuminates for learners “where they have done well, where their misunderstandings are, and what follow-up work might be required.” (Denton et al. 2008: 487). Based on this information, learners are then able to successfully refine their performance and make necessary changes to improve (Hepplestone et al., 2011; Nichol and Dick 2006). Feedback is also ongoing and, ideally, supporting self-correction. The iterative nature of the feedback allows assessment evidence based on classroom tasks to be drawn on to refine future activities. In this way, tasks are adapted to support the strengths and meet the needs of individual students (i.e., differentiated instruction).

All of this is not to say that summative assessment has no place in the literacy curriculum. A more accurate statement would be to say that it has historically tended to be over utilized. Kern (2000) points out that “[t]raditional [i.e., summative] form-based exercises, quizzes, and tests clearly have their place, but the ideal in a literacy-based program is to emphasize their use as formative rather than summative measures” (273). As an example of how traditionally summative assessment tools can be repurposed to meet formative needs, Jamison (2011) argues that criterion-referenced assessment can serve as an effective means for ongoing formative assessment that targets specific reading skills. However, she recommends the incorporation of criterion-referenced assessment instruments into classroom assessment. Criterion-referenced classroom tests operate by “instead of comparing [examinees’] performances to the performances of others (a relative interpretation), a criterion-referenced interpretation attempts to describe …the absolute level of performance”
(Reynolds, Livingston and Wilson 2010, 81). They can be used in the second-language classroom in the traditional summative manner which provides the teacher with data upon which he or she makes evaluation decisions. They can also be used for formative purposes which allow the teacher to provide learners with feedback linked directly to instructional goals. The primary shortcoming of criterion-referenced testing is that they are labor-intensive to create and score the necessary tests while returning them to provide timely and hence relevant feedback. However, technology greatly facilitates the creation of these types of assessments by allowing for the construction of item banks as well as rapid scoring of responses.

2. Technology and Formative Assessment

Technology allows formative assessments for multilingual literacy to become even more useful and powerful by streamlining the assessment administration and data collection process. The advent of more efficient hardware and software has allowed teachers to now use assessment tools that address former limitations such unwieldy administration while providing teachers and learners with rapid and detailed feedback on student performance (Hepplestone et al. 2011). Denton et al (2008) note that the electronic delivery of feedback “can facilitate rapid communication between tutor and student”(488). The speed of dispensing feedback enabled by online assessment delivery is crucial to the effectiveness of formative assessment. All of these features are claimed to increase student engagement with feedback in terms of willingness to act upon it (Denton et al. 2008; Hepplestone et al. 2011). Empirical research exploring the relationship of online formative feedback with summative test performance found that the use of an online formative assessment system had mild correlations with summative exam performance (Buchanan 2000; Klecker 2007). Students in another study also reported placing greater value upon online over handwritten feedback (Denton et al. 2008). Though there is surprisingly limited investigation into the effects of e-feedback (Denton et al. 2008).

A wide variety of traditional paper-based formative assessment tools and techniques facilitate the effective assessment of L2 literacy. These include rubrics, checklists, self and peer assessments, anecdotal records and portfolios among numerous others. However, teachers in many multilingual and second language literacy instructional contexts need to be made aware of recent developments in online formative literacy e-assessment innovations. These tools stand to revolutionize classroom literacy instruction because they ease much of the administration and record keeping burden that has made formative assessment somewhat undesirable in the past.

A brief introduction of several potentially useful tools can offer some sense of what is available to teachers. Each of these tools provides teachers with readily accessible and detailed assessment data that can effectively inform instruction. One example of an easily administered and informative informal instrument is the Diagnostic Online Reading Assessment (DORA). This is a diagnostic reading assessment whose purpose is to provide a
suite of assessments much like a traditional informal reading inventory. The DORA evaluates the learner and teacher of the learner’s relative reading strengths and needs in terms of decoding, fluency, comprehension and the like. Such a tool gives teachers information regarding where to focus their remediation efforts for struggling readers.

Online reading tutors are another emerging technology that develop literacy through ongoing feedback to the reader. Project Listen’s Reading Tutor uses speech recognition software to enable the learner to receive immediate feedback on her reading aloud performance. A unique and powerful feature of this tool is that the reader gets immediate ongoing feedback on her performance without the necessary patience or judgment of a human tutor. This feature allows the student to learn from her mistakes privately without the judgment of a human evaluator (D’ Silva 2012). Interactive ebooks (e.g., raz-kids) are based on traditional ebooks but often integrate video or sound. Rapid development of this technology may soon enable these books to read themselves aloud (Itzkovitch 2012). This allows multimodal access to the text.

Social network-based online language learning tools like Livemocha make peer feedback available on spoken or written language performance from several native speakers from around the world. This furnishes the learner with input from a wide variety of linguistically competent sources. There are always the more traditional language assessment tools that have been moved online such as the LOMERA. As was mentioned above, these tools take advantage of the ease of administering and grading the test online while also providing a hard copy backup for when technology fails. At present, most second language teachers do not appear to be aware of these assessment tools or how they might augment their current assessment practices. This regrettable state of affairs must be rectified.

The integration of formative assessment into the multicultural/multilingual language classroom offers numerous additional benefits to learners. For instance, formative assessment provides learners with more “options for students to show what they understand.” (Hamm and Adams 2009, 4) This enables learners to showcase their strengths rather than focusing on only areas of weakness as is typically the case with traditional summative assessments (Hamm and Adams 2009). These tools also help to create self-regulated learners by demystifying the assessment process (Popham 2011). That is, this process of interpreting feedback to modify performance grants learners deeper understanding of the criteria for competent task performance. This understanding then provides them with the skills for independent self-assessment in the future. A review of research into formative assessment revealed that all learners benefit from engaging in informed self-assessment, even those as young as first graders (Brookhart 2007).

3. Obstacles to the Integration of Formative Assessment into Multilingual Classrooms

A number of authors have identified several obstacles that have traditionally prevented the widespread adoption of formative assessment tools and techniques. One impediment is the time-consuming nature of much formative assessment due to the large amount of qualitative
feedback required when compared to a traditional summative letter grade (Denton et al. 2008). The increase in workload can cause teachers to quickly feel overwhelmed and return to traditional summative assessments. Popham (2011) recommends that for teachers to avoid feeling overwhelmed they should initiate formative assessment into their instruction on a small-scale basis and scale it up as they become more comfortable with the process.

In addition to difficulties with classroom implementation, a problem also exists regarding current conceptualizations of formative assessment which affect empirical research into the topic. For instance, no consistent theory presently guides formative assessment research causing multiple interpretations of the concept and thus rendering cross-study comparisons of results virtually impossible (Black and Wiliam 1998). Dunn and Mulvanon (2009) agree that the concept of formative assessment lacks the coherence necessary to guide educational research. They contend that “The vagueness of the constitutive and operational definitions directly contributes to the weaknesses found in the related research and dearth of empirical evidence identifying best practices related to formative assessment.” (2) They contend that for formative assessment to be a viable concept researchers must develop a common definition of the concept. They add that “… a sound research-validated framework for best practices in formative assessment and formative evaluation must be established to ensure maximum benefits for all those involved” (Dunn and Mulvanon 2009, 9). According to this line of reasoning, scholars and practitioners need to agree on what formative assessment is and how to investigate it empirically to ensure its validity and usefulness as a concept. Nevertheless, the fact that there are a wide range of conceptions of formative assessment does not necessarily mean that the research being done is flawed. As long as the investigator provides a sufficiently clear and thorough explication of her conception that should suffice. It could be argued that most concepts have comparable debates around their boundaries yet productive research continues. In this way all science proceeds.

Conclusion

This paper presents a case for greater integration of formative assessment practices in the Asian foreign language classroom. An overview of relevant background included a discussion of some of the shortcomings of traditional approaches to summative assessment in multilingual societies such as North America. The point is also raised that continued reliance on summative assessments is more persistent in Asian contexts due to a longstanding cultural fascination for standardized tests. This is regrettable because there are features of formative assessment that could greatly enhance L2 literacy instruction in many Asian contexts. Some particularly helpful features identified include the rich and immediate feedback provided by such forms of assessment as well as technology’s alleviation of clerical work for the teacher. Two primary obstacles to fuller integration of formative assessment into second-language classrooms are managing the workload associated with formative assessment and the disparate conceptions of formative assessment hindering research progress. These concerns are being addressed through technological innovation and evolving definitions of formative
assessment. The main claim put forth in this section is that, in order to benefit from the recent developments in formative assessment methods and advance English literacy development in their classrooms, language teachers in Asian EFL learning contexts must learn how to more fully exploit the improved formative assessment capabilities afforded by technology.

Embracing these types of assessments will have a number of positive implications for language teachers in Asian contexts. For one, learners may come to have more insight into their own L2 literacy strengths and needs. A flaw with most summative assessment is that it tends to be much better at detecting weaknesses than in highlighting learner strengths. Greater integration of formative assessment will help to put more focus on strengths to build learner confidence. Additionally, teachers will have access to more fine-grained information about their student L2 literacy strengths and needs which they can use to differentiate their instruction to meet the specific needs of their learners. Lastly, knowledge of current technological innovations for formative assessment will provide teachers with tools that streamline the assessment process while simultaneously giving them access to a wealth of data that they can use to inform their evaluation decisions.

References


The Problem

It is clear that English as a Second Language (ESL) learners generally do not do well in schools in Canada where the language of instruction is English (Gunderson 2007, 2009). It is also clear that there are differences in academic achievement related to the background of immigrant students entering Canadian schools (Murphy Odo, D’Silva and Gunderson 2012; Gunderson, D’Silva and Murphy Odo 2012). The degree to which immigrant students are included in the instructional environment of a classroom is likely associated with their potential for success in schools where the language of instruction is English.

Background

Millions of school-age migrants move every year with their families from country to country and enroll in classrooms where their cultures and languages are different from their classmates’ cultures and languages and the culture of teaching and learning in the classrooms. To be successful in their new schools immigrants must learn the language of instruction and socialize into the learning culture. In addition, the educational contexts must be inclusive so that they are able to benefit from instruction.

Student populations in Canadian schools have become dramatically diversified in the past two decades. In some urban schools, the greater Vancouver school district being a prime example, over 50% of students have a home language other than English. Enrolment in Canadian universities was reported to be at record high during the 2005-2006 academic year with young adults, aged 18-24, representing 64% of that enrolment and foreign students accounting for 15% of the growth in overall enrolment (Statistics Canada 2008). As a result of this growing diversity, an increasing number of Canadian immigrant students in elementary, secondary and post-secondary educational settings find themselves in multicultural learning environments. In the process of surrendering parts of both their first languages and first cultures students experience social exclusion.
This paper presents vignettes from three larger studies conducted in these multicultural contexts. Findings from these studies highlight factors that influence students’ social inclusion and exclusion in educational contexts. Each section will present a brief background, followed by details of the participants and discuss the findings relevant to the factors influencing social exclusion or inclusion. However, the discussion of the post-secondary study with Japanese students in an international exchange program will examine the responses of a survey in greater detail in order to make a connection between literacy practices and social exclusion.

Social Exclusion in Elementary Schools

An exploratory study was conducted in western Canadian schools in a large urban and a large suburban school district. The urban school district has an ESL population of 61% of its 56,000 students in grade kindergarten to twelve, while the suburban district has about 28% ESL in a population of 23,650 students. Individual schools in both districts, however, varied dramatically in the number of ESL students enrolled in them. This study was conducted in six schools; two in the urban and four in the suburban district. Overall the percentages of English speakers for the six schools varied from 23% (High ESL) to 87% (Low ESL) and 1,307 students ranging from grades 4-7 from these six schools were part of the larger study. The classrooms were divided into Low, Medium and High ESL (L, M and H-ESL) based on the proportion of ESL students in such classrooms. Only excerpts of classroom observations related to the study are reported here.

The theoretical model guiding this study was that the ratio of ESL to native speakers has a relationship with ESL students’ English reading achievement. Specifically, it was hypothesized that ESL students in classrooms with more native speakers would have more access to target language models and would show greater growth in English reading than those students in classrooms with fewer native English speakers. Classroom observations were made to develop descriptions of communicative interaction patterns among students and between students and teachers. Field notes were taken of classroom observations and evaluation sessions were conducted in which three researchers compared notes, made generalizations, and triangulated results.

English Language Use, Social Exclusion and Inclusion

The basic instructional pattern observed across all classrooms was whole-class. First languages (L1) were not used in the L-ESL classes. ESL students were entirely immersed in these classrooms and it was difficult to identify them. They seldom communicated with their English peers. In some L-ESL classes students with low-English proficiency appeared to have no interactions with peers or teachers. There was a great deal of L1 use in the H-ESL classes. The research team recognized Mandarin, Cantonese, Spanish, Tagalog, and a number
of other home languages (L2) being used among groups of students during class time, especially during the times students were asked to complete assignments.

L1 use was an interesting feature of the M-ESL classrooms. This pattern was most evident in the grade 3, 4, and 5 classrooms. Students were usually seated in small groups of desks and the ESL students were integrated throughout, so there were no ESL-only groups. The language interactions that took place at these desks were almost always in English. The exceptions involved students explaining to other students in their first language, as meaning-making for understanding, either vocabulary or concepts. These interactions occurred either between students at a particular group of desks or a student would get up and ask a classmate in another group. In a number of classrooms certain students appeared to be designated as bilingual experts, at least by other students who would ask them questions in their L1. These “bilingual buddies” were especially useful to ESL students when their classes were in a computer laboratory. It appeared that they were particularly useful to their ESL buddies in explaining vocabulary and concepts in English.

The H-ESL classrooms appeared to have students clustered in their L2 groups. Mandarin and Cantonese were prominently heard. A higher proportion of ESL students from a language group seemed to draw students to their L1 “enclaves.” While students felt comfortable in their L1 groups, it took away time and opportunities to allow them to socialize with their English speaking peers and in turn the wider mainstream multicultural and multilingual Canadian student community.

Informal conversations with the teachers led the members of the research team to conclude that ESL students in L-ESL classrooms were, in essence, integrated into the classrooms based on the notion that they would learn English and how to read English simply because their classmates were English speakers and readers, not by making accommodations for their special needs and abilities. Teachers reported that ESL students increased the range of skills and abilities in classes. Grade seven classes, for instance, enroll students who speak and read no English at all.

Three teachers stated that they thought it was unfortunate that there was such a big differential between affluent and poor students that appeared to break down across linguistic categories. One noted that she believed Tagalog speakers felt looked down upon by their affluent Mandarin speaking classmates. She suggested this situation made it difficult to plan collaborative learning strategies. Overall, teachers were concerned that ESL students were having great difficulty learning to read and write at grade level.

It was clear from the observations that there was a direct relationship between the percentage of English speakers and the amount of English being spoken in the classrooms. This confirms the common sense notion. However, the pattern is a bit more complex. ESL students in L-ESL contexts almost never appeared to be involved in any English interactions, except during whole-class lessons when teachers asked them questions. In the H-ESL classrooms First Languages (L1s) were spoken, except when teachers asked questions during lessons. It was also clear from these observations that while English Language Proficiency
(ELP) was a factor that contributed to social exclusion in H-ESL classrooms, the proportion of students from the same L1 group contributed towards inclusiveness into their L1 peer groups. Given their low English skills this would potentially contribute to their exclusion from their mainstream Canadian peers. Applying Gunderson’s (2012) notion of social exclusion to these educational contexts, it appeared that in the L-ESL classrooms ESL students faced social exclusion by submersion in a multicultural and instructional context dominated by native speakers. The M-ESL classrooms appeared to offer the potential for social inclusion. More research is needed to confirm the factors that mediated students’ uptake of interactions with their English peers and their engagement with their instructional contexts in these classrooms. The H-ESL classrooms appeared to promote social exclusion by a combination of the proportion of L1 groups and instructional design. The reading achievement figures from the larger study, the reporting of which is beyond the scope of this paper, corroborated these observations. Further research will be required to provide a deeper understanding of these trends.

Social Exclusion in Secondary Schools

The data used in this study were part of a larger set collected at an immigrant reception centre in a large metropolitan school district of western Canada (Gunderson 2007). Immigrants entering this district are interviewed as part of the process of enrolling them in schools. The data used in this study were taken from the interview records collected at this centre. It contained information such as immigration status, gender, AOA (Age-on-Arrival), home languages, and a number of other background variables. In addition, their academic achievement in high school grades 8 through 12 was recorded in the form of grades for English, Science, Mathematics and Social Studies. From the 1,318 students that were tracked through high school, English-12 (12th grade English) grade scores existed for a smaller subset of students. The data for N=95 students from three Asian language categories for English-12 were used for this study. While the primary focus of the larger study (Murphy Odo, D'Silva and Gunderson 2012) was to investigate Asian students eligibility for college based on English-12 scores, the overall data also provided insights into the social exclusion these students felt in a multicultural secondary-school environment.

Asian Language Groups and Social Exclusion

Students were primarily from three language categories –Mandarin, Cantonese and other Asian languages (Korean, Thai and Filipino). English-12 scores were the focus of analysis because students’ performance in the language of instruction –English– “constitutes the most decisive evidence of the likelihood of doing well in post-secondary educational programs” (Looker & Thiessen 2004, 13). Gunderson (2007) studied the larger group of students from which this sample was taken and looked at their academic achievement over examinable subjects –Social Studies, Math, Science and English. He attributed socio-economic
differences between these groups as a possible causal agent in group achievement differences. The results presented here reflect the same achievement data albeit a subset of that used by Gunderson (2007). The English Language achievement for the three Asian language groups in Figure 1 below illustrates their academic performance over the secondary grades.

**Figure 1: Achievement in English over Secondary School Grades**

![Graph showing achievement in English over secondary school grades for Mandarin, Cantonese, and Other Asian groups.]

While in comparison to the Cantonese and other Asian groups the Mandarin group performed better on average in English, students from all the three groups felt excluded from the mainstream student population in different ways because of their status as ESL. The anecdotal excerpts presented in these sections highlight how students voiced their frustration of social exclusion in a multicultural educational context that aimed to promote a pedagogical culture of inclusivity. It appeared that students found, however, inclusiveness in a group that shared their level of ELP.

*When I knew I was put in the ESL class, I was very disappointed. In the first week, I was totally upset and was in a very low mood because I didn't have many friends, and all things around me were unfamiliar. Besides, I didn't want to be distinct from others. I wanted to be a regular student. However, after the first day of integration, the master of hell told me where heaven was. As I first stepped in the regular classroom, I could easily feel the coldness and bitterness in the air. Everyone was indifferent to me. I was standing in front of the classroom like a fool waiting for the teacher to come. I was so embarrassed that I wanted to cry out and run back to the ESL class. As time went by, I made more friends in the ESL class and we studied together like brothers and sisters. We cared for and helped each other. But I remain an unconcerned visitor in the regular class after 6 months. I talk to no one. So now I am travelling between heaven and hell, back and forth.* (15-year-old female, Cantonese speaker, Hong Kong) (Gunderson 2007)
ELP, as reflected in the averages of these student language groups over the secondary grades, played a vital role in their social inclusion with the wider student community.

_The Canadian guys make fun of Chinese by pretending they speak it and making funny noises. They are really laughing at us and making fun, specially the white girls._ (16-year-old female, Shanghainese speaker, People’s Republic of China)

Akin to the trends in high ESL classrooms in the elementary school study, in a multicultural classroom where there was arguably an abundance of access to native English speakers, students appeared socially excluded from the wider student community because of their ELP and the proportion of L1 groups of students.

_There are too many Chinese students in [this city]. It is hard to practice English. I am happy that I arrived six years ago when there weren’t so many Chinese._ (18-year-old male, Cantonese speaker, Hong Kong)

Some Asian student groups used their social capital to gain additional English language support. According to Gunderson (2007), Mandarin speakers were from mainland China and Taiwan. The Taiwanese immigrant-families were socio-economically advantaged and were able to provide alternate means to support their children’s learning and enhance their academic success. These families not only socio-economically advantaged, but the parents were resourceful in mobilizing their social and financial capital to favourably supplement the educational experiences of their children. For instance, some students had one to four tutors that sometimes even accompanied them during travel to provide support for school work. It seems that the parents’ personal investment in their children’s education and their drive to make their children succeed in Canadian schools were among the reasons behind this group’s high academic achievement.

_I go to school all day, then Chinese school for 3 hours, then have a tutor twice a week, then do homework for 4, 5 hours until maybe midnight. Canadian students don’t work so hard because they know the language. I am a smart student in Taiwan. I get all good grade. In Vancouver I work so hard but my grades are not so good. I can’t go to school activities because my language is not so good and I have to study_ (14-year-old male, Mandarin speaker, Taiwan).

While parents were highly instrumental in enhancing the academic achievement for some students in ways just described, they also hindered students’ academic development in indirect ways. According to Gunderson (2007) a remarkable “conundrum” that beleaguered the school district was that parents feared the ESL label would hinder academic achievement.
and result in social exclusion of their children within their L1 groups and across the multicultural mainstream student population:

Many students and their parents complained that ESL classes were roadblocks to gaining admission to a university, so students got out of such classes as soon as they could. Some referred to ESL classes as a kind of ghetto. After they exited ESL classes their grades went down (268).

With strong aspirations to send their children to university, parents, particularly from Asian immigrant groups, were actively working on removing their children from ESL support classes that were vital to their language development, paradoxically reducing their ability to improve their ELP.

The “ESL” label and ELP were factors that contributed to social exclusion among students from the Asian language backgrounds in this study. It appeared that social capital may have helped some L1 groups gain an academic advantage resulting in their departure from being ESL and closer to being integrated into the wider multicultural community.

Social Exclusion in Post-Secondary Schools

The background for this study is different from the two described above. While students in the elementary and secondary school studies were immigrants, young adult international students from a Japanese university aged 19-21 years of age sojourning in a large western Canadian university were the focus of this study. They were part of an international Academic Exchange Program (AEP) from a Japanese university for 8 months of the academic year September 2009 to April 2010. The AEP was geared towards offering students an integrated academic and living environment that provided access to unique international academic and inter-cultural experiences.

The results reported here are from the larger study (D’Silva 2011). An online survey called “Reading Materials Survey Questionnaire” was administered to gather information on students’ reading habits so that the study could examine any changes in the literacy practices of the participating ESL learners over the course of a term. The responses to the six questions that surveyed the students on the number of hours spent in reading school and non-school related materials at the beginning (pre) and end of the term (post) are discussed below.

The survey questions shown in Table 1 probed students’ reading habits on the computer (or “on screen” from henceforth) and in print (materials such as books that are non-electronic) of school related materials or curricular materials (“Academic” reading materials from henceforth) and non-school-related materials (“independent” reading materials from henceforth) that included non-academic materials that students may read outside their classrooms or courses.
Table 1: Questions Used to Survey Reading Habits in Pre- and Post-Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reading Habits Survey Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How much time in a week (approximately) do you spend reading school-related materials on the computer?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How much time in a week (approximately) do you spend reading school-related materials in print (not online but in the form of books for example)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How much time in a week (approximately) do you spend reading non-school related materials in ENGLISH on the computer?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How much time in a week (approximately) do you spend reading non-school related materials in JAPANESE on the computer?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How much time in a week (approximately) do you spend reading non-school related materials in print in ENGLISH?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How much time in a week (approximately) do you spend reading non-school related materials in print in JAPANESE?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reading Habits of Academic Materials

Responses to the first question related to reading habits of academic materials on screen at the beginning (pre) and end-of-term (post) are in Figure 2 and Table 2 below in number of hours in a week. The choices offered for these items in the survey were: less than 2 hours, 2 to 5 hours, 5 to 8 hours and 8 to 10 hours.

Figure 2: Time Spent in a Week on Academic Reading on Screen

Table 2: Time Spent in a Week on Academic Reading on Screen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Spent Reading</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 hours</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 to 5 hours</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 5 to 8 hours</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 8 to 10 hours</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There appeared to be only a modest amount of increase from Pre to Post in the number of hours students spent reading academic materials on screen – 8% increase in the 2-5 hour range and 7% increase in the 5-8 hour range offset by a decrease of 13% in the less than 2 hour range. All courses in this AEP had a strong web supported presence. The companion websites for these courses contained course readings and other related academic materials in the form of electronic documents. Despite having access to a significant amount of online academic reading materials students’ responses reflect only a modest increase in reading hours on screen.

Responses on reading of course related materials in print (Figure 3 and Table 3) seem to show a dramatic increase over the term – a jump from 37% (32% + 5%) to 83% (55% + 26% + 2%) in the range of 2 and 10 hours. Academic reading in print seemed to have more than doubled in the 2 to 10 hour range. These figures suggest a substantial growth in the number of hours spent reading academic materials in print when compared to reading on screen. From observations, students seemed to be printing out copious amounts of pages of these online reading materials in order to read them in print. While reading on screen seemed an easy task when reading in Japanese, students paused frequently to refer to their electronic bilingual dictionaries when reading English materials on screen.

**Figure 3: Time Spent in a Week Reading Academic Materials in Print**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Spent Reading</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 hours</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 to 5 hours</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 5 to 8 hours</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 8 to 10 hours</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While it appears from these survey results that reading in print may have been somewhat more popular than reading on screen, reading academic materials both on screen and in print seemed to be a challenge for students who reported that the texts they were reading were of a high level of difficulty. A readability analysis of some of the academic texts read by these students revealed that they were in the difficult to very confusing range of the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) rating. Such academic texts clearly presented a reading challenge to students whether on screen or in print.

A majority of participants responded that they spent less than 5 hours on reading on screen (93% - 53 % below 2 hours and 40% between 2 and 5 hours) and in print (72% - 17% below 2 hours and 55% between 2 and 5 hours) by the end of the term. While these figures do not seem to represent an enormous amount of time spent on academic materials given the reading challenges that students were faced with and a course load of 12 credits, it may be a reflection of the students’ reaction to the challenges they faced in reading such texts. A female student in an interview suggested that she abandoned an academic reading when it was difficult.

Reading Habits of Independent Reading

The responses to time spent on independent reading in English on screen showed only a modest increase over the term (Figure 4 and Table 4).

**Figure 4: Time Spent on Independent Reading in English on Screen**

![Bar chart showing time spent on independent reading in English on screen](chart)

**Table 4: Time Spent on Independent Reading in English on Screen**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Spent Reading</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 hours</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 to 5 hours</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 5 to 8 hours</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The responses to time spent on independent reading in English in print also showed only a modest increase over the term (Figure 5 and Table 5).

**Figure 5: Time Spent Reading Independent Reading in Print in English**

![Graph showing time spent reading in print in English](image)

**Table 5: Time Spent in Independent Reading in Print in English**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Spent Reading</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 hours</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 to 5 hours</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 5 to 8 hours</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Student responses to independent reading in English on screen and in print suggest minor growth in the number of hours spent in a week over the period of an academic term. The time in hours spent in independent reading in English on screen grew from 10% (5% + 5%) to 26% (24% + 2%) while in print from 17% (15% + 2%) to 19% (12% + 7%) in the range of 2 to 8 hours.

The modest increase in independent reading in English both on screen and in print suggests that most time spent reading in English may have been in academic reading. In addition, the responses also suggest that a majority of students (74% on screen and 81% in print) spent less than 2 hours a week in independent reading by the end of the term. This may include those who did not spend any time in independent reading as the survey lacked a category to capture those students who spent zero hours in independent reading. These results suggest that students did not spend much time during the term reading in English other than for academic work. They likely spent a minimal amount of time reading in English for pleasure. A female student reported during the interview: “now I read only homework” implying that she spent most of her time in academic reading. The hours spent in independent reading in Japanese on screen are in Figure 6 and Table 6.
Figure 6: Time Spent in Independent Reading in Japanese on Screen

Table 6: Times Spent in Independent Reading in Japanese on Screen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Spent Reading</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th></th>
<th>Post</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 hours</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 to 5 hours</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 5 to 8 hours</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 8 to 10 hours</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Time Spent in Independent Reading in Print in Japanese

Table 7: Time Spent in Independent Reading in Japanese in Print

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Spent Reading</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th></th>
<th>Post</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 hours</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 2 to 5 hours</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 5 to 8 hours</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 8 to 10 hours</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Students’ responses to the last survey question on independent reading in Japanese in print are in Figure 7 and Table 7.

While there was a modest change (10% decrease in 2-5 hour range and 12% increase in the 8-10 hour range) in the reading habits in independent reading in Japanese on screen, in contrast, hours spent in independent reading of Japanese in print declined significantly with 33% more students (79% - 46%) responding that they spent a minimal amount of time. In addition, the time spent in all ranges of hours decreased as well contributing to an overall decreasing trend in the time spent in independent reading in print in Japanese.

The trends seen here in independent reading in Japanese both in print and on screen may resemble that expected of these students. International students in such programs predictably continue maintaining their reading habits in their L1. Students seemed to read more of these materials at the beginning than at the end of the term possibly because the access to fresh print materials in Japanese was limited in Canada. In contrast the time spent in reading Japanese on the computer had not changed as students stayed in touch with their family and friends through social networking websites, email and other forms of communication over the Internet or what the students referred to as “Japanese information.”

Literacy Practices and Social Exclusion
Survey results revealed that students were mainly reading academic materials in English. A greater amount of this reading was in print than on screen. When they encountered challenging academic texts students may have chosen to abandon or skip reading such texts. Independent reading in English both in print and on screen appeared to be considerably less when compared to academic reading. Independent reading in Japanese both in print and on screen appeared to follow trends expected of sojourning international students.

Wallace (2003) distinguishes between two kinds of reading. The first, which is done mainly for learning in academic contexts –reading for learning and the second, which is done voluntarily “when we don’t have to do it” –reading for pleasure (7). The results of the survey clearly indicate that a preponderance of the reading activity in English done by the students in the study was for school work –reading for learning. Reading for pleasure in English was only a small part of the students’ reading repertoire. Given the trends of reading in English both in print and on screen, it is no surprise that students maintained reading for pleasure in Japanese.

Students held positive views of reading and aspired to improve their English reading skills. They believed reading practice or extensive reading would improve their reading skills. These sentiments were best captured by the response from a female student who when asked what kind of help is needed to become a better reader in English replied: “I have to read much more…So more reading and more reading.” Another female student suggested that there may have been a desire to read for pleasure: “Now I read only for homework…but if I have time I want to read novel in English.” Despite having access to an abundance of print and media it appears that students did not use these facilities to read for pleasure in English.
Students in the AEP were interested in interacting with their local peers. The courses during the fall term were designed and customized for these sojourning students hence the classes had only students from the same L1 background. In addition, all students in the program were from the same university in Japan and could be assumed to share similar academic and social cultures. Outside their classroom, students made an effort to put their English language skills to use. One male student expressed his need to speak: “I just tried to ask questions and try my English to real Canadian it is really important to speak loudly and clearly…” implying a recognition of the need to build English language skills and interact with people they meet in their everyday lives. Students expressed that the lack of opportunities to connect with the wider English speaking community was because of her poor English language skills.

Some students also attempted to gather cultural knowledge from watching TV but found their English listening skills limited their ability to engage with Canadian and North American programming. For instance, one female student suggested: “I don’t watch TV in my room because they speaks so fast so I can’t understand.” Japanese students in other programmes at the host university in previous studies have also reported about “their relationships with Canadian students on their floors and expressed their frustration with their inability to have regular conversations with their Canadian peers” (Segawa 1998, 171). Despite having access to native English speakers, students in the AEP were not able to take advantage of such opportunities because of their perceived lack of English speaking skills.

Reading for pleasure has a positive impact on language development. Studies have associated reading for pleasure in L2 with vocabulary and cultural knowledge gains (Mikulecky 2008). Some believe that “an important by-product of reading for pleasure in any language is fluency” (Wallace 2003, 7) –a skill in English the students reportedly desired. Students spent only a minimal amount of time reading for pleasure. Reading for pleasure may have provided them with information that would help them in their communications and conversations with the people around them.

Other studies (such as Grayson & Stowe (2005) for instance) have highlighted similar difficulties with international students, including those from Japan, in Canadian universities. This group, consisting of a 100 students, had easy access to familiar speech communities and, therefore, was not forced into communicating with the larger student body in English. As a result they were comfortable spending time in their “speech enclaves” – the group that spoke Japanese. Given the limited access to authentic language interactions in English outside their classrooms and a significant academic workload these students may have been positioned to be in what reflected an “EFL” (English as a Foreign Language) context for most of their school day. Part of their day outside the classroom may have been spent in their living quarters where they had access to native English speakers, but reportedly struggled to interact effectively in English in these contexts. Students used IM and other social networking to stay connected to their sojourning Japanese peers even after school hours in order to complete school work mostly communicating in Japanese. While a bulk of their time was spent in an
EFL context, they appeared to have a transient ESL (English as a Second Language) experience for a small part of their school day.

ESL and EFL are terms used to describe learning contexts that are primarily reflective of whether the language of the larger community is English. Participants in this study were students who had learned English in Japan in what may be considered an EFL context. In Canada as sojourning students they were believed to be immersed in an English-rich environment where they would have access to speakers of English and hence in an ESL context. As in the study with elementary students, Gunderson et al (2008), students were in EFL contexts despite being in an English speaking community. The model of concentric domains of EFL and ESL instructional environments illustrated in Figure 8 below represents the context these students found themselves in. The inner circle where students stayed connected with their sojourning peers in what may resemble an EFL context and through their day make transient movements to the outer ESL circle where they connected with the wider English speaking community in what may resemble an ESL context.

Given the instructional contact hours, the hours spent during school hours in their cohort and reported reading habits in L1 and L2 as discussed so far, Figure 8 indicates that a majority of their context is taken up by the EFL environment. Presumably, there is always an inner circle representing an EFL context for sojourning students. It is desirable to limit the inner circle so as to provide students with an effective sojourning experience which is the primary goal of most AEP programs such as the one in the study.

From survey results, field notes and observations, it appears that most students spent a majority of their time during the week in their EFL domain. Their “reading for pleasure” habits in L2 appear to resemble their counterparts in EFL contexts in their homeland –mainly for academic work. Their access to native English models resembles that of minority language groups in Canada where students have a L1 other than English –ESL context. However, the uptake of these opportunities to interact and apply their English language skills with their native English speaking counterparts in the student and academic community was mediated by their English language skills which appear to be restricted. Instructional design, the proportion of the student group and English language proficiency contributed to these international students’ social exclusion from their wider academic community that they aspired to be part of. Their literacy practices in English and L1 on screen and in print, influenced primarily by their instructional contexts, were a mediating factor that may have contributed to their social exclusion in indirect ways. Independent reading for instance may have offered students the potential to enhance their English language skills in turn influencing their level of interactions with the wider multicultural student community. How these factors interact and mediate to impact social inclusion and exclusion in multicultural educational contexts may be the goals of future research.
Summary and Conclusion

The vignettes from three studies presented above highlight factors that influence the forces of social inclusion and exclusion of students in their educational contexts. Proportions of L1 groups and instructional design contributed to the social exclusion in the elementary school study. While proportions of L1 groups and being part of a perceivably disadvantaged group—“ESL”—were socially exclusionary factors, social capital appeared to help students in mobilizing their language skills to integrate with the mainstream community in the context of the secondary school study. By examining the reading habits of international students in the context of the post-secondary study, it appeared that the size of their L1 cohort, literacy practices and instructional design directly and indirectly contributed to social exclusion of students in their sojourning academic context. While the focus of these studies was not primarily to investigate the factors of social exclusion and inclusion they appear to support Gunderson’s notions of social inclusion and exclusion in school-based multicultural settings and provide a propaedeutic basis for future explorations in academic contexts (Gunderson 2012).

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PANEL I

Women Moving:
Micro-Level Case Studies of Migrant Women
Asia-Pacific region, with its both sending and receiving countries, presents various examples of migration and its consequential issues along with multiculturalism. Having its main research theme as migration and multiculturalism, Group 1 has set the first panel around these issues and “moving women.” Women are on the edge of any kind of movement, from local distances to cities and migration across continents. Hence, a closer look at moving women through the lenses of micro-level case studies and discussing adaptation strategies of these women to societal and bureaucratic changes was the rationale of our panel. The panel, then, brought together the case studies of migrant women and specifically women labor workers from Japan, the Philippines, former Soviet Union countries, Turkey and many other receiving, sending, transferring and host countries.

The first presenter, Dr. Nobue Suzuki from Chiba University looked at the recent stance of Filipino migrant women in Japan by focusing on caregivers and other care-related works of women with her paper “Forever in Love?: Labor, Temporality, and Filipino Women in Japan.” She presented the results of her interviews with care workers and asked the essential question of how multiculturalism can respond to changing living conditions of these women and how we can accommodate them in society.

Dr. Viktoriya Kim from Osaka University took the case to another dimension of “moving women” by giving detailed analysis of her research on female migrants in the entertainment industry of Japan and their living conditions after the enactment of 2005 Immigration Control Act. Her paper “Migration Policies vs. Entertainer; The Case of Female Labor Migrants from the Former USSR in Japan” closely looked at the limited impacts of the new immigration control act and argued that various resilience mechanisms, like underground strategies or marriages of convenience, were the only possible ways for those to adapt to the changes in society and bureaucracy.

The third presentation led to a complementary argument for the question of how women are surviving on the edges of law and society while we are going through a change not only in our societal and bureaucratic institutions but also in our individual perceptions and attitudes towards migrant women in receiving countries. Dr. Mine Eder from Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, examined Turkey as a hub country of migration and various examples of legality, illegality and ongoing vulnerability for these migrant women along those borders.
with her paper “Living on the Edge of Law, Economy and Gaze: Exclusion of Female Migrant Workers in Turkey.”

Both papers were well connected around the main question of how women adjust themselves to social, legal and perceptional changes in both receiving and sending countries through time with a wide array of case studies from the western and eastern ends of Asia. Some of the keywords that would shed a light on our overall discussion to connect migration with multiculturalism are “multicultural human relations” (Suzuki) and still “othering” these women on the “edge of law” (Eder) but again “resilience mechanisms” (Kim) of those women to reflect our transforming perceptions not only towards migrant women or migration but towards multiculturalism as well. Changing reaction of those migrant women (nurses, care givers, sex workers, housemaids or entertainers) to this transformation also prevails the fact that there are still borders in people’s minds along with the physical and exclusive borders between the countries on the way to better realization of multiculturalism in Asia.
The notion of multiculturalism suggests cultural encounters as well as incorporation of non-citizen people and their cultures into Japan’s social landscape. Today, media and consumer spaces feature ethnic elements much more than before. People’s global migrations have also created, expanded, and complicated these interfaces. Numerous scholars have shown us that migrations do not simply happen but are patterned, and gender has been one critical element in such pattern formation. A large number of women migrants move to foreign countries in order to provide care at their employers’ homes and in public sectors as nurses, caregivers, entertainers, sex workers, wife-mothers, and so on.¹ My contribution to the symposium is then to tackle the issues involved in multiculturalism in Asia through an investigation of a gendered migration, that of Filipino women (hereafter Filipinas) and its consequences over time that are taking place locally in Japan and to an extent, transnationally between Japan and the Philippines. I also consider what multiculturalism should do to better respond to these immigrant women’s situations in Japan and beyond.

Introduction

The decade of the 2000s witnessed a proliferation of studies of the care work that women take up abroad. While the gender norms in most societies continue to assign wives and mothers to take care of the young, old, sick, and disabled out of their “love,” the women’s labouring realities make it difficult to satisfy their gender-normative roles only by themselves. Amid these situations, people who need physical and emotional attention have come to variously suffer from “care deficit.” To alleviate the deficits, women from developing countries have been mobilized to fill the roles vacated by women in more affluent societies abroad.

Contemporary studies have included a wide range of women who provide care for foreign employers overseas (e.g., Carlos 2010; Cheng 2010; Constable 1997; ¹ I use “caregiver,” “carer,” and “care-worker” interchangeably except for “Helper” with a capital H, which means a care-worker with a certificate. See below for explanation. Men also take up these jobs abroad. However, their number is smaller than that of women and we may consider men’s caring as a form of feminization in the gender regime at large.)
Female marriage migrants as well not only provide wifely/maternal care for their nuclear families but also are incorporated into their extended families in order to take care of disabled and aging members (see Freeman 2011; Piper and Roces 2003). Moreover, as women from developing countries take over the caring work assigned to women of the affluent North, the women of the former group are in turn necessitated to hire yet other women to stand in their place, thereby constituting the “global chain of care” (Hochschild 2000). Amid the continuing undervaluation of reproductive work or what is euphemistically called “love’s labour,” in most societies an increased number of women of both wealthy and deprived classes worldwide find themselves in one way or another “chained” by the task of “love’s labour.”

Although the existing literature has illuminated the various dimensions of immigrant women’s contributions to their employers’ homes abroad and their own families back home through remittances and various forms of communication, as well as of their struggles to provide love’s labour “here” and “there,” the literature is also limited in two important ways. One is that as Martin Manalansan (2006) has pointed out, the studies of women’s global migration have thus far tended to focus on the “normative woman” or married women’s reproductive work abroad and their struggles to perform motherhood transnationally (e.g., Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Parreñas 2001, 2005). Consequently, we are yet to be informed about what immigrant women, especially those who are “derailed” from their gender-normative path such as divorcees and single mothers, are doing, and why. My second point is the existing literature has introduced different types of reproductive work that immigrant women do, but these are observed within a narrow span of time. Although some longer historical studies exist, such as Nakano Glenn’s (1986) work which looked into the labour of three generations of Japanese American women who served as domestics, her focus was on each generation and not on their successive engagements in different types of care work.

Based on my long-time association with Filipinas living in urban Japan, starting from the early 1990s to the present, this essay then attempts to fill this vacuum by detailing different kinds of care work they have taken up for over 20 years of their lives in Japan. Some women have by choice or by circumstance been chained to “love’s labour” throughout their adult lives and engaged in a series of care work situations for economic, social, and personal reasons. I will first consider the structure of opportunities in which they are funnelled into care work in a foreign land. This is followed by a section which delineates the ways in which Filipinas in Japan have come to be drawn into the elder-care field. Then, I introduce life stories of two Filipinas who have lived in Japan for over 20 years. In doing so,

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2 Except for a notable few (Mix and Piper 2003).

3 My research on Filipinas’ care work was born as an extension of my earlier project on an inquiry into Filipina-Japanese marriages in Japan, which started in the early 1990s. Since around 2005 I have gained views of 27 Filipina/o care-workers from formal interviews and casual conversations with numerous other Filipina/o caregivers. I have also participated in their meetings, workshops, and events and met caregivers, their employers and supporters, and related government workers. These data are supplemented by a survey on 190 Filipino caregivers in Japan in 2008 (RGFCJ 2010). I am grateful for the funds provided by the Japan Society for the
I hope to illustrate some of the ways in which Filipinas have been engaged in different kinds of care work over their life-courses—something hitherto analysed in separate and synchronic discussions. My choice of this small number of examples is to more fully reflect the complexity of their biographies and place them in temporal terrains. The stories show the women’s engagements in various types of care work in both public and private spheres, instead of rendering a patchwork of brief excerpts of a greater number of informants to fit them into my discussion. Although many parts of their stories overlap with numerous other Filipinas’ experiences in Japan, drawing a generalization from the two stories is not my goal. By describing their lives, I instead suggest that the incorporation of temporality enables us to see the workings of gender regimes not only across space but also across time.

1. The Trans-regional Structure of Opportunities

The Philippines has been one of the most organized labour-exporting countries in the world and has expediently supported the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in which Article 13 states that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his [sic] own” even if the entrance to another country is not always guaranteed. From the 1960s, the state aggressively promoted overseas migration based on what Anna Guevarra (2009) calls “labour diplomacy,” through which it tries to secure and expand the entrance and employment of Filipino workers in the foreign market. Together with this state-endorsed migration economy, the Catholic notions of sacrifice and martyrdom, the establishments of Migrant Worker Day and Month, and the material gains made visible by return migrants have stirred up hopes and dreams in Filipinos’ minds, leading a government official to say, “we [have] naturally evolved a migrant worker culture” (Guevarra 2009, 40). Instilling material, social, and cultural importance of work abroad in this way, this “naturalness” has helped the Philippine state to market dreams of going abroad to its citizens.

At the receiving end, unlike many Asian, European, and North American countries, Japan continues not to establish any recognizable immigration policy and has officially kept its door closed to foreign workers except for a few professional and skilled workers. Nevertheless, Japan does informally incorporate “unskilled” foreign workers under certain immigration categories and has received numerous workers who provide love’s labour in an intimate sphere outside the home. One prominent field in Japan that was open to foreign women was the area of care work and from the 1970s to 2005 the country was the almost exclusive host of Filipino, mostly women, entertainers. Their work is largely to help their predominantly male customers to wind down after work and boost their gendered egos though flirtation games and frivolous conversations. In this intimate sphere as well, “tender loving care” is one of the most welcomed aspects of their services. For the past 30 years, Filipinas had been situated in the nightlife businesses to take up this gendered care work, until 2005 when Japan tightened the issuance of entertainer visas (for details and critique see
Suzuki 2009). Today, the vast majority of Filipino residents are former entertainers who established their residency through marriage to Japanese. 4 In the wake of the 2005 legal change, many Filipina residents, who were by this time married or were formerly married to Japanese and raising their children, began working as caregivers.

2. Producing Filipino Caregivers

In 2011, nearly a quarter of the Japanese population is estimated to be over 65 years of age, and Japan is one of the most rapidly aging societies in the world (Statistics Bureau 2012). Although many societies in Asia—Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea—have incorporated foreign caregivers to attend to the elderly and others who need help (Lan 2006; Yeoh and Huang 2010), Japan has relegated this task to anyone in the family by introducing the elder-care leave scheme in 1991, though practically wives and mothers have assumed prime responsibilities. Starting from 2008 and 2009 the Japanese government has, albeit quite reluctantly, allowed nurse and care-worker (kaigo fukushishi) candidates from Indonesia and the Philippines respectively to work in Japan based on the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (for details, see Suzuki 2007). The EPA has received much attention from the media and stakeholders in caregiving. Before and especially during the increase in media attention to the EPA, local Filipinas have begun providing care to the elderly.

A survey conducted in 2008 in the Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka-Kyoto, and Fukuoka areas in Japan, found over 2,000 Filipinos who held “Home Helper” Level Two (hōmon kaigoin 2-kyū; hereafter, Helper) certificates, which are issued by prefectural governments (Research Group for Filipino Caregivers in Japan, RGFCJ 2010). The number of Filipino Helpers began to rise from 2004, when a concerned Japanese man married to a Filipina contacted a Helper training school in Tokyo to offer a course specifically designed for Filipinos. These courses, which normally require 130 hours of study on medical and institutional subjects and practicum, may provide additional classes for foreigners to improve their language skills, including vocabulary and reading and writing Japanese characters. Upon completing the course with no exam, a trainee receives a Helper certificate. Filipino residents came to learn about these courses through the local Filipino community, including the ethnic media and events for co-ethnics. Currently, several hundreds of them are working as Helpers with this certificate and yet others do so without it. Let us turn to some of the ways in which Filipinas have decided to engage in care work in Japan.

3. Filipina Caregivers in Japan

Of Filipina caregivers in Japan, we find roughly two categorizes of women: One consists of single mothers who have no choice but earn an income for themselves and their children. The

4 There were 209,376 registered Filipinos in 2011 of which 177,184 have permanent, spouse-or-child, and long-term visas, suggesting that most of them are/were married to Japanese and some are offspring of these couples (MOJ 2012).
other group consists of those whose marriages and financial situations are generally stable. As seen elsewhere, their employment options are by and large limited to service and menial work. Yet, in the case of Filipinas in Japan, because of their (former) job entertaining male customers in nightlife businesses and the tainted images thereof, their motivations to become a Helper reflect the particular social conditions in which they live. The first example is Fiona.

Fiona

Fiona was born in the mid-1960s and came to Japan as a singer-turned-hostess, working at night. She married three times over 20 years of her life in Japan. Her engagement in care work reflects initially the necessity for her to earn an income for her marital family and in later years her desire to recreate herself as a “respectable” member of society and a Catholic woman. Fiona met her first husband, a fast-food restaurant worker, during her first stint in Japan and soon gave birth to her only son. In order to augment their income, she also worked at a nightclub as a hostess on weekends. In the late 1980s, after the death of her “mother-like” nursmaid in the Philippines, whom she could not take care by herself, Fiona began to develop a desire to care for elderly people. Her first encounter with the work was a local hospital which was recruiting carers, including “foreigners.” But by “foreigners” the hospital meant Brazilians of Japanese descent and Fiona’s application was turned down. In the meantime, she divorced her first husband and lost her child to her in-laws.

Fiona’s life was worsened upon marrying another Japanese man whom she met at the club where she was working. According to her, this man was also “lazy,” but she was fortunate to have a new mother-in-law, a nurse, who was supportive of Fiona’s wish. Through her mother-in-law, Fiona landed a caring job. In addition to this work, she again had to work as a hostess at a nightclub a few days a week in order to augment the hospital’s salaries. Fiona described the sleepless days she had to survive as follows: She worked at the hospital during the day. Upon returning home, she took a shower, cooked for her and her husband, and rushed to the bar, and entertained (male) customers until two in the morning. Fiona ended this frantic routine when she learned that her husband was having an affair during the time she was out working at night. Consulting her nurse mother-in-law, Fiona divorced her husband and resumed care work. She chose care work because she believes that care work is a “respectable, solid job” [chanto shita, shikkari shita shigoto], which would, however financially difficult, still enable her to maintain a life alone.

She emphasizes that care work is not simply physically helping the elderly but it is the heart which does the work. At a workshop that she and her fellows organized for other Filipinos, Fiona presented her view as follows:

This character (聴) is the basic for caregiving. It consists of the ear (left), the eye (middle right, sideways), and the heart (bottom right), and on top of these is the

5 All personal names are pseudonyms. In order to protect the privacy of the people I describe in this essay, I also provide not-too-precise personal information (e.g., age) and took the liberty of modifying personal attributes and details, which are not crucial to the present discussion.
First, we need to listen to the patient, but it’s not just listening. You need to listen with your heart. You should listen with the heart (ki[ku] kokoro), see the patient with your heart (mi kokoro), and talk to the patient with your heart (kataru kokoro).

Encircling the cross, as a Catholic Fiona suggests that the care she wishes to provide is God’s tender loving care. Having gone through numerous struggles for many years as a foreign woman with stigmatized background and as a mother who lost her child to her in-laws, Fiona now lives with her third husband who is supportive of her desire to do care-work. Having made her life more financially and emotionally stable, Fiona is now trying to convince her fellow Filipinas in her vicinity to become carers as well. Of course, not all Filipinas opt to become carers, for many are aware of the low wage for the physically and mentally draining job. But like Fiona, Carrie chose care work.

Carrie
Carrie was born in the mid-1960s. When she was in her late teens, she came to Central Japan as a singer. In reality, she worked as a bunny girl and overstayed her visa for eight years. Meanwhile, she met Tanaka, who was then in his early 40s, and gave birth to her only child in early 1990s. She then returned to the Philippines in order to redress her legal status. By the mid-2000s, she divorced Tanaka because he was a heavy drinker, gambler, and womanizer. Carrie also implied that she suffered from Tanaka’s violence. Having gone through all this, after she divorced him, she was diagnosed with depression for a while. She described her current life by underscoring her loneliness and insecurity, saying, “If you don’t have a spouse, you know? You are left alone (in a foreign country). I only have my name, which is my guarantor.”

Soon after her divorce, Carrie went to the city hall to request livelihood and child allowances for her life with a son aged 15 at the time. Even though she did this while suffering from depression, Carrie was still aware of the importance of earning her own income. Thus, Carrie hurriedly picked up jobs at a supermarket, factory, and hotel (chambermaid), but she also knew these jobs would not give her the needed stability. She learned about schools for Helpers and got a certificate. Carrie has different motivations to work as a Helper from Fiona specifically because she is a foreign single mother whose ethnicity and sexuality have been under suspicion even more than in the case of married Filipinas. She has to worry about interrogation by different authorities. Indeed, Carrie once received a phone call at home from the police, which her son answered; he was shocked that the police was checking about his mother. Around this time, the police were aggressively arresting visa-overstayers. In that context, she told me, “I’m not Japanese. That’s it. Not having a visa is illegal. The police will get you. I’ve been questioned many times now.”

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6 This refers to the top-right part in the character 聽. Strictly, it consists of a horizontal bar with the Katakana syllabary “no”; however, various fonts representing the part do look like a cross.
Her description of police inquiries suggested that aside from her legality, the police questioned her about her sexuality and gendered morality. According to her, the police took her mature-looking son to be her “boyfriend” with whom she was cohabiting. Thus, she was expressing her worries that the police would harass an unwed foreign woman living with a significantly younger man for her immoral behaviour. Even though she is now a permanent resident, Carrie told her son that because she was a foreigner without permanent residency at that time, she had to not only retain a proper legal status but also demonstrate her good morality in the eyes of authority. To do this, Carrie reasoned, “If I pay tax, Immigration understands (that I’m not a trouble-making foreigner).” This way of thinking suggests that for Carrie establishing herself independently of welfare is a way to demonstrate to the authorities her bona fide social and moral status. She then went on to criticize other Filipinas around her and Tanaka for relying on welfare payments without trying to earn an income by themselves. For her, that is not the way one should remake oneself in a foreign land.

For the same reason, to become financially independent, many Filipinas however return to nightlife businesses upon becoming single mothers or needing to augment income for families in Japan and/or in the Philippines. When I asked Carrie whether or not she thought of returning to the club, she was very firm that she did not want to return there because of her age, and Japanese and Filipino gossip about such work, which in turn would have negative impact on her son. Thus, she repeatedly emphasized the fact that she was “the mother of her son.”

4. Chained and Chaining Themselves by “Love’s Labour”

The illustrations of Fiona’s and Carrie’s lives suggest some of the ways in which divorced, middle-aged Filipinas are trying to survive and establish themselves in a foreign land. In Fiona’s case, after having experienced divorce twice, she is now married to an understanding man and is financially stable. Although the two women’s economic and social situations differ, these Filipinas nevertheless have shared motivations to have chosen caregiving as their job. As mentioned earlier, many Filipinas initially came to Japan to provide “emotional labour” at the nightclubs (see Hochschild 1983) and later to perform household chores in addition to being the (practical) breadwinner for their families. Concurrently or intermittently doing these jobs, they have taken up elderly care. In certain sense, the sequential engagement and confinement within the field of care show continuity with the experience of immigrant women elsewhere. And yet, the social conditions in which these Filipinas live also differentiate them from other women immigrants elsewhere.

As I have elaborated on this point before (Suzuki 2000), “uplifting the images of Filipinos and the Philippines” has indeed been rhetoric very commonly used among those who are conscious of their status and morality by dissociating and dis-identifying themselves from the “Filipino entertainer” construct in Japan. In fact, another Filipina former-entertainer-turned-carer explained to me that becoming a Helper has enabled her to earn a reputation of being “serious” (majime) and “admirable” (erai) which she maintained
that she would not have won if she had continued to work at night. The spectre of misrecognized entertainers has hence continued to haunt Filipinas’ existence in a sexist and xenophobic society.

Note that Carrie has also been bothered by the police who called her up at home and stopped her many times to interrogate her about whether or not she was violating the laws. Having worked in the nightlife industries and overstayed her visa in the past, she is painfully aware of the power of the authorities. Upon giving birth to her son, she submitted to Immigration in order to return to the Philippines with him and even if by the time of interview Carrie was married to Tanaka, she was not able to join him until their son became three years old. Because she “is not Japanese,” she says, Carrie has become extremely careful about her status and movements. Furthermore, Carrie underscores that she is a taxpayer, a fact of her bona fide residency, which, she hopes, the Japanese authority would recognize.

Thus, while both Fiona and Carrie were desperate to earn an income in order to sustain themselves at various times in their lives, it was not that they could take up any job. Carrie especially repeated that she was a mother and therefore was worried about the negative impact on her son of socially suspected activities associated with her work, foreign status, and single motherhood. Partly, her emphasis on motherhood appears to be rooted in Catholicism, but it is also gossip in the Philippines that has transnationally regulated her choice of a job. In other words, in both home and host societies there are people and institutions that have worked to guide them to become “respectable” carers among Filipina residents in Japan. Of course, not all Filipinos were convinced or attracted by all these. Many do flatly reject doing a “maid’s job.” Nonetheless, Fiona, Carrie, and many other Filipinas are chained and chaining themselves by one form of “love’s labour” to another for their social and religious-moral well-being.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have explored some of the ways in which Filipinas in Japan have placed themselves in different kinds of “love’s labour” over time. In previous research, immigrant women’s work in this field was seen in a synchronic and spatial fashion. Building on their insights, my illustrations of Filipinas’ experiences in Japan have resonated with such work. At the same time, the women in this paper have demonstrated particular reasons for which they have been drawn into the care field, a zone which has been constructed by the local and transnational forces and racialized gendered regimes. The structure of opportunities for foreigners has been quite limited in Japan and for women immigrants, especially those of non-white race and/or from poorer states, working as entertainer-qua-hostess was practically the only legal way to work in Japan. To survive and find a way to remedy their disparaged racial/national, gender, and sexual statuses and identifications, the Filipinas in Japan I have described today are chained and chaining themselves in the intimate sphere that is being reorganized in transnational Asia.
Anthropologists have critiqued the seemingly liberal notion of multiculturalism for paradoxically placing ethnic minorities in limited niches which are deemed to consist of unique cultural elements differentiated from those of the mainstream society: for example, the rhetoric, “Filipinos are naturally suited for care work.” Simultaneously, the majority of Japanese have interacted with foreign residents primarily in terms of consumption of “their” differences and overlooked structural inequalities between the majority and minority as well as fine differences within a minority people (Yoneyama 2006). Thus, a critical Filipina observer commented on the fact that at most of seemingly well-meaning events such as “international festivals” the minority people are requested, however politely, to serve the interests of the majority and simultaneously are told to continue “their efforts” to promote “their culture” in Japanese communities (Go 1999). In the case of Filipinas in Japan, the majority of requests for them to cook ethnic food and perform ethnic dance can promote their presence in local communities. At the same time, the women are not only essentialized on stage as an ethnic “other” but also expected to entertain their majority guests with the feminized services of cooking and hostessing. In this sense, they remain “entertainers” for the majority. Although many Filipinas themselves do feel empowered by take taking part in these events, there are more reasons for us—the majority, privileged people—to consider and act towards enhancing their life chances beyond staged events and expanding their opportunities in the job market beyond “love’s labour.”

If we are to more seriously promote multiculturalism in Japan, we must first understand the ways in which Filipinas as well as other less privileged people, women in particular, have been chained and have been chaining themselves to “love’s labour.” Establishing accommodating immigration policies is one thing. We must also work to eliminate the racialized and sexualized images of Filipinas and other women from developing countries, as well as reduce gender inequalities. Transnational circulation of counter-discourses is one way to tackle the problem of representation beyond Japan’s national borders. This is an important basis for them to gain social respect. Only by having taken these steps, may we be able to establish a foundation for equal access to various resident rights as well as for enhancement of multicultural human relations in this country and beyond.

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Migration Policies vs. Entertainers:
Female Labor Migrants in Japan from the Former USSR

Viktoriya Kim
Osaka University

Introduction

Starting in the 1990s, the high proportion of women in contract migration became one of the distinctive characteristics of migration in the Asian region (Lim and Oishi 1996, cited in Lee 2005). In East Asia, countries with well-developed sex industries, including Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong SAR, are destinations for women from the Philippines, Thailand, several Commonwealth of Independent States countries, Eastern European countries and South American countries. The female migrants are employed predominantly in unprotected sectors such as entertainment and domestic services (Lee 2005, 167-168).

In the last three decades, the number of female migrants with Japanese entertainer visas increased drastically: in 2004 a total of 135,701 women entered Japan with such a visa, the majority of them coming from the Philippines (82,695), China (7,750) and Russia (6,855), as Table 1 shows (Kokusai Jinryû 2004a; 2004b).

This paper will focus on female labor migrants from former USSR countries in the Japanese entertainment industry. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, women from FSU countries (in particular, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) represent the largest European ethnic group working as entertainers in Japan, and such work was the most important motive for female labor migration from the FSU to Japan.

The “Entertainer visa” category is designated for musicians, actors, singers, dancers, sportspeople, models etc. It has been widely known as a legal channel that is abused for trafficking women for sexual exploitation (Lee 2005, 173). For example, as Hiroshi Komai points out, it has, in actuality, been used by brokers working to bring women into the country for businesses in the sex and entertainment industry. In fact, most of the singers and dancers who enter with entertainer visas spend just a small amount of their time performing, and pass the bulk of their work hours serving drinks to and talking with their customers, or in effect working as hostesses (Komai 1995, 73).

However, their numbers have been decreasing since the Japanese immigration policy revision in 2005, aimed at reducing human trafficking (Figure 1). As Rhacel Salazar Parreñas

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1 Hereinafter – FSU, Former Soviet Union
(2011) points out, hostess clubs, specifically those that employ Filipinas, Eastern Europeans, Colombians, and Korean women, have been labeled by the U.S. Department of State as hotbeds of sexual trafficking. These are places where women are not just harassed but supposedly held against their will, forced into prostitution, and made victims of sexual violence (Parreñas 2011, 4).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the migration process of women from their home country to Japan, especially the organization of the broker system and entertainers’ payments environment from 1990s to 2005 and the subsequent impact of migration policy changes on women’s activity as entertainers and on their private lives from 2005 to the present. The paper examines the routes FSU women used to come to Japan as entertainers before 2005 and possible ways for them to stay in Japan after 2005. Also under examination are the strategies women used in overcoming various obstacles erected by Japanese immigration policy from 1990s to 2010s. And finally, the question of whether women really did benefit from the new migration policies is discussed.

Participants in the study were 24 women from FSU countries that had experience working as entertainers/hostesses, and were at the moment married to Japanese men and living in urban areas of Japan. The data reveal that before the 2005 law change, the labor migration of entertainers from the FSU was institutionalized: the entire process, from recruitment to the end of contract, was organized, controlled and supported by local promotion agencies. Local networks in the women’s countries of origin were important as the starting point to migrate, and many women considered Japan a safe destination for labor migration. However, from 2005 women started to resort to other strategies such as fake marriages or marriages of convenience in order to continue working as entertainers in Japan, which has exposed them to vulnerabilities such as economic indebtedness and various forms of violence.

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<td>415</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>6,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 USA</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>6,585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on “Immigration Statistics Information” by Kokusai Jinryû (2004a; 2004b)
Migration Policies

Since the 1990s, there have been several revisions and amendments to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Immigration Control Act) of 1951, aimed at regulating the employment of foreigners in Japan. The most significant reform made in the 1990 amendment was the adjustment in the number of residence statuses from 18 to 27, which confirmed the state’s stance against the employment of unskilled foreigners, defining such employment as a criminal offense (Yamanaka 2011, 247-248). However, the amendment that has more heavily affected the entertainment industry were the 2005 revisions of the Immigration Control Act, aimed at reducing “human trafficking” in Japan.

UNODC\textsuperscript{5} defines human trafficking as a crime against humanity, that involves an act of recruiting, transporting, transferring, harboring or receiving a person through a use of force,

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.jpg}
\caption{Number of foreign workers entering Japan with “entertainer” visa status}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{3} The Immigration-Control and Refugee-Recognition Act, the Special Law on Immigration Control of those who have lost Japanese Nationality on the basis of the Peace Treaty with Japan (the so-called ‘Special Law’), and the Alien Registration Law (Law No.125 of 1952), which set out the procedures for registration, form the fundamental legislative platform for immigration control in Japan (Sellek 2001, 25).

\textsuperscript{4} While the inflow of foreign hostesses to Japan began in the first half of the 1980s, it was not originally recognized as labor migration because of its specific occupational concentration; it was treated rather as a problem of social mores, or the “internalization of sexual exploitation” (Mori 1997).

\textsuperscript{5} UNODC –United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
coercion or other means, for the purpose of exploiting them (UNODC 2013); the definition of sex trafficking in the U.S. Department of State’s *Trafficking in Persons Report* (TIP Report) is similar.\(^6\) The 2004 report mentioned that;

Japan is a destination country for Asian, Latin American and Eastern European women and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. (…) The Japanese government must begin to fully employ its resources to address this serious human rights crime within its borders.

The 2005 TIP Report acknowledged the Japanese initiative to revise its laws, especially concerning the situation of Filipinas in Japan, who were said to be “the largest group of sex-trafficked persons in the world, making up more than 10 percent of the 800,000 estimated victims of human trafficking worldwide (Parreñas 2011, 4):

…During the reporting period, the government undertook major reforms to significantly tighten the issuance of entertainer visas to women from the Philippines, a process used by traffickers to enslave thousands of Philippine women in Japan each year.

However, it must be noted that there is no empirical research or report on the trafficking situation in the East Asian region. In addition, it has not been established yet to which extent female entertainers are involved in the sex industry and suffering from human rights abuse and labor exploitation in Japan (Lee 2005). The 2006 TIP Report, for example, mentions “anecdotal reports of forced labor exploitation of Chinese and Thai migrants,” and that “there are no clear estimates on the number of trafficking victims in Japan, but most agree the number is significant and many women will not come forward for fear of reprisal by their traffickers” (TIP Report, 2006). What is noticeable is that the United Nations (UN) and other agencies’ intervention-oriented studies dominate the literature on East Asian trafficking.

Also, it is notable that it is still not clear whether women really benefit from all the measures taken to “protect and rescue” them from being trafficked. Since there is no data supporting the idea that hostesses in Japan are forced into prostitution, nor any studies on hostesses in Japan that mention women being enslaved and coerced while working as entertainers (Parreñas 2011, Allison 1994), it is necessary to investigate how women themselves experienced migration policy changes, and whether they can be more autonomous in their decision-making than they were before the revision of the Immigration Control Act in 2005.

\(^6\) The TIP report substitutes the word “exploitation” for being subjected “to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery” (Trafficking in Persons Report 2004, 9).
Research Process

Much of the data used for this study was gathered while doing research for my Ph.D. dissertation between 2006 and 2011 on rethinking the concept of international marriage in Japan. The study involved interviews with 45 women from the FSU who were at the time married or formerly married to Japanese men. Of these women, 24 had experienced working as entertainers in Japan, and some of them had continued working as hostesses after marriage. Most of the women were contacted through the Russian language Internet network of women from the FSU living in Japan, which has been established in February 2005. Currently, this network has about 750 regular members. Most of the participants in the study are women that live in the urban areas of Japan (mostly around Tokyo Metropolitan Area and Osaka Prefecture) and actively participate in multiple discussions on the online “Forum.”

Since some of the women continued working as hostesses even after marriage, I had the opportunity to ask them questions about their current work situation. One of the women attending several interviews in hostess clubs suggested that I join her to observe. Another woman invited me to dinner with one of her former customers. In addition, I did participant observation at bars/nightclubs where women usually gathered after their hostess club shifts.

The interviews were semi-structured and covered the following topics: a) personal and family backgrounds; b) routes to entertainer’s work; c) work experiences as hostess; d) migration process, networks in FSU countries and ways of recruiting local women; and e) ways women avoid restrictions imposed by Japanese immigration policies, and consequences resulting from the women’s avoiding immigration rules.

Findings

Process and Structure of Migration from FSU, 1990s-2005

This part discusses how the FSU entertainer-recruiting networks were organized before the revision of the Immigration Control Act. In her discussion, Nana Oishi points out that the migration process itself, especially the ways in which prospective migrants find information about jobs, is quite similar among those women: they find jobs overseas through personal networks or recruitment agencies (Oishi 2005, 124). The process was almost institutionalized and involved a number of people from both countries of origin and destination. Most of the work from recruitment to the end of the entertainers’ contracts was conducted by private agents (promotion agencies) and labor brokers (promoters). Therefore, firstly, it is necessary to discuss how those networks were organized in FSU countries and in Japan; next, the visa application process that involved communication between women and officials; and how the work, payment in particular, between entertainers, promoters, agencies and clubs was organized during the women’s contract periods.

7 Hereinafter – “Forum.”
Brokers and Local Networks

In her study, Yoko Sellek mentions that since the 1970s the number of private agents and labor brokers operating both in the sending countries and in Japan increased, and an organized and planned movement of foreign workers began to emerge (Sellek 2001, 37). There was also an organized network of brokers, or so-called promotion agencies situated in FSU countries. Their job included recruitment and training of women, visa support, air tickets, facilitation of departures, arrivals, and support through the period of their stay in Japan.

All women in the study except one (Lyubov, 36), who came on a temporary visitor visa for her first contract, came to Japan with entertainer visas as models, singers or dancers. In order to go to Japan and get an entertainer visa, women had to pass promotion agencies’ or brokers’ auditions. Firstly, prospective migrants had to undergo auditions where they demonstrated their dancing, modeling or singing skills. The employers, usually local private agents, Japanese labor recruiters and hostess club representatives from Japan, evaluated the women, sending those who were chosen to Japan.

There is no data on the period when entertainers from Russia and other FSU countries started coming to Japan. Lyubov, who came to Japan in 1993, said that since there were no hostess clubs in the FSU at that time, initially not many women understood the content of the hostess work.

Since I am a musician, when I saw an advertisement in the newspaper about jobs in Japan for women with dancing and singing skills, I called them. I expected a different type of job, not hostess. When I came to audition, most women there were dancers. I was selected at the first try. I had two purposes: to travel and to work at the same time, since I can sing and play piano. Later, they [local agents8] explained to us that we can sing karaoke songs. (…) Before coming I didn’t really understand the purpose of this work.

In terms of promotion agency geographical location, in her interview, Lyubov mentions that at the initial stage of the broker/promotion business in Russia, women living in big cities were the main target:

When I came to Japan, there were only Russian women from Moscow, its suburbs and Saint Petersburg. There was one woman from Ukraine, but apparently she had some connections with the promoter, therefore she could come. Other than Russians, there were Japanese, Australian, Brazilian and American women working in our club.

8 Author’s note.
However, by the end of the 1990s, brokers and promotion agencies had organized a wide network that included various regions in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In her interview, Diana (28), who worked for one of the promotion agencies (“B” Agency) in Ukraine, described how they managed it.

“B” promotion agency was founded by a Ukrainian man who had connections with a Ukrainian promoter living in Japan. The promoter herself was married to a Japanese national, who was also a promoter. Therefore, there were two offices: one in Ukraine (“B” Agency) and one in Japan that recruited women as dancers. “B” Agency was registered as a legal entity and began operating in 1998. The owner of “B” Agency had connections with one local dance school (“X” school) consisting of 100 students; initially they hired students from this school. Later on, through the head of “X” dance school, the Agency built a network with other regional and local dance schools situated in different regions of Ukraine. There were only four persons working on the Ukrainian side, conducting various assignments; Diana was working as an interpreter/translator, since she had studied Japanese language in the university. The structure of the work is shown in Figure 2.

Although some brokers attempted public recruitment through job advertisements recruiting women as dancers or singers to work abroad (as in the case of Lyubov), “B” Agency tried to avoid advertising itself, because by the end of the 1990s the Ukrainian police was checking various recruitment organizations for human trafficking activity. Therefore, initially the Agency worked through personal connections with dance schools; later on, however, the process was organized through the women’s social networks: women that went to Japan through “B” Agency began to introduce other women to the Agency.

I asked all the participants if they knew about human trafficking issues and the danger of enslavement and/or being forced into sex work before their first visit to Japan, and whether they took precautions. Many of them explained that while they were aware of the danger of
human trafficking and were cautious about it, most of them considered Japan was a safe destination for labor migrants. Also, some women mentioned that they only trusted stories about the work environment told by women they had known for a long time. Lilia (28) mentioned in her interview that after hearing about the work conditions from her close friend, whom she trusted, she too decided to apply for a job. Also, after several years of working in “B” Agency and building connections with various clubs, Diana herself decided to leave her job and to go to Japan as an entertainer. By that time she knew the contents of the job, and had decided that the work of hostesses was not dangerous.

Also, after working as hostesses, women shared their own experiences to determine whether a promotion agency was reliable or not. In the discussion on the online “Forum,” one woman mentioned that it is necessary to be cautious if the broker offers a high monthly salary. Usually when women sign their first contract, their salary is about ¥50,000 (about USD 500) per month. She explained that while this amount seems small, women earn much more through tips, “bonus systems” (that differs from club to club but usually includes profit from selling drinks to customers) and presents from customers, etc. Therefore, when somebody offered higher payments, there was a higher possibility of being trapped into sex work.

Since promotion agencies, brokers and promoters had a widespread network in Japan, women worked at various locations, from Aomori prefecture on the north to Fukuoka prefecture on the southern isle of Kyushu; there were both big city clubs and small countryside clubs. During the women’s stay in Japan, “B” Agency staff in Ukraine contacted them personally to check on their work conditions, and resolve problems if there were any. For instance, if there was any miscommunication or trouble, the Agency staff negotiated it with the hostess club.

Consequently, it is clear that most of the women were aware of the content of the job they would perform, and subscribed to it without coercion. Though some studies point out the involvement of organized crime groups in the trafficking of women (Lee 2005), none of the participants in the study mentioned being threatened or constrained to any extent. Thus, there is no indication that promotion agencies or brokers operated as criminal organizations.

Visa

The entertainers’ transportation and visa attainment process from their countries of origin to Japan was not covered in studies of female labor migrants in Japan (Lee 2005). In order to make up for this lack of information, I interviewed former entertainers about the visa application process. Knowing the content of their future jobs, most of the women entered Japan with an entertainer visa that allows them to work as dancers, singers and models in Japan for a period of 6 months. According to Parreñas, because the Japanese government bans the labor migration of unskilled workers, the visas of entertainers restrict their employment to singing and dancing on stage. Their visas additionally bar them from interacting with customers, because doing so would supposedly jeopardize the professional status of their jobs (Parreñas 2011, 30).
Therefore, in order to avoid these regulations, promotion agencies were training and preparing women for interviews that might be requested by Japanese embassy staff.

According to the study participants, women were applying for visas in groups. Some were invited by the Japanese Embassy to interviews (usually women who were going to Japan for the first time). For this kind of interview the promotion agency provided all necessary documents and the “plan of work.” For instance, if it was model work, they would prepare the women’s portfolio and a plan of photo-shoots (participation in videos, shows, TV advertisements etc.). Nina (24), from Ukraine, was registered and working as model in a model agency. This agency cooperated with the promotion agency in Kiev (capital of Ukraine) and was owned by Japanese nationals that apparently owned several hostess clubs in Japan. Since many women working at that model agency used to go to Japan as hostesses, eventually Nina also did so. However, four women mentioned that they did not know anything about the procedures; they received their passports with the status “as employee” and never knew what kind of visa they had been issued.

Payments and Other Regulations
Debt bondage is a major enforcement tactic for compliance that is commonly reported among those in the sex industries of Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong SAR (Lee 2005, 181). In studies of labor migrants (Komai 1995; Sellek 2001; Oishi 2005) and Filipina women (Parreñas 2011, etc.), there is a tendency to describe women as indebted by local brokers, promotion agencies and other middlemen.

Contrary to Filipina women’s experiences as described by Parreñas (2011), none of the women who participated in the present study mentioned being indebted. As Diana explained, it was more profitable for the agency if the same woman signed several long-term contracts. However, there were no restrictions on the number of contracts. On average, women managed to go for five to six 6-month contracts, with some going for up to 10 contracts. However, many women got married and left the job after their first contract ended. The
payment structure is shown in Figure 3.

Most of the payments were conducted by clubs that hired entertainers. According to Lyubov, who worked as a promoter from 2003 to 2005, hostess clubs paid to the promoters’ network about ¥240,000-280,000 monthly for every woman working in the club. This amount increased to ¥300,000 by 2008-2009. In addition, clubs were responsible for providing women with living accommodations and food expenses (about ¥30,000 monthly), and travel expenses (round trip from the woman’s country of origin to Japan). For example, if the promoter introduced five women to the club, the club had to pay ¥1,500,000 (¥300,000×5 persons) monthly during their contract period (which was usually up to 6 months).

From this amount, the promoter paid a monthly salary to the entertainer (about ¥50,000-60,000) and another to the agency that hired them (about ¥60,000). The rest was claimed by the promoter, when working alone (hiring and selecting women and introducing women to clubs). Usually, however, there was a long chain of promoters in Japan and the FSU. According to Lyubov, her main job was to introduce women to the clubs by showing their pictures to club owners, and to mediate payments between the clubs and other promoters in the chain of promoters. Therefore, if she introduced five women to the club, she would receive ¥10,000 monthly from the ¥240,000 paid by the club for each introduced woman.

From the women’s interviews, it became clear that they did not have any expenditures or debts except for Japanese language courses, which were optional, and clothing. However, according to Diana, in some cases women were forced to pay about USD 1,000-2,000 (about ¥100,000-200,000) to regional/local dance school heads for introduction or were asked to bring some gifts from Japan. Also, since some women did not have money for clothing before going to Japan, they borrowed money from heads of the schools and had to pay this back on their arrival. Although there were cases in which women were indebted to local brokers, those amounts were not a huge burden on the women, and their subsequent migration was not affected by these payments. After a 6-month contract, those women managed to save on average, ¥1,000,000, the minimum sum being ¥500,000 and the maximum ¥3,000,000. Their earnings were helpful to the women in the process of gaining economic stability in their countries of origin by acquiring university degrees, purchasing real estate, opening their own business, and other activities.

Overall, on the basis of the data presented, I argue that the broker system and conditions of hiring women from FSU countries were suitable and profitable not only for the hostess clubs, promoters and agencies, but also for the women themselves.

Process and Structure of Migration from FSU from 2005 to Present

This part of the paper will discuss the changes in women’s lives after the revision of the Immigration Control Act in 2005. In her study of Filipina entertainers, Parreñas (2011) argues that the 90 percent decline in the number of Filipina hostesses does not necessarily mean a victory in the global anti-trafficking campaign; rather, this policy poses a setback to the emancipation of women who were forced to remain in their countries. In addition to this argument, it is necessary to mention that new restrictive migration policies in Japan
contributed to the activation of migrants’ social networks and led to the development of new underground ways of migration. Oishi argues that macro-policies alone cannot determine patterns of migration, because they cannot dictate individual behavior. Women do not simply subject themselves to state policies; they think and act on their own, sometimes in defiance of the state (Oishi 2005, 105-106). In their search for loopholes in the law and avoidance of legal restrictions, many women choose to have fake marriages (so-called “marriages of convenience”), through which they are exposed to such vulnerabilities as sexual harassment from their “husbands,” indebtedness, and lack of external support.

After implementation of the amended Immigration Control Act and subsequent refusals of entertainer visas, those women who were staying in Japan were forced to find new ways to keep working as entertainers, since for some of them it was the only way to earn money to support themselves and their families back in the FSU. While some women managed to get married to Japanese men and leave the entertainment industry to become housewives, others got into fake marriages in order to get a spousal visa and legally keep working in Japan.

There were two interviewees that openly spoke of their fake marriages since both of them are in “real” marriages at the moment and have left the entertainment industry. While both of them managed to stay in those marriages until they found their “real” spouses, it is necessary to discuss the process that they had to undergo before divorcing their “husbands.”

Organization of Living Environment
The first problem women face in “marriages of convenience” is the necessity to cohabit with their “husband” in order to prove that their marriage is “real.” After women apply for spousal visa, Immigration Police officers may make sudden calls or visits to the couples’ houses/apartments to check if the marriage is “real.” In other cases the couple is invited for interviews at the Immigration Police, during which wife and husband are separately asked questions about their household. For instance, there are such questions as: “What is the manufacturer brand of your microwave oven, TV set and other electronic appliances?” “Which side of the bed does your husband/wife sleep on?” “Which days are for flammable waste in your district?” “What is the color of your husband/wife’s underwear today?” etc. Despite this, some women engaged in fake marriages take the risk and do not cohabit with their “husbands.” Most, though, do live with their fake “husbands” at least during spousal visa application; others do it for the entire period of “marriage.”

This kind of ambivalent status makes it very difficult for women to get any outside help or complain when they are abused or sexually harassed. One example is the case of Larisa (30), from Russia, who was in this kind of “marriage of convenience” with a Japanese man who was 27 years older than she. They decided to share an apartment in order to prove that their marriage was “real.” She said that it was not problematic for them because she spent almost every night in the hostess club and returned home early in the morning, while her “husband” stayed at work all day. This kind of “cohabitation” was convenient for both until the moment Larisa’s so-called “husband” started trying to persuade her to have sexual relations with him and become a “real” couple. From that point on, she had to be on the
lookout while they stayed at home together; several times she was forced to leave their apartment when she was afraid of being sexually abused. After Larisa’s refusal, her “husband” threatened her by refusing to provide documentation for the next visa application, and by informing the Immigration Police that she had married him for a visa.

Payments
In his book *Migrant Workers in Japan*, Komai (1995) introduces a classic case of fake marriage, in which the owner of a hostess club paid Japanese men ¥500,000 to “dirty their family registry”; in addition, he was planning to have the women pay a monthly sum of ¥100,000 to their “husbands” (Komai 1995, 76).

From interviews with women it became clear the same system of payments was still used for “marriages of convenience.” However, women are in charge of the whole process: each woman has to pay ¥500,000 to get married and ¥50,000 monthly to her “husband”; if she cannot pay the “marriage” money, the owner of the club loans her the sum, and she has to pay it back while working there. While the women’s income increases when they work by themselves without mediators since they receive about ¥10,000-15,000 per night plus tips and bonuses, they have to pay to the “husband” and living expenses (including housing and food) themselves apart from other necessary expenses.

Though it might seem that these women are at least more autonomous, there is still another trap for them. Since they don’t have an entertainer’s visa, the clubs they work for are not responsible for their activities outside of the club. This freedom makes women more vulnerable to sexual harassment from club customers than in the times when they had a status of entertainers and the clubs had to pay penalties if their workers were found to be involved in illegal activities, including meeting customers outside the club. Therefore, it can be argued that, while women working on entertainer contracts were “constrained” in some ways, they still had a fixed salary and could accumulate savings from tips and bonuses without being indebted. On the other hand, as the fake “spouse” of a Japanese national they are placed in a worse condition, since they are considered part-time workers in the club and are paid for actual working hours, while at risk of experiencing sexual harassment not only from their “husbands” but also from customers of the club.

Alienation
Among the consequences of “marriages of convenience” discussed above, there is also the risk to women of becoming alienated from the Japanese local community and from other women from the FSU. Women in these fake marriages tend to keep the nature of their marriage a secret from others, leading to their social isolation. As it became clear from my fieldwork, when women are hired by hostess clubs, their visa status is strictly checked by club owners, and most women that are hired have “spouse or child of Japanese national” visa status. During the interview, however, one of the women mentioned that while many of them possess spousal visas, theirs is not necessarily a “real” marriage. As in the case of Larisa, this kind of situation has serious health and social implications for women. These include their
inability to get help from officials, because of their fake marriage; being forced to work because of the payments they must make to their “husbands,” in addition to their own living expenses; lack of choices and less autonomy over decision-making, since women have to be in their marriage for about five years in order to obtain the status of “permanent resident (eijûken),” and therefore can experience abuse and harassment from their “husbands.”

Conclusion

This article discusses the changes that women experienced after the revision of the Immigration Control Act of Japan in 2005. While the number of cases presented is limited, I recommend that it is necessary to further investigate the current state of female labor migrants working in the entertainment industry in Japan.

Firstly, as is shown in the paper, the supposedly trafficked victims do not necessarily think of themselves as ‘oppressed,’ ‘exploited’ and in need of ‘protection.’ Changes in immigration policies caused by assumptions from outside sources such as the TIP Report, which considered female entertainers in Japan to be victims of human trafficking, led women to circumvent those policies and use underground strategies to support their lifestyle.

Secondly, as a strategy, some women choose fake marriages –“marriages of convenience.” However, such strategies make them more vulnerable and exposed to possible sexual harassment and domestic violence. Moreover, they become indebted to their de jure “husbands.” In addition, their status of “spouse” constrains their actions. As Komai points out, undocumented workers⁹ cannot appeal to government agencies or local government bodies for help when their human rights are violated (Komai 1995, 11).

Thirdly, as Daiva Repeckaite (2009) notes, much of the intense stigmatization on women is dealt by the Japanese immigration police. It is clear from the data that women are exposed to outside humiliation, such as interviews by the immigration police that are meant to distinguish between ‘real’ and fake marriages.

Thus, while the overall number of female labor migrants coming to Japan has decreased since 2005 revision of the Immigration Control Act, it is still unclear how much of a positive impact did the revision of the immigration policy in Japan has made on migrant women’s lives. Furthermore, as shown in the case of “marriages of convenience” although these women voluntarily choose to enter into these marriages, the question remains whether they are now less exploited and can exercise greater freedom in making their life choices under these conditions.

⁹ “Undocumented workers” are those who perform “unauthorized labor,” meaning that they have a valid visa but are employed in unskilled labor, which falls outside of the activities for which they were granted their visa (Komai 1995, 3).
References


Living on the Edge of Law, Economy and Gaze:  
Exclusion of Female Migrant Workers in Turkey

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Introduction

Based on a series of interviews with “undocumented” female migrant workers at different sites in Istanbul (deportation centers, shops, churches and private houses) this paper aims at mapping out the layers of vulnerabilities female migrant workers face in Turkey. In line with feminization of global migratory flows, Turkey has started receiving an increasing number of irregular female migrants in the 1990s, mostly from the post-Soviet world. These women have found jobs in precarious informal labour markets as domestic caregivers, cleaners, shop clerks as well as sex workers. Apart from the well-known vulnerabilities embedded in being a migrant, I argue that these women’s face three additional challenges that compound their difficulties. One is that Turkey, despite some regularization strategies and the establishment of a new Immigration Office, has started securitizing its borders making it harder for these women to move back and forth which lead to increasing criminalization of their status. Second, there is increasingly visible differential treatment and reception of these migrants according to their religion and country of origin. While a Muslim woman from Turkmenistan is more likely to receive a preferential treatment from law enforcers, for instance, a non-Muslim Ukrainian is more likely to be labeled as a “Natasha,” which became a pejorative term used for post-Soviet women working as sex workers. The arbitrariness, and uncertainty embedded in the migrant’s encounters’ with the state officials constitute yet another level of vulnerability. Third, and perhaps most difficult to tackle, these women have found themselves in a society with rising conservatism and Islamization of gender norms. The reinforcement of traditional gender roles by the governing party (AKP), the persistent decline in (Turkish) female labour participation in the country have further complicated this picture putting these women in the paradoxical “wanted, but not welcome” status. In the absence of any integrative measures for these migrants, the combined effect of existing legal, economic and cultural pressures in the country is a deep sense of exclusion.

Further complicating the picture is the fact that these migrant women face an increasingly volatile economy. Turkey, along with its Southeastern counterparts, has undergone significant neoliberal economic transformation over the last two decades, which
has meant declining role of the state in the country’s already feeble welfare regime and declining wages in the informal labour markets.

Theoretically, the study of female migrant workers and their “integration” in Turkey offers yet another set of evidence for the argument that globalization, and neoliberalization do not translate into increase openness, inclusion and improved gender norms. In anything, increasing uncertainties and volatility in the economy, coupled with securitization of borders (and rising conservatism in the case of Turkey) add fresh layers of othering, exclusion while reinforcing traditional gender norms.

In what follows, I describe some of the findings based on at least one hour-length interviews with more than 60 post-Soviet female migrant workers in different settings, in private homes where they work as domestic workers, in churches where they often socialize, and in shops in a specific district in Istanbul known as Laleli which specializes in formal and informal trading with the post-Soviet world. The research has started in the summer of 2007 when I interviewed 28 women at the deportation center of Kumkapı, Istanbul. These women were about to be deported for a variety of reasons, some for visa violations or visa fraud, some for working as sex workers (ages from 22 to 62). Since then I have interviewed seven employment agencies and/or “informal managers” as well as more than twenty police officers mostly working at the Bureau of Foreigners, Borders and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior including the then head of the deportation center at different periods. In fall 2012, I have gone back to the deportation center and was not given access for security reasons but I have been able to interview additional police officers managing the deportation centers.

The first part of this paper describes the interesting phenomena of rising feminisation of migratory flows to Turkey and particularly to Istanbul in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. These flows have occurred in the midst of tumultuous process of capitalist transition in the former Soviet Republics. Though most of the migration literature focusing on Eastern Europe and post-Soviet region zoom on human trafficking which indeed became rampant in the 1990s, the presumed “voluntary”, economic migration has largely been neglected. The economic violence that these migrant workers go through is nonetheless quite dramatic and should not be underestimated. As such, these migrant workers represent a new form of “voluntary servitude,” de la Boetie (1975) in the global economy. It would also be problematic, however, to depict these Post-Soviet migrant workers as total victims. As will be elaborated further below, these women learn to circumvent the rules, negotiate, plea, bargain and often get what they want through creating very effective social networks and information channels. Nevertheless, as in most migratory flows, controlling the borders, and increasing securitization of migrant women’s entry and exits have forced these women to constantly live on the margins of illegality and deportability.

The second part of the paper describes the different layers of “othering” mostly manifested through the encounters of these women with the police officers, employment agencies and in the workplaces. By othering, I mostly mean a kind of “racialization,” a structuring of social relations through the signification of biological or cultural characteristics.
in such a way so as to define and construct cultural characteristics as natural and hence immutable” (Kemp 2004, 269). Here, I try to develop two different arguments. One is that these migrant workers constantly live on the arbitrary borders of legality and illegality, and continuous legal production of illegality, which creates intense vulnerability, ambiguity and arbitrariness (Calavita 1998, 2005). Second is that there is an intense commodification through the pressures of the informal work life, ongoing subjection to discrimination and social and cultural “othering” these women find themselves in. These two processes, and the encounters of these women in their daily life, inhabit, as Kemp (2004, 268) aptly puts it, “a double moral standard that fuels the phenomenon of labor migrations globally, on the one hand, the increasing demand and recruitment of cheap and docile labor in the guise of migrant men and women that pervades the neoliberal economies, and the other strengthening the social and political barriers aimed at incorporation as legitimate members of the community.”

The third and final part of the paper focuses on the social and cultural transformation in Turkey and describes how the rising conservatism in the country has added new layers of “othering” further complicating the lives of these foreign female migrant workers.

1. Borders of Legality/Illegality: Living at the Edge of Law

The diversity, geographic dispersion and the volume of irregular migration into the city since the 1990s, be they asylum seekers, transit migrants mostly on their way to Europe, or migrants who come to Turkey to work temporarily and return home, the so called transnational, (or circular/pendulum/return) migrants, have been quite remarkable (İçduyu 2003, 2008). It is now almost a cliché among migration scholars on Turkey to remind everyone that Turkey is not only an immigration country, but also a country of emigration. The collapse of the Soviet Union the declining economic opportunities at home in the post-Soviet era, loosening of border controls and overall proximity of Turkey, which made the country and particularly Istanbul a convenient destination for this type of irregular migration, contributed significantly to this dynamism.

Migrant workers in Turkey are heavily concentrated in domestic service, in entertainment and in sex industries. in textiles, construction, the restaurants and in construction industry. Women heavily outnumber men, except in construction as they are seen as ideal employee in these sectors willing to work for much lower wages. İçduyu (2006, 11) provides a broad sectoral breakdown of these irregular and predominantly female migrants.¹ Accordingly, Post-Soviet and Bulgarian women worked in domestic work, Rumanians, Post-Soviets, Russians and Ukrainians in the sex and entertainment industry, still Moldavian and Rumanian women in textiles and Iranian, Iraqi, Moldavian and Rumanian in the construction industry. What is also remarkable with these flows is the growing numbers

¹ There is also significant group of transit migrants mostly from the Middle East, and Afghanistan and Pakistan who enter into Turkey with the intention of temporary stay to developed countries. Unlike the migrant workers, this group is predominantly male and also mostly smuggled into the country illegally.
of women. Among these transnational migrants/visitors, three groups of post-Soviet women were particularly “visible” since the mid-1990s. The traders in the bustling district of Laleli in Istanbul and more recently in the outskirts of Osmanbey (generally middle-aged, middle-class and relatively better educated), the sex workers (generally younger and less educated women derogatively known as “Natashas,”) and domestic workers (mostly Moldavians and Bulgarians but recently Uzbeks and Turkmens as well), who are often in-house babysitters or caregivers for the elderly. These groups have actually little in common and are not particularly sympathetic to each other. Their experiences and encounters with the state are also quite different. Suitcase traders (transnational entrepreneurs in the 1990s) were mostly legal, entering and exiting the country with proper visas though this was clearly not the case in the early 1990s when prostitution was part of the “start-up” capital for these traders. The goods they carry back home however are often “negotiated” in through informal networks. They declare these goods as “carry-on”s but both the volumes and quality of goods go well beyond the “legal” limits. The number of these shuttle traders (who were again predominantly women) has since dwindled since the mid-1990s but some have stayed on as migrant shopkeepers working in the Laleli area since they have language advantages. Domestic migrant workers, on the other hand, usually enter into the country with a one month visa but overstay their legal visas to find work and are faced with heavy fines and penalties on their departure, and still others find themselves in prostitution rings and in complete illegality, criminality.

One of the poorest countries in the post-Soviet region, for instance, Moldavia became of the largest migrant sending country to Turkey particularly in the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis (See Table 1, appendix). While some 371,000 Moldavian workers, approximately 25% of the active working population are said to be working abroad, this estimate does not take into account seasonal and temporal work. An estimated 600,000 Moldavians, some 40% of the active population is believed to have worked abroad for some time in 2003-2004 (World Bank 2006, 12). The country also ranks among one of the highest when it comes to the ratio of remittances to overall GDP. Following Togo with 31.1%, remittances account for 27% of the country’s GDP followed by (Lesotho with 25.8%, Haiti 24.8%, Bosnia 22.5% and Jordan 20.4%) (World Bank 2006, 90). Most of these migrant women have come from more rural areas and villages in the country and these remittances have been instrumental in addressing the skyrocketing poverty in the country. As more and more family members rely on these women’s domestic work abroad, Sassen has aptly called this phenomenon “the feminization of survival” (Sassen 2002). Because of its emphasis on consumption rather than production, however, the long term impact of these remittances on poverty alleviation in the country is highly questionable.

Apart from these push factors post-Soviet migrants were particularly appealing for the Turkish domestic labor market for three reasons. One is that the initial migrants were mostly

2 For details, see Yükseker (2001).
3 For details, see Erder and Kaska (2003).
4 “Migrant’s money is imperfect cure for poor nations” by Bob Davis (2006).
from Moldavia and all of Gagauz Turkic origin (the only Christian population with Turkic origins) and had a fairly good oral knowledge of Turkish, which was a great source of preference for the Turkish households. Secondly, these women were often more educated than their Turkish counterparts and were willing to work at least half the wage of their local counterparts. But perhaps most importantly, these women are willing to provide in-house care (since they rarely have anywhere else to go), are very flexible with working hours (many report that they work very long hours), and willing/ready to work for a lot less than their Turkish counterparts.

There were also a lot of pull factors. Domestic care for children and elderly has always been solved through informal labor networks in Turkey from the very start. The absence and a very limited scale of welfare state, the utter negligence of public preschool education (only 7% of pre-K students attend school) as well as care for the elderly has meant that such issues would have to be solved through extended family networks. The rapid socio-economic transformation of the country particularly since the economic liberalization of the 1980s, ongoing urban migration, the atomization and the subsequent evaporation of such family/social networks, that have long believed to play a crucial role in cushioning poverty, coupled with the rising number of elderly in the country have not only created more permanent pockets of poverty in the country, but have also led to the burgeoning demand for informal domestic work (Keyder and Bugra 2003; Keough 2006). Domestic care problem was initially “solved” through the “internal” Turkish/Kurdish migrant workers migrating from rural areas to the big cities. In fact, the gatekeeper’s wife (kapıcımin eşi) was often the “cleaning lady” of the households in the apartment (Given the historically low levels of female participation in the country, the “commodification of care” has ironically not been induced by increasing work life pressures of women but more by the availability of cheap labor. That is why, domestic care in households where women are “housewives” are also very common). The entry of these new migrants into an already informal market has marked a clear shift from the relatively less educated, poor rural migrants to better educated foreign migrant women with occupational skills. Still, as elaborated below, the growing competition between the “local” and “foreign” domestic workers can see as a new “race to the neoliberal bottom” driving the wages even lower. Though the wages for foreign migrant workers have increased over time as these workers have learned the language and adapted to the working conditions in the households, the salary of in-house domestic caregiver will still accept to work at a lower wage (The range can change, depending on their experience sometimes half, sometimes 3/4ths of the salaries of their Turkish counterparts).

Meanwhile, the lure of Laleli district, which transformed itself to a truly transnational market place since in the 1990s, was also significant. With almost all the signs in Russian, this is a district with the highest concentration of hotels, shops that cater to post-Soviet women, cargo companies and the so called tour operators which bring these migrants in, transnational entrepreneurs who carry goods and people to and fro as well red light

5 Moldavian or Russian speaking Moldavian followed suit, however and started learning Turkish upon arrival.
neighborhoods in its immediate vicinity. Most post-Soviet migrant women were brought to Laleli hotels where they stayed until they found a job. A lot of voluntary sex workers, also admit that they started their job in Laleli hotels and some were subject to very cruel treatment. Laleli is also the district where most of these migrant workers come either to find a new job, or to buy goods to send home, to contact cargo companies to send goods back home or to buy tickets to return home. As such, Laleli was mostly an informal transnational market place conducive for these flows. Though the dynamism of the district as a labor market has died down since the 2000s, there are still considerable migrant women working in Laleli shops and Laleli is still a meeting place for most of these women. (Eder et al. 2008)

At the macro level, the most enabling aspect of the government is the much looser visa policies towards the post-Soviet republics. As Kiriçi (2005) explains, the current visa policy of Turkey allows for three modes of entry to the country. One allows for visa-free entry and the second requires nationals to obtain visa prior to the arriving to Turkey. Along with these conventional categories, the most interesting practice Turkey employs is the “sticker visa” (bandrol in Turkish), which is issuing visa at the frontier in return for a fee that changes from country to country. Most of the former Soviet Union countries can enter with this sticker type visa and all the interviewed shuttle traders and the Post-Soviet migrants have unanimously said that easier visa regulations were one of the most important factors in choosing Turkey for suitcase trading and for working as domestic helpers. (In the case of the Post-Soviets and Bulgarians, the ethnicity and language were also additional factors as Turkic origin and Turkish speaking Gagauz Post-Soviets and the Bulgarian Turks were among the first to arrive.) Turkey also signed bilateral agreements with Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union facilitating regular travel and making other visa arrangements for transit travel (Kiriçi 2005, 351). In December 2011, visa requirements for Georgians, in October 2012 for Moldavians were also lifted. These loose visa policies have clearly affected the number of people traveling from the former Soviet Union. As Kiriçi (2005, 356) again explains “In 1964 there we only 414 entries from the Soviet Union out of the total of almost 230,000 overall entries into Turkey. In 1970, the figure increased to a modest 4,800 and 40,015 in 1980. The unwinding of the Cold War helped to increase contacts and 1990 saw more than 220, 000 entries, year the sticker visa arrangement was introduced. Subsequently, the number of entries from ex-Soviet world increased each and every year and reached more than 2.7 million entries in 2005. As of 2009, there were 2.7 million entries into Turkey only from the Russian Federation (See Table 2, appendix).6

The looser visa policy, which set a stark contrast to the hardening of the European borders through the Schengen visa system, occurred against the backdrop of Turkey’s economic liberalization. In 1992, the architect of this liberalization, Turgut Özal, pushed for the creation of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area (BSEC) which aimed to vitalize the economic and social exchanges in the region. The vision of Turkey as a regional power

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6 This number rose significantly with the mutual removal of visas with the Russian Federation by March 2011. In October 2012, visas for Moldavia were removed as well.
fueled by some of the nationalistic rhetoric to “reunite” with the now-independent Turkic republics and eagerness establish close ties with communities with ethnic and cultural ties to Turkey also explains why the governments in the early 1990s were ready to adopt more flexible visa system.

Meanwhile, pressured increasingly by the labor unions and complaints of “foreigners are taking our jobs” the government introduced some legal measures. On September 6, 2003, a new law on “Working Permit for foreigners” which facilitated obtaining work permits and residence permits for foreigners and removed domestic work from the illegal job list.\(^7\) This law, however, also increased the fines for illegal employment.\(^8\) Since 2003, there is no significant evidence, however, that work permits among the domestic workers have actually increased.\(^9\) The fact that the initiative is totally left to the employer, and work permits would mean increased costs and responsibilities for the employer can explain why legalization has not been meaningful on the ground. Again in 2012, the government passed a “pardon” for irregular migrants, who have overstayed their visas and allowed the existing migrants

Not all female migrant workers, however, had prospects for legalization. The double standards were most visible in the case of foreign sex workers. Sex workers, voluntary and involuntary also favored Turkey for flexible visa regime, but though prostitution is legal for Turkish citizens, the foreign sex workers are not permitted to work in Turkey according to the 1950 Passport Law article 8 which states that “prostitutes or those who receive income by pushing others into prostitution are subject to deportation” (İlkaracan and Gülçür 2002, 413).

2. Deportability and Increasing Securitization

From “deliberate negligence,” to accepting bribery, from agreeing to a regular cut to threats of “harassment” (checking passports, sending thieves, harassment of “foreign-looking women” on the streets) state officials employ different control strategies at different stages migratory flows. The fact that these migrants ultimately need these state officials “not to see” this flow and find out about the informal domestic market, opens immense possibilities for the officials to capture some sort of rent, what one may call a “rent of negligence.” In effect, informal domestic work occurs in the “deliberate negligence zone” of the state defining what Kellee S. Tsai (2002, 14) has aptly called “local logics of economic possibility” where as she describes it “individual staff of the state decide whether and how to enforce specific regulations, collect fees and taxes and issue licenses. Policies are not implemented uniformly because individual agencies and bureaucrats are not implementing them uniformly.”\(^10\) Tsai also adds, however, that the “integral part of their decision making calculus in policy implementation stems from their interactions with economic actors.”

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\(^7\) Law 4817 Official Gazette 6 March 2003, entering into force on September.
\(^8\) The law actually centralized all the work permits and groups them under the Labour Ministry.
\(^9\) Most recent study in 2006 report that there are no significant numbers of applications for permit (Erder 2007, 104).
\(^10\) Such implementation of state authority in effect reminds us of Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty. “Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception” (Schmitt 1927 reprinted 2008).
As early as 2003, however, there were several signs securitization and increased controls at the borders. The border control introduced a practice demanding the evidence of means of subsistence for the intended duration of the stay. Post-Soviet tourists were asked, for instance to show evidence of a thousand dollar (approximate cost for one month stay which is the duration they can legally stay with the sticker visa) at the point of entry. What this practice simply did, however, was to increase the price of the “tour operators” who “lent” this 1,000 dollars to the prospective migrant workers only to be collected after the entry.

Attempt by the police and law enforcement to somehow measure the scope and depth of irregular migration continues through statistically, one can know whether the individual is overstaying their visa, or whether they have just come as tourists or shuttle traders, or whether they were involved in passport fraud only at the time of entry and exit to the country. Post-Soviet women in Turkey form a significant portion of those who are deported for illegal work, working as sex workers or for document fraud (Others such as those from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are mostly transit migrants, predominantly male and are mostly deported for illegal entry). Table 1 (appendix) provides some clues on the number of deportations.

Deportations, however, are increasingly seen as insufficient in managing these flows. That is why the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Undersecretariat for Foreigners have come up with the so called, equal stay requirement requiring a migrant to spend the same amount of time outside Turkey as the time they overstayed their visa. This is valid even for those who pay their penalties for overstaying their visa fully. Not surprisingly, in its implementation, the equal stay rule has created a vast opportunity to police and law enforcement to “interpret” this rule as they saw fit. The shift was most dramatic among the Bulgarian Turks (also a significant group in domestic care industry) who could legally enter back and forth between Bulgaria and Turkey every 3 months. Between 2001-2007, migrants from Bulgaria were allowed to stay in Turkey on visa waivers valid for three months. In 2007, within the context of the harmonization the Schengen regime, the government signed a new visa agreement allowing the Bulgarian Turks to stay a maximum of 90 days during a period of six months. In effect, the Bulgarian Turks became as undesirable “irregular, foreign migrants” almost overnight (Kashi and Parla 2009).

These women, however, have thus begun to temper with their passports, divorce their husbands, thus change their last name and receive new passports so as to gain re-entry to Turkey. Elena has done just that, she got divorced, changed her last name and was able to reenter Turkey without having wait out the equal stay requirement. The increasing passport controls, finger printing, documentation and electronization have all been used to address these “loopholes.”

But the migrant workers have also produced various alternatives. For instance, they choose different transportation methods. “Our names can be traced easily through ports and airports,” explained one Moldavian woman Tatiana, so “you leave by plane, return by

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minibuses which are harder to trace.” It is much easier to get deported at the airport, they put you in the next plane, much harder at the land borders.” In effect, for each strategy that the government has adopted in order to presumably “control” the flow of migrant workers, these women have developed very effective counter strategies to circumvent these restrictions.

Yet another barrier was the change of in the Citizenship Law in Turkey in 2003, which made getting citizenship through marriage more difficult by requiring a minimum of three years of living together with the husband/wife before gaining citizenship. “They were constantly getting married and were having their citizenship right the day after they got married” explained one police officer, “we would bust a sex operation and could not do anything against these women because they were Russian but with Turkish citizenship. The law had to change, now we can go and check whether the couple is actually living together or not and really make sure, it is not a ‘fake marriage.’” Marriage still enables these migrant women to get work permits but regular checks by the police makes it very difficult for the migrant women to actually marry. Meanwhile, even though marriage offers a passageway for legalization, it still creates vulnerability for woman in the domestic sphere, as they are reluctant to report any domestic abuse or violence in fear of losing legal status.

3. Informality, the Domestic Workers, Sex Workers: Living on the Edge of the Economy

It is important to note that the domestic labor market in Turkey has always been predominantly informal, so what the government was arguing, in effect, was not that this illegal employment was increasing informality and illegality in the country. It was simply protesting that foreign informal domestic workers were replacing the Turkish ones. Almost half of the working population in the country is informal defined as having no access to social security benefits and women’s participation in the labor force has been predominantly informal (State Statistics, Employment Data). Despite legal changes on work permits, only 14% of those with residence permits actually have work permits, which suggest a significant percentage of informal work.

These women, regardless of whether they are domestic workers or sex workers, have no access to free health care, even in the case of emergencies, and they cannot open any bank accounts. Though there are some organizations such as the IOM (International Organization for Migration) helping women (albeit very limited) who have been trafficked and forced into prostitution, there are hardly any civil society groups and organizations providing help for self-employed sex workers, or voluntary migrants working in the informal labor market.

A typical foreign migrant woman planning to come to Istanbul, for the first time, to work as a domestic worker usually starts by contacting the so-called tour operators in their own country. These tour operators that started as a small business in the country have now become a major sector. There are at least 10-15 tour operators in a given village all wanting organize and pool the potential migrants. These tour operators also have direct and indirect ties with semi-formal employment offices in Istanbul whose job to match the families seeking domestic help with these new migrants. That is how Elena, a Gagauz woman in her 30s, first
came to Istanbul in 2001. She chose a particular tour operator “because they were from her
own village and she could trust them.” These operators would also “arrange” a suitable
family for Elena. For this particular service, Elena promised to give her a fee 50$ to the
operator, Sonia. A quarter of the first salary (usually 75 dollars) is paid to the Turkish contact
at the employment office (Gonca hanım). A typical wage for a domestic worker is about 400
dollars, which is at least four-five times the average salary in Moldavia (These numbers have
since increased to 700-800 dollars depending on the experience). These employment offices
usually have the incoming migrant to fill out a form. But these forms really have no other
function except for giving an appearance to the families that the office has done some of
screening and selection. They are not legally binding and do not give any rights to the
workers.

And for this presumed service, office usually charges a fee to the domestic help
seeking families, which is either half or full one month salary. So the office usually charges
both sides the families and the migrant workers at the same time. The employment offices
can be located in Laleli, for convenience purposes because Laleli is often the last stop for the
tour operators. Some are placed in the cheap hotels/motels in the district until they find a job
or some shabby apartments with tens of other migrant workers. So some of these employment
offices look like temporary shelters for these workers.

The first time a migrant is coming to Istanbul is also the moment of intense
vulnerability. “I didn’t know anybody and they told me that I will have to go to a family in
Izmir” explained Elena. “Luckily I spoke and understood Turkish (which is of course not the
case for non-Gagauz Moldavians). They had me talk to this family on the phone. They agreed
to pay for my bus ticket and the next thing I know, I was on the bus to Izmir in the middle of
the night wondering how I am ever going to find this family.” The vulnerability of these
workers do not only stem from being in a country that they don’t know and that they have
started working without a residence and work permit. The first thing this employment office
usually does, is taking the passport of these migrant workers and giving it to families. “If the
family is not happy with the worker,” explains Gonca, “we guarantee to the families that they
can find somebody else for a period of six months. You try our workers and if you want to
change, you can change as much as you like.” As has been documented, this is where these
women with her passport confiscated might also face the risk of being forced to sex trade
(Erder and Kaska 2003). “There are certain shady tour operators who are actually known for
this trade” explains Elena and there are some that are known to find all kinds of work,
domestic workers, modeling and prostitution. “They even advertise on TV, that they will find
jobs in the fashion industry.” Indeed, there seems to be thin line between those “marketed”

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12 Interview with Elena, 16 June 2006.
13 Interview with Gonca at a fancy looking emloyment office in Çiftehavuzlar which is a fancy district on the
Anatolian side of the city with considerable concentration of upper and middle class workers (25 August 2006).
This period used to be one year but was apparently halved arguably due to rising demand for domestic services.
for the informal domestic labor market and those marketed for the fashion industry, modeling, shopkeeping in Laleli and indeed for prostitution.14

These tour operators usually arrange the paperwork and are responsible for safe passage as well. If there are some irregularity or complicated visa issues, the price of travel goes up. There are three basic ways of traveling to Istanbul, waterways by often-shabby boats from Odessa, through airlines which is evidently priciest option though much cheaper than the regular flights and most commonly used and cheapest route through minibuses passing Romania, Bulgaria and Turkish borders. These operators are also expected to solve problems with the police officers at the passport checks at the airport, ports or the borders. Usual visa duration for the Moldavians is one month after which they begin to overstay. The penalties for overstaying the visa increase after each 6 months. Initial overstay is 400 dollars, after 6 months the price goes up to approximately 800 dollars, which is why most Moldavians working as domestic workers often leave with this deadline.

This high labor turnover has allowed for a creation of intense networks among the post-Soviet women over time as the families began to request that they find their own replacements before the workers return home. These networks were often based on family ties, or coming from the same neighborhood. “Even though I was happy with the family I worked for in Izmir” explained Elena, “it was hard to send money and goods to my family back home from Izmir. So when my next-door neighbor called and asked me whether I would be interested in replacing her, taking care of a one-year-old baby in Istanbul, I accepted. It was a new risk but I wanted to send stuff home pretty bad and my neighbor assured me that it was a good family.”

The story of Elena indicates that after the initial entry into the informal domestic labor market, migrants do indeed form important networks, spreading work on available jobs, meeting on their off-days on Laleli, exchanging most recent information on visas, travel and

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14 IOM report (Erder and Kaska 2003, 61) concludes: We should stress that no cases of forced migration, such as kidnapping of women and children before migration were discovered during the course of the study. Women migrants in Turkey are generally young adult women who were willing to engage in circular migration and accept temporary work to earn money through various jobs.

On the other hand, even though the actual scale is not known, cases of forced prostitution have been observed. In this connection, cases of deception are frequent as those women mostly willing to migrate and work in the extensive informal labour market. Thus, forced entry into sex work has been observed among women who migrate for the first time, who have no connections in Turkey, live relatively isolated environments such as in small towns and villages at home, has been given false accounts regarding migration outcomes, and especially their initial stay in Turkey when, in fact, they are subjected to slavery-type conditions and confiscation of their passports. Such occurrences were particularly frequent in the period immediately following the opening of the regional borders for citizens of ex-Soviets countries and were organized by local intermediaries with contacts in Turkey. Other women arrive in Turkey either through an agency or an intermediary or on their own. Although they may not have been deceived into working in sex trade, they are misled in other ways, for instance, by being employed illegally. They work as e.g. cleaners, models, translators, in the entertainment business or as industrial workers and are often cheated out of their wages, or have their passports confiscated. Deprived of money, without contacts or access to help, such women are at the high risk of ending up in sex trade, even if they did not start out here. A third group of women, who may be termed, professionals come to Turkey with the intention of working in the sex trade, or decide to do so after their arrival. (emphasised by the author)
sending packages and money back home. The high mobility of these women and the circularity of this migration also allowed these women to use their friends and relatives as couriers sending money and goods. There is a ceiling that the some government puts in terms of the amount of foreign exchange these women can bring in (5,000 dollars per person). The minibuses also accept cash from these women but can charge quite high commissions such as 7-8%. They can also hide their money in the packages they send, but this tends to be risky as the minibus drivers can always claim that they were apprehended at the border and take the money. That is why the domestic workers tend to diversify the way they send goods and money (There is even a system of receiving commissions on the money sent through supposed friends, though much lower than the sending via minibus). If no job is available and if the new migrant does not have friends, then they are most likely to end up in employment agencies.

The interviews with these so-called employment agencies, which in fact are informal networks that have established ties with one or two of the post-Soviet countries in the 1990s, reveal intense racialisation of these women as well. At its worst, there is even a slavery language used. “I keep telling these women not to come here with golden teeth” said one agency manager, “I end up having to take these women to the dentists because golden teeth shouts ‘I am a foreigner, come and get me.’” The physical appearance and ageism is also very common. “We have to find women whom we will be proud to send to ‘good families.’” That is why they have to look decent and tidy. But they should not be too old either, because they will get tired very quickly.15

There also appears to be a wage scale based on the foreign migrants experience, how well they speak Turkish and how “presentable” they are. The Moldavians, for instance, who have been in the domestic care market for almost twenty years, have begun to out-price the “newer” migrants from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and claim that even though they may speak some Turkish, they do not know “how to manage a house properly.” Uzbeks and Turkmens new to both domestic workers and sex workers market indeed agree to work for lesser wages starting the race to the neoliberal bottom one more time, this time among the foreign migrants themselves.

The vulnerability of these women does not end with the employment agencies, however. A lot of discrimination and harassment continue inside the households as well. One story of a 24 year of Moldavian women, encapsulate the problems.

“I was working in a family, there were two children. The husband was very fond of foreign women. Before I started to work, the wife took me to the doctor. I went through a medical examination, I was a virgin. They wanted to have a medical report because one can do prostitution in her day-off, everything can happen. The man became obsessed with me. He was asking why I was still a virgin at that age; our people generally come to Turkey after they marry. He was then saying that the medical report

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15 Employment agency interview, 20 August 2012.
was lying, that I was not a virgin. I am not obliged to make him believe in that. In fact, such a thing can be understood within a short period of time, from the attitude of someone. One night, I took a shower in my bathroom, which was within my room. I always lock the door of my room at nights. I am used to it because we did always lock our doors at the dormitory. The man knocked at my door and I thought that something happened to the children. I opened the door, I had only my towel with me and the man entered to my room. I was very afraid and I became very angry. When I got angry, I don’t fear from anything, not from the Gendarmerie and anything. The room was obscure and I recognized in the dark that he was passing to the other side of the bed. I opened the door and I went screaming outside. The cabin of the security guards was very close to our house and I cried for their help. We called the Gendarmerie. The validity of my visa had already expired. The chief of the Gendarmerie was a very kind person. I made a complaint but I had to withdraw my complaint because I would be sent back if I bring that to the court.”

“I found another job. They were not giving me food. The woman had put her pullover in a basin. I took her pullover and put it in a larger basin. She got angry with me and scolded because that pullover was worth of 400 Turkish liras. I packed up my belongings and left immediately. I worked there for two weeks, I was left hungry and was not able to have my payment.”

In short, from labor agencies to uncertain and unreliable working conditions, these women find themselves totally commodified, either as domestic workers, working long hours in homes or always potentially available sexual objects.

4. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: In Search for a “Perfect Migrant”

Not surprisingly, there are numerous police harassment stories narrated by the Post-Soviet domestic workers, the shuttle traders as well as sex workers. Periodic deportations, arbitrary pick-ups from Laleli, passport confiscations are all but too common. But most the Post-Soviets and other domestic workers complain about being treated as “Natashas.” There is considerable number of stories of the police following these women (assuming they have dollars) and asking “cuts” with the threat of reporting them. They all complain about the arbitrary implementation of the law. “They want to find out that we have overstayed our visa so they can threaten us,” said Tatyana, one of the domestic workers. “There are even those who just look at you, think that you are ‘foreign looking’ (blond, blue eyes) and feels as if they have found a gold mine.” “In effect,” she said “the police are always there to demand their cuts.”

16 Interview with Tatyana, 3 August 2006.
There are also lots of complaints about such police behavior promoting the negative reputation of the Laleli district and undermining their trade. Some shopkeepers have even claimed that the police are tied to prostitution rings and get their rent from the hotels and even from the pimps to “overlook” their operations. One shopkeeper also said, “there is no use of reporting a theft to the police. Several times, I have tried and have seen the thief released from the police station in half an hour. I am sure they get their cut from theft as well.” Hence the police fail to provide security for the shopkeepers, the shuttle traders and certainly not the migrant workers. On the contrary, there are numerous reports of maltreatment by the police particularly during deportation, sexual advances and harassment.17

An odd hierarchy also emerges among the police officers as well. “We know where these women live, they, of course, do not live in family houses. We can pick them up, thousands of them if we want. But we don’t choose to, we simply cannot manage it (referring to the capacity of the deportation center which the police insisted on calling a ‘guesthouse’ (misafirhane)).”18 These women are not seen as a major security threat (particularly in comparison to male transit migrants) but were more of a “nuisance.” “We could go to Laleli right now and pick up as many women as we want, but usually we don’t enter the shops, there the shopkeepers are trying to earn their bread, produce something. Those, we don’t mess with. In fact, those shopkeepers sometimes help the police as well. But those idle women chatting on the streets are always target. In fact, I can tell so easily who is a foreigner and who is not, it is so obvious.”

“Of course, we don’t pick up the Germans and the English in a bar” narrated another police officer at the Foreigners Bureau, “we may not be always right. Sometimes those women in these bars have valid visas, but they may still be deported mainly because thanks to the ‘environment’ she is in, she is deemed to be there for that job (referring to prostitution).” It is this enormous leverage the police enjoys in defining as who and who may not be a prostitute is what creates a zone of rather arbitrary racialialisation since these definitions are admittedly based on “impressions.” And this is when the social and cultural preferences and perceptions start constituting a new layer of control over the female migrant workers. Apparently, a similar practice emerges when accepting applications for a residence permit.

“If a female applicant comes with a boy friend, forget it, we don’t give them residence even though they may be eligible. You know, we are also responsible for upholding the moral values of this society.”19

Anna from Moldova, 19 years old, was asked her identity card late at night in Şişli because she says she was wearing a very short skirt and talking with a man. “I love wearing low-cut clothes. I was caught with a very short skirt. We said with my friends that we will meet at a café in the park of Maçka and then we will go and watch the football match. They

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17 The treatment is even harder on men than women. On February 2006, two of the research assistants working on the project have personally witnessed the beating of a migrant worker for failing to come up with the deportation money. The deportation money is asked from the “deported” himself or herself. Otherwise, there is a long waiting time. Police say, most somehow “cough up the money.”
18 Head of the Deportation Center, 7 August 2007.
19 Police officer at the Foreigners Bureau, 17 August 2007.
were calling me when I was returning home and was passing through the gate of this park of Maçka. And there were two girls who were I guess doing that job. The police could not make them stop so they squeezed me. I asked them why. My skirt was really very short. Why did I wear it? Because I went to the match and I am a football fan, a fan of Beşiktaş club.”

Maya (Turkmen Woman) says that she never had a problem with the police. She explains: “we are not indecent (açık saçlık) women, we go to and return from our work, in street we are careful, we look right ahead in front of us, no one can tell anything to us. The police looks and sees us this way, why should he do harm to us?”

She says that it helps to be a Turkmen and a Muslim when finding a job and connects this with the fact that they do not have any incidents with the police. “Moldavian women are more open, they can say yes to anything, but we cannot. They are beautiful, young, with white skin and blue eyes. Turkish men like them; they want to go home with them. Moldavian women can have relationships with those men, but if we make such a mistake, the family will warn and get that woman out of that job. We do not permit anyone to make such a mistake. If we did, how can we look into each other’s eyes?”

Most of the women firmly claim that it was the way they were dressed that stigmatised them. Some protested the stigmatisation and continued to dress as they liked, often suffering from the consequences, others changed the way they dressed not to attract attention. The police interviews clearly reveal the clear “Natasha” bias against all post-Soviet women no matter what profession they are in.

I believe they are raised differently and their belief system, their religion is different. “They come here because they want to make an ‘easy living’ Yes, some are pressured into it but most are here to find a ‘rich husband and live easily’. How come they are deceived? They are promised a lot of money. Shouldn’t they be suspecting what is expected when such an amount is promised? OK, to be subject to violence and rape is not good, but I believe that you offer a domestic worker some money, and say ‘come this weekend and sleep with this man,’ they will all come leaving their jobs as domestic workers. They never come here and return home wholesomely. I also believe they are coming here voluntarily, they have the body. God, gave them the beautiful body and they are using it, all of them, all from the post-Soviet world. They are like the people you watch on Paparazzis on TV, sleeping with one guy one day, sleeping with another the other day.”

Some women did claim, however, that it was easier to be “invisible” because they were Muslim and Turkish origin. And when they were caught, if they were devout Muslims, the police usually treated them better. What constitutes a “perfect immigrant” has historically been a subject of politically intense debate among the historians of Turkey and is beyond the scope of this paper (Cagaptay 2006; Kirisci 2000). But it is important to point out that although a “Muslim Turk” has long been at top of the hierarchies of the integration as preferable immigrant, the role of having of Turkic origins in having a preferential treatment

20 At the Deportation Center, 13 September 2007.
21 At an employment agency, 12 August 2012.
22 Police officer at the Foreigners Bureau, 16 August 2012.
have declined considerably in the last decade. Indeed, comparing the Iraqi Turkmens and the Bulgarian Turks, Danis and Parla argue that this “Turkic origin” card, hardly stops stigmatization and exclusion (Danis and Parla 2008).

Yet, being a Muslim, some migrants from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have claimed have still helped them in their encounters with the police. “Since we are not blond and do not look flirtatious as the Moldavians and Ukrainians, some argued, “We are usually under the radar.” Others have also expressed that they use head scarf to blend in. “It made my life much easier, than I don’t get the usual gazes, the foreigners get in this country and I never, I mean I never tell them where I come from. If I say, Turkmenistan, they may still think I am from Russia. They often do not know the difference. So I never say.” Other women have decided to wear headscarf after they started to live together with their boyfriends. “We had religious ceremony, but the legal ceremony, because he is already married.” Indeed, example of multiple wives, though entirely illegal according to the country’s secular Civil Code, is still common particularly in rural areas.

5. Rising Conservatism, Religiosity: Living under the Gaze

What is more interesting however, is that entrenched impressions of these women are emerging against a significant social and cultural transformation in the country since the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in 2002. A whole series of political contestations in the country have occurred over issues involving the role of women. There are, indeed, significant signs for Islamisation of gender norms and sharp shift in political preferences towards more conservative values (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009). These authors empirically find, for instance, that there is strong correlation between rising religiosity and lack of interpersonal trust, tolerance and increasing xenophobia. Toprak (2008) has also pointed out to “growing neighborhood” pressures particularly on women, othering those who do not fit the Sunni Muslim mold.

Another visible sign is the rise in domestic violence. A 2009 UN report on domestic violence in Turkey, found that four out of every ten women in the country have seen domestic violence and only a handful speak up. In fact, the rising conservatism makes speaking up ever more difficult, though some women still do. A news reporter, encapsulates the problem rather well.23

A woman in the studio audience stands up and, with the spotlight highlighting her covered head, announces to the crowd that her husband abuses her but that she doesn't know how to react and still be a good Muslim.

The host of this popular Turkish TV show, “Islam in Our Life,” Professor Faruk Beser, is—from his trimmed mustache to his tailored suit—the image of a modern, successful Turkish man. But as he approaches the woman, his answer is far from progressive.

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Looking her in the eye, Beser urges the woman to “carry this pain within you and keep living with your husband,” prescribing constant prayer over divorce, and reminding the woman of the rewards she will receive in heaven for her suffering.

What is shocking about this scene is not so much the reaction of the host, a man known for his conservative interpretation of Islam in a country that is 99 percent Muslim, but rather that the woman had the courage to speak up at all.

The prevalence of domestic violence is largely attributed to patriarchal power relations, lower literacy rates for women though domestic violence is certainly not limited to poor, rural areas where illiteracy are higher, the importance “honor” which culminate in its extreme in “honor killings” which is all heavily intertwined with growing acceptance of traditional role for women in Islam.

Traditional gender norms are also getting reinforced through laws. In 2008, for instance, the government has decided to pay households (read women) with low incomes money for taking care of the elderly and the handicapped in their family. While such a policy can be heralded as an anti-poverty program and recognition of women’s domestic work, it also sent a clear signal that the “real” role of women is being a “care-giver.”

Finally, Turkey is among the very few countries even including those with predominantly Muslim population, where female labor participation has actually declined instead of increasing. According to the General Directorate of Women Status December 2010 report, the percentage of women participating in the labor force has declined from 34.2% in 1990 to 26% in 2009. One of three women work without any insurance but this informality is higher is agriculture where 41.7% of women are still employed. As rural to urban migration continues, new female migrants into the cities have found it difficult to adjust and find jobs in the urban labor markets. Ironically, most unskilled, informal jobs are most carried out by relatively educated foreign migrant workers, in effect saturating the lower end of the informal labor market. The non-participation of women in the labor force then may not yet pose a new challenge for migrant workers working in the domestic care industry since they, too, actually reinforce the traditional role of women. But the rising conservatism and intolerance for foreigners may pose new challenges for these women as competition of lower paying jobs intensifies.

Rising conservatism is also likely to pose new challenges for sex workers as well. Newspapers are full of news on how sex workers, models have been captured and deported. Indeed, though it is hard to prove, there seems to be deliberate attempts to clean the police force from those who have been involved in some of the prostitution rings and related corruption scandals.

**Conclusion**

Migration of Post-Soviet women to work as domestic workers, shopkeepers, and sex workers in Turkey reflects a global trend of feminization of transnational migration. Pushed by the rapid economic transformation in the Post-Soviet countries, and lured by the rising demand
from Turkey as well as its relatively flexible visa regime, these predominantly female migrant workers found themselves in a highly precarious environment. The workers were in fact filling a growing demand in Turkey’s highly neoliberal economy. Unable to provide sufficient public services and pre-school education for kids, or regulate its labor markets, foreign migrant domestic care appear to address the “growing care deficit” in the country, while offering flexible work hours and much lower wages. Same was true for demand for sex workers mostly fulfilling the sexual fantasies of dark-skinned and/or elderly Turkish men with a blond foreigner.

Yet, a double morality was at work here. The exigencies of the neoliberal markets came into conflict with the desire to control the flow of these women. Indeed, the encounters of these women with the employment agencies and police officers all reflect this double-edged sword. These women create immense opportunities for “rent” yet they also need to be controlled. This ambiguous encounters with the police and employment agencies, also explains how and why these migratory flows become ever more organized and routinized over time, with solid social networks and how these women themselves, in turn, develop survival strategies (Keough 2006).

These difficult encounters manifest a series of “otherings,” racialisations, and continuous commodification ranging from their golden teeths, the looks, dresses to their skin color. These otherings were sometimes based on their nationalities (Russian means Natasha, sex workers), sometimes simply on their language or their distance from “Turkishness.” Sometimes, being a Muslim appeared to help, sometimes looks and nationalities overshadowed all the others. It is precisely the ambiguities, uncertainties of these “otherings” and the wide room for unchecked racialisations, which create intense vulnerability for these women.

Perhaps, that is why growing Islamisation in the country and the growing entrenchment of traditional gender norms is problematic since they add yet another layer of uncertainty, and ambiguity, another unfriendly gaze and anxiety into the lives these women with huge potential for “othering.” But, in that they may at least not be alone, backed by secular and feminist women refusing to live by the Islamist gender roles.

References


Appendix

Table 1: Number of irregular migrants apprehended by country of origin (Illegal entry-exit, overstay of visa or illegal stay)

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Source: İçduyu (2006, 2008) İnsan Hareketleri Şube Müdürlüğü (The Directorate of Human Movements)
Table 2: Total exit and entry numbers based on country of origins 2009

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**T O T A L** 35,779,352 36,300,665
PANEL II

Language Education Policy in Japan: Critical Issues and Challenges
Introduction

Hirofumi Wakita
Ryukoku University

In multicultural societies, language planning and policy play an important role in dealing with a variety of problems among people with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. This is because language is inextricably tied with culture, history, race, ethnicity and identity, so issues surrounding language carry a heavy burden of sensitive historical, political and cultural significance.

In recent years, special attention to language policy has been paid by researchers, administrators and policy makers, triggered, obviously by the rapid progress of globalization and the resulting high mobility of people, ideas and material things, and the worldwide expansion of English as a *lingua franca*.

Looking at the Japanese context, due to problems such as the rapidly falling birth rate and the rapidly increasing aging population, it is estimated that over ten million foreign guest workers will be needed to sustain the society in the near future. In addition, mobility and immigration in Asia is likely to advance rapidly and thus the society will surely become diverse, that is, more multicultural and multilingual than it is now.

In this context, there is no doubt that many critical issues at a macro and micro level in terms of language policy need to be clarified. To name a few examples: (1) How should the government guarantee the language rights of those people from abroad as a group as well as an individual and to what extent? ; (2) What will the status of the Japanese language and other languages including English become in the future? ; (3) What language should be used for education, considering the growing number of immigrants/minorities? ; (4) What are the purposes and goals of foreign language education at schools and what are the critical issues and challenges to improve it at a national and school level?

In this panel, four presenters will discuss language policy issues in Japan from different perspectives as exemplified above.

(1) Prof. Mitsunori Takakuwa will raise some questions about the current situation of Japanese foreign language education which focuses on English-only policy and makes some proposals as to which direction the language policy should be geared.

(2) Prof. Toshinobu Nagamine will discuss his research findings in a qualitative case study concerning pre-service and in-service EFL teachers’ perception of the new language education policy related to teaching English in English in Japanese secondary schools.
(3) Prof. Julian Chapple will begin his discussion by proposing the term ‘ulterior culturalism’ and then examine the policy and potential of multiculturalism in contemporary Japan from the perspective of the educational system.

(4) Prof. Soo im Lee will shed some light on Japanese learners’ underlying beliefs in English language learning and will propose some new perspectives related to the mechanism of affective factors in motivating them to learn English.
Implementing Effective Foreign Language Education for the Diversified Japanese Society

Mitsunori Takakuwa
Meiji Gakuin University

Introduction

In the compulsory education in public schools in Japan, foreign language education formerly began in lower secondary schools in principle. From 2011 it was introduced in elementary schools as well. Thus Japanese students in public schools are supposed to have chances to learn foreign languages for at least several years during their compulsory education. Nonetheless, in reality, their choices are limited; they can learn only English, not other foreign languages, under the current national curricula. English education is THE foreign language education provided in the compulsory education in Japanese public schools, and other foreign language education has been neglected. However, Japanese society is not so ethnically homogeneous as it appeared to be (Burgess 2007; Okubo 2008; Tsuneyoshi 2004). There are about two million foreigners registered in Japan, and more importantly, they are from various countries and regions, including where English is not primarily used (Ministry of Justice 2012). Still should we stick to the “English education only” policy?

This paper surveys the foreign language education in Japanese compulsory education under the current national curricula. It then examines the effectiveness of the foreign language education in relation to diversified Japanese society, with special reference to schools with foreign children who do not have knowledge of the Japanese language. Finally the paper offers an alternative approach to foreign language education that will be in line with Japanese society seemingly becoming more diversified in the future.

1. English Education as the de facto Foreign Language Education

In the academic year of 2011, starting in April and ending in March the following year, English education was officially introduced in elementary schools in Japan. Although the grade in which students start learning English varies from place to place, the national curriculum, or the Course of Study, for elementary schools specifies what is to be learned in grades five and six. This means that Japanese elementary school students will have started to learn English by the time they are in grade five at the latest. It should be noted that English education in elementary schools is formally called “Foreign Language Activities.” Therefore,
any other foreign language instead of, or in addition to, English could theoretically be taught. However, in reality, English is the choice of language as specified in the national curriculum formulated by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (hereafter MEXT): “In principle English should be selected for foreign language activities” (MEXT 2010). Thus in Japan “Foreign Language Activities” in elementary schools is practically synonymous with English education.

Japan adopts a nine-year-long compulsory education system from grade one to grade nine. Japanese students have an additional three years of “foreign” language education after graduating from elementary schools. However, even at the lower secondary school level (grades seven through nine), foreign language education usually implies English education. The national curriculum for lower secondary schools lists “Foreign Languages” as the name of the subject to be taught along with other subjects such as Japanese language, mathematics, and science. However, it is easy to recognize that only English is intended in the curriculum. There are three sections in the “Foreign Languages” curriculum for lower secondary students: overall objective, objectives and contents for each language, and lesson plan design and treatment of the contents (MEXT 2011a). The first and the third sections are brief, and much of the space is reserved for the second section. This extensive section is unevenly divided into two parts, “English” and “Other Foreign Languages.” The way English education is implemented is explained in great detail. For example, one of the three subsections under the heading of “English” is “contents,” which contains how four skills of English should be incorporated in language activities, how pragmatic functions of language should be treated in those activities, what phonological, lexical, or grammatical items of English should be taught, and how these items should be treated in class.

Compared to this detailed treatment of “English,” the explanation of “Other Foreign Languages” in the same section, “Objectives and contents for each language,” of the curriculum is markedly brief. Under the heading of “Other Foreign Languages” there is only one sentence, saying “Instruction for foreign languages other than English should follow the objectives and contents of English instruction” (MEXT 2011a, 8). It may seem that MEXT meant to write the sentence to implement foreign language education other than English. However, this interpretation is highly unlikely for the following reasons.

First, MEXT is the only agency in Japan to control education in general. As Seargeant (2009) pointed out, the Japanese educational system is highly centralized. Even when local governments set their own educational goals, they should follow the national curriculum. With the power and control that MEXT has, it specifies what to teach and how to teach it in great detail in the national curricular for academic subjects, as is the case with “English” described above. Thus, if MEXT had indeed intended to implement foreign language education other than English at the lower secondary level, it would have laid down the contents and the methodology of language teaching for other languages as well in the national curriculum. Instead, as we saw above, MEXT provided a very brief explanation in a single sentence. This lack of detailed explanation on foreign language education other than English suggests that MEXT does not take its implementation into serious consideration.
Second, it is virtually impossible to follow the objectives and contents of English instruction in teaching other foreign languages. As mentioned above, English education has been introduced in elementary schools in the current national curriculum. In its previous version, fostering listening and speaking abilities in English seemed to be more emphasized. However, the revision was made in a way that, because English education would be introduced at the elementary level, development of abilities in all four skills of the English language would be made possible by building them on the foundation of students’ communication abilities that was intended to be formed at the elementary school level (MEXT 2011c; National Institute for Educational Policy Research 2012). However, there is virtually no basis for foreign languages other than English since foreign language activities at the elementary level are synonymous with English education. How can learners of a foreign language who have no knowledge of it learn it effectively by following a curriculum that assumes they have already studied it? If MEXT had been serious about implementing foreign language education other than English, it should have written another curriculum in which instruction may not follow the objectives and contents of English instruction. Thus, in reality, during the period of compulsory education in Japan, both “Foreign Language Activities” in elementary schools and “Foreign Languages” in lower secondary schools listed in the national curricular are practiced through English education.

2. English Education for Whom?

As we saw above, English education is the de facto foreign language education in the compulsory education system in Japan. It is true that English is among the most influential languages in the world today in the sense that it is primarily used in international communications in politics and businesses. However, it is also true that not everyone will be involved in such international communications. Among the biggest reasons to reallocate initial English education to elementary school level was that many Japanese people did not have good command of English even after about six to ten years of English education, including higher education, before it was introduced to elementary schools (Seargeant 2009), and that starting to learn English at an earlier age was thought to be the solution to the Japanese people’s lack of proficiency in English. That is, it was assumed that extending the period of English study would enable Japanese people to become proficient in it. This solution may work in some contexts, and may not in others. For the solution of making the period of English learning longer to work effectively, it should also be assumed that Japanese people’s relatively poor English proficiency level, if indeed it exists, is due to the limited amount of time spent learning English. However, the factors that affect second language learning are more complicated (e.g., Andreou, Vlachos and Andreou 2005; Ellis 2004). If one has no contact time with a target language, one is not likely to acquire it. If one lives in an environment in which the target language is primarily used and has much contact time with it by using it daily, one is likely to acquire it. In this sense, increasing contact time with the target language may lead to enhancing learners’ proficiency levels. But it is unknown how
much contact time is enough for them to become proficient in the language on the continuum of contact time between zero and every day. Under the current national curriculum, Japanese fifth and sixth graders will experience English education for 35 periods (each a 50-minute class) per year—the same amount of time as is dedicated to “Moral Education.” Would it be considered a significant amount of time to add 70 periods (roughly equaling 58 hours) of English lessons in the last two years of elementary schools?

Motivation is also an important factor in second language learning (e.g., Dörnyei 2001; Gardner 2010). In Japan many people do not need English to live their daily lives (Yano 2008). Although some people may use English at work, they do not need it when buying groceries, commuting, going to hospitals, banks, or public offices, and so on. Two types of motivation can be introduced here: integrative and instrumental motivations concerning second language learning (Gardner and MacIntyre 1991). Some learners are interested in the target language itself, the countries or regions in which it is primarily used, and the cultures associated with those who use it. Such learners can be said to have integrative motivation to learn the target language. Other learners tend to regard the language as some instrument or tool by which they can fulfill their desires to accomplish tasks in, say, business. These learners are thought to have instrumental motivation to learn the target language. In Japan, many people whose first language is Japanese do not have to use English. In such a situation, it appears difficult to encourage learners to maintain either type of motivation long enough for them to become proficient in the target language. Of course there are some people who were able to learn it successfully with either or both types of motivation. It is likely that language teachers are among them. Other professionals or workers who use it for their business may also have been successful in maintaining motivation to learn it. However, it is not as easy to maintain motivation to learn the target language as those who have been successful in being motivated may think it is.

Terasawa (2011) pointed out that the view that Japanese people have aspirations to learn English is misleading. A large-scale social survey of $n=2,507$, which investigated the behaviors and thoughts of Japanese people based on the two-stage stratified random sampling (JGSS Research Center n.d.), showed that about 40 percent of Japanese valued English skills either for their work or their personal life while the remaining of about 60 percent did not. More detailed analyses showed that according to type of job those who were professional workers valued English skills highly whereas people in other occupations did not. In the “Professional” category, 69.9 percent of 113 male workers and 60.4 percent of 134 female workers put a relatively high valuation on English skills for their jobs. Also 63.7 percent of 113 male workers and 51.8 percent of 137 female workers valued English skills highly for their hobbies or personal relationships. The category of types of job that comes after “Professional” is “Managerial.” In this category, 52.5 percent of 40 male workers and 25.0 percent out of four female workers valued English skills for their jobs, and 57.5 percent of 40 male workers and 75.0 percent of four female workers valued English skills highly for their hobbies or personal relationships. It should be noted here that the relatively high percentage of 75.0 percent may be due to the small number of samples, that is $n=4$ for this category.
Thus caution is needed to evaluate this figure. For workers in other types of job (“Agricultural,” “Skilled,” “Semi-skilled,” “Unskilled,” “Clerical,” and “Sales”), 54.2 percent out of 168 male clerical workers who valued English skills highly for their jobs was the highest. Thus it is safe to conclude that, except for those who are professional workers, the majority of Japanese people do not think English skills are important for their jobs and/or their personal lives.

From a slightly different perspective, it can be pointed out that among the parents of students who go to school and study English, the majority does not value English skills highly. The students also know that Japanese people do not need to use English in their daily lives. How can they be motivated to learn English then? It could be argued that English will be useful when visiting foreign countries or regions. However, the number of people who go overseas should be considered. Table 1 shows the total number of Japan’s population, Japanese nationals overseas who stay overseas longer than three months, and Japanese overseas travellers (Japan National Tourism Organization n.d; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications n.d.).

In Table 1 the number of Japanese nationals living in Japan is used to show a rough measure of how many Japanese people may need to use English after they study it under the national curricula. Japan’s total population is slightly larger than the number of Japanese nationals since the former includes other nationals living in Japan. As we can see, the number of Japanese nationals overseas is very small compared to Japanese nationals in Japan. Its ratio is less than one percent. The number of Japanese overseas travellers is much larger than that of Japanese nationals overseas. Still the number of Japanese overseas travellers accounts for no more than 14 percent of that of Japanese nationals in Japan. Of course it is unlikely that every one of the Japanese nationals overseas and Japanese overseas travellers has to be proficient in English since some of them may go to countries or regions where English is not used primarily. However, for the sake of discussion, let us assume that everyone in these two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese population</th>
<th>Japanese nationals overseas</th>
<th>Japanese overseas travelers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>125,930,000</td>
<td>837,744</td>
<td>16,215,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>126,053,000</td>
<td>871,751</td>
<td>16,522,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>126,206,000</td>
<td>911,062</td>
<td>13,296,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>126,266,000</td>
<td>961,307</td>
<td>16,831,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>126,205,000</td>
<td>1,012,547</td>
<td>17,403,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>126,286,000</td>
<td>1,063,695</td>
<td>17,534,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>126,347,000</td>
<td>1,085,671</td>
<td>17,294,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>126,340,000</td>
<td>1,116,993</td>
<td>15,987,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>126,343,000</td>
<td>1,131,807</td>
<td>15,445,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>126,382,000</td>
<td>1,143,357</td>
<td>16,637,224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
categories would need to use English. Still the proportion of Japanese who need English is relatively small, and the conclusion that the majority of Japanese do not need English for their daily lives is tenable. Then why do Japanese students have to study English, among other foreign languages, for at least five years of compulsory education (grades five through nine), and probably for three additional years (grades ten through twelve) in upper secondary school? Do all of them have to learn it even when the majority of them are unlikely to need it? Maybe now is the time to think whether English education should be the de facto foreign language education in Japan.

3. Diversity in Japanese Society

As we have seen so far, the majority of Japanese people do not need English for their daily lives. Are there any other foreign languages they might encounter in Japan? Table 2 shows the number of registered foreigners, and the breakdowns by nationalities (Ministry of Justice 2012).

As Figure 1 shows, the number of registered foreigners gradually increased from 2001 and peaked in 2008, when over 2.2 million foreign residents were registered. After that the number declined, and, as of 2011, just over two million foreign residents were registered (Ministry of Justice 2012).

Out of the total number of 2,078,508 registered foreigners, Chinese constitute about 33 percent, Koreans constitute about 26 percent, and both Brazilians and Filipinos constitute about 10 percent (See Figure 2).

Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 show that the majority of the registered foreigners originally came from Asian and South American countries. Because no data are available for the first language of these registered foreigners, we cannot be sure of which languages they use primarily. However, the fact that in these Asian and South American countries English is not primarily used as the first language of those who live there suggests that not everyone from these countries is proficient in English to the extent that they can live their daily lives using English without any difficulty. Then what would happen in terms of communication if the majority of Japanese who do not need and thus do not use English for their daily lives meet these foreigners from Asia and South American countries in Japan? Theoretically, it is possible to use English to communicate with each other. However, this type of communication requires both parties to be proficient in English. Whether the foreigners can use English or not, the majority of Japanese do not. Thus this type of communication seems rare, if any, in reality. Another scenario is for both parties to use Japanese. Anecdotally this type of
<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,778,462</td>
<td>1,851,758</td>
<td>1,915,030</td>
<td>1,973,747</td>
<td>2,011,555</td>
<td>2,048,919</td>
<td>2,152,973</td>
<td>2,186,121</td>
<td>2,134,151</td>
<td>2,078,508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>381,225</td>
<td>424,282</td>
<td>462,396</td>
<td>487,570</td>
<td>519,561</td>
<td>560,741</td>
<td>606,889</td>
<td>655,377</td>
<td>680,518</td>
<td>687,156</td>
<td>674,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>632,405</td>
<td>625,422</td>
<td>613,791</td>
<td>607,419</td>
<td>598,687</td>
<td>593,489</td>
<td>589,239</td>
<td>578,495</td>
<td>565,989</td>
<td>545,401</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>265,962</td>
<td>268,332</td>
<td>274,700</td>
<td>286,557</td>
<td>302,080</td>
<td>312,979</td>
<td>316,967</td>
<td>326,456</td>
<td>330,522</td>
<td>300,032</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>156,667</td>
<td>169,359</td>
<td>185,237</td>
<td>199,394</td>
<td>187,261</td>
<td>193,488</td>
<td>202,592</td>
<td>210,617</td>
<td>211,716</td>
<td>210,181</td>
<td>209,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>50,052</td>
<td>51,772</td>
<td>53,649</td>
<td>55,750</td>
<td>57,728</td>
<td>58,721</td>
<td>59,696</td>
<td>59,723</td>
<td>57,464</td>
<td>54,636</td>
<td>52,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>46,244</td>
<td>47,970</td>
<td>47,836</td>
<td>48,844</td>
<td>49,390</td>
<td>51,321</td>
<td>51,851</td>
<td>52,638</td>
<td>52,149</td>
<td>50,667</td>
<td>49,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>245,907</td>
<td>264,621</td>
<td>277,421</td>
<td>288,213</td>
<td>296,848</td>
<td>309,450</td>
<td>321,489</td>
<td>337,205</td>
<td>338,323</td>
<td>334,970</td>
<td>336,162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Ministry of Justice (2012).
Figure 1: Total Number of Registered Foreigners in Japan

![Graph showing the total number of registered foreigners in Japan from 2001 to 2011.

Figure 2: The Percentage of Registered Foreigners by Nationalities in 2011

![Pie chart showing the percentage of registered foreigners by nationality in 2011.

- China: 32.5%
- Korea: 26.2%
- The Philippines: 10.1%
- Brazil: 10.1%
- USA: 2.4%
- Peru: 2.5%
- Others: 16.2%]
communication seems much more common than the first one. This is not surprising in that there are many foreigners who have lived in Japan and become proficient in Japanese. Even those foreigners who are not so proficient in Japanese are likely to be aware that it is primarily, and exclusively in most cases, used in Japan, and that they are expected to communicate in Japanese while they are in Japan. This type of communication is consistent with the language policy with which the Japanese government has put assimilation pressure on them (Tsuneysoshi 2004; Vaipae 2001). Japan has not actively accepted immigrants (Kanno 2008; Sato, Okamoto and Miyao 2009). As it is rapidly becoming an aging society (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare n.d.), it seems to have come to realize that, without people from outside the country, it is very difficult to sustain such a rapidly aging society. Currently there are about two million registered foreigners, which accounts for less than two percent of Japanese population. Thus these foreigners are considered minority groups compared to the mainstream Japanese nationals. For the minority groups, about 79 percent of whom are people from Asian and South American countries, the Japanese government has been trying to help them acquire Japanese. Also at present many local governments along with the Japanese government offer important notices and instructions concerning the civil service in Chinese, Korean, Spanish, and Portuguese as well as Japanese and English. If some areas have relatively a large number of other minority groups whose first language is not among those listed above, the local governments may translate notices and instructions into languages used by these groups as well or instead. However, apart from translated documents, face-to-face services in the minority languages are very limited. Such services by which foreigners will receive assistances in the civil services in their first languages are often provided by local organizations, including NGOs and NPOs, not by local governments (Burgess 2007; Tsuneysoshi 2004). The fact that services in minority languages are limited in Japan is not surprising given that the majority of Japanese people are not proficient even in English, which they learn at school for several years, let alone in other languages, which are virtually neglected in foreign language education in the compulsory education as we saw above. However, would it not be qualified as another type of communication in the present Japan that both Japanese and the foreigners try to learn each other’s language? That is, while the foreigners keep learning Japanese, Japanese people also try to learn other foreign languages in addition to English. This would allow both parties to interact with each other in a two-way communication.

4. Foreign Language Education in Line with Internal Internationalization

Like English, the majority of Japanese do not need other foreign languages either since they can live their daily lives in Japanese. Thus English and other foreign languages are similar in terms of usefulness for the majority of Japanese in their daily lives. However, a difference between them can be found in terms of the number of registered foreigners living in Japan as we saw in Figure 2. Although no data is available for how many of these registered foreigners actually have a language closely associated with their countries of origin as their first
language, it can be safely estimated that there is at least a slightly larger chance for Japanese to encounter foreigners whose first language is, or who have a good command of, Chinese, Korean, Portuguese, or Spanish than those with English. Thus it is as well worth learning foreign languages other than English as it is to learn English. The word *kokusaika*, which literally means internationalization, is often heard in many contexts in Japan (Ertl 2008). However, internationalization is usually associated with English, not with other foreign languages. This seems due to the assumption that internationalization occurs when Japanese people go abroad, that is, when the direction of internationalization is outbound. Japanese people have an image of their going abroad, and thus they come to a conclusion that they need English outside Japan. However, as we saw above, internationalization does not occur unidirectionally. The opposite form of internationalization occurs by which foreigners come from outside Japan. In this type of internationalization, which is called internal internationalization (Tsuneyoshi 2004), the direction is inbound, and the knowledge of the first languages of the foreigners will enhance greater communication between them and Japanese people. In other words, there is a sizable conflict regarding internationalization for Japanese people. In internationalization in its traditional sense, they believe they have to use English, which is not always true though, and thus they try to learn and use it for communication with foreigners, even when they go to countries or regions in which English is not primarily used. Thus Japanese people may believe learning English is important and English education as the de facto foreign language education in the compulsory education in Japan supports this view. In contrast, in internal internationalization, Japanese people believe they have only to use Japanese, and English if necessary, and thus they do not try to learn other foreign languages even if the foreigners who use them as their first language outnumber those who use English as such. This may be partly because Japan tries to assimilate foreigners into Japanese society by making them learn Japanese on one hand and neglecting foreign language education other than English in the compulsory education system on the other. Implementing foreign language education other than English in the compulsory education may lead to resolving this conflict.

5. Foreign Children at School

There is another valid reason to learn foreign languages other than English in the compulsory education system in Japan. As we saw above, at present there are about two million registered foreigners in Japan. The number of these figures has been slightly decreasing partly because of the recession after the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 and the Great Earthquake in Japan in 2011. However, the number of children whose first language is not Japanese and who need special assistance in the Japanese language at school did not decrease. MEXT (2011b) reported the following numbers of those children (See Table 3).
Table 3: Number of Foreign Children Who Need Japanese Language Instruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign children who need Japanese language instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>19,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>18,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>19,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>25,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>28,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>( - )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>28,511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers in Table 3 show the students in all the public elementary schools, lower and upper secondary schools, and other types of schools which include schools for the challenged. Data for 2009 is missing because MEXT decided to conduct this survey every other year after 2008. A glance at this table suggests that the number of foreign students who need Japanese language instruction peaked in 2008, and it might have started to decline, given that the total number of registered foreigners peaked in 2008 and has declined since then (See Table 2 and Figure 1). However, we cannot be sure about this since, as stated above, data is missing for 2009, and will be missing every other year after that, and thus we do not and will not have sufficient data to verify the interpretation of the data given above.

There is one thing we can reasonably conclude. Whether the number of foreign children who need Japanese language instruction stays the same or is decreasing, the total number of schools that host such students has increased since 2005 as in Table 4.

Table 4: Number of Schools That Host Children Who Need Japanese Language Instruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Schools hosting foreign children who need Japanese language instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>( - )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6,423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In other words, the possible decrease in numbers of such children, which might be related to the decrease of the total number of the registered foreigners, does not affect the number of schools that host such students. Of course it is possible that the number might have been higher in 2009 than in 2010, and we cannot be sure about this since no data is available for 2009. Still we can safely conclude that the number has increased since 2008, when the number of registered foreigners has, and the number of foreign students who need Japanese language instruction also seems to have, started decreasing. This brings up another issue for discussion. That is, how do schools accommodate these foreign students who need Japanese language instruction? As Burgess (2007) pointed out, additional teachers are dispatched for those schools that host a certain number of such foreign students. This assistance does not seem sufficient, but it still is better than to provide no support. About 80 percent of the schools that host such foreign students have four or fewer of them (MEXT 2011b), and it is often the case that no additional teacher is dispatched for them (Burgess 2007; Tsuneyoshi 2004). Does having four such foreign students require the school’s teachers to make significantly less efforts than having five of them? The line drawn between these cases is arbitrary. In fact, even having one such student requires teachers to make tremendous efforts. In the Japanese compulsory education system, at least one teacher is assigned to each class as a homeroom teacher, who takes care of the students in the class in terms of not only the students’ academic progresses but their school lives in general. Even when there is only one student in a class who needs Japanese language instruction, if the homeroom teacher does not speak their first language, the teacher has to make extra efforts just to communicate with the student, let alone to take care of the student’s school life in general. To make matters worse, it is often the case that the parent or parents of such a student may not have knowledge of the Japanese language. Thus, if the teacher wants to talk to the parent(s), an interpreter may be needed. Apparently the teachers and the schools need much more support than they now receive from both the national and local governments. Currently local volunteers who have the knowledge of the first language of the students who need Japanese instruction come to school and help them in class. However, not every school has those volunteers nearby. The most important thing is for schools and the teachers to be able to offer such support to those students. Burgess (2007) reported a case in which one of such students felt frustrated with having a limited knowledge of Japanese, and wished to speak with teachers and others in his or her first language:

Some students even made practical suggestions regarding ways to alleviate the feelings of isolation and loneliness that tended to characterise the first year or so:

It was really tough [at first]. Sitting in the classroom, listening to the lesson –well, I couldn’t understand anything. Even if my friends laughed I had no idea what was funny. I was on my own, alone. At first I would have loved to have been taught by a teacher who knew my native language. That had always been a wish of mine. If there had have been someone I could discuss things with in my native language,
someone who would listen to what I have to say, it would have been fantastic.

This kind of comment was fairly typical, a powerful reminder that in most cases the student was the only non-Japanese native not only in the class but also in the whole school (Burgess 2007, 12-13).

How can teachers and schools systematically accommodate these students when local volunteers are not available? This is when we should come back to the discussion of foreign language education in Japan.

**Conclusion**

As we saw before, English education is the de facto foreign language education for elementary and lower secondary schools in Japan. That is, in Japan’s compulsory education system, students in public schools study English as a foreign language, but not other languages. It is true that English is widely used around the world and, thus, to learn English is useful. However, the majority of Japanese can live their daily lives without it. That is, English is a language that is useful but not always necessary for them. If so, they do not have to learn English to the extent that all Japanese are expected to become as proficient in it as those who use it as their first language. As we saw before, for the majority of Japanese there are slightly higher chances to communicate in languages other than English inside Japan, although the chances are still low. Whether the target language is English or any other foreign language, it is not easy to become as proficient in it as those who use it as their first language with merely a few years of foreign language education in the country. This is mainly due to the fact that no foreign language is prevalent in Japan. However, if we can set the goal of foreign language education as to become proficient in it to the extent that Japanese people use it according to their goals and purposes, we can safely reduce the number of class periods for English in the compulsory education system, and make room for other foreign language education.

Thus, by introducing education in other foreign languages as well, we can not only teach other foreign languages to Japanese students, but also make them realize that English is not THE foreign language but simply one of the foreign languages in the world. If Japanese students have knowledge of other foreign languages, students who come from overseas and use them as their first languages may feel more comfortable at school. It is also possible that some of the Japanese students may become teachers with such knowledge and help those students who come from outside Japan in their first languages. Because Japanese society is rapidly aging, it is anticipated that an even larger number of people will be needed from outside Japan to sustain it. This will promote diversification in Japanese society. The knowledge of foreign languages will thus be a key factor here in the near future.
References


Preservice and Inservice EFL Teachers’ Perceptions of the New Language Education Policy to “Conduct Classes in English” in Japanese Senior High Schools

Toshinobu Nagamine
Prefectural University of Kumamoto

Introduction

Japan has to date tried to create national-level conformity so as to unify the quality of education. One of the reasons underlying such an attempt was the awareness of “global competitiveness” (Hargreaves 1994, 5). Knowledge of science and technology was assumed to promote the productivity and prosperity of Japan and stabilize the national position in international affairs. Thus, the government, especially after World War II, carried out a series of education reforms in order to institutionalize “scientific disciplines after Western models” (Figal 1999, 77). As a result, the conformity in the quality of education made it possible for Japan to claim its excellence in basic education rooted in the rigid compulsory education system (see Lucien 2001). It cannot be denied, however, that the educational conformity has generated some negative repercussions. For instance, scientific knowledge and mathematical certainty were excessively valued and actively sought in the education system, while humanistic aspects of education were underestimated, particularly in the area of liberal arts (McCarty 1995; cf. Toulmin 1990). Furthermore, since the quality of teachers was left unquestioned for a long time in the past, what the Japanese call *shishitsu* (i.e. the quality of teachers) has recently been called into question. This issue has become a crucial theme of today’s educational debates in Japan (e.g. Grossman 2004). This fact, among others, clearly indicates that the top-down approach to education reforms should have been a bottom-up approach.

The new version of the *Course of Study* (national curriculum guidelines) was announced by MEXT (the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) in March, 2009 (MEXT 2009). The new version includes measures to improve students’ communicative competence in English in Japanese senior high schools. One of the measures is to mandate that senior high school EFL (English as a Foreign Language) teachers conduct all classes in English. Chapter 3, provision 4 of the Common Content of all subjects in the new *Course of Study* states the following:
When taking into consideration the characteristics of each English subject, classes, in principle, should be conducted in English in order to enhance the opportunities for students to be exposed to English, transforming classes into real communication scenes. Consideration should be given to use English in accordance with the students’ level of comprehension. (MEXT 2011)

This new language education policy is to be implemented in the academic year of 2013, but it has already generated repercussions among preservice EFL teachers, inservice EFL teachers and teacher educators in Japan (Yamada and Hristoskova 2011). Many scholars and researchers alike assert that the new language education policy was developed and introduced abruptly by MEXT in a top-down fashion, and that the new policy did not reflect EFL teachers’ realities in local school settings. Glasgow (2012), for instance, points out native English-speaking teachers’ and Japanese EFL teachers’ uncertainty about their roles in enacting the policy, and implies the possibility of unsuccessful implementation of the policy. It is also argued that the quality of English education is likely to decline because of the enforcement of the new language education policy to ‘conduct classes in English’ in senior high schools (cf. Shin 2012). Such an argument appears to be based primarily on a presupposition that the use of students’ mother tongue or first language in class (teachers’ and students’ use of Japanese in Japanese EFL contexts) plays a crucial role in developing CALP (Cognitive Academic Language Proficiency); the new language education policy is criticized as merely forcing teachers to emphasize the development of BICS (Basic Interpersonal Communication Skills) (see Cummins 1979, 1984).

As Yamada and Hristoskova (2011) mention, MEXT’s new language education policy has indeed become the subject of heated debates in the field of English education. What is missing in the nationwide debates is in-depth, constructive discussions of not only how inservice EFL teachers perceive the new language education policy but also how preservice EFL teachers perceive it in teacher education settings. The new language education policy certainly requires EFL teachers to change their beliefs regarding English learning and teaching, their pedagogical approaches and teaching practices. Nevertheless, while voices of policy-makers and academicians (people who hold more power) can be heard, voices of such critical stakeholders as preservice and inservice EFL teachers (people who hold less power) are rarely heard. In other words, dialogue in which critical stakeholders can engage themselves is lacking. This observation is crucial because as Freire (1993, 92-3) asserts, “[w]ithout dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be no true education.” Another of Freire’s (1993, 90) remarks may be pivotal to cite here: “How can I dialogue if I am closed to — and even offended by — the contribution of others? How can I dialogue if I am afraid of being displaced, the mere possibility causing me torment and weakness?” It can be argued that voices from critical stakeholders should receive much attention, and that those voices need to be taken into consideration and reflected in the process of policy making and implementation (cf. Mātā 2012).

Gorsuch (2000) claims that conditions at schools and in classroom settings tend to
affect teachers’ perceptions of pedagogical approaches. Unless such context-bound, socio-educational and often political factors are taken into account, our arguments for and against the new language education policy can ultimately prove fruitless. Or even worse, English teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers) will most likely end up as the main barrier to educational change (see Shin 2012). Therefore, a qualitative case study was designed and conducted to explore and investigate preservice as well as inservice EFL teachers’ perceptions of the new language education policy. This paper discusses major research findings of the study. Primary data were gleaned from multiple sessions of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with four participants, two preservice teachers (one male and one female) and two inservice teachers (one male and one female). The collected data were analyzed employing Grounded Theory Approach (GTA) (Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998). In what follows, the research design and its rationales will be explained, and the major research findings will be presented. Based on the research findings, some implications will also be proposed for policy-makers, administrators and teacher educators to develop and implement language education policy successfully in Asian EFL contexts in general and Japanese EFL contexts in particular.

1. Research Methodology

1.1. Qualitative Research Design and Case-Study Approach

According to Maxwell (1996), there are five major research purposes that are typically found in qualitative research: (a) to understand meaning(s); (b) to understand a particular context; (c) to identify unanticipated phenomena and influences; (d) to understand processes; and (e) to develop causal explanations. Considering such purposes and the nature of the present study (i.e. descriptive, particularistic, and heuristic), a qualitative research design was employed. In addition, a case-study approach was applied regarding ‘case’ as “a thing, a single entity, a unit around which there [were] boundaries” (Merriam 2001, 27). The present study aimed at providing “in-depth insight into complicated situated and social issues” (Mann and Tang 2012, 477) involved in enacting the new language education policy in Japanese EFL contexts. Since four participants were investigated, the present study might be categorized as a collective case study (Stake 2005), which allowed the researcher to examine “both the uniqueness and similarity” (Mann and Tang 2012, 477) of the participants. This study was a small-scale study which incorporated a total of four cases. Hence, the prime goal was not “generalization in a statistical sense” (Merriam 2001, 61) (cf. Maxwell 2002). Rather, particularization of observed and interpreted phenomena (cases) was considered the prime goal (see Davis 1995).

1.2. Participants

As noted earlier, participants were four EFL teachers, two preservice EFL teachers (one male and one female) and two inservice EFL teachers (one male and one female). All participants were selected in such a way that the researcher could increase the opportunity “to identify
emerging themes” (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, and Allen 1993, 82) embedded in context, choose “information-rich cases” (Patton 2002, 230), and achieve typicality or representativeness of Japanese EFL contexts and EFL teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers). Rather than using probability sampling or random sampling, purposeful sampling was used to select the participants (see Creswell 1998; Eisenhardt 2002; Maxwell 1996; Merriam 2001). Participants’ biographical information is presented in Table 1.

1.3. Data Collection and Analysis
Primary data were collected through multiple sessions of individual in-depth interviews. Each in-depth interview had a semi-structured form, and was conducted in Japanese. All interview sessions were recorded using an IC recorder. Recorded data were then transcribed for later data analysis. The data analysis was done following GTA procedures (see Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1998). Accordingly, the present study aimed at ‘theory building.’ Strauss and Corbin (1998, 12) describe the rationale as follows: “[t]heory derived from data is more likely to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Participants’ Biographical Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying/Travelling Abroad Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Employment Exam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Data Collected by the Author.
resemble the ‘reality’ than is theory derived by putting together a series of concepts based on
experience or solely through speculation (how one thinks things ought to work).”

All transcribed interview data were segmented in consideration of every utterance’s
meaning and subtle nuance (in this stage, translation from Japanese into English was carried
out). Open coding was then conducted to identify properties and dimensions (overall features
of phenomena under study) in all segmented data (see Appendix A). Referring to the
identified properties and dimensions of data, axial coding was performed to verify the
relationships/connections among categorized data (i.e. sub-categories and core categories).
After the axial coding, selective coding was carried out. Selective coding involved the
process of selecting and identifying core categories and systematically relating them to other
categories. In this stage, the relationships among targeted phenomena (which included
sub-categories and core categories connected by common properties and dimensions) was
verified and validated to construct a theory.

Whilst coding all data, a concept map (a category diagram) was developed (see
Appendix B). The concept map underwent several revision processes due mainly to some
modifications of labels and categories. The researcher’s interpretations of the obtained data
were checked for accuracy by consulting the participants throughout the term of the
investigation (member checking). Finally, story lines were developed taking into
consideration three aspects of analyzed data, that is, condition, action/interaction and
consequence. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), the three aspects collectively
constitute a ‘paradigm’ (the paradigm model).

1.4. Research Questions

Prior to the investigation, the following research questions were formulated.

(a) How do participants perceive the development process of the new language education
    policy to ‘conduct classes in English’ in Japanese senior high schools?
(b) How do participants perceive the implementation of the new language education policy to
    ‘conduct classes in English’ in Japanese senior high schools?
(c) How do participants perceive school and classroom conditions, particularly in relation to
    the enactment of the new language education policy to ‘conduct classes in English’ in
    Japanese senior high schools?

2. Major Research Findings

Salient, recurring themes, which represent “information-rich cases” (Patton 2002, 230), will
be presented in this section. Among multiple meta-themes that emerged in the present study,
the following three meta-themes were chosen: (a) Native Speakerism; (b) Resistance to
Change; and (c) Teachers’ Practical Knowledge and Lack of Information-Sharing. Under each
meta-theme, research findings will be described and documented in the form of story lines.
As will be seen, each theme shows the uniqueness of individual participants’ cases: the
uniqueness of the participants’ perceptions of the new language education policy, which were deeply rooted in context. Moreover, it was evident that the participants’ perceptions were greatly influenced by socio-educational and political factors.

2.1. Native Speakerism

When the participants were asked how they felt about the fact that the new language education policy was developed, they all expressed various levels of pressures as well as anxieties regarding their teaching practices. One of the themes that emerged in the participants’ data was their perception of non-native English teachers’ position. It was evident that they started to regard their position as disadvantageous and inferior to that of native English speakers in conducting all classes in English. Participant A, for instance, mentioned as follows (“[ ]” signifies information added by the researcher; “…” denotes the place where part of interview data was omitted):

There are many weaknesses I can find in being a non-native speaker [of English]. The level of my speaking proficiency is not high enough. If MEXT can allow native English speakers to teach all English classes in [senior high] school, I will appreciate that! If there is a role a Japanese English teacher can play .... Maybe, a role of instructing test-taking techniques for entrance exams. That’s all.

It has been reported in the TESOL field that non-native teachers tend to perceive and identify themselves and native English-speaking teachers more or less in the same fashion (see Gebhard and Nagamine 2005; Moussu and Llurda 2008). As Participant A implied, such a tendency might have been intensified by the introduction of the new language education policy. What should be noted here is that the participants commonly perceived the development of the new policy as a ‘critical incident’ (Farrell 2008). Critical incidents in professional experience are known to trigger teachers’ awareness of professional identities (cf. Sakui and Gaies 2002; Vavrus 2002) and prompt teachers to become more concerned about who they are as persons and teachers than what they know (knowledge and skills) (Connelly and Clandinin 1999). In addition, the awareness of professional identities determines teachers’ motivation to stay in the profession. Accordingly, it is a legitimate action to change the way of supporting teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers) in terms of the formation of professional identity.

As the aforementioned data of Participant A exemplifies, all participants showed a similar tendency to limit their teacher role to such a specific area of instruction as grammar teaching and entrance-exam preparation. It was also found that Participants A and B, that is, inservice teachers, emphasized non-native EFL teachers’ superior role in classroom management and disciplining students. By (re-)conceptualizing their role in comparison to that of native English speakers, the participants possibly tried to maintain self-esteem and avoided losing face. When asked what level of English proficiency would be required to conduct English classes in English, Participant D answered, “Ideally, native speaker’s level,”
without hesitation. This participant continued:

_People may say, “You're a Japanese teacher! It's definitely OK if your English is not as good as native [English] speakers!” There is no way I would ever accept that idea. So, I think Japanese English teachers must improve English skills ... I don’t think it’s possible to become a person like a native [English] speaker. No matter how hard I study ... If there are native [English] speakers who have learned very well about English education in Japan, we [referring to a prefectural board of education] should employ them as senior high school English teachers. I think it’s the best idea._

Participant C commented on the same issue, alluding to her belief that MEXT has an intention to ultimately lay off Japanese senior high school English teachers whose English proficiency is not up to the level of native English-speaking teachers.

Any educational change necessitates teachers to change because an individual teacher is “the acting subject of change” (Carson 2005, 6). Such transformative change implicates teachers’ professional identity formation (Carson 2005). The observed perceptual characteristics (particularly, perceiving and identifying non-native speaker teachers’ position in a specific manner) indicate that teachers’ images of self, as well as their self-esteem, might be at stake due to the implementation of the new policy.

2.2. Resistance to Change
Participants A and B in particular expressed a strong feeling of dislike toward MEXT and the new language education policy. Participant B, for example, stated that MEXT does not fully understand local school situations and a variety of problems that inservice teachers face on a daily basis (e.g. parents’ as well as students’ expectations and needs, class size, dealing with students’ different levels, lack of cooperation with junior high school teachers) and that the realities as perceived by inservice teachers are not taken into consideration in the process of policy making. All participants implied that they felt a sense of distance from MEXT, especially when they learned that the new language education policy was announced. Participant B criticized MEXT for starting a teacher-certificate renewal system in 2009.

_The Democratic Party [of Japan] promised the abolition [of the teacher-certificate renewal] system. But, it never happened. I trusted politicians then ... Our burden has already increased since then [April of 2009]. And, now we have the new policy._

The coalition government of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Komeito Party decided to start the teacher-certificate renewal system. The government then experienced a change of regime in 2009; the Democratic Party took a new administration. As Participant B asserted, the Democratic Party publicly announced prior to its administration that the teacher-certificate renewal system would be abolished, and that alternative measures would
be undertaken to ensure preservice and inservice teacher quality (shishitsu). The aforementioned remark of Participant B implies that teachers’ expectations toward the government were effectively violated, and that teachers might have been demotivated to seek for positive changes in the field of education. Such demotivation possibly led the participants to have negative attitudes toward the enactment of the new language education policy. Participants A, C, and D pointed out that conducting all English classes in English would only be effective for students to improve their listening skills.

Furthermore, Participant C stated:

*I didn’t tell you this last time [in the previous interview session]. I took a teacher employment exam this year, and I passed it, uh ... My dream was to become a senior high school [English] teacher. I think I told you that. But, I took an exam for [prospective] junior high school [English] teachers ... That’s right! I gave up!*

Even though this participant’s initial intension was to become a senior high school English teacher, she was pressed to change her mind because of the development of the new policy. “I couldn’t imagine myself using English fluently to teach [English] classes,” said the participant, “So, I intentionally avoided aiming for a senior high school position.” Yet another type of resistance was also observed. Participant A, for instance, reported that she made a firm decision to keep using Japanese in her English classes. This participant confessed that she had never even thought about using English to conduct English classes, and that the percentage of her spoken English in class was “probably close to zero.”

2.3. Teachers’ Practical Knowledge and Lack of Information-Sharing

The participants demonstrated, though in an individually different manner, the perception of the necessity to change their pedagogical approaches and teaching practices in senior high school settings. What was not demonstrated by the participants was the consistent explanation about MEXT’s expectations for change. The necessity to incorporate communicative activities into English class is clearly mentioned in the recent versions of the Course of Study. The necessity to enrich the quality of communicative activities is also articulated in the latest version of the Course of Study. Moreover, it is clear that MEXT is trying to generate a shift from traditional approaches (e.g. teacher-centered, textbook-based grammar translation method) to student-centered, communicative approaches. As Nishino (2012) argues, such an attempt appeared to conflict with the participants’ familiar teaching practices and beliefs about English learning and teaching. Participant C mentioned as follows:

*It’s just extremely difficult [for me] to plan a lesson in which I use English to teach ... I think ... Perhaps, I’m thinking that ... I will need to apply the grammar translation method, at the same time using English to explain ... grammar structures. Vocabulary: Correct translation. Perhaps, because I’m thinking this way, I can’t imagine myself*
conducting English classes in English. I can’t stop thinking ... if I were a student, I wouldn’t want to be taught in English. I wouldn’t be able to understand what the teacher was saying. I wouldn’t feel comfortable.

Struggling to find possible explanations about MEXT’s expectations for change, Participant C frequently referred to her past in-class learning experience. In her junior high and senior high school days, the teacher-centered, textbook-based grammar translation method was primarily used to teach English subjects. “We were often asked to read aloud English texts in both [junior high and senior high] schools. But, there were very few communicative activities in senior high school.” The grammar translation method was therefore the most familiar teaching approach. In other words, her “practical knowledge” (Golombek 1998) of English teaching was formed when she was a junior and senior high school student, which still affected the way she, as a preservice teacher, thought about possible approaches to conducting English classes in English. Similar phenomena were also observed in the other participants’ data. Lortie (1975) argues that prior learning experience in schooling plays a crucial role in determining teaching beliefs and practices, and that teaching beliefs are formed on the basis of prior learning experience as students rather than as teachers (i.e. the apprenticeship of observation).

What appeared to be another crucial factor affecting the participants’ perceptions was the lack of authentic experience being taught in English (see Table 1). It was hence speculated that gaining authentic experience being taught in English would positively affect teachers’ attitudes and motivation to teach English classes using English. Participant D, however, pointed out the meaninglessness of such speculation. He had a study abroad experience on an ESL program in Canada. “Of course, classes were taught using English there.” The participant continued:

Every lesson included many types of communicative activities. I really enjoyed interacting with my classmates and instructors through those activities. I couldn’t understand everything, though. If you ask me to teach the same way as those instructors did, I don’t think I can do it ... First of all, I don’t remember how they explained grammar points ... The environment [indicating the distinction between ESL and EFL contexts] is different. We don’t need to use English to live here [in Japan]. I think that ... the necessity to use English must be created.

Participant C suggested that MEXT make English an elective subject, and that “only students who are really motivated to learn English as a communication tool” take English classes in senior high school. By doing so, MEXT may be able to support students who are interested in learning a different foreign language(s), while highly-motivated students may be gathered and taught in English class. Participant A implied the lack of teachers’ opportunity to share information regarding class preparation procedures and instructional ideas to make English teaching effective. This participant also expressed an idea that there might be a
“Japanese way” of teaching English which values the development of “linguistic sensibilities” and language awareness; hence it was not surprising when she said that she made a decision to keep using Japanese to teach English classes. This participant further mentioned that MEXT sent a DVD to every senior high school so that inservice teachers could watch and learn from successful teaching practices with the use of English. Detailed descriptions of class preparation procedures were not recorded on the DVD. Accordingly, on the one hand, context-sensitive, locally-appropriate approaches may be called for; on the other, preservice as well as inservice teachers are not given ample opportunities to share information (particularly, information regarding instructional processes), transform practical knowledge and develop as professionals in a cooperative or collaborative fashion.

**Implications and Conclusion**

The new language education policy, which is to be enacted in the academic year of 2013, mandates that senior high school EFL teachers conduct all English classes in English. The new policy has generated repercussions among preservice teachers, inservice teachers and teacher educators. There is no doubt that the new policy is adding to the pressure on both preservice and inservice teachers. The level of associated anxiety, as well as the level of pressure, might vary among teachers due possibly to differing school settings, employment status, teaching beliefs, and/or the way they perceive realities. Likewise, the way teachers react to the enactment of the new policy can also vary. The enactment of the new policy certainly requires teachers to change their beliefs regarding English learning and teaching, their pedagogical approaches and teaching practices. Nevertheless, while voices of those who hold more power can be heard in the current nationwide debates, voices of those who hold less power are rarely heard. It can be said that dialogue in which critical stakeholders (i.e. preservice and inservice teachers) can engage themselves is lacking in the current discourse regarding the development and enactment of the new policy.

This paper reported on the major research findings of a qualitative case study which was designed and carried out to explore and investigate preservice and inservice EFL teachers’ perceptions of the new language education policy. The research findings revealed contextuality (Packer and Winne 1995) of realities and issues uniquely recognized and perceived by the participants. Based on the research findings, the following implications can be proposed for policy-makers, administrators and teacher educators to develop and implement language education policy successfully in Asian EFL contexts in general and Japanese EFL contexts in particular:

(a) Policy-makers in collaboration with administrators can reconsider students’ right to choose a foreign language(s) to learn in school.
(b) Policy-makers and administrators can conduct needs analyses of foreign language(s) in local school settings to clarify parents’ as well as students’ needs.
(c) Policy-makers can give opportunities to students, parents, teachers,
administrators, and teacher educators to get involved in meaningful, constructive dialogue in the process of policy making.

(d) Teacher educators, possibly in collaboration with administrators, can provide ample opportunities for teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers) to experience awareness-raising, reflection-type activities so that teachers can share process-oriented information and transform their practical knowledge and teaching beliefs.

(e) Teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers) can explore and negotiate descriptive ways of teaching (as opposed to prescriptive ways of teaching) that are context-sensitive, locally-appropriate teaching approaches.

As can be seen in the listing of implications above, collaboration or cooperation among policy-makers, administrators and teacher educators is vital to make the implementation of any language education policy effective. All critical stakeholders need to get involved in discourse or discursive practices so that the process of policy making, as well as the implementation of policy, can be a collaborative/cooperative endeavor. In addition, considering the fact that *de facto* foreign language education is ‘English education’ in Japan, it cannot be denied that students’ right to select and study a foreign language(s) in school settings has been prejudiced. This problem should be solved as soon as possible in order for Japan to develop as a multilingual and multicultural society. It is hence suggested that policy-makers in collaboration with administrators (such as officers of prefectural boards of education) conduct needs analyses to investigate students’ and parents’ needs regarding foreign language learning at a local-school level. It is imperative and urgent for the government to create a system to reflect outcomes of needs analyses in policy making and enactment.

As the research findings indicate, even after the enactment of the new language education policy in the academic year of 2013, senior high school teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers) might teach English classes exactly the same way as they have been taught using Japanese (i.e. through teacher-centered, textbook-based grammar translation method). By providing inservice and preservice training in which teachers can fully explore and effectively transform their practical knowledge and teaching beliefs, teacher educators and administrators can play an important role in the implementation of the new policy. The action of teacher educators and administrators may thus become a determining factor in the successful enactment of the policy. In addition, as is evident in the present study, teachers will most likely end up as the main barrier to educational change unless they are given sufficient opportunities to explore and negotiate descriptive ways of teaching (context-sensitive, locally-appropriate teaching approaches). Moreover, it seems urgent to equip teachers with knowledge and skills to take part in political dialogue and discourse pertaining to education. More specifically, teachers need to acquire astute analytical skills to scrutinize macro-structures of their educational, political context (Johnson 2009). Teachers also need to acquire political tactics to get engaged in discursive practices so as to negotiate and change
the realities (see Shin 2012).

The limitation of the present study may be attributed to the number of participants (i.e. four cases). The participants were restricted to only Japanese teachers in an EFL setting. Furthermore, although the research methodology (particularly, the employment of GTA and member checking) might have minimized this possibility, it is likely that the researcher’s role (interviewer) affected the objectivity in the data analysis and interpretations. Therefore, even though it was not a prime goal of this study, generalizability might be called into question. It should be stressed, however, that particularization, as opposed to generalization, was the goal of this study. The remark of Davis (1995, 441) is relevant here: “[o]ne of the common criticisms of qualitative studies is that they are not generalizable. On the one hand, a strength of qualitative studies is that they allow for an understanding of what is specific to a particular group, that is, what cannot possibly be generalized within and across populations.” In this regard, the particularization of the studied cases should be taken as a strength.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Coding Sample of Participant B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segmented Data</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I don’t think MEXT fully understands what’s really going on in school.</td>
<td>Time Denial</td>
<td>Present Complete</td>
<td>MEXT’s understanding of local school settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Object of denial</td>
<td>MEXT’s understanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Object of understanding</td>
<td>Local school situations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement type</td>
<td>Criticism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feeling/emotion</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If MEXT had closely worked together with inservice teachers to develop the</td>
<td>Mood Object of</td>
<td>Subjunctive</td>
<td>Involvement of inservice teachers in policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language education policy, the policy would have been totally different.</td>
<td>postulation Goal</td>
<td>MEXT’s close,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of work Result of</td>
<td>collaborative work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>postulation</td>
<td>with inservice</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of difference</td>
<td>teachers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of the</td>
<td>Development of the</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>language education</td>
<td>language education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy Difference</td>
<td>policy Difference</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of the policy</td>
<td>of the policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subjunctive</td>
<td>Great (“totally”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXT staff don’t have any understanding of our problems that inservice teachers</td>
<td>Time Denial</td>
<td>Present Complete</td>
<td>MEXT’s understanding of inservice teachers’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are faced with on a daily basis. Sad...</td>
<td>Object of denial</td>
<td>MEXT staff’s</td>
<td>problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Object of</td>
<td>understanding</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>understanding</td>
<td>Inservice teachers’</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Description of</td>
<td>problems</td>
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<td></td>
<td>problem Occurrence</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
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<td>of problem Statement type</td>
<td>Daily</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feeling/emotion</td>
<td>Criticism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sadness (“Sad”)</td>
<td>MEXT staff’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Data Collected by the Author.
Appendix B: Sample Concept Map (Subset)

<< Policy Making >>
Involvement of inservice teachers in policy making, Implementation of needs analysis, Making English subjects elective, Reflecting globalization issues

<< Perceived Realities >>
Perceived distance from MEXT, Increasing workload of inservice teachers, Lack of collaborative/cooperative professional development, Perceived level of teacher’s English proficiency, Perceived level of students’ English proficiency, Existence of entrance exams, Parents’ expectations, Students’ needs and expectations, Lack of cooperation with junior high school teachers

<< Beliefs >>
Differing definitions of communicative competence, Past in-class learning experience, Native speakerism, MEXT’s understanding of inservice teachers’ problems, MEXT’s understanding of local school settings, MEXT’s coercive practices, Mistrust in politics

<< Perceived Issues >>
Difficulty teaching grammar, Difficulty planning lessons, Difficulty determining teacher’s role, Issues of class preparation, Issues of teaching materials, Classroom management/disciplinary issues, Issues of self-esteem, MEXT’s understanding of preservice teachers’ psychology, Distinction between ESL and EFL

<< Resistance >>
Avoiding senior high school teacher’s position, Making a firm decision to keep using Japanese

\[\text{\<<< >> = Core category, \< > Sub-category, Italics = Label} \]
\[\text{-\rightarrow = Relation speculated based on data analysis} \]

Source: Primary Data Collected by the Author.
Multiculturalism or “Ulterior-Culturalism” in Japan

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“Strength lies in differences, not in similarities”
— Stephen R. Covey

Introduction

As migration has gradually increased over the past 50 years, so too has the need for states to deal with difference. Since the 1960s, a growing number of democratic states have embraced multiculturalism in varying forms and degrees in order to deal with increasing ethnocultural diversity within their borders. Considering that today only 10 to 15 per cent of countries can reasonably be described as ethnically homogeneous (Connor 1994; Väryinen 1994), even states which were historically void of ethnic minorities, are increasingly finding themselves searching for ways and means to deal with newfound diversity. From initial policies of elimination, marginalization, assimilation, or integration, multiculturalism has emerged, matured and progressed significantly, widely viewed today as a way to accommodate diversity that is compatible with the goals and ideology of democracy and liberalism. Consequently, as a result of ongoing and increased cross-border movement, societies consisting of a single unitary culture are no longer likely in the modern world (Parekh 2000). Rather we will see a greater number of societies in which multiple cultures coexist and to ensure stability, they will need to promote policies for equal respect and accommodation; that is: multicultural societies.

Yet, multiculturalism is one of those terms so fraught with complex emotional and societal imagery that it easily polarizes people either to a pro or anti stance. Those in favour of pursuing its policies view it as a panacea for rights injustices and discrimination which often accompany diversity while at the same time stressing the economic, social and cultural benefits of variety. On the other hand, those against point to incidents of unrest supposedly resulting from multiculturalism such as ethnic cleansing (the former Yugoslavia), the Paris riots, the London bombings, immigrant marches in the United States and other such ethnic unrest. Multicultural policies have proven, however, to be surprisingly durable. Contrary to what many expected, when adopted as official state policy it is not necessarily associated with a widening and deepening of the divide between ethnic groups (MOST 1995). Furthermore, it has often been the very denial of minority rights, for example language rights, that has been the cause of many conflicts (for example, Canada, Belgium, Sri Lanka), not the policy itself (May 2012).
The objective of this paper is to briefly examine the broad characteristics of multicultural policies, in particular highlighting the often overlooked or undervalued role of language and education issues, in order to assess multiculturalism’s potential to provide a cohesive response to growing ethnic diversity in Japan. While this paper does not aim to define an ideal policy of multiculturalism (an improbable task), it is useful to stress the main threads encompassed by the theory as these form a point of reference. Therefore, the paper firstly provides a brief overview of the features of multicultural societies. Against this background, it assesses the outlook for Japan. In particular, the focus is on education, specifically language policy, foreign linguistic opportunities amongst Japanese and minorities, and the issues they face. Finally, it presents some potential benefits –at present generally overlooked or ignored– that could be gained from a policy of more proactive multiculturalism while trying to counter some of the widely-held fears which accompany the increased acceptance of diversity.

1. Multiculturalism

There are no perfectly construed models for a multicultural society in the world, since “the concept of multiculturalism is a value-laden prescription rather than a descriptive condition” (Graburn, Erlt and Tierney 2008, 1). That said, there is a need to clearly differentiate between what I term proactive multiculturalism (that founded in policy and accepted ideology) and superficial multiculturalism (the outward appearance of difference in a society). Used normatively, multiculturalism refers to policies that promote diversity. In other words, a multicultural society can be described as one that is, “at ease with the rich tapestry of human life and the desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see fit” (Bloor 2010, 272).

Generally speaking, the way in which states deal or have dealt with the varied issues of diversity within their domains falls into one of a number of categories. There is the traditional approach, represented by countries like France, which seeks to avoid the recognition of ethnic or linguistic minorities by stressing nationality based on *jus soli* and a civic concept of citizenship. This means that “French citizens, whatever their ethnic origin, enjoy equal civic, cultural and linguistic rights as individuals, but not collectively, as minority groups” (MOST 1995). In contrast to the individual approach, other states assign citizenship along the lines of the principle of *jus sanguinis*, or blood relations. In this category are states like Germany and Japan where access to nationality for those of differing ethnic backgrounds is rare. There is also the model represented by places like Canada or Australia which have adopted multicultural policies aimed at fostering unity amongst a diverse range of peoples supported by policies to meet such ends.

Multicultural societies generally share several broad characteristics which provide further ways of examining multiculturalism. Commentators, for example, claim that the theory of multiculturalism is a combination of three key interrelated but separate constituents, namely: the demographic-descriptive, the programmatic-political and the
ideological-normative (Inglis 1996; Modood 2011). Firstly, multicultural states require two-way integration of both groups and individuals in order to promote dialogue and interaction between cultures, to lessen misunderstanding and promote a greater awareness of one another. This demographic-descriptive process is used to refer to the presence of linguistically, culturally and ethnically unique members within a certain population, particularly with that distinctiveness has some social significance (MOST 1995). Secondly, there is the programmatic-political usage of “multiculturalism” that examines the specific policy initiatives designed to respond to and manage ethnic diversity within a given state. This involves policies of equality being applied in a discriminating but not a discriminatory way (Modood 2011); in other words striving to avoid highlighting any single ethnic or religious group as the dominant one. Finally, there is the ideological-normative usage of multiculturalism which seeks to create a dynamic national identity and involves issues pertaining to popular, public debate and ethical-philosophical consideration about the place of those with culturally different identities in contemporary society.

To briefly apply the above three characteristics to the case of Japan is revealing. In terms of the demographic-descriptive process of multiculturalism, it is fair to say that a growing awareness of the presence of linguistically, culturally and ethnically diverse members has emerged of late. National and local government publications make frequent mention of the fact and numerous NGOs are now involved with attempts to integrate and promote dialogue. However, it is highly debatable whether the dialogue and interaction is aimed at fostering awareness and lessoning misunderstanding and also whether it is two-way. Rather, much of the literature pertaining to the perception of demographic-description is just that: description and statistics for the purpose of control. Further, it is even more unlikely that the “significance” of the existence of diversity is considered anything more than a significant problem to be dealt with. The notion that there is an inherent reciprocal benefit is not a topic Japan’s policy-makers often broach.

In the case of the second aspect of programmatic-political use, again Japan appears to be operating under a different set of considerations. Of the specific policies implemented to respond to and manage ethnic diversity in Japan, the majority are aimed at containment and control, not acceptance and equality. As Takaya (2007) clearly states, adopting an official multicultural policy in Japan has never been considered and the highlighting of the ethnic Japanese group is still the only goal. At the same time, there is to a certain extent a ‘hierarchy of foreignness’ in Japan, creating greater inequality.

Finally, in terms of the ideological-normative, there is no evidence to suggest that Japan’s state-makers are presently interested in creating a “new dynamic national identity”, nor particularly interested in addressing the issue of the place in society for those from different backgrounds. Rather, in some areas, efforts are being doubled to at least maintain, if not strengthen, the idea of a unique identity with little space for those from culturally diverse backgrounds. Western proponents of multiculturalism emphasize that multiculturalism enriches society as a whole and such a policy benefits both individuals and the larger society by reducing pressures for social conflict based on disadvantage and inequality (MOST 1995).
It is difficult to claim that “enrichment of society as a whole” could be considered a commonly held belief related to multicultural expectations in Japan at present. Rather, many critics would likely argue the reverse. Several international organisations and think tanks concerned with multiculturalism have revealed Japan’s lack of attainment and their findings make a compelling case. The Multicultural Policy Index (MCP) gives Japan a score of 0 for its multicultural policies (Multicultural Policy Index) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) ranks Japan 29th out of 33 countries (MIPEX).

2. Japan’s Own Multiculturalism?

There is little debate that Japan is – and has been for a long time – a multicultural state. The ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity within its borders is, despite the best efforts of many leaders over the decades, impossible to deny. However, again we need to clearly differentiate between what has at times been referred to as “superficial”, “cosmetic” (Morris-Suzuki 2002), “Soft” (Rex and Singh 2003) or “benevolent” (May 1992) multiculturalism, or what could be described as a multicultural “façade”, and the aforementioned “proactive multiculturalism” (i.e. that which is recognised, welcomed, policy-based and secure). In other words, of the three characteristics explained earlier, the demographic-descriptive factor has been proven and now a programmatic-political approach is required to bring about ideological-normative changes and this, in turn, requires an examination of the education system and its role in the language education of minorities of citizens.

How each state approaches and deals with increasing diversity issues reflects not only their past and present but projects their future. Japan’s “multiculturalism,” differs dramatically in shape and form from other states in terms of both its starting point and goals. That a large number of the world’s so-called “multicultural societies” are English-speaking, is a significant point given English’s standing as the globe’s lingua franca. Multiculturalism is “popular” or “successful” in liberal, democratic, Western states because 1) They are liberal and democratic and therefore obliged to accommodate, and 2) Predominantly English speaking (either officially or de facto). Japan has the unique opportunity, therefore, to write the rules for the multicultural policy it deems will most successfully enrich its society. Policy-proactive multiculturalism requires recognition of the benefits inherent in the policies and the appreciation of the “social equation” that the sum of all the different parts is exponentially greater than the subtraction of minor factors from the original. In other words, recognizing that the concerted push to accept difference can in fact lead to real benefits.

The history of multiculturalism in Japan has hitherto been incorporated into one of two broad terms. Firstly, going back to the early 1980s, the term in vogue was uchinaru kokusaika (internal internationalisation). This term was coined to explain the processes of change that were increasing in Japan domestically such as a sudden influx of nikkeijin immigrants, overseas investment in Japan and so forth. Activities undertaken in the name of Uchinaru kokusaika gradually came to refer to events undertaken by local and regional governments to either promote sister-city relations or address the immediate needs of foreigners in their
jurisdiction. The term is a direct contrast to its mirror image *kokusaika* (internationalisation) which –despite its appearance– generally refers to outward-facing exchange. “*Kokusaika* essentially blends Westernization with nationalism, failing to promote cosmopolitan pluralism” (Kubota 2002, 14). In a similar vein, multiculturalism in Japan has more often than not been affected by an “external logic” from outside society (Tarumoto 2003). Tarumoto provides three reasons for this lack of attention to domestic demands but sensitivity to external ones: a lasting legacy of empire-colony relations, Japan’s late entry to the international community coupled with a strong desire to become a respected member and an inflexible decision-making processes. The final point can be seen as a symptom of a lack of multicultural education. In other words, a greater multicultural outlook in the education system could very well result in greater flexibility and acceptance in future leaders. Put another way, without such a background it is difficult to imagine that flexible change can spontaneously emerge from within.

The second term used recently to describe the process of multiculturalism in Japan is *tabunka kyosei* (multicultural coexistence). According to Morris-Suzuki (2002, 171), *tabunka kyosei* is merely “cosmetic multiculturalism,” that is “a vision of national identity in which diversity is celebrated, but only under certain tightly circumscribed conditions.” This would put the policy into the same category as *kokusaika*, in other words, window-dressing to placate external commentators without upsetting domestic stakeholders. Similarly, Iguchi (2008) sees no direct resemblance in the process of *tabunka kyosei* and the policies of multiculturalism in places like Australia or Canada. Multiculturally-focussed education in Japan seeks to emphasizes the idea of Japanese and newcomers living together in harmony. Yet, such education risks excluding newcomers as “different” and thus “reproducing national boundaries” (Suzuki 2000) and putting Japanese under pressure to be more Japanese and foreigners more ethnic (Burgess 2004). In other words, Japan’s present attempts to incorporate multicultural aspects into its curriculum are predominantly concerned with answering the question of how to deal with the “world out there,” not about the “world in here.” It is this ulterior culturalistic approach that is masking opportunities for progress and innovation.

What kind of, and to what extent, Japan moves along the gradient of multiculturalism will depend on the results of domestic debates as well as international pressure. However, as this paper proposes, a recognition and understanding of some of the benefits of multiculturalism for both Japanese (in particular regarding language options and opportunities) and minorities should be on the agenda of such a debate.

3. Multiculturalism and Language

Acceptance of diversity is often discussed in terms of culture and religious tolerance. Yet, every state that adopts multiculturalism also has to tackle the issue of language rights and linguistic pluralism in order to achieve a truly equitable society. Thus, many countries today are reviewing their education systems in response to the rapidly evolving and diversifying
world. If you are to fully accept difference, at some point you must also address the issue of language since issues of Language are basically issues of power (Joseph 2006, Chomsky 1979) and language issues are in the end all political. Multiculturalism, therefore, also intrinsically entails language policy and if it is to be pursued and successful in Japan this needs to be closely examined. Japan’s stance reveals that debates pertaining to such issues are still often framed in a predominantly ethno-centric context representing a manifestation of culturalism at odds with multiculturalism. Further, the approach taken towards linguistic minorities, linguistic diversity and non-Japanese language policies reveals a lack of understanding of, and/or commitment to, the benefits that can be achieved from “proactive” multiculturalism.

In explaining the development of language policies, Ricento (2000) outlines three broad stages. The initial stage, whereby language is used as a vehicle for nation and state-building, the period around the 1970s and 1980s when language’s supposed neutrality was peeled away and the various ideological aspects associated with language policy became clear and, finally, the present with the focus on global flows (people, money, ideas, etc.) and identity issues. Japan –like many other developed nations– is now at the final stage but in possession of language policies seemingly unchanged from the first stage. The consequences of this are clear according to Gottlieb (2010, 1) who states: “A monolingual ideology means no recognition at policy level of internal linguistic communication needs or of the existence of community languages.”

However, just what kind of recognition should be afforded minority language(s) poses a very complex dilemma. Churchill (1986) provides a useful framework encompassing six principle policy responses to the educational and linguistic needs of migrants within the OECD states. Briefly, the first stage (language deficit) in which language rights for minorities are almost non-existent and the pressure is on assimilation. Stage two (socially linked learning deficit) links the educational success (or otherwise) of migrants with their family status. The push here is to achieve adjustment to the majority. The third stage (Learning Deficit and Social/Cultural Differences) associates minority language disadvantages with the fact that the majority culture’s education is unable to adopt a positive view towards minority languages. In the fourth stage (Learner Deficit from Mother Tongue Deprivation) there is a greater recognition of the need to support minority language abilities and this is consequently reflected in bilingual programmes offering home language support. Stage five (Private Use Language Maintenance) acknowledges the right of minorities to maintain and foster their languages in private. Maintenance bilingual programmes, which teach in minority language, are good examples. The sixth and final stage (Language Equality) grants official status to the minority language and ensures support in a wide variety of social and cultural activities including, of course, the education system.

Multicultural states support community languages1 for a number of reasons. One

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1 The term “community languages” is prominent in Australia and England but “Heritage language” appears more prevalent in North America.
reason is the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in which Article 27 states:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities should not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

Likewise, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education “provides for the establishment or maintenance, for linguistic reasons, of separate schools” (May 2012, 200) as long as attendance is optional and in line with the nation’s standards. While these documents and the sentiments they represent alone do not legally obligate any state to provide language instruction per se, they represent a clear indicator of the level of state-support required and regarded as a civil right. Further, they pave the way for –in Churchill (1986)’s parlance– the creation of a stage 5 minority language education policy.

A second reason is that the support of first languages also provides a way of incorporating migrants into society more easily and allows for cultural, linguistic and identity building and maintenance (explained below). Thirdly, at the same time, policies promoting bilingualism or multilingualism add to the linguistic mosaic of the wider community and are generally viewed favourably as beneficial skills and even economic assets (explained later).

Consequently, in proactively multicultural societies such as Canada, Australia, Sweden, or other countries of migration such as England or New Zealand, language and related educational policies have become a key factor. Each has strived to develop programs which ensure that newcomers have opportunities to learn to a reasonable level of competence both the national language(s) and their mother tongue\(^2\) (MOST 2005). This distinguishes their policies from either the assimilationist focus only on the national language or the isolationist/differentialist focus on only the mother tongue (Skutnabb-Kangas 1983). Further, because all such countries stress the necessity of students becoming fluent in the national language. They are, therefore, at the forefront in developing teaching pedagogies and programs to facilitate the learning of that language as a second language by adults as well as children. In Japan’s case, the language requirements for citizenship equate to “an ability to read and write Japanese equivalent to that gained by the second or third year of elementary school” (Gotliebb 2010, 2), which can hardly be considered sufficient to function as a full-fledged member of society nor be a motivating factor for migrants to acquire linguistic skills.

It is to this regard in Japan that the discussion now diverts its focus, to the twin issues of the language education of non- (or not totally) Japanese and foreign language education in Japan and the problems and possibilities –more importantly– each present.

\(^2\) England’s Schools Minister Jim Knight said: “Everyone in this country should be confident in English but it is vital that they are also confident in other languages, including their mother tongue. See: “Community languages ‘lack status’.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/7255493.stm

Issues pertaining to migrant language rights can be broadly viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, there is the impact of acquisition (or otherwise) on the students themselves. This can then be further split into linguistic issues and identity issues. A second perspective pertains to the impact of language diversity on Japanese society at large and this as well can be further examined in terms of assimilation and the impact on Japanese students’ appreciation, understanding and motivation for languages in general. Research shows that –done properly– multicultural policies seem to have created a more beneficial environment for minority language maintenance and generated positive cross-cultural attitudes and interethnic relations (Hatoss 2005).

On the surface, the claim that Japan’s lack of experience with the concept of Japanese as a Second Language (JSL) is what hinders new migrants’ full and stable incorporation into Japanese society makes sense. The same process took many years in English speaking societies as well and was borne out of increasing need and demand. However, in spite of claims that JSL has had a short history in Japan (Oga and Abe 2009), the reality is in fact quite different. The history of JSL teaching can be traced back to the Japanese nation’s spread into Hokkaido and Okinawa and ensuing need for unification, its imperial days when such education was carried out in Taiwan and Korea as well as during World War 2 in occupied regions (Gottlieb 1995a). It is therefore, ironic, as Befu (2009) points out, that at the peak of Japan’s imperial drive in the years prior to 1945, Japan was the most multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multicultural that it had been at any other point in history. While its leaders continued to stress homogeneity, the country encompassed a vast array of disparate ethnic, racial and linguistic groups in Taiwan, Korea, Micronesia and the Kuriles.

In Japan’s modern era (post WW2), JSL has only been seen as a recent trend (and hence perhaps the reason for the historical memory loss) as the country has not seen itself as one of migration and as such, JSL was not required. It was only the revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1990 which allowed for an influx of migrants of Japanese descent (nikkeijin) from countries in South America, that led to the establishment of JSL classes (Shikama 2008, 53). Ostensibly, the reasoning for allowing nikkeijin freer access to Japan was that their ethnic background would allow them a smooth transition into Japanese society. It is ironic then that when this naturally did not prove to be the case, their presence was the catalyst for the emergence of community-based JSL language assistance and teaching.

There are many groups striving to assist migrants in Japan today reflecting the understanding and wider appeal for such actions. Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ) is one such group. In 2006, they published a report urging migrants to be able to have the opportunity to learn their mother tongue and culture along with Japanese in Japan’s public schools. The reasoning was that such an opportunity would allow them to not only gain respect for their culture and roots, but also provide a learning opportunity and excellent entry point for multicultural education for Japanese students; precisely, what this paper is
advocating. Similarly, in its analysis of Japan’s multicultural system, the MIP index cautioned Japan saying: “Japanese schools may miss opportunities brought by immigrant children and weakly implement intercultural education” (MIPEX 2012). Continuing, it listed Japan’s unfavourable support to schools to allow immigrant children to achieve their best and for all children to understand and appreciate diversity. Finally, it concluded that Japan “critically ignores the new opportunities that these children could bring to mainstream Japanese schools by diversifying the student body, offering additional foreign languages, introducing other cultures, and including immigrant parents. This is because schools in policy-proactive multicultural societies act as centres for community learning and building and not merely vehicles for furthering the national goals of the state.

Presently JSL classes in public schools are provided in an ad hoc fashion by the Ministry of Education, but a much wider range of language classes (often run by volunteers through local international associations) and other multilingual services is provided by local governments, NGOs and NPOs. Local Japanese language classes have been a growing feature in migrant-populous regions since the early 80s. Yet, Hsu (2009, quoted in Gottlieb 2012) points out that unlike their equivalent in, for example English-speaking countries, such not-for-profit volunteer groups focus not only on language learning, but also as meeting places for Japanese interested in intercultural communication and exchange. In other words, such classes are grassroots “bottom-up evolution of language policy to meet local needs which may in time influence a national response” (Gottlieb 2012, 130). Such a response is typical in Japan, where the local government has taken the lead in meeting language needs. The Council of Cities with Concentrations of Foreign Residents (a coalition of 26 cities in seven prefectures with foreign populations ranging from 2% to 16.3%) issued the Minokamo Declaration in 2008 calling for a guarantee of support to enable foreign residents to become proficient in Japanese so that they can achieve independence and participate fully in community building.

Until very recently, support from the Japanese Ministry of Education has, with the exception of the creation of a JSL curriculum in 2007, been focused on infrastructure and administrative issues (Kawakami 2008). As Kawakami (2008) continues, presently there are no specialized Japanese-language teachers in Japan’s public schools, no teacher training courses for such teachers at universities, no recognized scale for assessing Japanese language ability of JSL students and no nationally approved language policy covering JSL for migrants nor native Japanese students. Of these issues, Kawakami stresses the quality of JSL teachers as of utmost concern since there are presently no specific teaching qualifications required for JSL teachers. Among his proposals, he suggests that JSL teachers should be trained in the same way as ESL teachers in other countries are. These issues reflect the similar state of affairs afflicting teacher education of native Japanese English teachers today. According to the Agency for Cultural Affairs (2010), approximately 54 percent of all JSL teachers in Japan today are volunteers.

What is required is a national policy for the education of children in Japan whose first language is not Japanese. Many educators still seem reluctant to grasp the point of
incorporating the students’ L1’s into the school curriculum and see the school’s role in bilingualism as dealing with the language of school only and leaving any other linguistic needs up to individual families at home (Kano 2006). As a consequence, of this lack of understanding, teachers have often tended to blame a bilingual students’ lack of academic ability on either their L1 or their parents’ low income status (Kano 2006).

Language education is crucial for newcomers as it represents more than just the acquisition of the grammar and vocabulary needed to make an intelligible sentence. It also requires “mastering complex sets of discursive practices for use in a range of social contexts” (Miller 2006, 291).

A Discourse is a kind of identity kit which comes complete with the appropriate costume and instructions of how to act, talk, and often write, as to take on a particular social role that others will recognize (Gee 1996, 127).

Students attend JSL classes in many cases solely in order to regain their sense of self (Ota 2000). Schools have a responsibility, therefore, to assist students in the acquisition of such identities as well as the opportunity to obtain skills to challenge overwhelmingly negative identities they at times be faced with (Cummins 2000). In short, it is not something that can be easily dished out by volunteers, even with the very best of intentions. The question is, however, whether Japan is ready to accept such a social role for JSL speakers and if Japanese are ready to accept greater changes to their language and society or not? For example, allowing non-Japanese to more easily become eligible for employment in local government and take on roles such as interpreters would seem like a cheaper option than spending enormous amounts on training Japanese to take on similar responsibilities.

Under present conditions, lessons for students from non-Japanese backgrounds are often dealt with through “pull out classes” for those in public schools or relegated to separate private foreign schools (Brazilian, Korean, Chinese, French, International, etc.). However, the problem is the increasing scale of the issue. Recent statistics show that in 2010 there were a total of 28,511 non-Japanese students in Japanese schools in need of Japanese language teaching. This number represents a jump of approximately 10,000 students over the past decade. Further, in the same year there were 5,496 students who possessed Japanese nationality in need of the same assistance revealing the growing diversification of the concept of citizenship in Japan and its ensuing linguistic complexities. It is, however, fundamentally impossible for Japan “to spend time and money for the maintenance of learners’ mother tongue within the framework of school education in Japan” (Hashimoto 2007, 34) and until this situation is rectified, there is little prospect of change.

There have been recent positive moves made by the government. A 2009 Cabinet Office committee document outlines measures to help non-Japanese children whose parents can no longer afford the fees for ethnic schools and wish to make the transition to Japanese schools. If properly implemented, such measures can have ramifications far beyond the provision of financial support in difficult times; “they lay the groundwork for enabling
language proficiency which could in time assist those migrants who wish to become citizens” (Gottlieb 2010, 2). Yet, once again, this discussion is predicated on the premise that first discussion must be had amongst the population as to the necessity or otherwise of such policy-proactive multiculturalism. One further reason for initiating serious debate into linguistic issues facing migrants and non-Japanese is the benefits accruable for Japanese students, themselves as the increasing presence of variety in the classroom has the potential to provide reciprocal educational benefits to Japanese students. As Japan’s JSL education curriculum has yet to fully incorporate the above discursive practices and discourses, it is hardly surprising that such facets will appear in the foreign language curriculum which is what the final section deals with.

5. Foreign (i.e. English) Language Education in Japan

Languages other than English have always been permitted from the beginning as the guidelines created to set out rules state only that “in principle, the foreign language should be English”. The guidelines go on to explain that this means schools can teach a language other than English if such things as their founding philosophy, geographical situation or student body should make doing so more appropriate. However, in this case, they are required to give full consideration to the students’ next step up the academic ladder (i.e. junior high schools) and the foreign languages taught there. Thus, the implications are quite clear that English is the foreign language of junior high schools and any language activities dealt with at elementary schools should give this due consideration. In short, consequently diversity is not reflected in the foreign languages offered in its education system (Kubota 2002, 15). In reality, therefore, in Japan, “foreign language” education is merely a euphemism for “English language” education as there are almost no other language options available in the nation’s public schools.

Foreign (i.e. English) language education in Japan is English as an International Language (EIL) as opposed to a foreign (EFL) or second language (ESL) policy. The reasons for this approach can be traced back to the nation’s internationalisation (kokusaika) policies and goals of the 1980s and 90s when Japan was striving to “deal” with growing diversity, international pressure and expectations.

The EIL policy ensures English remains as arm’s length, allowing Japanese language speakers a tool to communicate their ideas externally while ensuring that unique identities remain intact and unaffected. Under this policy, English study is a survival skill, for external communication not internal use (Torikai 2005). Hashimoto (2000) claims that Japan’s foreign language education in fact fosters the “Japanisation” of Japanese students and contributes to the reaffirmation of “Japaneseness”. This is because the English language is taken out of its cultural context and taught as a subject devoid of its historic roots. Thus, policy-makers have been able to deconstruct English in such a way as to remove its associated culture of individual empowerment, capable of threatening the notion of Japaneseness. Others claim that policy-makers probably consider the inability of the majority to use English as a form of
“protective moat that helps preserve national interests and sensibilities” (Haffner et al 2009, 60). Befu (1983, 242) claims one (unexpected) aspect of English teaching in Japan is to convince Japanese of their separateness to Others. McVeigh (2002, 148) likewise describes how “English is dissected and reassembled into a malformed creature” aimed at “demonstrating one’s Japaneseess.” However, an ideal of foreign language education is to explore “the sense of self that might develop through foreign language learning” (Hashimoto 2000, 41). It is hard not to reach the conclusion that Japan’s policy-makers have deliberately worked to ensure that the language learning process in Japan is devoid of its inherent transformative potential for seeing the world in a different way (Haffner et al 2009). Again, signs of “ulterior culturalism,” the antithesis of multiculturalism. For progress to be made, such ideas must be tackled.

The tendency to see language learning as “English only,” (until university entrance at least) creates an atmosphere in which non-Japanese become the victims of a lack of exposure and access to varied language opportunities. This atmosphere is in part due to a commonly held belief that learning languages is something only Japanese have to really struggle with and that those from other cultural backgrounds are at some seemingly inherent advantage. Consequently, the implication is that without the handicaps the Japanese supposedly have, other nationalities do not require as much assistance. This argument thus allows for the successfully segregation of foreign language education and JSI, the skeleton approach to JSL and, consequently, any potential reciprocal benefits are nullified.

At the same time, a lack of opportunities to use the foreign language results in a lack of confidence (Yoshida 2010) and feeling that language learning is difficult. Furthermore, many Japanese claim a lack of access to opportunities to exercise language skills is a barrier coupled with a seemingly uniform national characteristic towards shyness. According to Zimbardo, “more than any other nationality, the Japanese report feeling shy in virtually all social situations” (1989, 212). By breaking down stereotypes, altering ideas and bringing JSL and foreign language learning in Japan closer together reciprocal benefits could be obtained. For example, greater access to a variety of languages at different school levels would undoubtedly open possibilities for Japanese students to gain confidence, opportunities to speak and listen, and an appreciation that language learning is something almost everyone struggles with. It would also show that mistakes are natural and acceptable. Zimbardo’s research also revealed that three-quarters of the respondents considered their shyness to be a problem. Changes suggested here may offer a solution.

**Conclusion**

As Gottlieb (2010) claims, a linguistically diverse Japan should be seen as a resource, not a problem. Done properly, both Japanese students and minority/immigrant students could be positively stimulated. At the same time, Japanese culture and language need not be negatively affected. While many fear that society will suffer, traditions will be destroyed and the language forever altered, societies and cultures can in fact benefit from globalization. The
Catalan culture has shone through as a proud representation of a globalized Spain as has been the case with Scottish culture and an ensuing Celtic revival thanks to global pressures (Haffner et al 2009). Approached correctly, multiculturalism could be a way to help enhance Japan. Small changes would make a difference in Japan’s education system and today changes are what are required. Korea, for example, is more proactive and this is reflected in its economic growth.

There has been a renewed interest on the part of the national government in the past few years in terms of providing support for the language needs of newcomers. In 2009, for example, the Cabinet Office started a multilingual website in English, Portuguese and Spanish. Such a trend perhaps signifies that the national government will from now play a more proactive role. Yet, regardless, there are many other tasks that could be undertaken. In relation to the curriculum, for instance, present textbooks in all levels of schooling could be enhanced with more information about minorities and foreign nationals living in Japan. Incorporating more inter- and multi-cultural activities into the curriculum, too, would not only draw greater attention to the issues, but also hopefully foster a stronger desire amongst students to learn other languages and their cultures. Endorsing and actively encouraging the participation of Japanese children and students in foreign language classes being run for overseas students at public schools would have a similar effect.

The government would do well to look at the initiatives already undertaken by active localities, too. Kanagawa Prefecture has developed a “Global Village” concept used as pillar in the prefecture’s multicultural education programme focusing on local high school students. Similarly, drawing on the experiences of other countries would help Japan to perhaps avoid making unnecessary mistakes. Finland offers a number of good examples of what is possible. In order to achieve a greater degree of support and understanding amongst the general populace, teacher training programmes are utilized to foster acceptance and this is something that Japan could well consider amongst its present proposed changes to the teacher education licensing system. At the same time, due consideration should be given to the employment of bilingual teachers to assist schools in areas where there is a large concentration of students with insufficient Japanese language. While assisting in the academic development of migrant children, such teachers would also be able to “internationalise” the school and promote cultural activities. Ota City in Gunma Prefecture is presently the only city in the country experimenting with such teachers and has achieved positive results.

Many Japanese are clearly interested in learning languages, which is today an approximately 770 billion yen market (Yano Research 2012). Greater variety of languages should be offered or experienced; Korean, Mandarin, Bahasa Indonesia, Spanish, Russian and Arabic would all add to Japan’s assets. Greater linguistic and communication skills and attention would also benefit Japan’s presence in the international arena. Teacher training should be re-examined, the curriculum reformed, school control made freer and teachers from various countries should be included in the nation’s schools and allowed to teach freely.

From a purely economic standpoint, the potential for greater productivity depends on immigration, integration and the ensuing education policies as well. Japan should seriously
consider its future and remember that “the freedom to learn is one of the key freedoms that should be not be restricted by authorities” (Haffner et al 2009, 16). There is no reason why Japan, with all it has to offer the world in terms of technology, culture and spirit, would not also flourish if more of its citizens were given the educational impetus and framework needed to become more linguistically rich and diverse.

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Japanese Learners’ Underlying Beliefs Affecting Foreign Language Learners’ Motivation: New Perspectives of Affective Factors Mechanism

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Introduction

Despite being the world’s third-largest economy and a major export powerhouse, Japan is known for its citizens’ poor English-speaking ability, despite a six-year curriculum of English education in middle and high school (Katsumura 2011). The country’s average score on the TOEFL iBT (Test of English as a Foreign Language, Internet Based Test) in 2010 was ranked 27th among 30 Asian countries, below Mongolia and Turkmenistan (English Testing Service, TOEFL report 2011). Sharp criticism is directed against the English education system in Japan, and researchers are simply puzzled as to why a wealthy, well-educated country that invests so much time and money in English education shows such poor results (Hagerman 2009, 55).

English is often presented as an important tool for furthering commercial and national competitiveness in the world (ibid. 56). Poor English ability is cited as the main reason for Japan’s weakening leadership and competitiveness in the global markets today (Japan Center for Economic Research 2011). It is expected that the shrinking domestic market will force Japanese companies to shift their interests to overseas markets and that foreign language abilities will be essential for this shift to take place. English was not needed by most Japanese when the domestic market was strong because they could find jobs in Japan, but “No English, no job situations” might become a reality for most Japanese business people in the near future (Katsumura 2011). And yet, whenever Japanese EFL learners’ poor test performance comes under the spotlight, some educators and researchers offer the counter-argument that solely focusing on test score comparisons does not necessarily indicate that Japan’s English education is failing (Torikai 2002).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the failings of developing a consistent policy English education in Japan from socio-cultural perspectives. This paper particularly aims at illuminating the underlying beliefs and values reflected in the English education policy.

1 This paper is a modified version of the working paper, Lee, Soo im. 2012. Japanese Learners’ Underlying Belief Affecting Foreign Language Learners’ Motivation: New Perspectives of Affective Factors Mechanism in the Working Paper series Studies on Multicultural Societies No. 4, Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University Phase 2.
Japanese learners, who live in a moderately homogeneous society, linguistically speaking, do not feel an immediate need to acquire English even though the buzz words like “internationalization” and “globalization” have been spread in the society. However, despite of the ongoing surge of globalization, Japan still underestimates the impact of “globalization” which will be the inevitable wave of the future. This study argues that ethnocentrism and cultural nationalism hinder Japanese learners from mastering English abilities and it has legitimated the idea that English hegemony should not affect the Japanese society.

1. Binary Definitions of English Abilities

When the economic boom of the early 1970s began, internationalizing the country was seen as essential for progress, and since then, English has been ostensibly taught for communicative purposes. However, the translation method has also been persistently maintained as evidenced by the two types of English classes offered throughout Japan: Eigo, (English) taught by Japanese teachers and Eikwaiwa (English conversation) taught by native speakers. The distinctly divided roles of Eigo and Eikwaiwa have not been successfully integrated (Lee 1989), and this bipolarized approach can be still seen in English curriculums at many Japanese universities. The distinctive roles are derived from the stereotypical image that each group of teachers has particular strengths and weaknesses and this attitude is a form of linguistic discrimination. Despite the social pressure on English educators and learners, no significant changes have been observed to date. Japan has always been ranked one of the lowest among Asian countries on TOEFL scores, and Japan’s average score was already lower than China and Korea ten years ago (English Testing Service 2005).

In Japan the purpose of learning English is idiosyncratically defined in a way that does not appear in ESL (English as a Second Language) contexts nor in many EFL (English as a Foreign Language) ones. The binary label for English education is often quoted at university level curriculum; Kyyouyou Eigo (English for personal enrichment) and Jitsuyou Eigo (practical English skill required at work places). This persistent attitude towards bipolarizing the types of English brings the stakeholders to endless and sterile discussions, and in worse cases, ideologically heated debates that do not bring about any substantial results. Kyyouyou Eigo is conceptualized more ambiguously than Jitsuyou Eigo, but is most frequently referred to as English that is to be taught to help learners advance personal development, and to do so, the method most often adopted is reading rather than using the four integrative skills for communicative purposes. Some even feel that reading in English will help students develop their Japanese ability (Gorsuch 1998). The advocates for Kyyouyou Eigo are often English literature specialists, although there are some exceptional cases of English literature specialists who are keen to meet the needs of society, including communication skills in English.

These binary definitions of English abilities first appeared in 1974 in a famous debate known as the Hiraizumi vs. Watanabe Ronsou (debate) (Hiraizumi and Watanabe 1975). Wataru Hiraizumi, a Japanese politician, frustrated by seeing the unproductive results of the
English education system of the time, introduced a radical change in the form of a bill submitted to the Diet, Japan’s legislative branch. He suggested that English be eliminated from the entrance examination subjects and that intensive and functional English programs be designed for a select number of motivated learners. Shoichi Watanabe, a university professor, opposed the bill, emphasizing the importance of personal development through reading English texts. The term *Kyouyou Eigo* was introduced in opposition to *Jitsuyou Eigo*. Since then, reading by translating text from English to Japanese has been the most commonly adopted method by *Kyouyou Eigo* advocates.

2. Importing “Internationalization”

Japan experienced an economic bubble from 1986 and 1991, in which real estate and stock prices were greatly inflated. Japan’s rapid economic success began to hurt America’s pride by “buying up” American real estate, most notably the famed Rockefeller Center in New York City, and other assets, such as Sony’s acquisition of Hollywood’s Columbia Pictures (Shuman 2011). Yasuhiro Nakasone was Japan’s prime minister from December to November 1987, and during that time, he launched drastic educational reforms focusing on Japan’s internationalization and with the “internationalization” slogan, the JET (The Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme) was started in 1987. The program was started by local authorities in cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (JET programme 2012). The JET participants in the initial year were predominantly native speakers of English from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, while Canada and Ireland was added in the following year.

Although the JET program’s goal is to promote internationalization and foster ties between Japanese citizens (mainly young people) and JET participants at the person-to-person level, it is a Western internationalization that is being propagated since most of the JET participants are still from the West. In 1987, from four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand), 848 people participated Japan as the first participants of the program (JET, History of the JET Programme 2012a). The JET program emphasizes the diversity of the participants and the development of an international network between JET participants and the people of Japan. The program was expanded even after the bubble economy collapsed in 1991 and the number of participants reached the peak in 2003 with 6,273 participants from 40 countries. The budget for the program, however, was gradually cut down since then. The total number of JET Program participants as of July 1, 2012 was 4,359 with the following breakdown: 2,334 participants from the US; 432 from England; 477 from Canada; 262 from Australia; 248 from New Zealand; 107 from Ireland; 78 from China; 64 from Korea; 105 from South Africa; 14 from Germany; and 14 from France (Total Number of JET Participants, as of July 1, 2012b).

Considering the fact that the target language was English, a heavy emphasis on Western culture permeates the JET curriculum (Matsuda 2002), and the United States remained to be
the largest group among the participants. Over the years, especially in recent times, the JET Program has been sharply criticized. One of the major critiques is that the English level of Japanese people has not improved much since the JET Program began in 1987. Spending over three million yen a year plus housing and transportation subsidies for each JET program participant is a huge expenditure if the total number of the participants is close to 4,000 (Constantine 2012).

In the book Importing Diversity: Inside Japan’s JET program, McConnell (2000) questions how a relatively homogeneous and insular society will react when the government attempts to turn a buzzword –internationalization– into a reality. His analysis of the JET program reveals that the influx of foreigners has caused confusion and tension among Japanese teachers of English who have to deal with inexperienced young JET teachers. At the same time, foreigners who thought they were coming to teach English have been disappointed to find out that teaching was not the primary goal of the program. In addition, there have been accusations of racial insensitivity and white bias. McConnell writes, “Through the JET program the Japanese government has stated very clearly its position on racial and social equality, and the concept of ‘internationalization’ has been grossly distorted” (81). Applications from teachers of color were give special treatment and JETs of color were placed in urban areas since in rural areas “everyone from the mayor down to the parents and students was probably counting on a white face” (82). Thus, at the grassroots level in Japan, many language learners still equate “internationalization” with a white Western native speaker.

3. Japan’s Cultural Nationalism

In 2000, the late Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi caused a huge controversy when he proposed making English the “official second language” of Japan. The sterile debate regarding which was more important –Kyōyou Eigo or Jitsuyou Eigo– was sidetracked when the “Tsukaeru Eigo” policy was introduced in a MEXT action plan to cultivate “Japanese people with English Abilities.” The MEXT initiatives put forth the idea that English education should be closely related to the needs of the society; universities were encouraged to set concrete targets from the viewpoint of fostering personnel who could use their English in the workplace while at the same time many companies began to ask applicants for TOEIC scores. Japanese teachers of English began to feel external pressure as they felt they were being forcibly brought into a race in which they had to compete not only with other schools domestically, but also with other Asian countries, particularly Korea and China, at the international level.

In response to the Tsukaeru Eigo policy, a number of critics began to protest against the hegemony of English and criticize the imperialism of English. Books such as Eigo wo manabeba bakani naru, gurobaru shiko toiu mosou (If you study English, you will be stupid: An illusion of globalization) began to appear (Yakushiin 2005). Suzuki (2000) argued that Japan did not need an official second language due to its strong economic status. Instead of making English a second language, he advocated the spread of Japanese as an international
language. Even today, Suzuki’s views are reactionary to the hegemony of English, and he admits that language is a power source. His nationalistic views are often reflected in his praise of Japanese uniqueness and the Japanese homogeneous society.

The concept of Nihonjinron is still deeply established in Japanese society as seen in Suzuki’s views. Nihonjinron refers to a culturally nationalistic concept of Japanese uniqueness. Japan’s economic success, along with other positive factors such as the low crime rate, is often attributed to the “homogeneity” of the country (Befu 2001; Dale 1988). This hegemony of homogeneity affects language policy in Japan. Befu criticizes the idea that race, ethnicity, nationality, and language ought to be one-dimensional and that “Japaneseness” based on cultural nationalism would be eliminated if any one of the aspects is jeopardized. Cultural nationalism in Japan is deeply rooted in the Japanese education system and Western egalitarian values contradict the Japanese hierarchical nature of human relationships. Japan’s eternal rival is the West and the binary view of “we, Japanese versus the West” has not changed since Japan was forced to end its isolationist policies by the gun-boat diplomacy of the U.S. in 1853. Since then, with the exception of the years leading up to World War II, Japan has looked at the West with strong admiration and sometimes ideal goals, but at the same time, it feels threatened and draws an invisible line to protect its Japaneseness. Japan’s views toward the West are based on a sense of both inferiority and superiority and cultural nationalism. That’s why the attitude towards English hegemony swings like a pendulum from love to hate or vice versa. Japanese society uses native English teachers to achieve the goal of modernizing the country, but the foreigners are not considered members of Japanese society. They are equal, but segregated.

4. The Changing Role of English in Japan

The role of English in Japan has changed rapidly since the country opened up to the outside world following the gunboat diplomacy of the US in 1854. During the Meiji period (1868-1912), under the slogan of fukoku kyouhei (strong military, rich country or enrich the economy and strengthen the military), many young students were sent overseas to Europe and the US to study modern technology. Within the country, 3,000 foreign professionals were temporarily employed as o-yatoi gaikokujin or “hired foreigners” to teach Japanese intellectuals in a variety of fields such as technology, engineering, science, and the English that was needed to understand these fields (Ohta 1995).

English was an essential tool in the enlightenment of Japan, but it was designated as an enemy language during World War II, only to be swiftly rehabilitated to a language symbolic of modernization in the post-war era. However, despite a campaign to promote internationalization since the 1970s, with English continuously being designated as a subject for high school and university entrance examinations, even today very few people in Japan are able to use it as a communication tool. Thus, the role of English as a foreign language in Japan has changed depending on the needs of the country as part of the rapid globalization process. When English was first introduced to Japan, its function was purely instrumental,
and it was learned mainly for security purposes. Soon after, English was taught in an effort to acquire technology from the West to modernize and industrialize Japan. However, actual users of English were limited only to “male intellectuals” who were able to attend universities. New concepts of “freedom, democracy, speech, expression, legend and justice” were introduced to Japanese society along with the English in which these egalitarian values are embedded. Intellectual figures such as Kanzo Uchimura, Inazao Nitobe, and Tenshin Okakura were trained by the o-yatoi gaikokujin or ‘hired foreigners’ with the Direct Method and reportedly became quite proficient in English (Hatta 2003). Soon after, the pedagogical climate was changed by the view that Western values learned along with English would corrupt the Japanese mind and “Japaneseness,” and following such values blindly would make Japan submissive to Western imperial powers (Ohta 1995). The Direct Method was adopted first and later the Translation Method with the use of Japanese language as a means of instruction in the classroom. Subsequently, Japanese teachers of English replaced native English teachers who were initially dominant in number.

As early as the 1890s, when Japan was already an imperial power in East Asia, it campaigned for co-prosperity among Asian countries to protect the region from Western imperialism. When it launched into war against the US and their allies in 1941, the role of English changed drastically from a tool used to learn about Western civilization and technology to the language of the enemy. English was legally banned, including all imported English words, such as the words used for baseball rules, which were awkwardly translated into Japanese (Miller 1967). At the same time, political propaganda attempting to eradicate Western beliefs and values was common (Dower 1987). For example, one widely circulated picture portrays a woman brushing “individualism, selfishness, luxury, disharmony and aggressiveness” from her hair, symbolized as dandruff (269). English coincided with an ideological vehicle to transmit the Western value system, particularly American egalitarian values that did not reconcile with the state conceptualization of Japan’s emperor as the holy head of the nation.

When Japan admitted its disastrous defeat in 1945, the US occupation army brought American culture along with the English language. The US soldiers gave sweets, chewing gum and chocolates to starving children, and “Give me chocolate!” became a catchy English phrase for the approach Japanese children adopted toward the conquerors (Dower 1999). Many people of that generation reported that the taste of American chewing gum did much more than just fill their empty stomachs. Even as children, they were keenly aware of the gigantic power the chewing gum symbolized, and realized how fragile their own country had been. The “Give me chewing gum!” children believed the rumors that every American house included a movie theater and a huge refrigerator that was the size of a Japanese house (Lee 2004). During the occupation period, English was re-introduced along with Western values. Western values were interpreted as modern values; for example, the concepts of “freedom” and “consumerism” became fundamental values in Japan’s newly established democratic social system. At the same time, English language functioned as a symbol of Western power and hopes for the future, as evidenced by the elite status attributed to those who could speak
Dower stated that even practical undertakings such as teaching English were carefully wedded to an explicit philosophy of accentuating the positive, spreading even to the popularity of radio programs such as “Come Come English” (173).

The children who asked for sweets from the U.S. occupation army soldiers, the “Give me chocolate!” generation, revitalized the Japanese economy, and the baby boomers turned the country into the world’s second largest economic power by the late 1970s. During the period of economic growth, Western culture, especially American culture, became the role model for Japanese (Sekiguchi 2002). It was in these circumstances that the “Barbie Doll Syndrome” emerged in Japanese society, in which Barbie dolls with blond, blue eyes and long legs replaced Japanese traditional dolls as young girls’ playmates. The concept of beauty was also changed along with the popularity of the Barbie doll, and the hasshin or eight-head figure (a tall, well-proportioned figure having a small head) became the ideal for young Japanese women (Lee 2004). Cars, electric appliances, and other merchandise that symbolized modernization were advertised with catchy English phrases by white Caucasian models during the economic development in the 1960s and 1970s (Hagiwara 1998).

However, “acquiring English” for the non-elite in society followed a different path. English was never much more than one of several subjects included in high school and university entrance examinations, and communicative competence was only necessary for international business or politics. In this way, English became the elites’ language, and interacting with native English teachers in English was perceived as “cool and sophisticated” in the eyes of the masses. This love-hate relationship with native English teachers, or the hired, but separated employees, has been consistent since Japan first hired Oyatoi-gaikokujin.

Currently, the majority of English speaking instructors in Japan are from the inner circle defined by Kachru and Nelson (1996) as areas where English is the primary language, and they are mainly white Anglos represented by Americans, British, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders. Teachers from outer circle countries such as India, the Philippines, and Malaysia where English has been officially recognized as an additional language are rarely employed as English teachers due to advertisements for teachers often “request” native speakers, usually meaning white teachers. Most of the English native speakers are hired as English teachers as if they were Oyatoi-gaikokujin, and their direct participation to curriculum decision making is hardly seen.

The role of English as a foreign language in Asian countries varies depending on the specific needs of each country and how they take part in the rapid globalization process. For some non-English speaking countries, English instruction and learning is solely instrumental while in other non-English speaking countries, English is taught as a mere school subject. In most cases, however, English is taught as an effort to acquire technology from the West and to help modernize or Westernize domestic industries and society. Even though cultural values are only taught at superficial levels, the Western value system is accessed through acquiring English. In countries such as Japan, Korea, and China, Western egalitarian values often contradict existing cultural values. Korea and China are obviously doing a better job to clarify the needs of English than Japan, as shown in international competitiveness rankings and
Conclusion

Learners of EFL, such as Japanese learners who live in a society that is moderately linguistically homogeneous, do not feel an immediate need to acquire English, although they realize the necessity of mastering it for their future. It means that even though they say they are interested in the target culture and language, it doesn't necessarily affect their attitude towards making efforts to reach the language goal. Internationalization and globalization have been buzzwords in English education in Japan for the last two decades. Those words have become subconsciously integrated in learners’ awareness, but such awareness doesn't produce a desirable outcome in language acquisition.

An interdisciplinary interpretation of the findings in this study leads to the following argument. The dichotomous view which splits the world into two spheres, Japan and the West, has been prevalent in the form of cultural nationalism in Japan that assumes that the spiritual, moral, and cultural life of the Japanese should not be corrupted by foreign influences no matter how much Japan’s material way of life may be affected by them (Sugimoto 1997, 169). This cultural nationalism results in a dichotomous view of language –English or Japanese– as one way or another, the two languages are measured against each other. That is, the linguistic nationalist claims that the more Japanese people who master English, the more they will become culturally rootless or lose “Japaneseness” (Fujiwara 2004).

In much of the nationalistic literature of the 1970s, race, language, and culture were defined synonymously, resulting in what one Japanese critic calls a “unitary ethnic nation, intolerant of alien elements, constitutionally unable to accept the existence of different kinds of Japanese” (Nakanishi 1988, 21; McConnell 2000, 15). The definition of Japaneseness by the Japanese that is one-dimensional, focusing on biological race and a sharing of the same language and culture still deeply penetrates Japanese society (Befu 2001). In conclusion, since English is considered a tool transmitting Western values and beliefs, it is clear that Japanese ethnocentric beliefs and values influence English language learning. Spolsky (2004) argues that a monolingual country usually comes to see its language as threatened from the outside, and supranational policies for language rights often appear in order to save the weakened language in competition with the more powerful language. The findings of this study on ethnocentrism which are supported by Spolsky’s theory and language policy in various country cannot be detached from any other topics in foreign language learning.

Positive and negative views of Japanese language are frequently heard interchangeably in the midst of globalization, and the distinctiveness of Japanese language in contrast with English is emphasized in the discourse (Kubota 2002). The discourse has been actively developed by educators and language policy makers, and Japanese English learners are keenly aware of the socio-cultural environment surrounding them. Learners feel ambivalent toward learning English and their perceptions swing like a pendulum between their own desired motivation (what people really want for themselves) and desirable motivation (how
people think the world ought to be).

One last thing that deserves mention is the relationship of gender in TEFL education in Japan. Simon-Maeda (2004) describes severe gender bias in TEFL in Japan in her narrative inquiry and she discloses antagonism experienced by female English teachers’ in their male-dominated work places. At the university and junior college level in Japan, women still make up only 18.2% of full-time faculty positions (Kato, Chayama, and Hoshikoshi 2012), despite female students accounting for the majority of students majoring in English literature. Incorporating Western beliefs and values along with English might be interpreted as a serious threat to predominantly Japanese male professors’ male chauvinistic national identity and face-saving to keep their national pride. Overall, this study indicates that the low English proficiency of Japanese people is interpreted to be a socio-cultural product.

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Bungei Shunju.


PANEL III

Questioning Boundaries and International Relations: Perspectives from East Asia
The focus of Panel 3 was on exploring some of the ways that International Relations (IR) as a field has been constructed within the boundaries of normative and hegemonic understandings, in particular those derived from what can be termed ‘Western’ IR and to raise questions and propose alternative methods for understanding Asian IR. The three paper presentations in Panel 3 could be viewed as moving from the local level (albeit with larger ramifications at the East Asian regional level) to the mid-range national level to the macro level, though all three papers moved between various levels of analysis and were informed by similar conceptions of challenging the normative boundary making that exists within mainstream IR.

The first paper given by Prof. Ching-Chang Chen, “Taiwan, Sino-Japanese Relations, and the Origins of the Senkaku Islands Dispute,” proposed a constructivist explanation of the recent territorial dispute as an alternative to the over simplified China-Japan conflict that is so prevalent, seeking to build on a longer term historical analysis of the ongoing political posturing between the governments of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (hereafter referred to as Beijing and Taipei). Challenging mainstream and realist interpretations of this conflict as originating entirely in Chinese territorial claims vis-à-vis Japan, Prof. Chen foregrounded the domestic uses of the conflict for both Beijing and Taipei as they attempt to satisfy differing nationalistic narratives. In so doing, Prof. Chen argued that not only are such explanations more useful for academic understanding but also helpful in avoiding further escalation of conflict between China and Japan.

In the second paper given by Prof. Young Chul Cho, “Pitfalls of Seeking a Universalist National School of IR: The Case of South Korea,” an analysis of the different frames of IR in South Korea was provided. Prof. Cho contrasted mainstream IR theory in South Korea with an attempt by recent scholars to produce an independent “Korean” school of IR. The dilemma of universality vs. exceptionalism in theory building was raised in the context of an appeal by South Korean scholars to export their theories to other non-Western contexts highlighting the resultant problem of reinscribing hegemonic tendencies.

The third paper given by Prof. Hiroaki Ataka, “Unthinking the Westphalian Narrative: Towards a Plural Future of World Politics,” proposed moving beyond the less than helpful dichotomy of West and non-West. Prof. Ataka argued for a pluralization of theory making, one that draws on “history with historicism,” constructing multiple narratives of past, present and future. In this manner, it would be possible to envisage an IR that could overcome its
reliance on Eurocentric notions of modernity, the state and convergence of government systems in other parts of the world as a result.

Two discussants followed and provided both questions and challenging remarks. First, Prof. Karatani raised questions about the category of the West. Is it the same now as it has been historically? Similarly what is meant by the “contemporary world?” Prof. Tosa followed with some remarks about the Senkaku dispute going back 100 years prior and illustrated with maps of that period. He also raised the question of liminal states in reference to boundary making that was the overall theme of the panel.

The panel challenged symposium attendees to think outside of the normal frames of reference in relation to IR and political claims making of states and other actors. Moreover the question of universality arising from an Asian context was addressed and undoubtedly this question is certain to provide many avenues for further provocative discussions in the future.
Taiwan, Sino-Japanese Relations, and the Origins of the Senkaku Islands Dispute

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Abstract

The conventional wisdom attributes the origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute to the exclusivity of sovereign territory, natural resource competition, and the changing power configuration in East Asia. Although some note that nationalism has been a key source of political legitimacy for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Cold War era, this view at best explains the persistence of the Sino-Japanese dispute rather than its origins. On the other hand, the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) overlapping territorial claims in the East China Sea are typically dismissed by outside observers as irrelevant or a sign of Taiwan’s leaning toward the PRC. This research seeks to advance an alternative explanation about the origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute. It suggests that the birth of the dispute in the early 1970s was inseparable from a legitimacy contest between Taipei and Beijing over who was the “true” defender of China’s national interest. Given the mounting difficulty of retaining the China seat at the United Nations and the increasingly precarious diplomatic relationship with Tokyo in 1971, as an authoritarian regime Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang urgently needed a new source of legitimacy to sustain its rule in Taiwan. Framing the Diaoyutai islands as an “occupied territory” amid an earlier discovery of the potential oil and gas reserves there and the forthcoming reversion of Okinawa to Japan allowed Taipei to portray itself as the guardian of the Chinese nation that could stand up to “Japanese imperialism,” forcing Beijing to follow suit. Understanding the significance of the Diaoyutai issue’s domestic origins will help to reduce the likelihood of misinterpreting China’s seemingly belligerent rhetoric as a genuine security threat, hence mitigating the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.
Pitfalls of Seeking a Universalist National School of IR: The Case of South Korea

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Introduction

Robert Cox’s (1986, 27) famous phrase, that ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, shows that theorization cannot be a value-free academic activity. International Relations (IR)\(^1\) theorization itself is a political act implicated in the power and interest of theorists who are embedded within a particular social and political time and space. IR theory offers not just a way of seeing or not seeing, but also a certain viewpoint of what our world does, or ought to, look like. ‘International relations theory is not only about politics, it also is itself political.’ (Hutchings 1999, 69) This way of understanding theorization/theory indicates that scholarship may be affected by the ideologies, contexts, and positionalities of scholars, and scholarship may be a powerful arena in which political struggles among scholars with different normative orientations take place through knowledge production and consumption. It is necessary here to recall that ‘power produces knowledge …power and knowledge directly imply each other’ (Foucault 1979, 27). Most of the theoretical perspectives in IR have been Western-centric throughout its disciplinary history and, in practice, the Western-centric IR theories have catered for the interests of Western powers and civilization. The absence of non-Western IR theory implies that the Western players have been ahead of their counterparts in the non-Western world in terms of real world power competition.

However, in proportion to Asia’s elevating international standing in world politics in the post-Cold War era of globalization, there has recently been growing interest in producing non-Western, indigenous IR theory in many parts of Asia and from critically-informed scholars interested in IR knowledge based on the non-Western world (Acharya 2011; Acharya and Buzan eds 2010; Alagappa 2011; Behera ed 2008; Chun 2011; Kim and Cho 2009; Kim and Cho eds 2007; Mallavarapu 2009; Qin 2011; Shilliam ed 2011; Shimizu et al 2008; Tickner and Blaney eds 2012; Tickner and Waever eds 2009; Xiao 2010; Yamamoto 2011).\(^2\) South Korea is no exception. Although South Korean scholars’ aspiration to have their own brand of IR theory has existed since the 1950s, the South Korean IR community

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\(^1\) In this paper, capital letters refer to the academic field, and lower case to the practice of world politics.

\(^2\) Indeed, the call for a less Western, more diverse IR is not limited to the IR scholarship in Asia, but can be found in the mainstream American IR academia (Jackson 2011; Tickner 2011a, 2011b).
vigorously engaged in arguing for the building of a distinctively Korean IR theory in the 2000s. Against this scholastic backdrop, this paper aims to provide a critical, meta-theoretical assessment of the two major recent South Korean discourses on how to construct its national school of IR in the global academic field, by examining various academic publications (such as journal articles/chapters, newsletters, and books) produced mostly after 2000 by the South Korean IR/political science community. This paper will argue that South Korean IR academia’s recent quest for an independent, self-reliant national school of IR with universal applicability still seems to be operating under colonial thinking, which tends to confirm and consolidate the hegemonic status of mainstream American IR based on rationalist epistemology while possibly ending up treating Korea as a mere test-bed for rationalist IR approaches. In addition, it may run the risk of projecting an ethnocentric, imperialistic undertone onto non-Western IR communities in practice, whereas epistemologically it expands the rationalist hegemony.

As for this paper’s structure, the following section provides a brief historical sketch of IR in South Korea, showing that there has been a persistent call to build a Korean school of IR since the 1950s. The third section discusses the South Korean rationale behind its quest for a distinctively Korean IR theory by considering how IR in South Korea has been perceived by local scholars. In examining the two major approaches to building the future Korean national school of IR, the fourth section points to universalism/universality as a core element in the process of theorizing Korean international relations. The fifth section, in a critical, reflective perspective, explores two potential pitfalls of seeking the taken-for-granted universality of future Korean-style IR theory. The last section recaps the paper’s key arguments while stressing the importance of practising reflexive self-criticism during theorization.

Three disclaimers should be made explicit at the outset. First, this paper’s survey of South Korean publications regarding the production of a distinctively Korean IR theory may not be exhaustive, but is sufficiently extensive to capture the major features of this phenomenon. Second, this paper does not regard the South Korean IR community as a monolith, which sees the world all in the same way. There is indeed considerable diversity within the South Korean IR community in terms of research topic, theoretical approach, and methods. Rather, this paper intends to discuss critically the study of international relations in South Korea in a quest to create a made-in-Korea IR theory. Third, despite the critique of the ways to produce a universalist Korean-style IR theory in South Korea, this paper neither underestimates nor emasculates the agency of IR scholarship in South Korea. It does not claim that the South Korean IR community has stopped theorizing or become nativistic, but rather that it needs to continue to be critically alert to its (mistakenly) taken-for-granted meta-theoretical/normative underpinnings in the theorization process. In fact, this paper’s critique alludes to the growing agency of Asian IR in the global scholarship and today’s world politics.
In their reflective review of IR in South Korea while emphatically calling for the building of a distinctively Korean IR theory (Korean School of IR), Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009, 406-410) provide a historical trajectory of IR in South Korea in the Cold War era by dividing the period into three stages. The first stage is called the ‘Founding Era’ (late-1940s~1960s). Due to the legacy of Japanese colonialism, IR as a subfield of political science in South Korea was initially shaped by Korean scholars with a Japanese academic orientation. Yet, the American influence became predominant after the Korean War (1950-3), since Korean scholars felt the necessity to rely on American materials for information on international politics and did want to pursue higher education at US universities. The second stage is called the ‘Formative Era’ (1970s), which is characterized by ‘the rigorous application/reapplication of American IR studies into Korean issues’ (Kim and Cho 2009, 408). The third stage is the period of ‘Competing Alternative Views’ (1980s), which is characterized by the tension between the mainstream American IR perspectives and Marxist traditions. Since the end of the Cold War, it is said that the South Korean IR academic field entered the stage of ‘Paradigmatic Pluralism’ or ‘Maturity’ (Kim and Cho 2009, 410-9; Park 2005, 68-9; Park 2008, 19-20). At this stage corresponding to the present era of globalization, IR in South Korea became plural in terms of its theories and research topics. It would appear in the period of maturity that there is no serious time-lag between the scholarly trends in the West and South Korea respectively.

It is widely accepted in South Korea that Korean IR still lacks an independent intellectual basis and has been shaped by the changing landscape of mainstream American IR. In fact, considering contemporary Korean history, South Korean IR’s Western-dependency (particularly its American-dependency) is understandable. Related to South Korea’s domestic and international politics, the American influence remains clear. Since, and even before, its national birth in 1948, America has been one of the most important factors shaping South Korea into what it is today (Im 2006). The same is true of IR academia in South Korea. To modernize the country against North Korea after the Korean War, South Korea’s educational system was voluntarily modelled on that of America, not to mention the curricula for teaching academic subjects; national education has been an essential aspect of the statecraft and modernization in South Korea. Arguably, crudely speaking, the social sciences in South Korea mean American social sciences (Chung 2007; Hong ed 2008; Kim 2010). Indeed, the South Korean IR profession has appeared to be a staunch disciple of mainstream American IR. The whole of academia –particularly, political science and IR– in South Korea still tends to prefer American doctoral degrees to domestic or non-American ones, so PhDs from America have an advantage in the South Korean academic job market (Hong ed 2008; Park 2005; Yu and Park 2008). It is thus unsurprising that, when conducting their own research, South Korean IR scholars have heavily relied on the major American IR approaches, such as

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<sup>3</sup> Also see Chun (2010), Hahm (2008), Park (2005), Park (2008).
balance of power, deterrence, power transition, democratic peace, and so on. South Korean scholars have well digested and appropriated the American IR knowledge by rigorously applying it to Korean cases in their empirical work. Indeed, American IR, as a reference point for explaining South Korea’s security policy and foreign behaviour, has substantially contributed towards developing IR in South Korea and offering some policy guidelines for Seoul (Kim 2007c).

However, by pointing out the adverse effects of American-centrism (broadly speaking, Western-centrism) on its local IR community, which will be discussed in the following section, in South Korea, there has been a persistent call for ‘the Koreanization or Indigenization of IR’ since the 1950s (Lee and Lee 2006), even at a time when South Korean IR scholars vied to apply the various Western IR theories to Korean realities more rigorously. Despite its heavy reliance on the Western IR theories, ‘self-referential IR,’ ‘Juchejeok [self-reliant] IR,’ ‘the Korean School,’ ‘Korean IR,’ ‘IR with self-identity,’ ‘distinctively Korean IR theory,’ ‘IR with Korean characteristics,’ ‘IR in the Korean context,’ and the like are buzzwords in the South Korean IR community. Moreover, there have recently been louder calls for the production of a distinctively Korean-style IR theory, like the English School, in South Korea, as its international and economic standing rose during the post-Cold war era of globalization; major examples of this are the special edition of The Korean Journal of International Relations in 2007 under the theme of ‘50 Years of the Korean Association of International Studies (KAIS): Introspection and Prospect’ and the Inauguration Speech of President of the KAIS in 2011 (Kim 2011b; also see Ha, Kim, and Kim eds 2005; Ha ed 2008; Kim 2011b; Woo and Park eds 2004). In a similar vein, although globalization/globalism is today’s societal norm in its country, the following affective statement of stressing nationalization resonates with many South Korean IR scholars: ‘Currently, the Korean IR scholarships no longer rely on just importing foreign thoughts and ideas. Now is the time to facilitate the process of appropriating the study of IR to the standards of Koreanization’ (Kim and Cho 2009, 402). In brief, building the ‘Korean School’ of IR is largely seen as an academic and historical mission to be finally completed in the globalizing 21st century in the field of international relations in South Korea.4

2. The Korean School as a Way of Normalizing Colonized IR in South Korea

IR in South Korea still relies heavily on Western theories and ideas when considering non-Western but important issues related to it, such as Korea’s incomplete nation- and state-ness, South Korean developmental modernization, the fluctuating inter-Korean relations, Korea’s place in Northeast Asia, and so on. Here, the key issue vexing the South Korean IR community is the conscious or unconscious intellectual dependency of South Korean IR on

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4 Interestingly, nowadays, in South Korea, the idea of exercising soft/cultural power (such as the Korean Wave – Hallyu) through public diplomacy abroad is often stressed in academia, media and policy-circles. Considering this, the Koreanization of IR appears to contribute to and work with the broader Korean charm offensive discourse today.
the West; more to the point, the entrenched Western-centrism within South Korean IR, perhaps throughout all of South Korean academia in general (see Kim et al. eds 2006; Lee et al. 2005; KPAC ed 2003). According to Jung In Kang (2006, 120-6), a famous politics professor and vehement critic of Western-centric thinking in Korean mind-sets, the excessive Western-dependency in South Korean political science has had three negative impacts on developing its own scholarship, as follows:

As they digest “advanced” Western theories, non-Western scholars internalize the Western mode of thinking as both universal and preferential while *failing to craft the critical tools to theorize their own unique political experience.* … Non-Western scholars, immersed in advanced Western theory, sometimes *distort the realities of their own societies* when they are not able to locate the relevance of Western theory. … With the prevalence of Westernized critical thinking and assimilationist interpretative frameworks, *the reality or facts of non-Western societies continue to be marginalized* (italics: my emphasis).

In a similar vein, Jinseog Yu and Kun Young Park (2008, 62-4) claim that the heavy dependence of South Korean IR on American IR has effectively served as a handmaiden for American value and interests, by wielding the power of America against Korean theory-consumers to equate American concerns with Korean ones in the field of international politics. What is more, Koreans’ uncritical consumption of American IR theories would make the existing international reality disadvantageous to Korea and disable their intellectual capacity for transforming world politics. Indeed, there was much more work deploring the excessive Western-dependency/Western-centrism in South Korean academia while calling for its own brand of IR theory in the 2000s (see Chun and Park 2002; Ha and Kim 2005; Hahm 2008; Hong ed 2008; Kang 2006; Kang 2010; Kim and Cho ed 2007; Kim 2008a; Kim 2008b; Kim 2002; Kim 2010; Lee et al. 2005; Lee 2007a; Lee and Lee 2006; Park 2008; Woo 2004; Yang 2010).

For the majority of South Korean IR scholars, Western IR theories (particularly the mainstream rationalist approaches in the US) have acquired a hegemonic status over the meta-theoretical foundations of IR in South Korea (Kang 2010, 12), while South Korean IR scholarship is said to be culpable of serving Western interests and treating Western practices as superior and universal. This has thus driven them to ‘self-marginalization, self-abasement, and self-negation … they have not been able to form independent worldviews, a fact that eventually rendered them as self-alienated’ (Kang 2006, 119). In this sense, IR in South Korea is a still-colonial Western scholarship which reproduces the West’s frameworks in non-Western Korea. The effect of this hegemony of American-centrism is to marginalize the possibilities for a Korean school of IR.

At this point, the absence of its own brand of IR theory has produced a psychological – or self-esteem– problem for the South Korean IR community. Over the last six decades since the Korean War, South Korean IR scholars have made little, if any, progress in producing
theories and concepts which can be called the stuff of Korean IR known to the global scholarship, whereas the country’s rapid political, economic, and social development illustrates the classic rags-to-riches tale in today’s world. The call for IR theory with a Korean self-identity became stronger during the period of South Korea’s growing wealth and power in the post-Cold War age of globalization. Even when South Korea’s East Asian neighbour – China– is likely to project core China-style IR concepts representing their academic identity (for example, China’s Confucian Tianxia worldview which is proposed as being comparable with the realist concept of ‘system’ and the English school’s concept of ‘society’), there has been no such grandiose global-level IR concept/theory constructed in South Korea or by Korean scholars. This brutal reality harms South Korean IR scholars’ self-esteem. The following comments by Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009, 416) vividly reveal the commonly-shared frustration within the South Korean IR community over the theoretical underdevelopment of Korean IR:

There is no denying that Korean IR scholarship has less influence in the world compared to what the dependencia school from Latin America initiated as a sensational model of underdevelopment to the global audience. Why can’t Korea follow what Latin America succeeds in? … Perhaps most IR scholars in Asia have gotten away from what has been called an intellectual colony in relation to the US dominance of academic areas (italics: my emphasis).

Hence, the development of a Korean school of IR is a way of securing scholarly independence to overcome the intellectual colonialism: ‘Indigenization [of Korean IR] could be interpreted not just as a field of study but also as a matter of dignity for Korean IR scholars’ (Kim and Cho 2009, 403; also see Hong ed 2008; Kim 2007a; Kim 2002, 2009; Lee and Lee 2006). Furthermore, the absence of Korean-style IR theories contributes to the marginalization not just of South Korean IR scholars in the global scholarship, but also of their country in world politics. Related to this, in calling for Korean and, more broadly, non-Western IR theories, Chaesung Chun (2010, 87) argues that ‘Untheorized territory of the non-Western world would not be grasped by policy makers, either. What is theorized has an opportunity to be problematized in academic and practical worlds.’

All things considered, what is meant by the indigenization of IR in South Korea? The ‘Korean School’ of IR must be established for 1) academically improving South Korean IR knowledge production for global scholarship, 2) raising the dignity of IR scholars in South

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5 It is assumed that, realistically, South Korea, as a divided, middle power, is in no position to project a new and/or post-Western world order, unlike its neighbouring great powers in the Asia-Pacific area. South Korean IR tends to focus on how to place Korea in a changing, uncertain world (that is, producing survival, unification and developmental strategies for South Korea), while cautiously reading how the new world order takes shape. In this sense, note that some foreign policy-oriented concepts devised mostly for Seoul have been discussed in South Korea, drawing on a combination of Korean experience and Western IR knowledge (see Ha and Nunkung eds 2007; Kim 2007c, 2008d). Yet, it would seem that the concepts are not structure-level universalist IR theory which South Korean IR wants to produce, and they sound Western rather than distinctively Korean.
Korea while avoiding their intellectual Western-dependency (colonialism), and 3) protecting the national interests in regional and global politics. In short, the idea of building a ‘Korean School’ of IR is based on the premise that the current South Korean IR academia is still colonized by the West and, more to the point, by the hegemony of mainstream American IR. To overcome this colonial situation, that is, to normalize IR in South Korea, distinctively Korean IR theories should be created to speak to the world on behalf of Korean scholars and the whole Korean nation. This might also allow Korea to seek equal status vis-à-vis the West, academically and practically.

3. The Essentiality of Universality in the Theorization of a Distinctively Korean IR Theory

As for the issues concerning the Koreanization of IR, it is said in South Korea that there exists a tension between two emulating approaches: the universality-focused approach, and the particularity-focused approach. In the process of theorizing on Korean IR from the perspective common to general IR, the former approach aims to produce so-called scientific knowledge which should be applicable in the global scope and empirically testable. Here, the key question is ‘How can we [South Korean IR scholars] construct a distinctively Korean IR theory while keeping it as generalizable as possible?’ (Choi 2008, 209) Accordingly, this approach often seeks to generalize from the Korean experience and history for the wider audiences outside Korea, but on its own terms, and at the same time tends to revise and develop the existing rationalist IR theories through the Korean and East Asian contexts (Lee 1999, 567; Min 2007). The point of this approach is that, in regarding IR as one of the modernist social sciences, future Korean IR theory should be universally applicable while incorporating its unique experiences and history which show Korea’s distinctive ontology. Here, Korean particularistic IR theory without universality, which is consumed only inside Korea, is no more than empty talk, as such a theory is undesirable and unachievable (Kim 2007c, 283, 302). Despite making efforts not to ignore indigenous factors, scientific universality (or generality) rather than particularity comes first in the theorization.

On the other hand, the particularity-focused approach stresses ‘the importance of identifying Korea’s unique historical experience from its own historical perspectives’ (Choi 2008, 205; also see Chun 2010, 2011; Chun and Park 2002, 26; Ha 2008, xi; Kim and Cho 2009, 420). A dialogue with Korean diplomatic history is crucial for building its own national IR school, often seeking certain prototypes of Korean security practices in history (Ha, Kim, and Kim eds 2005; Kim 2008b; Ku 2008; Lee 2007b). Moreover, while there are abundant pre-theoretical resources in Korea, these have not been fully exploited by its IR scholars. South Korean scholars have been cut off from their own classical intellectual resources and

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6 This section will not detail who’s who in the two camps or plural scholars’ specific claims for their respective positions, but will rather indicate the basic features of each approach and consider their tacit meta-theoretical/teleological underpinnings in theorization. For a detailed discussion of the two approaches, see Choi (2008), Kim and Cho (2009), Kim (2010).
need to rediscover them and reconnect for theorization. In doing so, the Korean identity can be extracted from traditional Korean political thought, breaking away from the ongoing intellectual colonization (Bae 2003, 98, 103). Overall, this particularity-focused approach makes much of Korea’s indigenous perspectives, historical experiences and contextual exceptionalism in the formative process of theorization.

Yet, it should be noted that the particularity-focused approach argues for making an important contribution to the study of global phenomena from the Korean perspective without being unduly jingoistic, nationalistic, and parochial. The approach should not be limited to the Korean peninsula, since the political phenomena found in Korea share a universal nature with those of other countries (Chun 2007, 235; Kim 2010, 10, 121-3; Kim 2007a, 122). This stance seems to generate a paradox. As Korean particularity contains a certain universal element (or meaning), it is said in the particularity-focused approach that Korean-style IR theory can be peculiar to Korea and, at the same time, universally applicable to the world outside Korea. However, it is curious that, if non-Korean (e.g. Chinese, Japanese, American, and so on) particularity equally and essentially has a universal element which can be extracted from Korean particularity, on what basis can that universal element be claimed to belong exclusively to Korean particularity? Perhaps the element can also be called Chinese, Japanese, American, and so on, for everyone has the same one. In spite of this, seeking and/or discovering universality is desirable and necessary in the theorization of an IR theory with a distinctive Korean self-identity. For example, Chul-Koo Woo (2004, 15) argues that ‘To seek a Korean identity of IR studies, the Korean IR community needs to construct an objective, universal theoretical framework which can explain Korea’s various historical events’. Taik-young Hahm (2006, 1-2) further asserts that ‘The search for Korean international relations theory is only possible through the convergence of both universalism and historicism-particularism’ (also see Chun 2007, 249; Kim and Cho 2009, 417). A key challenge for the particularity-focused approach is to explore how Korea’s unique experience can be turned into definitive frameworks for analyzing phenomena outside Korea. The point of this approach is that the theorization should be primarily based on Korea’s unique ontology which is required to be globally acceptable beyond its national boundaries; here, the quest for universality is seemingly taken for granted.

As a result, although discussing the tension between the universality-focused and particularity-focused approaches is somewhat useful for working out the formation of IR scholarship in South Korea for pedagogical purposes, the demarcation between them are not clear-cut –they are not polar opposites– in the sense that both regard universality as an essential core of their theorization, explicitly or implicitly. Both have the same mission: that is, future Korean-style IR theory should be welcomed, recognized, and consumed by the local scholarship and, more importantly, by the global scholarship that is dominated by the West.  

In short, universality, roughly interpreted as making the ‘Korean School’ of IR marketable

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7 Indeed, this reliance on the West to endorse Korean IR’s uniqueness reveals an utterly inexpressible desire for the Koreanization of IR and thus points to South Korean IR’s non-Western characteristics.
globally, is essential in the theorization of the Korean school of IR.

4. Potential Pitfalls of Seeking the Universality of Future Korean-style IR Theory

In the two discourses on how to build a universalist Korean-style IR theory, broadly speaking, two attempts have been suggested for achieving universality. One is to acquire general recognition as an equal IR enterprise from the West (or, more to the point, the American IR scholarship largely based on rationalist (positivist) epistemology) and the other is to export made-in-Korea or made-by-Koreans IR theories to both Western and non-Western IR societies—particularly, the scholarship in developing countries often called the Third World.

4.1. Self-Reliant Korean School of IR in Colonial Thinking

To overcome its intellectual colonialism towards the West, the IR scholarship in South Korea aims to produce a universalist, Korean-style IR theory. At this juncture, a critical question should be raised: what is the apparent, central reference point of the universality that is eagerly sought by the South Korean IR community? In other words, when understanding IR as a ‘structured field permeated by relations of power’ (Waever 2010, 298), who has the institutional (if not, hegemonic) power to call something universal or not in the existing global IR scholarship? Apparently, American IR as a modernist social science still works as ‘the epicenter for a worldwide IR community engaged in a set of research programmes and theoretical debates’ (Ikenberry 2009, 203), a widely-accepted belief that even reflectivists cannot deny American rationalist IR’s dominant position in “legitimate” knowledge production and disciplinary gate-keeping in the scholarship (Smith 2000, 2002, 2004; Weaver 1998, 2010). The same is true of the majority of South Korean IR scholars who often look to American IR as the global standard for evaluating their academic work while simultaneously competing with it (Min 2007). The point here is that, to (appear to) be universally applicable in IR, in practice future Korean-style IR theories should receive general recognition as an equal scientific IR enterprise to the mainstream American IR scholarship. If the theoretical products of South Korea are simply ignored in the global scholarship, how can its IR community claim and prove that Korean-style IR theories are universal or truly global? Put simply, considering the ongoing asymmetric relations of power between America and South Korea in the global IR scholarship, Korean IR cannot be universal by itself; it needs American IR’s endorsement in order successfully to build its brand of “universal” IR theory.

Then, what is the key rule of engagement for intellectual contestation with and/or recognition from the American IR scholarship based largely on rationalist meta-theory? To answer this, it is useful to discuss briefly rationalism’s response to reflectivism in the third great IR debate and meta-theoretical position of Alexander Wendt’s (1999) constructivism in relation to rationalism and reflectivism. In response to the reflectivist, meta-theoretical critiques of rationalism, Robert Keohane (1988, 392), on the side of the rationalistic inclinations, claims that ‘the greatest weakness of the reflective school lies not in deficiencies in their critical arguments but in the lack of a clear reflective research program that could be
employed by students of world politics’. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (quoted in Sterling-Folker 2006, 8) also accuse the reflectivist methodology of mere ‘interpretivism’ that lacks any standard of judgment, which could result in ‘a form of epistemological anarchy’ in the IR discipline. The rationalists urge the reflectivists to suggest appropriate “scientific methods,” rather than merely denouncing rationalism at the abstract level. It thus appears clear that the adoption of a positivist epistemology is the minimum, essential requirement for being accepted by the mainstream rationalists as an “equal”, “legitimate” enterprise in IR (Smith 2002, 2004).

In addition, another case can vindicate this point. By introducing his version of constructivism in IR, often called conventional or modernist constructivism, Alexander Wendt (1999, 394) locates his theoretical position within the framework of the third great debate between rationalism/positivism and reflectivism/post-positivism: ‘My objective … is to build a bridge between these two traditions’. Towards this end, Wendt (1999) argues that the world we want to know is social rather than static, which shows an idealistic ontology. Wendt (1999, 75) adds that ‘Constructivists … are modernists who fully endorse the scientific project of falsifying theories against evidence’, revealing a positivist epistemology. This meta-theoretical positioning gives birth to the significant facet of Wendt’s constructivism vis-à-vis other theoretical paradigms. In his Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt (1999, 38-40) states that ontologically he is post-positivist, while epistemologically he is positivist. Based on this meta-theoretical position, Wendt (1999, 40) believes that his constructivism can provide the ‘via media’ (the middle path) between rationalism and reflectivism. Although reflectivists disagree with Wendt’s claim of the via media due to his meta-theoretical inconsistency (Campbell 2001; Zehfuss 2002), rationalists treat Wendt’s constructivism subscribing to the positivist epistemology as a legitimate IR approach along with realism and liberalism while thoroughly rejecting the radical reflectivist approaches (Smith 2002, 74-6). The positivist epistemology and allied scientific methods still ‘define “proper” social science and thereby serve as the gatekeepers for what counts as legitimate scholarship’ in the mainstream IR (Smith 2002, 72).

These two contemporary theoretical debates reveal that, to obtain favourable recognition from the mainstream rationalist IR in America, IR in South Korea should theorize on Korean international relations or conceptualize unique Korean ontological entities, on the basis of an empiricist, positivist epistemology. In fact, growing South Korean voices, explicitly or implicitly, follow this basic meta-theoretical rule of engagement with IR in America, in calling for universal IR theory with a distinctive Korean self-identity.8 On the side of the particularity-focused approach, Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009, 403)

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8 To be fair, note that few voices are critical of scientific universality and American positivistic international studies in South Korea (see Kang 2010; Kim 2002; Hong 2008a). In so doing, the voices tend to pay great attention to Korean exceptionalism against Western scientific universalism while shedding light on the politics of knowledge production/consumption between Korean and American academia. Seemingly, no clear Korean-invented epistemologies and methodologies, as distinct from Western ones, have been suggested by the critics of scientific universalism in South Korea. In criticizing American universalism, they also tend to be interested in the globalization of IR in South Korea by exporting Korean-style theory.
state that ‘International politics as a social science’ must be based on its own history and roots. YoungMyung Kim (2010, 10) also argues that, using ‘Western social science’ appropriately, it is necessary to take notice of Korean particularity and the search for its universal meaning. Based on the concepts of generalizability, preciseness and simplicity, for which a good theory should strive, in Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), Seokwoo Kim (2007b, 116) points out that, in South Korea, the universality-focused approach stresses generalizability, whereas the particularity-focused approach is concerned with preciseness, and then argues that IR in South Korea should adopt an eclectic approach, combining generalizability with a precise adherence to its national IR theorization. Chaesung Chun (2007, 245) calls South Korean IR scholars actively to participate in the process of creating ‘universal explanatory’ theories in the global scholarship while making much of Korean particularities and normative foundation. Jinseog Yu and Kun Young Park (2008, 66) claim that future Korean-style IR theories should best ‘explain’ Korean situations, and provide an action-plan for Korea by ‘predicting’ the future. In addition, Byoung Won Min (2007, 43, 50) argues that, by starting from the revision of the existing Western theories to suit Korean realities, the South Korea IR community should produce Korean IR theories which are ‘communicable’ and ‘compatible’ with the criterion of international standard in the existing global IR scholarship. Woosang Kim (2007c, 285) also argues that South Korean IR scholars should produce a new type of ‘positivistic, universal’ IR theories and try to revise and improve the existing rationalist IR theories along with their counterparts in the West. Against the backdrop of empiricist social science, the most explicit guideline on how to develop a Korean school of IR is suggested in Jong Kun Choi’s (2008, 215) article entitled, Theorizing East Asian International Relations in Korea, as follows:

Any theorizing based on Korea’s unique historical experiences must be tested under the principle of generality. ... Although Korean IR should strive to explain the country’s unique historical experience, it will be judged by strict measurements of scientific universalism, which will contribute to globalization of Korean IR in return. … the success or failure of Korean theorists in developing a “Korean School” will depend on their ability to inspire and support a vibrant program of empirical research not only in the Korean and East Asian contexts, but also in world politics as a whole (italics: my emphasis).

To make universalist Korean-style IR theory marketable and acceptable to the American IR scholarship that is seen as the global reference point, the South Korean strategy of adopting the mainstream rationalist epistemology in theorization is appropriate and likely to be successful. However, this move seems to raise a paradox about IR in South Korea. That is, although the South Korean IR community has long argued for the overcoming of the excessive Western-dependency (de facto colonial) situation in their IR studies by constructing the independent, self-reliant Korean school of IR by Koreans themselves, the local
scholarship, by adopting the positivist epistemology for achieving universality, is unable to become “self-reliant” and “independent” and thus it is almost impossible for it to unilaterally normalize its so-called colonized IR. Rather, the reality is that local scholars’ independent self-reliance against intellectual colonialism relies not on South Korean IR’s efforts and will, but on the long-term academic colonizer’s—American IR’s—benign decision. The call for building universally applicable Korean IR theory with a distinctive self-identity is still operating in colonial thinking sustained by the hegemony of American IR, after all. The more IR in South Korea is obsessed with the universality of the mainstream rationalist IR in their theorization, the greater its dependency on American IR. This implies that, in constructing a universal Korean school of IR, its IR community will, in practice, reinforce the hegemony of American IR’s meta-theory in South Korea and make American IR appear more universal. This may also relegate Korean IR to being little more than a provider of ‘unique regional independent variables’ (Choi 2008, 193) to the American rationalist IR theories. In so doing, future Korean-style IR theories, albeit successfully produced, would at best occupy a small, compartmentalized space within the mainstream rationalist IR of America. At this juncture, just as it is claimed that ‘it is the right time to deepen the process of Koreanization of the IR discipline’ (Kim and Cho 2009, 420) in the post-Cold War era of globalization, it is high time to question the taken-for-granted value in South Korean theorization, that is, the universality which has the implicit hierarchical character: the rule-setting (dominant and colonial) America and the rule-following (dominated and colonized) Korea. Otherwise, it would seem that the self-declared independent Korean school of IR remains stuck in the colonial thinking of IR as American social science.

4.2. A New Ethnocentric Hegemony?
Although any global-level Korean-style IR theory remains to be created, the South Korean IR community seems to have one apparently self-evident goal to achieve through its own brand IR theory in the near future: ‘It seems that Korean political scientists are about to stand shoulder to shoulder with political scientists of any advanced Western country. Political science in Korea faces new challenging task of exporting theoretical and substantive knowledge created domestically’ (Park 2005, 69). Despite his critiques of South Korean mimicry of American positivist international studies, Sung-Hack Kang (2010, 36) reveals the idea of knowledge as a commodity to be sold globally: ‘Scholarship is the product of civilization. … The time has come for Korean IR scholars to take it seriously to globalize their academic products in the academic field of international relations’. Similarly, Taik-Young Hahm (2008, 67) mentions that it is likely to have Korean identity when Koreans design, put, and sell their brand theoretical products on the domestic and international markets of IR theory. In the field of International Political Economy, Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009, 419-20) maintain that ‘It could be a good opportunity to extend the Korean way of development to Africa and the Asia-Pacific region in the global context’. In his chapter entitled, Knowledge and International Politics: Democratization of Korea and Task of Scholarship, Seongmin Hong (2008b, 51) also pronounces that ‘(South) Korea should
be a theory-export country’, adding that South Korea should actively provide students from
Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America with scholarships and invite them to
attend Korean universities and research centres. Exporting knowledge should be recognized
as a crucial aspect of diplomacy, and the Korean academia and government should take
serious measures to promote it. All of these arguments appear to be state-centric.

Here, it is necessary to consider some normative questions relating to the consumers of
made-in-Korea or made-by-Korean IR theories abroad. If the Korean-style IR theory should
be exported, what kind of theory (or product) is it? For whom and for what ends? Put
differently, what does the South Korean IR community mean by Korean-style IR theory?
What sort of elements will it incorporate? What should it look like? Whose interests does it
reflect? Accordingly, it is necessary to examine what South Korean scholars wish future
Korean-style IR theories to be. Taik-Young Hahm (2008, 38, 68) pronounced that the Korean
School of IR should be IR of/in Korea, by Koreans and for Korea. Ho-Jae Lee et al. (2005, 25)
state that the indigenization of IR means the development of an IR theory and research
methods based on Korean cases and historical experiences. This should accord largely with
the pursuit of Korea’s interests. More specifically, Chaesung Chun and Kun Young Park
(2002, 7) argue that Korean-style IR theory should be knowledge which serves as a guideline
for action by best explaining and predicting Korea’s situation, and a political means of
reflecting Korean voices in the global scholarship of IR theory and establishing the status of
further argue that the world is starting to accept that the image of the world captured by the
perspective based on the Korean reality is universal (also see Chun 2010, 74; Ha and Kim

Considering all of this, it is likely that possible future Korean-style IR theories will be
rooted in Korean history, traditions, thoughts, ideologies, and practices. Indeed, it can be seen
as particular and Korean-centric, pretending to be universal in order to enhance and secure its
own claims and national interests. It is difficult to define on what basis Korea’s national
perspective/interests can be equated with the world’s universal perspective/interests: are
Korea’s interests every nation’s interests? Given the above comments by South Korean IR
scholars, the development of a distinctively Korean IR theory with universal applicability, if
it is to happen at all, cannot be disconnected from a certain (presumably high) degree of
Korean-centrism. Roughly speaking, South Korean IR scholars may well respond to Western
theoretical claims of universality dressed up in the garb of ethnocentrism by putting forth an
ethnocentric paradigm, disguised with universalism, of their own making. In this case, future,
universalist Korean-style IR theory can be regarded as a would-be hegemony, rather than
becoming post-hegemonic. Indeed, this does not appear to be a unique phenomenon in South
Korea. For instance, Callahan (2008) provides a penetrating critique of the concept of
‘Tianxia All-under-Heaven,’ seen as Chinese visions of the world order by some Chinese
scholars. In his article, The Absence of Non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered, Chen
(2011, 4) also points to the danger of ‘reproduce[ing] the very hegemonic logic of dominance’
by potential indigenous IR theories in Asia which speak for them and their interest.
Given this possible hegemonic nature after nationalizing IR theory in the Korean context, if South Korea tries aggressively to export its Korean-centric theoretical products under the banner of universalism to non-Western (particularly so-called Third World) societies, this move may be strikingly similar to the West’s White Man’s Burden toward the East. It is probable that, in commodifying and exporting Korean-style IR theory, the possible central elements of the theory all arise out of Korean thinking and practice, yet are presented as universal knowledge that is applicable to, and whose application would benefit, non-Western societies. Put simply, South Korea, with its own brand theory, enlightens other, under-theorized non-Western societies regarding their own modernization. In this logic of thinking, perhaps there is insufficient room for considering the ways in which non-Western others perceive the Korean-style IR theory and South Korea’s unquestioned drive for the export of its own brand universalist theory. If this concern is not properly addressed during the theorization, future Korean-style IR theory may be in danger of projecting an ethnocentric undertone of imperialism to non-Western societies while becoming controversial and self-serving. With this practical pitfall, (meta-)theoretically, note that the South Korean expansion may be the proxy-hegemony on behalf of mainstream American rationalism, since future Korean-style IR theory’s universality is likely to be based on the rationalist epistemology, as discussed earlier. This again attests to colonialism in South Korean IR. Accordingly, despite the long-term outcry over its American-centric intellectual dependency/colonialism within its IR academia, South Korea appears to search for colonies which vindicate the universal fit of its national school of IR in practice while consolidating the epistemological hegemony of American rationalism in theory.

On the whole, while critically arguing that ‘the post-war international relations theory is the hegemonic project of the United States for the management of world order’ (Hahm 2006, 1), South Korea’s unquestioned move (if not, drive) to export possible Korean-centric IR theories reflecting its own national interests under the banner of universalism would actually be an ethical oxymoron. What is needed in the South Korean IR community while theorizing is reflectively to rethink the broadly shared –implicitly or explicitly– idea of exporting Korean-style IR theory abroad in the name of universality.

Conclusion

As Smith (2004, 504) points out, ‘scholarship is based in a set of social forces toward which it is supportive (either explicitly or implicitly) or opposed. In essence, then, scholarship cannot be neutral; it is unavoidably partial, is unavoidably political, and unavoidably has ethical consequences’. Given this value-laden knowledge-power dynamic, it is impossible to create a neutral, universalist IR theory that simply deals with how the world really is objectively, to which everyone must subscribe without questioning its universality. Despite using the term “science,” seen as a foundation of universality, the social sciences are not value-free, immaculately objective academic enterprises (Nugent 2010). Societal pressures and social science development have always intermingled. If a certain theory is said to be
universal across time and space, then that theory is often a mere disguise for the secular interests of those promoting it. In practice, using the concept of universalism could be easily associated with violence against actors and things which appear to be unfit for it. In order to be universal, the universality must eliminate, exclude, and marginalize what is seen as not universal. Universalism as knowledge is thus a byproduct of power politics.

Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, it would seem that the pursuit of universality based on modernist social science has been taken for granted in building a Korean national school of IR. In so doing, the South Korean IR community inadvertently considers IR in America as the reference point for measuring their level of imagined universality. Under this circumstance, in spite of arguing for the normalizing of its colonized IR by producing self-reliant Korean-style IR theories, success relies not on South Korean IR’s products but rather on the long-term academic colonizer’s –American IR’s– benign decision. It is argued in this context that the recent call to build a universalist Korean-style IR theory is still operating under the colonial thinking, sustained by the hegemony of American IR’s positivist meta-theory. This might turn South Korea into a mere test-bed of American IR’s so-called “scientific” models, while showing South Korea’s ongoing, ingrained ‘Westoxification’ (Jung 2010, 96) in theorization. In a similar vein, Chen (2011, 4) argues that the possible emerging non-Western IR theories in Asia –which attempt to show the contributions by non-Western scholars from local ‘vantage points’ in the global IR scholarship dominated by the West– could end up becoming ‘derivative discourses’ of the modern West, ‘reproducing the logic of colonial modernity rather than disrupting it.’

It should be noted that American IR itself is geographically, linguistically, methodologically, and politically parochial (Biersteker 1999). It is not the anointed guardian of universal truths but merely one of them in the global IR academic field, albeit the dominant. Plus, due to its growing recognition in the global IR scholarship, the English School has been regarded as a role model for the South Korean IR community while hardly heeding the English School’s conservative, imperialistic traits, laced with being universal (Callahan 2004). What is required for South Korea is not to universalize the Self in relation to the West, but to provincialize the hegemony that tries to convert others into its own definition of universalism. This is not to say that the existing hierarchical relations between the West and non-West must be reversed for the non-Western, and Western IR knowledge is totally irrelevant. Rather, everyone’s locus is the centre and at the same time the periphery, and/or the IR’s centre is everywhere and its fringe nowhere. Regarding this, for the South Korean IR community, the question of how to ‘work towards fashioning a post-western IR’ (Behera 2007, 342), which goes beyond any hierarchical binary (e.g. Orientalism and Occidentalism), should be taken seriously in their everyday research and teaching. In addition, South Korea needs to urge the hegemony to critically rethink its claim for universality while trying to decolonize South Korea in a self-reflective manner. Indeed, there have been calls for making IR studies more diverse (Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Beier 2005; Jones ed 2006; Kayaoglu 2010; Shani 2008; Tickner 2011a, 2011b).

As for the theory-export mentality associated with the universalization of the Korean
national school of IR, the following critical questions are worth considering. As argued above, even the dominant American IR and the English School are not self-evidently universal per se, so is it possible for distinctively Korean IR theories to be universal? If so, in what ways? Why does the South Korean IR community tend simply to treat universalism as the goal to be achieved in building its own brand IR theory? Why is there no serious discussion of the denotation and connotation of their taken-for-granted universalism itself? In fact, the absence of these questions in the theorization is thoroughly political as well as normatively problematic, for possible future Korean-style IR theory with universalist orientation can be regarded as a would-be hegemony, rather than becoming post-hegemonic. This hegemony would be designed to serve South Korean national interests in practice and theoretically to consolidate the mainstream rationalism in American IR. It is thus necessary to reflect on whether the hidden rationale for exporting the Korean-style IR theory is identical to what the South Korean scholars criticize as the hegemonic nature of their counterparts in the West. A self-reflective critique of the idea of universalizing Korean-style IR theory is essential in its theorization.

All things considered, it is questioned whether the concept of universalism can provide a proper ethical basis for engaging with others. As has been shown, due to its seemingly unconditional quest for universalism, South Korea is unable to decolonize itself from the West, and at the same time is likely to search for non-Western colonies of its Korean-centric IR theory. Note that this paper’s suggestion of the essentiality of problematizing universality in building a Korean school of IR does not mean that IR in South Korea has to be distinctively particularistic throughout and exceptionally essentialist against other IR communities, nor that the South Korean IR community should stop doing theorization. Far from it. IR theorizing is a worthy, rewarding, and pleasurable activity that can deepen and expand our understanding of world politics. IR theorization in South Korea should not be based on inward-looking, nationalistic, and defensive nativism. Rather, this paper strongly supports meaningful dialogues between Korean and non-Korean IR communities at various levels via many different channels, taking into account a plurality of cultures. The normative point of this paper is that Korean-style IR theory, if any, cannot be self-evidently universal, but should be freely shareable with others while showing its contribution as well as temporal/spatial limitations. It is a matter of attitude towards engaging with others: universalism or share-ness. A perpetual critical appraisal of the meta-theoretical, normative foundations of any theory in the making is an indispensable task for all IR scholars, and theorizing should go hand in hand with practising self-criticism.

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Unthinking the Westphalian Narrative: Towards a Plural Future of World Politics

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Introduction

Recent International Relations scholarship has seen an emerging debate on the possibility and desirability of non-Western or national forms of understanding “the international,” with advocates arguing for the need to include ideas and experiences beyond the West, while critics caution about the dangers of looking too much for “differences” (cf. Acharya and Buzan 2010; Bilgin 2008). Perhaps a reflection of the rise of Asia (or the non-West more generally) in recent years, however, this invites one to question whether the Western/non-Western IR debate has produced relevant new insights for our understanding of the contemporary world. A key contribution of this approach is that it highlights the Eurocentric, Westphalian narrative (and its corollary of seeing the development of international history as the “expansion of European international society”) built in to the heart of IR—which is increasingly recognized as insufficient to understand the world today. Seen as the “multicultural moment” for the discipline (Kymlicka 2007), rebalancing representations to produce a truly global understanding of international relations, however, it may nonetheless follow the same fate as multiculturalism, similar to what Yoshikazu Shiobara (2010, 9) reports of the shift from “integration with diversity” to “cohesion as administration” in Australia. In particular it remains a constant danger that the debate will lapse into relativism, leading IR to retreat to the study of abstract principles or to just become a convenient legitimising discourse of the great powers, East and West.

Rather than portray the “West” and the “non-West” as a dichotomy, and somehow intrinsically different, a better way forward is to reconsider the linear and teleological notions of history built into mainstream IR that recognises sovereign states (and the relationship between them) as the only legitimate organisation of international relations, for a more plural understanding of world politics that accommodates variety of ideas, practices and experiences (both Western and non-Western), but in a way that is relational and not merely creating unconnected historical narratives of world politics. This is so, because the inflexible nature of mainstream IR that critics claim draws only from Western experiences stems from its

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understanding of historical developments. In an attempt to develop and contribute to a more relevant, critical IR theory, therefore, this paper argues that it is necessary to first unthink the Westphalian narrative engrained in the field in order to rediscover forgotten ideas and thinking that will open up alternative ways of conceiving the world. (Re)constructing multiple historical narratives and imagining plural futures, each reflecting experiences from both “West” and “non-West,” and comparing them with regards to whether it addresses the problems that matter to and are identified by groups in the local, national, and global communities (Flyvbjerg 2006, 84; 2001), it seems, is a more fruitful path of questioning both the disciplinary and social boundaries of IR.

The paper will be structured as follows. The first section examines the Western/non-Western IR debate. It looks at how the debate has shed renewed light on the Eurocentric nature of the discipline, and how the field suppressed the voices and experiences of the non-West in the development of international relations theory. Calls for developing new, non-Western or national schools of IR, as a corollary to this debate, will also be traced. While acknowledging the positive contributions of the debate, the second section highlights three limitations of the on-going discussion, and suggests that in order for the growing non-Western IR theory to make a substantial impact on the discipline, these limitations, and in particular its lack of engagement with the Westphalian narrative, need to be tackled. The third section then turns to this issue, suggesting that the linear, teleological historical narrative of mainstream IR needs to be abandoned in favour of a more plural understanding of world politics. It looks at the relationship between history and IR, on the plural forms of history, and how such plural and open-ended history could be connected to underpin alternative post-Western or post-Westphalian IR theories. Conclusion follows.

1. Western/non-Western IR Debate

While the search for a solid disciplinary core has been going on ever since its birth, recent decades have seen renewed interest on the shifting boundaries of the study of international relations. Pinar Bilgin (2010, 818-820) organises this development around two axis. On the first axis lies the debate on “American IR versus the rest,” where the question is whether IR as a discipline can be regarded as an “American social science” (Crawford and Jarvis 2001). In the 1970s, Stanley Hoffmann (1977, 48) argued that,

“The political preeminence of the United States is the factor I would stress most in explaining why the discipline has fared so badly, by comparison, in the rest of the world …. Insofar as it deals primarily with the contemporary world, it seems to require the convergence of a scholarly community capable of looking, so to speak, at global phenomena (i.e., of going beyond the study of the nation’s foreign policy, or of the interstate politics of an area) and of a political establishment concerned with world affairs; each one then strengthens the other.”
Almost a quarter of a century later, Robert Crawford (2001, 4) observes that the discipline “is multinational to be sure, but outside its American and Anglo-European cores consists of little more than foreign policy analyses, and what counts as a theory or discipline is in all places measured by the yardstick of what is endorsed officially as such in the United States.” By setting new research agendas and laying the boundaries for what counts as “science,” or simply by the sheer number of IR scholars, the United States occupies a special place in the field of study.

In essence, however, such debate centres on the difference between American and European (or more specifically British) variants of IR, where the former focuses on liberal ontology through rational choice, and is overwhelmingly theoretical by drawing on American and comparative politics, while the latter does not follow these characteristics (Waever 1998, 2010). As a result, IR is identified as a sub-field of Political Science in the US, whereas in Europe (Britain) it is regarded as a separate field of study.2

More recently, Bilgin points to an emerging body of literature that constitutes a second axis: “Western IR versus the rest.” Here, the question is less the difference between approaches to “the international” on both sides of the Atlantic, and more on how mainstream IR is both implicitly and explicitly based on the experiences and concerns of “the West.” Such Euro-centric nature of the discipline has been pointed out before. John Hobson (2012, 14-21), for instance, identifies six Eurocentric myths of IR (noble identity/foundationist myth, positivist myth, great debate myth, sovereignty/anarchy myth, globalization myth and theoretical great tradition myth) and argues that “international theory does not so much explain international politics in an objective, positivist and universalist manner but seeks, rather, to parochially celebrate and defend or promote the West as the proactive subject of, and as the highest or ideal normative referent in, world politics (Hobson 2012, 1). Branwen Jones (2006, 2) agrees, suggesting that “For much of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the field of IR has been dominated by North American, European, and to a lesser extent, Australian scholars. Thus, the majority of literature in the discipline of IR is written by and about only some of the peoples of the world —predominantly Americans and Europeans. IR remains guilty of forgetting and detracting from the thoughts and acts of not only the people of Africa but also ‘the rest’ of the non-Western world.” In a similar vein, drawing on Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe, Rosa Vasilaki (2012, 9) attempts to rectify such bias by calling for the “provincialising” of IR by “decentring the West and further deconstructing the dominance of Western epistemologies and values initiated by the poststructuralist/postmodern movement.”3 Thus, the debate between American/Western IR and the rest has opened up the discipline to serious scrutiny, examining its Eurocentric tendency and its consequence for our understanding of international relations.

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2 Such differentiation is also true for International Political Economy, which is regarded as being located under IR in the American context, while in the British case the field of study is considered separate. See Cohen (2007, 2008) on American and British IPE, and Blyth (2009) on the attempts at bridge-building.

3 The paper was first presented at the JAIR-BISA Collaborative Postgraduate Panel, 2011 JAIR Annual Conference, Tsukuba, 11-13 November 2011, a joint venture between Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) and British International Studies Association (BISA) that aims at such decentring of IR.
Yet what is new about the recent debate on the “Western IR versus the rest” is that it forces our attention beyond the current confinements towards research that seeks to rectify this lack of representation and develop alternative ways of conceiving the world. In a widely-cited special issue of *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* in 2007, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2007a) sets out the question “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?” According to Acharya and Buzan (2007b, 428-431), reasons for the absence of non-Western IR theory maybe attributed to the following facts: that Western IR theory has acquired hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense; that local conditions discriminate against the production of IR theory; and, that the West has a big head-start, and what we are seeing is a period of catching up. Reflecting on whether one can use Asia (or the non-West more generally) as the basis for generalisation that could meaningfully address the disjuncture between International Relations theory and the universality of human experience, Acharya and Buzan (2010, 230) arrive at a rather pessimistic conclusion, suggesting that “we should not have high expectations of an Asian or non-Western approach to IR emerging. The injection of Asian experience and thinking into the global debates about IR seems much more likely to come in more fragmented, possibly nationalist, forms.” Although not necessarily advocating a move towards national perspectives, Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver (2009, 339) nonetheless argues that “Without producing that much of its own IR theory and perspectives, IR ‘works’ in many places, but this means something markedly different than in the core [i.e. the West]. Instead of comparing it to IR in the core —and defining peripheral IR in terms of what it is not— it is necessary to see what it is.” A common thread running through all such suggestions is the conviction that beyond the boundaries of dominant Western IR lies a uniquely different world that needs to be explored in greater detail.4

Partly in response to such problematisation of the nature of the field, there have been increased efforts to develop Non-Western, national schools of IR. Muthiah Alagappa (2011, 195), for instance, observes that IR studies “grounded in national circumstances, experiences, traditions, and aspirations has experienced dramatic growth in several Asian countries and is fast becoming an important field of study. There is also growing interest among Asian scholars in IR theory including the development of indigenous ideas, concepts, and perspectives.” Reporting on the development of IR in China, Yaqing Qin (2007) argues that while the scholarly community is still in its infancy, Chinese School of IR theory is possible or even inevitable given the rising global role of the country in the international realm. Such sentiment is echoed by William Callahan (2008, 750), who points out the dangers of new hegemonic thinking in China: “rather than guide us towards a post-hegemonic world order, Tianxia [organising principle of Imperial China] presents a new hegemony that reproduces China’s hierarchical empire for the twenty-first century.” In the case of Japan, Takashi Inoguchi (2007) outlines the national state of the art, maintaining that although there is a lack

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4 See also other contributions in Tickner and Wæver (2009), as well as Tickner and Blaney (2012) and Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney (2012).
of IR theory if the term is another name for positivistic, American style research, there is abundant work if we look further; for instance, what Inoguchi calls three “proto-theoretical arguments” of Nishida Kitaro, Tabata Shigejiro, and Hirano Yoshitaro. A further positive endorsement is provided by Josuke Ikeda (Shimizu et al. 2008, 7), pointing out that Japanese as well as Asian IR offers “an attempt to make the existing mainstream of IR less absolute than before, through providing a different thought as components of a universal and multicultural IR.” In an effort to develop post-Western forms of IR, Giorgio Shani (2008, 723) argues that “A genuinely ‘post-western’ critical international theory would interrogate not only the positivist methodology of IR but also the concomitant assumptions of western cultural distinctiveness and superiority which are constitutive of the discipline.” For him, it is not enough to merely “add new voices” but to rethink the ontological premises of Western IR theory. Together, these new body of literature identifies the Eurocentric, Western nature of the study of international relations, examines how it frames the discussion on approaches to “the international,” and instead advances paths towards a more “local” set of theories of international relations; or to use Acharya and Buzan’s (2007a, 309, emphasis added) words, “indigenous political or strategic traditions, beliefs and practices that may have no equivalent in the Western IRT.”

2. Limits of the Debate

And yet, reservations remain as to whether the Western/non-Western IR debate has produced any relevant new insights for our understanding of the contemporary world. The answer to this question is patchy at best. Three limitations of the debate can be highlighted: consequences of emphasising hegemony and differences, the dangers of relativism, and the lack of tackling the real issue of the Westphalian historical narrative.

First, the Western/non-Western IR debate as it is currently framed risks fragmenting (or further fragmenting) the discipline by stressing the hegemony of Western IR and over-emphasising the “difference” between Western IR and its non-Western alternatives. Such an assertion runs the risk of naturalising the hegemonic nature of Western IR while labelling non-Western IR as a sort of “eccentric” knowledge. Bilgin (2008, 5-6) cautions that searching for genuine alternative knowledge “should not limit its task merely to looking beyond the spatial confines of the ‘West’ in search of insight understood as ‘different’, but should also ask awkward questions about the ‘Westernness’ of ‘Western’ IR and the ‘non-Westernness’ of others.” This is so, because clearly distinguishing between Western and non-Western forms of knowledge may distort the historical connections between the “West” and the “non-West” in the emergence of such ideas about international relations. Similarly, Ching-Chang Chen (2011, 4) points out that “with a competitive mood to become another English School or a superior alternative to Western IRT, Asian aspirations for their national

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5 The continued strength of American IR and its ability to set the criteria for “proper” theories are all too evident. See also Ong (2004).
schools of IR still treat East and West as oppositional entities.” If such endeavour does not advance our collective understanding of the nature of “the international,” then “simply calling for greater incorporation of ideas from the non-West and contributions by non-Western scholars from local ‘vantage points’ does not amount to the democratization of IR” as the advocates envision. While it is often acknowledged that one of the reasons for the seemingly dominant status of Western IR is its privileged access to metatheoretical issues and what comprises a proper “theory” of IR (cf. Acharya and Buzan 2010; Jackson 2011), hegemonic struggles over what constitutes legitimate knowledge by drawing on national or civilisational differences may not necessarily give rise to the pluralisation of our understanding of international relations.

Second, the emphasis of alternative, indigenous theory of IR advocated by the proponents of the debate may lead not only to hegemonic struggles for legitimate knowledge but also to the trap of relativism. This point can be highlighted by drawing parallels with the discussions on the plural forms of modernity (Wagner 2012, Ch.2-3). Spearheaded by Shmuel Eisenstadt’s (2000, 2002) work on “multiple modernities,” this approach seeks to revise the theory of modernisation and broaden our horizon of what it means to be modern beyond its Western imaginaries via the notion of a “cultural programme.” The approach provides an useful path towards understanding the different forms of modernity, but it is also limited in that it is based on some assumption of “original” diversity: “assumption that the major world civilizations pursued historically parallel trajectories, without any significant exchange, until their encounter with European modernity” (Wagner 2012, 33). Such formulation makes it difficult to compare different forms of modernities and to examine the interaction among them, leaving one vulnerable to the spectre of relativism. Similar dangers are also present in the current arguments for non-Western IR. As Tickner and Waever (2009, 338-340) amply remind us, the diverse ways IR is practiced around the world do not necessarily imply a separate universe —lowered international communication can only lead to a kind of internal monopoly of criticism and assessment. Decentring the production of knowledge and developing multicultural or multicivilisational approaches can enrich the discipline only if it opens up channels of dialogue between them.6

The third limitation of the Western/non-Western IR debate is that while it rightly offers a critique of the Westphalian historical narrative underpinning much of mainstream IR theory as Eurocentric, emphasis has been placed on developing “separate” histories that are absent from the orthodox view rather than critically engaging with the grand narrative. The notion that the modern state system came into life with the Westphalian settlement of 1648 which ended the Thirty Years’ War is well known and accepted (cf. Nye Jr. and Welch 2011, 72-73). The treaties of Westphalia put to an end to the Respublica Christiana with its multilayered authorities, and subsequently an international society with sovereign states as its exclusive members was born. This linear historical narrative is then grafted on to the tale of the “expansion of international society,” in which the rules and institutions of Europe were

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6 Karagiannis and Wagner (2007) offer some helpful thoughts on how to pursue this.
exported to the rest of the world. It is in this sense that Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (1984, 2, emphasis added) declare that “Because it was in fact Europe and not America, Asia, or Africa that first dominated and, in so doing, unified the world, it is not our perspective but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric.”

Such an account, however, has been subject to greater historical scrutiny in recent years. Andreas Osiander (2001) points out that the shift from multiple political authorities of medieval Europe to the neatly divided sovereign territorial states in modern times was a gradual one. Westphalia was only given its current role by the nineteenth- and twentieth-century international lawyers. Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John Hobson (2011, 741) agrees, stating that the clear-cut story of transformation “obscures the existence of various hierarchical international political transformations, especially of an inter-civilisational nature, that have existed not just in the pre-1648 era, but above all within the post-1648 ‘anarchic’ era.” From a political Marxist point of view, Benno Teschke (2003, 3) also argues that “1648, far from signalling a breakthrough to modern inter-state relations, was the culmination of the epoch of absolutist state formation; it marked the recognition and regulation of the international —or, to be more precise, inter-dynastic— relations of absolutist, dynastic polities.” The function of this Westphalian narrative, as Turan Kayaoglu (2010, 194) suggests, is that it “allows scholars to reinvent an framework of normative hierarchy depending on where Western and non-Western societies [are] placed in the narrative. Western states produce norms, principles, and institutions of international society and non-Western states lack these until they are socialized into the norms, principles, and institutions of international society.” Without tackling the master narrative underpinning Western IR, therefore, any attempts to develop IR beyond the West would run into a dead end and possibly regarded only as “pre-modern” in nature.

The Western/non-Western IR debate does take such revisionist views into account. This is apparent, for instance, when Buzan and Richard Little (2010, 197) encourage non-Western IR theorists to play a crucial and distinctive role in the promotion of world historical perspectives to overcome these shortcomings. Nonetheless, engagement between the development of non-Western IR and the critical examination of Westphalian narrative remains minimal, since proponents of non-Western IR, rather than critically engaging with this literature and the narrative at large, goes straight on to advocate attempts “to recover the civilizational histories before the encounter with the West, and look to them for alternatives to the Eurocentric Westphalian model” (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 228). The result of such lack of engagement is the multiple historical explanations of local or regional variances that do not necessarily contribute to the increase in relevant new insights for our collective understanding of the world today. It is to this issue that the paper will now turn.

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7 On the effect of the Westphalian narrative on IR literature, see also Schmidt (2011).
3. The Problem of Historical Narratives in IR

Thus far the paper has examined the debate on Western and non-Western IR and its limitations, highlighting how a fresh look at the discipline’s historical foundations is necessary to start developing IR theory that goes beyond the regional or civilisational divide. Rather than portray the “West” and the “non-West” as a dichotomy, and somehow intrinsically different, therefore, a better way forward is to abandon the linear and teleological historical narrative of mainstream IR for a more plural understanding of world politics that gives weight to a variety of ideas, practices and experiences, but in a way that is relational and that does not merely create unconnected historical narratives of world politics.

3.1. History and IR

The development of non-Western IR, if it is to avoid simply producing separate, indigenous and unconnected understandings of international relations around the world, and hence fall prey to the logic of “cohesion as administration” as in Australian multiculturalism, requires a fresh look at the relationship between history and IR. This is so, because the addition of multiple knowledge of and by the non-West, without a clear historical dimension, may either be regarded as a commentary of the present, or due to its incompatibility with the mainstream literature rooted in the Westphalian narrative, marginalised to the periphery of the discipline. This latter point can be exemplified by the lack of change to the Westphalian narrative after all the revisionist literature, perhaps because of its high stake for the field of study: “A genuine commitment to revisionism would necessitate a reconceptualisation of many of the fundamental frameworks of the discipline, as well as the need to reset its parameters or boundaries, not to mention invalidating the past as a (re)source from which we can pick historical data points at our leisure” (de Cavalho, Leira, and Hobson 2011, 756). In order for non-Western perspectives to engage and transform the core of the discipline, therefore, the underlying relationship between history and IR needs to be examined.

The relationship between history and IR has been a rather uncomfortable one, and the ahistoricism of IR has been widely documented (Hobden and Hobson 2002; Hobson and Lawson 2008). Although attempts have been made to bridge the gap (cf. Elman and Elman 2001; Kennedy-Pipe 2000), the worlds of theory building and historical empirical research remain distant in the minds of those practising it. As a consequence of this absence of communication, the grand historical narrative of Westphalia remains untouched, and in some sense strengthened. George Lawson (2012, 204-205) calls such forms of ahistoricism “history as scripture”: history, from this view, becomes a predetermined site for the empirical verification of abstract claims; “history serves as a ‘scripture’, as the application of timeless ‘lessons’ and inviolate rules removed from their context and applied to ill-fitting situations.” As Marc Trachtenberg (2006, 44) reminds us, “History is not to be thought of as a great

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8 The opposite of this, according to Lawson (2012, 205), can be labelled “history as butterfly,” where history is used as a means of disrupting prevalent power-knowledge nexuses. See also Hobson and Lawson (2008, 423-425) and Vaughan-Williams (2005).
reservoir of facts that can be gathered up like ‘pebbles on the beach’ and drawn on for the purpose of theory testing. It is important because by studying history the scholar can develop the kind of sensibility that makes intelligent judgment possible.” Even if one argues that history and IR could meaningfully come together, most mainstream research falls under what John Hobson and Lawson (2008, 421-423) label “history without historicism,” a mode of inquiry which recognises general/universalist propositions that can be applied across time and place. By examining transhistorical categories at the highest level of generality, such mode of inquiry is not far away from the ahistoricism identified above, and could ironically result in the (re)construction of grand historical narratives that plagues much of Western IR.

The problem with such construction of grand narratives, as exemplified by the Westphalian variant, is that history is downgraded to merely legitimise the official line of “how we got here,” effectively marginalising voices and experiences that do not fit into this master narrative. As Hobson and Lawson (2008, 424) points out, “reading history either through a theoretical lens or via the construction of a broader narrative is to fall into the trap of ‘mastering history’ so that it conforms to particular political and ideological ends.”9 Or, as Duncan Bell (2009, 5) reminds us from the view of disciplinary history of IR, “Disciplinary mythologies perform various legitimating functions, classifying some positions as the product of intellectual progress, others as consigned forever to the proverbial dustbin of history.” This brings us back to the problem of how the development of non-Western IR is currently pursued, since the production of indigenous knowledge equipped with its own “civilisational” history may simply erect multiple theories of non-Western international relations backed by its own true history that cannot speak to either the dominant Western form or amongst each other. In order to avoid such a possible outbreak of a “clash of civilisations” within the discipline, a radically different way of conceiving history is needed.

3.2. On the Pluralisation of History

The underlying problem with both Western and non-Western IR, in its current guise, is its understanding of history. Although a diverse array of voices, experiences and practices are drawn to develop these theories, both contemporary and historical, most take as its ultimate goal arrival at an understanding of the single and genuine truth of how the world works.10 Historically, this entails an interpretive closure of the historical records. By contrast, the paper advocates an alternative view of history that is open to the future and which resists any such closed interpretations. Nick Vaughan-Williams (2005) highlights these two views as part of an ongoing debate between “traditional historians” and “critical historiographers.” Traditional historians, as Vaughan-Williams (2005, 119) outlines, rest on six core principles:

“firstly, the past is considered ‘real’ and ‘truth’ relates to reality through referentiality and inference; secondly, so-called ‘facts’ derived from evidence a priori distinct

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9 See also Bently (2005).
10 On the metatheoretical debate over Positivism and Postpositivism, see Smith, Booth and Zalewski (1996).
from interpretation; thirdly, ‘fact’ and ‘value’ are clearly separable; fourthly, ‘history’ and ‘fiction’ can and must be differentiated; fifthly, the knower is removed from what is known; and, sixthly, ‘truth’ is not perspectival.”

History for traditional historians, then, is an unmovable truth that awaits, to be uncovered and excavated through the detailed reading of historical records (Trachtenberg 2006, 1-7; Jenkins 2003, 3). Such a take on history underpins much of both Western and non-Western IR theory, resulting in mutual non-acceptance that undermines our collective understanding of the world.

By contrast, critical historiographers acknowledge the fact that history is “made” by the historians rather than simply being “discovered” through evidence-based methodology (Vaughan-Williams 2005, 120).11 It destabilises the boundary between facts and fiction, and shifts our attention from the inquiry of “facts” to the inquiry of “meanings” (Noe 2007, 15). Following this view of history, past events do not present themselves but must be given attached meanings and organised into a narrative (Suganami 2008). As Hayden White (1987, ix) puts it, “Narrative is not merely a neutral discursive form that may or may not be used to represent real events in their aspect as developmental processes but rather entails ontological and epistemic choices with distinct ideological and even specifically political implications.”

To look at history from the critical historiographers’ point of view is to realise that configuring past events through the narrative act is a never-ending endeavour. History is continuously subject to revision, and past events take on multilayered meanings. In this sense, writing history is by nature an open-ended process (Noe 2007, 84-86). Past events are essentially incomplete, continuously connecting with preceding and succeeding events and acquiring new meanings in the process; weaving such relationships and producing “networks of meanings” is the historians’ act of “configuration” (Noe 2007, 90). The implication of such an alternative view of history is that it necessarily leads us to abandon efforts at a linear and teleological historical narrative —whether Westphalian or any other civilisational kind. Drawing on Paul Ricouer (1990, 206, emphasis added), this may be posed as a question of whether to “renounce Hegel”: where “leaving behind of Hegelianism signifies renouncing the attempt to decipher the supreme plot.”12 A post-Hegelian history, as Hiroyuki Tosa (2012, 34) suggests, would therefore abandon any attempts at an ultimate plot that places the past, present and future in a single historical story; it would necessarily be a network of multiple perspectives where the acceptance of the past, experiences of the present and expectations of the future collide, one that can be characterised as non-deterministic history. The pursuit of critical, alternative knowledge that goes beyond the current West/non-West dichotomy, in other words a post-Western (or post-Westphalian) notion of theory and history, therefore, would inevitably have to be plural in form.13

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11 As Carr (1990, 11-12) declares, “The historian is necessarily selective.” See also Moses and Knutsen (2012, Ch.9) on the methodological implications.
12 For an example of a Hegelian narrative in IR, see Fukuyama (1989).
13 On the virtues of pluralism, see Connolly (2005, 2010).
The construction (or reconstruction) of IR theories based on plural forms of history, however, does not necessarily have to be confined only to the role of a destabilisation tool of mainstream positivistic approaches and its singular conception of history (Lawson 2012), but could also take on a much more positive role. Here, a useful starting point is Heikki Patomaki’s notion of an “iconic model.” In After International Relations, Patomaki (2002, 76-77) criticises the positivistic conception of causality that underpins much of mainstream literature (and by implication the traditional historians), which involves empirical invariance that presupposes a closed system, in favour of a critical realist conception denoting real causal mechanisms and complexes that produce effects in open systems.  

This can be exemplified by two different approaches to adequate explanations: ampliative and reductive (Patomaki 2002, 124-125). The ampliative strategy, characteristic of mainstream Western IR theory, starts by searching for highly secure propositions, or unproblematic core beliefs, and subsequently moves outward by making inferences from this secure starter set. A reductive strategy, by contrast, begins not in the quest for accepted truths but for well-qualified and interesting “candidates” or “prospects” of truths. These candidates are then narrowed down through empirical research from multiple angles, to find not the “uniquely correct answer” but the “strongest and most defensible position.” The type of IR theory that is suitable for this latter purpose is what Patomaki (2002, 78-79) calls the “iconic model”:

“An iconic model is a descriptive picture—which can and should also be conceived of as an interpretation—of a possible world, a possible causal complex, which is presumed to be responsible for producing the phenomena we are interested in explaining. Iconic models are based on idealisations and abstractions, and they always involve metaphors, metonyms and analogies. Although they are interpretative and based on implicit and explicit conventions of language, these conventions are also projective: the model describes and posits existential hypotheses about entities and their relations.”

The iconic model is thus a form of inquiry that analytically “accentuates” a particular dimension of reality, similar to Max Weber’s ideal-types, which offers an ideal picture of events, types of action and social relationships (Patomaki 2002, 128).

What is interesting about this iconic model for the purpose of this paper is that its scope ranges from events that “actually happened” to those realities that “could have happened.” From such a perspective, attention could then turn to the underlying conditions of that event which led to the sequence of events that followed, but also to the factors that “could have” changed the course of history and led to an alternative possible world. Such inquiry can

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14 On critical realism and IR, see Jackson (2011, Ch.4) and Patomaki and Wight (2000).
15 It should be noted, however, that this is not a “normative” claim, but a description of the world that could have happened verified “scientifically.”
16 Such attempts to examine the “if” of history, albeit in different ways, can be found in Lebow (2010) and Tetlock, Lebow and Parker (2007).
uncover paths that were not taken, or ideas and thinking that are now forgotten but still exist under layers of history. By rereading these factors into the history of world politics, particularly those from the “non-West,” one can meaningfully break with the linear and teleological notions of history built into mainstream IR, and achieve meaningful integration without necessarily erecting separate histories and theories that are not compatible. The construction (or reconstruction) of IR theories based on plural forms of history is thus possible without necessarily fragmenting into Western and non-Western IR.17

3.3. Plural But Relational History of World Politics: The Case of Global History

Before concluding, however, there is one caveat that needs to be addressed: if the history of world politics is to be constructed in a plural and open-ended form, then how should we link different voices and experiences across time and space without necessarily depending on a singular, linear and teleological historical narrative? A similar concern is taken up by the advocates of non-Western IR theory (Acharya 2011), but as long as it sees the West and the non-West as distinct with the West currently dominating the disciplinary landscape, the dangers of it becoming a hegemonic battlefield remains.18 Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon’s (1999) seminal piece on “relationism,” which takes processes of social transaction as the basic building blocks of theory may provide us with some starting point, but here, the trajectories of global history will be examined to look for clues as to how this might be achieved.

The recent growth of global history as an approach to history, with a new academic publication Journal of Global History starting in 2006, is in one sense a response to or recognition of the fact that traditional studies of national or local history cannot adequately address global problems and issues that have emerged with the rise of globalisation. As Bruce Mazlish (1993, 1-2) puts it,

“This today, we find the signs of the times pointing to a new destination. Ours, to put it categorically, is an Age of Globalization. … These and other ‘signs’ require us to design a new perspective to guide our understanding of what is happening around us. A new consciousness is needed to help us view these developments along with other more traditional ones and to give meaning to them.”

Such efforts to produce histories that transcend national and cultural boundaries involves “the construction of meta-narratives that might, at one and the same time, deepen

17 Furthermore, in such future-oriented research, and acknowledging the double hermeneutical nature of research where the researcher, the theory, and everyday meanings cross over, the reflexive ability of the researcher becomes vital; as Patomaki (2002, 137-138) acknowledges, “It is at least as important that in making something actual (present), actors unite reasoning about the past and possible futures in terms of narratives. A social scientist, in his or her turn, tells stories and may thereby re-signify practices.” Such reflexivity will avoid efforts to include non-Western ideas and experiences in IR to merely be a legitimising discourse for great powers particularly in the “East.”

18 See also Hutchings (2011).
our understanding of diversities and scale up our consciousness of a human condition that has for millennia included global influences, and intermingled with local elements in all its essential dimensions” (O’Brien 2006, 38). As Pamela Crossley (2008, 4-5, emphasis added) writes,

“The conundrum that global history has set itself is how to tell a story without a center. It is not certain this can be done. The ultimate global history device, should it be realized, would not be text, or story arc, or an analytical concept. It would be more likely be a context spinner …. To spin sequentially a perspective of history centered on Ethiopia, or the pentatonic musical scale, or KIT chromosomal rearrangements, or interest rates would be desirable; to spin them simultaneously would be excellent; to have patterns extract themselves objectively from infinite simultaneous perspectives would be ideal. Unfortunately, language and narrative stay within the limits of grammar, vocabulary, and a unidirectional sense of time, and the moment of matching form and content has not yet arrived. Global historians are always working in suspense.”

How do global historians go about tackling such an immense task? Crossley (2008, 9) presents four narrative strategies or ideal types of global historical research that may provide some sense of direction on how IR theories may be redirected and reconstructed. First, “divergence” is the “narrative of things diversifying over time and space from a single origin.” An example of this is the grand story of humanity, tracing its origin to a single source. Second, “convergence” is the “narrative of different and widely spaced things necessarily assuming similarities over time.” This is best exemplified by Karl Marx’s notion of stages of history, where physical conditions of human social, economic and political life produce contradictions that lead to major transformative stages in historical development. Third, “contagion” denotes “narrative of things crossing boundaries and dramatically changing their dynamics at the same time.” The Spanish conquest of the Aztecs is a case in point, with disease playing a transformative role. And lastly, “systems” is the “narrative of interacting structures changing each other at the same time.” Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory highlights this systemic thinking. Following this category, the Westphalian narrative of European sovereign states and society of states spreading to the rest of the world may be categorised as “convergence.” As Patrick O’Brien (2006, 32-33) laments of the diminishing intellectual returns of eloquent scholarship that are concerned with the “necessary endeavour to ‘deconstruct’, ‘provincialize’, ‘fragment’, ‘proliferate’, ‘destabilize’ and ‘treat with incredulity’ any meta-narratives purporting to be global, on the grounds that they will be contaminated by Eurocentric exclusions, or based upon ways of representing the past derived from Western social science,” what we need is critical theoretical and empirical research that strengthens the plural but relational history of world politics, or to use Crossley’s category, effort towards understanding the “system” of world politics.
Conclusion: Towards a Plural Future of World Politics

The paper has argued that while recent debates on Western and non-Western IR have invited scholars to take a second look at the discipline’s Eurocentric foundations, it has not amounted to the full transformative movement that its proponents have hoped for due to its tendency to talk past dominant Western understandings. Particularly lacking is the absence of engagement with the linear and teleological notions of history built into mainstream, Western IR, in the form of a Westphalian historical narrative. In order to transcend this Western/non-Western dichotomy and to start to construct a more pluralistic understanding of world politics, the paper examined alternative views of history that is open to the future and which resists any interpretative closures. The implications of works by “critical historiographers” (Vaughan-Williams 2005), abandoning efforts of a grand narrative —either Westphalian or any other civilisational kind— was then connected to Hekki Patomaki’s (2002) iconic model to offer a theoretical approach that accommodates such plural notions of history. (Re)constructing multiple historical narratives and imagining plural futures, each reflecting experiences from both “West” and “non-West,” and connecting them without necessarily packaging those voices into a single historical story, it seems, is a more fruitful path of questioning the boundaries of IR.

References


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APPENDIX
PROGRAM

Day 1: 17 November, Saturday

09:30 – 10:00 Registration

OPENING 10:00 – 10:10
10:00 – 10:05 Opening Remarks
Norio Tanaka (Vice President, Ryukoku University)

10:05 – 10:10 Program Chair Address
Kosuke Shimizu (Director, Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University)

OPENING PANEL 10:10 – 11:35
Chair: Shoichi Matsumura (Ryukoku University)

10:10 – 10:55 Keynote Speech
Keynote Speaker: Lee Gunderson (University of British Columbia)
“Theorizing Multiculturalism: Modeling the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in School-Based Multicultural Settings”

10:55 – 11:35 Featured Speakers
10:55 – 11:15 Dennis Murphy Odo (Georgia State University)
“Unresolved Issues Surrounding the Role of Technology in Large and Small-Scale Literacy Assessment in Multicultural/Multilingual Contexts”

11:15 – 11:35 Reginald Arthur D’Silva (University of British Columbia)
“Social Inclusion and Exclusion in Multicultural Contexts: Vignettes from Studies with Asian EAL Learners in Elementary, Secondary and Post-Secondary Canadian Schools”

11:35 – 13:00 Lunch Break
## PANEL I
**13:00 – 14:45**

**WOMEN MOVING: MICRO-LEVEL CASE STUDIES OF MIGRANT WOMEN**

**Chair:** Aysun Uyar (Research Institute for Humanity and Nature)

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<tr>
<td>13:50 – 14:15</td>
<td>Mine Eder (Boğaziçi University)</td>
<td>“Living on the Edge Law, Economy and Gaze: Exclusion of Female Migrant Workers in Turkey”</td>
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**Discussants:** Pauline Kent (Ryukoku University)  
Chizuko Sato (Institute of Developing Economies)

## PANEL II
**15:15 – 17:35**

**LANGUAGE EDUCATION POLICY IN JAPAN: CRITICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES**

**Chair:** Hirofumi Wakita (Ryukoku University)

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<td>Toshinobu Nagamine (Prefectural University of Kumamoto)</td>
<td>“Preservice and Inservice EFL Teachers’ Perceptions of the New Language Education Policy to ‘Conduct Classes in English’ in Japanese Senior High Schools”</td>
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<td>15:55 – 16:15</td>
<td>Julian Chapple (Ryukoku University)</td>
<td>“Multiculturalism or ‘Ulterior-Culturalism’ in Japan”</td>
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<td>16:15 – 16:35</td>
<td>Soo im Lee (Ryukoku University)</td>
<td>“Japanese Learners’ Underlying Beliefs Affecting Foreign Language Learners’ Motivation: New Perspectives of Affective Factors Mechanism”</td>
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**Discussant:** Shoichi Matsumura (Ryukoku University)

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<td>18:30 – 20:30</td>
<td>Reception</td>
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**Day 2: 18 November, Sunday**

09:30 – 10:00  Registration

**OPENING**  10:00 – 10:05
10:00 – 10:05  Opening Remarks
   Koichi Yawata (Ryukoku University)

**KEYNOTE SPEECH**  10:05 – 11:30

Chair: William Bradley (Ryukoku University)
Keynote Speaker: Navnita Chadha Behera (University of Delhi)
   “Multiculturalism in Asia: Civilizational Ethos and Modern Practices”
Commentator: Giorgiandrea Shani (International Christian University)

11:30 – 13:00  Lunch Break

**PANEL III**  13:00 – 14:45
**QUESTIONING BOUNDARIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM EAST ASIA**

Chair: William Bradley (Ryukoku University)
13:00 – 13:25  Ching–Chang Chen (Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University)
   “Taiwan, Sino–Japanese Relations, and the Origins of the Senkaku Islands Dispute”
13:25 – 13:50  Young Chul Cho (O.P. Jindal Global University)
   “Pitfalls of Seeking a Universalist National School of IR: The Case of South Korea”
13:50 – 14:15  Hiroaki Ataka (Ritsumeikan University)
   “Unthinking the Westphalian Narrative: Towards a Plural Future of World Politics”
Discussant: Hiroyuki Tosa (Kobe University)

**ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION**  15:15 – 17:00
Chair: Junya Takiguchi (Ryukoku University)
   Hirofumi Wakita (Ryukoku University)

17:00 – 17:15  Closing Remarks
   Kosuke Shimizu (Ryukoku University)
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

The Second Afrasian International Symposium
Afrasian Research Centre
Ryukoku University

William Bradley
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Pauline Kent
Shoichi Matsumura
Masako Otaki
Shincha Park
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Mika Shimada
Sou Sakurai
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